Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of Legal Personality

Chesterman, Simon, (August 28, 2020). 

Forthcoming in 

International & Comparative Law Quarterly

NUS Law Working Paper No. 2020/025

SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682372

Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become more sophisticated and play a larger role in society, arguments that they should have some form of legal personality gain credence. It has been suggested that this will fill an accountability gap created by the speed, autonomy, and opacity of AI. In addition, a growing body of literature considers the possibility of AI systems owning the intellectual property that they create. The arguments are typically framed in instrumental terms, with comparisons to juridical persons such as corporations. Implicit in those arguments, or explicit in their illustrations and examples, is the idea that as AI systems approach the point of indistinguishability from humans they should be entitled to a status comparable to natural persons. This article contends that although most legal systems could create a novel category of legal persons, such arguments are insufficient to show that they should.

An approach for combining ethical principles with public opinion to guide public policy

E. Awad and others.
Artificial Intelligence
Volume 287, October 2020, 103349

Abstract

We propose a framework for incorporating public opinion into policy making in situations where values are in conflict. This framework advocates creating vignettes representing value choices, eliciting the public's opinion on these choices, and using machine learning to extract principles that can serve as succinct statements of the policies implied by these choices and rules to guide the behavior of autonomous systems.

From the Discussion

In the general case, we would strongly recommend input from experts (including ethicists, legal scholars, policymakers among others). Still, two facts remain: (1) views on life and death are emotionally driven, so it’s hard for people to accept some authority figure telling them how they should behave; (2) Even from an ethical perspective, it’s not always clear which view is the correct one. In such cases, when policy experts cannot reach a consensus, they may use citizens’ preferences as a tie-breaker. Doing so, helps reach a conclusive decision, it promotes values of democracy, it increases public acceptance of this technology (especially when it provides much better safety), and it promotes their sense of involvement and citizenship.  On the other hand, a full dependence on public input would always have the possibility for tyranny of the majority, among other issues raised above. This is why our proposed method provides a suitable approach that combines the utilization of citizen’s input with the responsible oversight by experts.

In this paper, we propose a framework that can help resolve conflicting moral values. In so doing, we exploit two decades of research in the representation and abstraction of values from cases in the service of abstracting and representing the values expressed in crowd-sourced data to the end of informing public policy. As a results, the resolution of competing values is produced in two forms: one that can be implemented in autonomous systems to guide their behavior, and a human-readable representation (policy) of these rules. At the core of this framework, is the collection of data from the
public.

Professional Psychology: Collection Agencies, Confidentiality, Records, Treatment, and Staff Supervision in New Jersey

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4975-17T3

In the Matter of the Suspension or Revocation of the License of L. Barry Helfmann, Psy.D.

Here are two excerpts:

The complaint included five counts. It alleged Dr. Helfmann failed to do the following: take reasonable measures to protect confidentiality of the Partnership's patients' private health information; maintain permanent records that accurately reflected patient contact for treatment purposes; maintain records of professional quality; timely release records requested by a patient; and properly instruct and supervise temporary staff concerning patient confidentiality and record maintenance. The Attorney General sought sanctions under the UEA.

(cut)

The regulation is clear. The doctor's argument to the contrary, that a psychologist could somehow confuse his collection attorney with a patient's authorized representative, is refuted by the regulation's plain language as well as consideration of its entire context. The doctor's argument is without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

We find nothing arbitrary about the Board's rejection of Dr. Helfmann's argument that he violated no rule or regulation because he relied on the advice of counsel in providing the Partnership's collection attorney with patients' confidential information. His assertion is contrary to the sworn testimony of the collection attorney who was deposed, as distinguished from another collection attorney with whom the doctor spoke in the distant past. The latter attorney's purported statement that confidential information might be necessary to resolve a patient's outstanding fee does not consider, let alone resolve, the propriety of a psychologist releasing such information in the face of clear statutory and regulatory prohibitions.

The Board found that Dr. Helfmann, not his collection attorneys, was charged with the professional responsibility of preserving his patients' confidential information. Perhaps the doctor's argument that he relied on the advice of counsel would have had greater appeal had he asked for a legal opinion on providing confidential patient information to collection attorneys in view of the psychologist-patient privilege and a specific regulatory prohibition against doing so absent a statutory or traditional exception. That the Board found unpersuasive Dr. Helfmann's hearsay testimony about what attorneys told him years ago is hardly arbitrary and capricious, considering the Partnership's current collection attorney's testimony and Dr. Helfmann's statutory and regulatory obligations to preserve confidentiality.

The decision is here.

Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment

Gregg D. Caruso (2020)
Neuroethics ​13(1): 13-28.

Abstract

Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished. A number of sentencing guidelines in the U.S. have adopted desert as their distributive principle, and it is increasingly given deference in the “purposes” section of state criminal codes, where it can be the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code’s provisions. Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the Model Penal Code so as to set desert as the official dominate principle for sentencing. And courts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety of contexts, as with the Supreme Court’s enthroning retributivism as the “primary justification for the death penalty.” While retributivism provides one of the main sources of justification for punishment within the criminal justice system, there are good philosophical and practical reasons for rejecting it. One such reason is that it is unclear that agents truly deserve to suffer for the wrongs they have done in the sense required by retributivism. In the first section, I explore the retributivist justification of punishment and explain why it is inconsistent with free will skepticism. In the second section, I then argue that even if one is not convinced by the arguments for free will skepticism, there remains a strong epistemic argument against causing harm on retributivist grounds that undermines both libertarian and compatibilist attempts to justify it. I maintain that this argument provides sufficient reason for rejecting the retributive justification of criminal punishment. I conclude in the third section by briefly sketching my public health-quarantine model, a non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. I argue that the model is not only consistent with free will skepticism and the epistemic argument against retributivism, it also provides the most justified, humane, and effective way of dealing with criminal behavior.

The info is here.

Burr moves to quell fallout from stock sales with request for Ethics probe

Jack Brewster
politico.com
Originally posted 20 March 20

Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) on Friday asked the Senate Ethics Committee to review stock sales he made weeks before the markets began to tank in response to the coronavirus pandemic — a move designed to limit the fallout from an intensifying political crisis.

Burr, who chairs the powerful Senate Intelligence Committee, defended the sales, saying he “relied solely on public news reports to guide my decision regarding the sale of stocks" and disputed the notion he used information that he was privy to during classified briefings on the novel coronavirus. Burr specifically name-checked CNBC’s daily health and science reporting from its Asia bureau.

“Understanding the assumption many could make in hindsight however, I spoke this morning with the chairman of the Senate Ethics Committee and asked him to open a complete review of the matter with full transparency,” Burr said in a statement.

Burr, who is retiring at the end of 2022, has faced calls to resign from across the ideological spectrum since ProPublica reported Thursday that he dumped between $628,000 and $1.72 million of his holdings on Feb. 13 in 33 different transactions — a week before the stock market began plummeting amid fears of the coronavirus spreading in the U.S.

The info is here.

When Medical Debt Collectors Decide Who Gets Arrested

Lizzie Presser

Propublica.org
Originally posted 16 Oct 19

Here is an excerpt:

Across the country, thousands of people are jailed each year for failing to appear in court for unpaid bills, in arrangements set up much like this one. The practice spread in the wake of the recession as collectors found judges willing to use their broad powers of contempt to wield the threat of arrest. Judges have issued warrants for people who owe money to landlords and payday lenders, who never paid off furniture, or day care fees, or federal student loans. Some debtors who have been arrested owed as little as $28.

More than half of the debt in collections stems from medical care, which, unlike most other debt, is often taken on without a choice or an understanding of the costs. Since the Affordable Care Act of 2010, prices for medical services have ballooned; insurers have nearly tripled deductibles — the amount a person pays before their coverage kicks in — and raised premiums and copays, as well. As a result, tens of millions of people without adequate coverage are expected to pay larger portions of their rising bills.

The sickest patients are often the most indebted, and they’re not exempt from arrest. In Indiana, a cancer patient was hauled away from home in her pajamas in front of her three children; too weak to climb the stairs to the women’s area of the jail, she spent the night in a men’s mental health unit where an inmate smeared feces on the wall. In Utah, a man who had ignored orders to appear over an unpaid ambulance bill told friends he would rather die than go to jail; the day he was arrested, he snuck poison into the cell and ended his life.

The info is here.

Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law

Murphy, Colleen
Law and Philosophy,
Vol. 24, 2005.
Available at SSRN

It is often argued that the rule of law is only instrumentally morally valuable, valuable when and to the extent that a legal system is used to purse morally valuable ends. In this paper, I defend Lon Fuller’s view that the rule of law has conditional non-instrumental as well as instrumental moral value. I argue, along Fullerian lines, that the rule of law is conditionally non-instrumentally valuable in virtue of the way a legal system structures political relationships. The rule of law specifies a set of requirements which lawmakers must respect if they are to govern legally. As such, the rule of law restricts the illegal or extra-legal use of power. When a society rules by law, there are clear rules articulating the behavior appropriate for citizens and officials. Such rules ideally determine the particular contours political relationships will take. When the requirements of the rule of law are respected, the political relationships structured by the legal system constitutively express the moral values of reciprocity and respect for autonomy. The rule of law is instrumentally valuable, I argue, because in practice the rule of law limits the kind of injustice which governments pursue. There is in practice a deeper connection between ruling by law and the pursuit of moral ends than advocates
of the standard view recognize.

The next part of this paper outlines Lon Fuller’s conception of the rule of law and his explanation of its moral value. The third section illustrates how the Fullerian analysis draws attention to the impact that state-sanctioned atrocities can have upon the institutional functioning of the legal system, and so to their impact on the relationships between officials and citizens that are structured by that institution. The fourth section considers two objections to this account. According to the first, Razian objection, while the Fullerian analysis accurately describes the nature of the requirements of the rule of law, it offers a mistaken account of its moral value. Against my assertion that the rule of law has non-instrumental value, this objection argues that the rule of law is only instrumentally valuable. The second objection grants that the rule of law has non-instrumental moral value but claims that the Fullerian account of the requirements of the rule of law is incomplete.

American Psychological Association Calls for Immediate Halt to Sharing Immigrant Youths' Confidential Psychotherapy Notes with ICE

American Psychological Association
Press Release
Released 17 Feb 20

The American Psychological Association expressed shock and outrage that the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement has been sharing confidential psychotherapy notes with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to deny asylum to some immigrant youths.

“ORR’s sharing of confidential therapy notes of traumatized children destroys the bond of trust between patient and therapist that is vital to helping the patient,” said APA President Sandra L. Shullman, PhD. “We call on ORR to stop this practice immediately and on the Department of Health and Human Services and Congress to investigate its prevalence. We also call on ICE to release any immigrants who have had their asylum requests denied as a result.”

APA was reacting to a report in The Washington Post focused largely on the case of then-17-year-old Kevin Euceda, an asylum-seeker from Honduras whose request for asylum was granted by a judge, only to have it overturned when lawyers from ICE revealed information he had given in confidence to a therapist at a U.S. government shelter. According to the article, other unaccompanied minors have been similarly detained as a result of ICE’s use of confidential psychotherapy notes. These situations have also been confirmed by congressional testimony since 2018.

Unaccompanied minors who are detained in U.S. shelters are required to undergo therapy, ostensibly to help them deal with trauma and other issues arising from leaving their home countries. According to the Post, ORR entered into a formal memorandum of agreement with ICE in April 2018 to share details about children in its care. The then-head of ORR testified before Congress that the agency would be asking its therapists to “develop additional information” about children during “weekly counseling sessions where they may self-disclose previous gang or criminal activity to their assigned clinician,” the newspaper reported. The agency added two requirements to its public handbook: that arriving children be informed that while it was essential to be honest with staff, self-disclosures could affect their release and that if a minor mentioned anything having to do with gangs or drug dealing, therapists would file a report within four hours to be passed to ICE within one day, the Post said.

"For this administration to weaponize these therapy sessions by ordering that the psychotherapy notes be passed to ICE is appalling,” Shullman added. “These children have already experienced some unimaginable traumas. Plus, these are scared minors who may not understand that speaking truthfully to therapists about gangs and drugs – possibly the reasons they left home – would be used against them.”

Groundbreaking Court Ruling Against Insurer Offers Hope in 2020

Katherine G. Kennedy
Psychiatric News
Originally posted 9 Jan 20

Here is an excerpt:

In his 106-page opinion, Judge Spero criticized UBH for using flawed, internally developed, and overly restrictive medical necessity guidelines that favored protecting the financial interests of UBH over medical treatment of its members.

“By a preponderance of the evidence,” Judge Spero wrote, “in each version of the Guidelines at issue in this case the defect is pervasive and results in a significantly narrower scope of coverage than is consistent with generally accepted standards of care.” His full decision can be accessed here.

As of this writing, we are still awaiting Judge Spero’s remedies order (a court-ordered directive that requires specific actions, such as reparations) against UBH. Following that determination, we will know what UBH will be required to do to compensate class members who suffered damages (that is, protracted illness or death) or their beneficiaries as a result of UBH’s denial of their coverage claims.

But waiting for the remedies order does not prevent us from looking for answers to critical questions like these:

• Will Wit. v. UBH impact the insurance industry enough to catalyze widespread reforms in how utilization review guidelines are determined and used?

• How will the 50 offices of state insurance commissioners respond? Will these regulators mandate the use of clinical coverage guidelines that reflect the findings in Wit. v. UBH? Will they tighten their oversight with updated regulations and enforcement actions?

The info is here.

Chinese court sentences 'gene-editing' scientist to three years in prison

Huizhong Wu and Lusha Zhan
kfgo.com
Originally posted 29 Dec 19

A Chinese court sentenced the scientist who created the world's first "gene-edited" babies to three years in prison on Monday for illegally practising medicine and violating research regulations, the official Xinhua news agency said.

In November 2018, He Jiankui, then an associate professor at Southern University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen, said he had used gene-editing technology known as CRISPR-Cas9 to change the genes of twin girls to protect them from getting infected with the AIDS virus in the future.

The backlash in China and globally about the ethics of his research and work was fast and widespread.

Xinhua said He and his collaborators forged ethical review materials and recruited men with AIDS who were part of a couple to carry out the gene-editing. His experiments, it said, resulted in two women giving birth to three gene-edited babies.

The court also handed lesser sentences to Zhang Renli and Qin Jinzhou, who worked at two unnamed medical institutions, for having conspired with He in his work.

The info is here.

A Right to a Human Decision

Aziz Z. Huq
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 713

Abstract

Recent advances in computational technologies have spurred anxiety about a shift of power from human to machine decision-makers. From prison sentences to loan approvals to college applications, corporate and state actors increasingly lean on machine learning tools (a subset of artificial intelligence) to allocate goods and to assign coercion. Machine-learning tools are perceived to be eclipsing, even extinguishing, human agency in ways that sacrifice important individual interests. An emerging legal response to such worries is a right to a human decision. European law has already embraced the idea in the General Data Protection Regulation. American law, especially in the criminal justice domain, is already moving in the same direction. But no jurisdiction has defined with precision what that right entails, or furnished a clear justification for its creation.


This Article investigates the legal possibilities of a right to a human decision. I first define the conditions of technological plausibility for that right as applied against state action. To understand its technological predicates, I specify the margins along which machine decisions are distinct from human ones. Such technological contextualization enables a nuanced exploration of why, or indeed whether, the gaps that do separate human and machine decisions might have normative import. Based on this technological accounting, I then analyze the normative stakes of a right to a human decision. I consider three potential normative justifications: (a) an appeal to individual interests to participation and reason-giving; (b) worries about the insufficiently reasoned or individuated quality of state action; and (c) arguments based on negative externalities. A careful analysis of these three grounds suggests that there is no general justification for adopting a right to a human decision by the state. Normative concerns about insufficiently reasoned or accurate decisions, which have a particularly powerful hold on the legal imagination, are best addressed in other ways. Similarly, concerns about the ways that algorithmic tools create asymmetries of social power are not parried by a right to a human decision. Indeed, rather than firmly supporting a right to a human decision, available evidence tentatively points toward a countervailing ‘right to a well-calibrated machine decision’ as ultimately more normatively well- grounded.

The paper can be downloaded here.

How should we balance morality and the law?

Peter Koch
BCM Blogs
Originally posted 20 Dec 19

I was recently discussing a clinical case with medical students and physicians that involved balancing murky ethical issues and relevant laws. One participant leaned back and said: “Well, if we know the laws, then that’s the end of the story!”

The laws were clear about what ought to (legally) be done, but following the laws in this case would likely produce a bad outcome. We ended up divided about how to proceed with the case, but this discussion raised a bigger question: Exactly how much should we weigh the law in moral deliberations?

The basic distinction between the legal and moral is easy enough to identify. Most people agree that what is legal is not necessarily moral and what is immoral should not necessarily be illegal.

Slavery in the U.S. is commonly used as an example. “Of course,” a good modern citizen will say, “slavery was wrong even when it was legal.” The passing of the 13 amendment did not make slavery morally wrong; it was wrong already, and the legal structures finally caught up to the moral structures.

There are plenty of acts that are immoral but that should not be illegal. For example, perhaps it is immoral to gossip about your friend’s personal life, but most would agree that this sort of gossip should not be outlawed. The basic distinction between the legal and the moral appears to be simple enough.

Things get trickier, though, when we press more deeply into the matter.

The blog post is here.

Pa. prison psychologist loses license after 3 ‘preventable and foreseeable’ suicides

Samantha Melamed
inquirer.com
Originally posted 4 Dec 19

Nearly a decade after a 1½-year stretch during which three prisoners at State Correctional Institution Cresson died by suicide and 17 others attempted it, the Pennsylvania Board of Psychology has revoked the license of the psychologist then in charge at the now-shuttered prison in Cambria County and imposed $17,233 in investigation costs.

An order filed Tuesday said the suicides were foreseeable and preventable and castigated the psychologist, James Harrington, for abdicating his ethical responsibility to intervene when mentally ill prisoners were kept in inhumane conditions — including solitary confinement — and were prevented from leaving their cells for treatment.

Harrington still holds an administrative position with the Department of Corrections, with an annual salary of $107,052.

The info is here.

The Big Change Coming to Just About Every Website on New Year’s Day

Aaron Mak
Slate.com
Originally published 30 Dec 19

Starting New Year’s Day, you may notice a small but momentous change to the websites you visit: a button or link, probably at the bottom of the page, reading “Do Not Sell My Personal Information.”

The change is one of many going into effect Jan. 1, 2020, thanks to a sweeping new data privacy law known as the California Consumer Privacy Act. The California law essentially empowers consumers to access the personal data that companies have collected on them, to demand that it be deleted, and to prevent it from being sold to third parties. Since it’s a lot more work to create a separate infrastructure just for California residents to opt out of the data collection industry, these requirements will transform the internet for everyone.

Ahead of the January deadline, tech companies are scrambling to update their privacy policies and figure out how to comply with the complex requirements. The CCPA will only apply to businesses that earn more than $25 million in gross revenue, that collect data on more than 50,000 people, or for which selling consumer data accounts for more than 50 percent of revenue. The companies that meet these qualifications are expected to collectively spend a total of $55 billion upfront to meet the new standards, in addition to $16 billion over the next decade. Major tech firms have already added a number of user features over the past few months in preparation. In early December, Twitter rolled out a privacy center where users can learn more about the company’s approach to the CCPA and navigate to a dashboard for customizing the types of info that the platform is allowed to use for ad targeting. Google has also created a protocol that blocks websites from transmitting data to the company, which users can take advantage of by downloading an opt-out add-on. Facebook, meanwhile, is arguing that it does not need to change anything because it does not technically “sell” personal information. Companies must at least set up a webpage and a toll-free phone number for fielding data requests.

The info is here.

DNA genealogical databases are a gold mine for police, but with few rules and little transparency

Paige St. John

The LA Times

Originally posted 24 Nov 19

Here is an excerpt:

But law enforcement has plunged into this new world with little to no rules or oversight, intense secrecy and by forming unusual alliances with private companies that collect the DNA, often from people interested not in helping close cold cases but learning their ethnic origins and ancestry.

A Times investigation found:

• There is no uniform approach for when detectives turn to genealogical databases to solve cases. In some departments, they are to be used only as a last resort. Others are putting them at the center of their investigative process. Some, like Orlando, have no policies at all.

• When DNA services were used, law enforcement generally declined to provide details to the public, including which companies detectives got the match from. The secrecy made it difficult to understand the extent to which privacy was invaded, how many people came under investigation, and what false leads were generated.

• California prosecutors collaborated with a Texas genealogy company at the outset of what became a $2-million campaign to spotlight the heinous crimes they can solve with consumer DNA. Their goal is to encourage more people to make their DNA available to police matching.

There are growing concerns that the race to use genealogical databases will have serious consequences, from its inherent erosion of privacy to the implications of broadened police power.

In California, an innocent twin was thrown in jail. In Georgia, a mother was deceived into incriminating her son. In Texas, police met search guidelines by classifying a case as sexual assault but after an arrest only filed charges of burglary. And in the county that started the DNA race with the arrest of the Golden State killer suspect, prosecutors have persuaded a judge to treat unsuspecting genetic contributors as “confidential informants” and seal searches so consumers are not scared away from adding their own DNA to the forensic stockpile.

The info is here.

Holding Insurers Accountable for Parity in Coverage of Mental Health Treatment.

Paul S. Appelbaum and Joseph Parks
Psychiatric Services 
Originally posted 14 Nov 19

Despite a series of federal laws aimed at ensuring parity in insurance coverage of treatment for mental health and general health conditions, patients with mental disorders continue to face discrimination by insurers. This inequity is often due to overly restrictive utilization review criteria that fail to conform to accepted professional standards.

A recent class action challenge to the practices of the largest U.S. health insurer may represent an important step forward in judicial enforcement of parity laws.

Rejecting the insurer’s guidelines for coverage determinations as inconsistent with usual practices, the court enunciated eight principles that defined accepted standards of care.

In 2013, Natasha Wit, then 17 years old, was admitted to Monte Nido Vista, a residential treatment facility in California for women with eating disorders. At the time, she was said to be suffering from a severe eating disorder, with medical complications that included amenorrhea, adrenal and thyroid problems, vitamin deficiency, and gastrointestinal symptoms. She was also reported to be experiencing symptoms of depression and anxiety, obsessive-compulsive behaviors, and marked social isolation. Four days after admission, her insurer, United Behavioral Health (UBH), denied coverage for her stay on the basis that her “treatment does not meet the medical necessity criteria for residential mental health treatment per UBH Level of Care Guidelines for Residential Mental Health.” The reviewer suggested that she could safely be treated at a less restrictive level of care (1).

Ms. Wit’s difficulty in obtaining coverage from her health insurer for care that she and her treaters believed was medically necessary differed in only one respect from the similar experiences of thousands of patients around the country: her family was able to pay for the 2 months of residential treatment that UBH refused to cover.

The info is here.

Neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom: a review.

Aono, D., Yaffe, G. & Kober, H.
Cogn. Research 4, 40 (2019)
doi:10.1186/s41235-019-0179-y

Abstract

The use of neuroscience in the courtroom can be traced back to the early twentieth century. However, the use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal proceedings has increased significantly over the last two decades. This rapid increase has raised questions, among the media as well as the legal and scientific communities, regarding the effects that such evidence could have on legal decision makers. In this article, we first outline the history of neuroscientific evidence in courtrooms and then we provide a review of recent research investigating the effects of neuroscientific evidence on decision-making broadly, and on legal decisions specifically. In the latter case, we review studies that measure the effect of neuroscientific evidence (both imaging and nonimaging) on verdicts, sentencing recommendations, and beliefs of mock jurors and judges presented with a criminal case. Overall, the reviewed studies suggest mitigating effects of neuroscientific evidence on some legal decisions (e.g., the death penalty). Furthermore, factors such as mental disorder diagnoses and perceived dangerousness might moderate the mitigating effect of such evidence. Importantly, neuroscientific evidence that includes images of the brain does not appear to have an especially persuasive effect (compared with other neuroscientific evidence that does not include an image). Future directions for research are discussed, with a specific call for studies that vary defendant characteristics, the nature of the crime, and a juror’s perception of the defendant, in order to better understand the roles of moderating factors and cognitive mediators of persuasion.

Significance

The increased use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal proceedings has led some to wonder what effects such evidence has on legal decision makers (e.g., jurors and judges) who may be unfamiliar with neuroscience. There is some concern that legal decision makers may be unduly influenced by testimony and images related to the defendant’s brain. This paper briefly reviews the history of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom to provide context for its current use. It then reviews the current research examining the influence of neuroscientific evidence on legal decision makers and potential moderators of such effects. Our synthesis of the findings suggests that neuroscientific evidence has some mitigating effects on legal decisions, although neuroimaging-based evidence does not hold any special persuasive power. With this in mind, we provide recommendations for future research in this area. Our review and conclusions have implications for scientists, legal scholars, judges, and jurors, who could all benefit from understanding the influence of neuroscientific evidence on judgments in criminal cases.

A Fake Psychologist Treated Troubled Children, Prosecutors Say

Fake Credentials on LinkedIn Page

Michal Gold
The New York Times
Originally published September 29, 2019

Here is an excerpt:

But Mr. Payne has no formal counseling training that prosecutors were aware of. He told investigators that he was a doctor with a “home-schooled, unconventional education during the Black Panther era,” according to court papers.

None of Mr. Payne’s patients had been hospitalized or physically harmed, an official said. Some of his patients liked him and his treatment methods.

But others became suspicious during therapy sessions. Mr. Payne would often talk about his own life and not ask patients about theirs, the official said. He would also repeat exercises and worksheets in some of his sessions with little explanation, giving patients the sense that he had run out of ideas to treat them.

According to prosecutors, Mr. Payne and Ms. Tobierre-Desir worked at three locations: his main office in a large building in Brooklyn Heights, a smaller building in Prospect-Lefferts Gardens and the offices of a nonprofit based at Kings County Hospital Center, one of the hospitals with which Mr. Payne claimed to be affiliated.

Mr. Payne’s relationship with the nonprofit, the Kings Against Violence Initiative, was unclear. The group did not respond to requests for comment on Friday.

The info is here.

The brain, the criminal and the courts

Eryn Brown
knowablemagazine.org
Originally posted August 30, 2019

Here is an excerpt:

It remains to be seen if all this research will yield actionable results. In 2018, Hoffman, who has been a leader in neurolaw research, wrote a paper discussing potential breakthroughs and dividing them into three categories: near term, long term and “never happening.” He predicted that neuroscientists are likely to improve existing tools for chronic pain detection in the near future, and in the next 10 to 50 years he believes they’ll reliably be able to detect memories and lies, and to determine brain maturity.

But brain science will never gain a full understanding of addiction, he suggested, or lead courts to abandon notions of responsibility or free will (a prospect that gives many philosophers and legal scholars pause).

Many realize that no matter how good neuroscientists get at teasing out the links between brain biology and human behavior, applying neuroscientific evidence to the law will always be tricky. One concern is that brain studies ordered after the fact may not shed light on a defendant’s motivations and behavior at the time a crime was committed — which is what matters in court. Another concern is that studies of how an average brain works do not always provide reliable information on how a specific individual’s brain works.

“The most important question is whether the evidence is legally relevant. That is, does it help answer a precise legal question?” says Stephen J. Morse, a scholar of law and psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania. He is in the camp who believe that neuroscience will never revolutionize the law, because “actions speak louder than images,” and that in a legal setting, “if there is a disjunct between what the neuroscience shows and what the behavior shows, you’ve got to believe the behavior.” He worries about the prospect of “neurohype,” and attorneys who overstate the scientific evidence.

The info is here.

DC Physician Indicted for Almost $13M in Medicare Fraud

Ken Terry
MedScape.com
Originally posted August 9, 2019

A physician who has a practice in the District of Columbia has been charged with participation in an alleged $12.7 million healthcare fraud scheme that involved submitting false claims to Medicare for complicated procedures that were never performed, according to a Department of Justice (DOJ) news release.

In an indictment filed July 30 in the District of Columbia, physiatrist Frederick Gooding, MD, aged 68, of Wilmington, Delaware, was charged with 11 counts of healthcare fraud. He was arrested on August 1.

According to the indictment, from January 2015 to August 2018, Gooding participated in a healthcare fraud scheme in which he submitted Medicare claims for injections and aspirations that were not medically necessary, not provided, or both.

Gooding allegedly knew that the injections were not provided. To disguise his scheme, he allegedly falsified medical documents to make it appear as if the purported medical services billed to Medicare were medically necessary.

The info  is here.