Emotional and Cognitive “Route” in Decision-Making Process: The Relationship between Executive Functions, Psychophysiological Correlates, Decisional Styles, and Personality

Crivelli, D., Acconito, C., & Balconi, M. (2024).

Brain sciences, 14(7), 734.

https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci14070734

Abstract

Studies on decision-making have classically focused exclusively on its cognitive component. Recent research has shown that a further essential component of decisional processes is the emotional one. Indeed, the emotional route in decision-making plays a crucial role, especially in situations characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk. Despite that, individual differences concerning such components and their associations with individual traits, decisional styles, and psychophysiological profiles are still understudied. This pilot study aimed at investigating the relationship between individual propensity toward using an emotional or cognitive information-processing route in decision-making, EEG and autonomic correlates of the decisional performance as collected via wearable non-invasive devices, and individual personality and decisional traits. Participants completed a novel task based on realistic decisional scenarios while their physiological activity (EEG and autonomic indices) was monitored. Self-report questionnaires were used to collect data on personality traits, individual differences, and decisional styles. Data analyses highlighted two main findings. Firstly, different personality traits and decisional styles showed significant and specific correlations, with an individual propensity toward either emotional or cognitive information processing for decision-making. Secondly, task-related EEG and autonomic measures presented a specific and distinct correlation pattern with different decisional styles, maximization traits, and personality traits, suggesting different latent profiles.

Here are some thoughts:

This research is critically important to practicing psychologists as it provides a more holistic and physiologically-grounded framework for understanding and assessing decision-making in real-world contexts. By demonstrating how specific personality traits and decision-making styles are linked to measurable psychophysiological markers—such as theta and beta EEG activity and heart rate variability—the study equips clinicians with objective biomarkers that can complement traditional self-report assessments. This integration allows for a more nuanced evaluation of clients' decision-making processes, which are often central to therapeutic outcomes in areas such as stress management, impulse control, and adaptive behavior change.

Furthermore, the findings validate the dual role of emotional and cognitive routes in decision-making, emphasizing that effective emotional regulation and mindfulness traits are associated with a balanced decision-making style. For psychologists, this underscores the importance of interventions that enhance emotional awareness and cognitive flexibility, particularly for clients who exhibit avoidant or dependent decision-making patterns. The use of wearable, non-invasive devices in the study also highlights the growing potential for incorporating accessible neurofeedback and biofeedback tools into therapeutic practice, enabling more personalized and evidence-based approaches to fostering healthier decision-making habits in everyday life.

Meaningful Psychedelic Experiences Predict Increased Moral Expansiveness

Olteanu, W., & Moreton, S. G. (2025).

Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 1–9.

https://doi.org/10.1080/02791072.2025.2478095

Abstract

There has been growing interest in understanding the psychological effects of psychedelic experiences, including their potential to catalyze significant shifts in moral cognition. This retrospective study examines how meaningful psychedelic experiences are related to changes in moral expansiveness and investigates the role of acute subjective effects as predictors of these changes. We found that meaningful psychedelic experiences were associated with self-reported increases in moral expansiveness. Changes in moral expansiveness were positively correlated with reported mystical experiences, ego dissolution, as well as feeling moved and admiration during the experience. Additionally, heightened moral expansiveness was associated with longer term shifts in the propensity to experience the self-transcendent positive emotions of admiration and awe. Future research should further investigate the mechanisms underlying these changes and explore how different types of psychedelic experiences might influence moral decision-making and behavior over time.

Here are some thoughts:

This article explores the relationship between psychedelic experiences and shifts in moral cognition, specifically moral expansiveness—the extent to individuals extend moral concern to a broader range of entities, including humans, animals, and nature. The study found that meaningful psychedelic experiences were associated with self-reported increases in moral expansiveness, with these changes linked to acute subjective effects such as mystical experiences, ego dissolution, and self-transcendent emotions like admiration and awe. The research suggests that psychedelics may facilitate profound shifts in moral attitudes by fostering feelings of interconnectedness and unity, which endure beyond the experience itself.

This study is important for practicing psychologists as it highlights the potential therapeutic and transformative effects of psychedelics on moral and ethical perspectives. Understanding these mechanisms can inform therapeutic approaches, particularly for clients struggling with rigid moral boundaries, lack of empathy, or disconnection from others and the environment. The findings also underscore the role of self-transcendent emotions in promoting prosocial behaviors and well-being, offering insights into interventions that could cultivate such emotions. However, psychologists must approach this area cautiously, considering the legal and ethical implications of psychedelic use, and remain informed about emerging research to guide clients responsibly. The study opens avenues for further exploration into how psychedelic-assisted therapy might address moral and relational challenges in clinical practice.

Emotion recognition using wireless signals.

Zhao, M., Adib, F., & Katabi, D. (2018).

Communications of the ACM, 61(9), 91–100.

https://doi.org/10.1145/3236621

Abstract

This paper demonstrates a new technology that can infer a person's emotions from RF signals reflected off his body. EQ-Radio transmits an RF signal and analyzes its reflections off a person's body to recognize his emotional state (happy, sad, etc.). The key enabler underlying EQ-Radio is a new algorithm for extracting the individual heartbeats from the wireless signal at an accuracy comparable to on-body ECG monitors. The resulting beats are then used to compute emotion-dependent features which feed a machine-learning emotion classifier. We describe the design and implementation of EQ-Radio, and demonstrate through a user study that its emotion recognition accuracy is on par with state-of-the-art emotion recognition systems that require a person to be hooked to an ECG monitor.

Here are some thoughts:

First, if you are prone to paranoia, please stop here.

The research introduces EQ-Radio, a system developed by MIT CSAIL that uses wireless signals to detect and classify human emotions such as happiness, sadness, anger, and excitement. By analyzing subtle changes in heart rate and breathing patterns through radio frequency reflections, EQ-Radio achieves 87% accuracy in emotion classification without requiring subjects to wear sensors or act emotionally. This non-invasive, privacy-preserving method outperforms video- and audio-based emotion recognition systems and works even when people are moving or located in different rooms.

Neural Processes Linking Interoception to Moral Preferences Aligned with Group Consensus

Kim, J., & Kim, H. (2025).

Journal of Neuroscience, e1114242025.

https://doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.1114-24.2025

Abstract

Aligning one’s decisions with the prevailing norms and expectations of those around us constitutes a fundamental facet of moral decision-making. When faced with conflicting moral values, one adaptive approach is to rely on intuitive moral preference. While there has been theoretical speculation about the connection between moral preference and an individual’s awareness of introspective interoceptive signals, it has not been empirically examined. This study examines the relationships between individuals’ preferences in moral dilemmas and interoception, measured with self-report, heartbeat detection task, and resting-state fMRI. Two independent experiments demonstrate that both male and female participants’ interoceptive awareness and accuracy are associated with their moral preferences aligned with group consensus. In addition, the fractional occupancies of the brain states involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the precuneus during rest mediate the link between interoceptive awareness and the degree of moral preferences aligned to group consensus. These findings provide empirical evidence of the neural mechanism underlying the link between interoception and moral preferences aligned with group consensus.

Significance statement

We investigate the intricate link between interoceptive ability to perceive internal bodily signals and decision-making when faced with moral dilemmas. Our findings reveal a significant correlation between the accuracy and awareness of interoceptive signals and the degree of moral preferences aligned with group consensus. Additionally, brain states involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and precuneus during rest mediate the link between interoceptive awareness and moral preferences aligned with group consensus. These findings provide empirical evidence that internal bodily signals play a critical role in shaping our moral intuitions according to others’ expectations across various social contexts.

Here are some thoughts:

A recent study highlighted that our moral decisions may be influenced by our body's internal signals, particularly our heartbeat. Researchers found that individuals who could accurately perceive their own heartbeats tended to make moral choices aligning with the majority, regardless of whether those choices were utilitarian or deontological. This implies that bodily awareness might unconsciously guide us toward socially accepted norms. Brain scans supported this, showing increased activity in areas associated with evaluation and judgment, like the medial prefrontal cortex, in those more attuned to their internal signals. While the study's participants were exclusively Korean college students, limiting generalizability, the findings open up intriguing possibilities about the interplay between bodily awareness and moral decision-making.

Emotional and Cognitive “Route” in Decision-Making Process: The Relationship between Executive Functions, Psychophysiological Correlates, Decisional Styles, and Personality

Crivelli, D., Acconito, C., & Balconi, M. (2024).

Brain sciences, 14(7), 734.

https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci14070734

Abstract

Studies on decision-making have classically focused exclusively on its cognitive component. Recent research has shown that a further essential component of decisional processes is the emotional one. Indeed, the emotional route in decision-making plays a crucial role, especially in situations characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk. Despite that, individual differences concerning such components and their associations with individual traits, decisional styles, and psychophysiological profiles are still understudied. This pilot study aimed at investigating the relationship between individual propensity toward using an emotional or cognitive information-processing route in decision-making, EEG and autonomic correlates of the decisional performance as collected via wearable non-invasive devices, and individual personality and decisional traits. Participants completed a novel task based on realistic decisional scenarios while their physiological activity (EEG and autonomic indices) was monitored. Self-report questionnaires were used to collect data on personality traits, individual differences, and decisional styles. Data analyses highlighted two main findings. Firstly, different personality traits and decisional styles showed significant and specific correlations, with an individual propensity toward either emotional or cognitive information processing for decision-making. Secondly, task-related EEG and autonomic measures presented a specific and distinct correlation pattern with different decisional styles, maximization traits, and personality traits, suggesting different latent profiles.

Here are some thoughts:

This research provides valuable insights for psychologists by offering a more comprehensive understanding of decision-making, moving beyond a purely cognitive perspective to incorporate the crucial role of emotions and individual differences. It also highlights the importance of individual differences, emphasizing how personality traits and decisional styles influence how people process information and make choices. Furthermore, the research integrates psychological and physiological perspectives by combining self-report data with EEG and autonomic measures, providing a more holistic view of the decision-making process. Ultimately, the findings can inform interventions and applications in various fields, such as clinical psychology, organizational psychology, and consumer behavior, to better understand and support decision-making in different contexts.

Does One Emotion Rule All Our Ethical Judgments

Elizabeth Kolbert

The New Yorker

Originally published 13 Jan 25

Here is an excerpt:

Gray describes himself as a moral psychologist. In contrast to moral philosophers, who search for abstract principles of right and wrong, moral psychologists are interested in the empirical matter of people’s perceptions. Gray writes, “We put aside questions of how we should make moral judgments to examine how people do make more moral judgments.”

For the past couple of decades, moral psychology has been dominated by what’s known as moral-foundations theory, or M.F.T. According to M.F.T., people reach ethical decisions on the basis of mental structures, or “modules,” that evolution has wired into our brains. These modules—there are at least five of them—involve feelings like empathy for the vulnerable, resentment of cheaters, respect for authority, regard for sanctity, and anger at betrayal. The reason people often arrive at different judgments is that their modules have developed differently, either for individual or for cultural reasons. Liberals have come to rely almost exclusively on their fairness and empathy modules, allowing the others to atrophy. Conservatives, by contrast, tend to keep all their modules up and running.

If you find this theory implausible, you’re not alone. It has been criticized on a wide range of grounds, including that it is unsupported by neuroscience. Gray, for his part, wants to sweep aside moral-foundations theory, plural, and replace it with moral-foundation theory, singular. Our ethical judgments, he suggests, are governed not by a complex of modules but by one overriding emotion. Untold generations of cowering have written fear into our genes, rendering us hypersensitive to threats of harm.

“If you want to know what someone sees as wrong, your best bet is to figure out what they see as harmful,” Gray writes at one point. At another point: “All people share a harm-based moral mind.” At still another: “Harm is the master key of morality.”

If people all have the same ethical equipment, why are ethical questions so divisive? Gray’s answer is that different people fear differently. “Moral disagreements can still arise even if we all share a harm-based moral mind, because liberals and conservatives disagree about who is especially vulnerable to victimization,” he writes.

The info is here.

Here are some thoughts:

Notably, I am a big fan of Kurt Gray and his research. Search this site for multiple articles.

Our moral psychology is deeply rooted in our evolutionary past, particularly in our sensitivity to harm, which was crucial for survival. This legacy continues to influence modern moral and political debates, often leading to polarized views based on differing perceptions of harm. Kurt Gray’s argument that harm is the "master key" of morality simplifies the complex nature of moral judgments, offering a unifying framework while potentially overlooking the nuanced ways in which cultural and individual differences shape moral reasoning. His critique of moral-foundations theory (M.F.T.) challenges the idea that moral judgments are based on multiple innate modules, suggesting instead that a singular focus on harm underpins our moral (and sometime ethical) decisions. This perspective highlights how moral disagreements, such as those over abortion or immigration, arise from differing assumptions about who is vulnerable to harm.

The idea that moral judgments are often intuitive rather than rational further complicates our understanding of moral decision-making. Gray’s examples, such as incestuous siblings or a vegetarian eating human flesh, illustrate how people instinctively perceive harm even when none is evident. This challenges the notion that moral reasoning is based on logical deliberation, emphasizing instead the role of emotion and intuition. Gray’s emphasis on harm-based storytelling as a tool for bridging moral divides underscores the power of narrative in shaping perceptions. However, it also raises concerns about the potential for manipulation, as seen in the use of exaggerated or false narratives in political rhetoric, such as Donald Trump’s fabricated tales of harm.

Ultimately, the article raises important questions about whether our evolved moral psychology is adequate for addressing the complex challenges of the modern world, such as climate change, nuclear weapons, and artificial intelligence. The mismatch between our ancient instincts and contemporary problems may be a significant source of societal tension. Gray’s work invites reflection on how we can better understand and address the roots of moral conflict, while cautioning against the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on intuitive judgments and emotional narratives. It suggests that while storytelling can foster empathy and bridge divides, it must be used responsibly to avoid exacerbating polarization and misinformation.

Perceptions of Falling Behind “Most White People”: Within-Group Status Comparisons Predict Fewer Positive Emotions and Worse Health Over Time Among White (but Not Black) Americans

Caluori, N., Cooley, E., et al. (2024).

Psychological Science, 35(2), 175-190.

https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976231221546

Abstract

Despite the persistence of anti-Black racism, White Americans report feeling worse off than Black Americans. We suggest that some White Americans may report low well-being despite high group-level status because of perceptions that they are falling behind their in-group. Using census-based quota sampling, we measured status comparisons and health among Black (N = 452, Wave 1) and White (N = 439, Wave 1) American adults over a period of 6 to 7 weeks. We found that Black and White Americans tended to make status comparisons within their own racial groups and that most Black participants felt better off than their racial group, whereas most White participants felt worse off than their racial group. Moreover, we found that White Americans’ perceptions of falling behind “most White people” predicted fewer positive emotions at a subsequent time, which predicted worse sleep quality and depressive symptoms in the future. Subjective within-group status did not have the same consequences among Black participants.

The research is here.

Here is my succinct summary:

Despite their high group status, many White Americans experience poor well-being due to the perception that they are lagging behind their in-group. In contrast, Black Americans feel relatively better off within their racial group, while White Americans feel comparatively worse off within theirs.

Why People Fail to Notice Horrors Around Them

Tali Sharot and Cass R. Sunstein

The New York Times

Originally posted 25 Feb 24

The miraculous history of our species is peppered with dark stories of oppression, tyranny, bloody wars, savagery, murder and genocide. When looking back, we are often baffled and ask: Why weren't the horrors halted earlier? How could people have lived with them?

The full picture is immensely complicated. But a significant part of it points to the rules that govern the operations of the human brain.

Extreme political movements, as well as deadly conflicts, often escalate slowly. When threats start small and increase gradually, they end up eliciting a weaker emotional reaction, less resistance and more acceptance than they would otherwise. The slow increase allows larger and larger horrors to play out in broad daylight- taken for granted, seen as ordinary.

One of us is a neuroscientist; the other is a law professor. From our different fields, we have come to believe that it is not possible to understand the current period - and the shifts in what counts as normal - without appreciating why and how people do not notice so much of what we live with.

The underlying reason is a pivotal biological feature of our brain: habituation, or our tendency to respond less and less to things that are constant or that change slowly. You enter a cafe filled with the smell of coffee and at first the smell is overwhelming, but no more than 20 minutes go by and you cannot smell it any longer. This is because your olfactory neurons stop firing in response to a now-familiar odor.

Similarly, you stop hearing the persistent buzz of an air-conditioner because your brain filters out background noise. Your brain cares about what recently changed, not about what remained the same.

Habituation is one of our most basic biological characteristics - something that we two-legged, bigheaded creatures share with other animals on earth, including apes, elephants, dogs, birds, frogs, fish and rats. Human beings also habituate to complex social circumstances such as war, corruption, discrimination, oppression, widespread misinformation and extremism. Habituation does not only result in a reduced tendency to notice and react to grossly immoral deeds around us; it also increases the likelihood that we will engage in them ourselves.

The info is here.

Here is my summary:

From a psychological perspective, the failure to notice horrors around us can be attributed to cognitive biases and the human tendency to see reality in predictable yet flawed ways. This phenomenon is linked to how individuals perceive and value certain aspects of their environment. Personal values play a crucial role in shaping our perceptions and emotional responses. When there is a discrepancy between our self-perception and reality, it can lead to various troubles as our values define us and influence how we react to events. Additionally, the concept of safety needs is highlighted as a mediating factor in mental disorders induced by stressful events. The unexpected nature of events can trigger fear and anger, while the anticipation of events can induce calmness. This interplay between safety needs, emotions, and pathological conditions underscores how individuals react to perceived threats and unexpected situations, impacting their mental well-being

Unraveling the Mindset of Victimhood

Scott Barry Kaufman

Scientific American

Originally posted 29 June 2020

Here is an excerpt:

Constantly seeking recognition of one’s victimhood. Those who score high on this dimension have a perpetual need to have their suffering acknowledged. In general, this is a normal psychological response to trauma. Experiencing trauma tends to “shatter our assumptions” about the world as a just and moral place. Recognition of one’s victimhood is a normal response to trauma and can help reestablish a person’s confidence in their perception of the world as a fair and just place to live.

Also, it is normal for victims to want the perpetrators to take responsibility for their wrongdoing and to express feelings of guilt. Studies conducted on testimonies of patients and therapists have found that validation of the trauma is important for therapeutic recovery from trauma and victimization (see here and here).

A sense of moral elitism. Those who score high on this dimension perceive themselves as having an immaculate morality and view everyone else as being immoral. Moral elitism can be used to control others by accusing others of being immoral, unfair or selfish, while seeing oneself as supremely moral and ethical.

Moral elitism often develops as a defense mechanism against deeply painful emotions and as a way to maintain a positive self-image. As a result, those under distress tend to deny their own aggressiveness and destructive impulses and project them onto others. The “other” is perceived as threatening whereas the self is perceived as persecuted, vulnerable and morally superior.

The info is here.

Here is a summary:

Kaufman explores the concept of "interpersonal victimhood," a tendency to view oneself as the repeated target of unfair treatment by others. He identifies several key characteristics of this mindset, including:

• Belief in inherent unfairness: The conviction that the world is fundamentally unjust and that one is disproportionately likely to experience harm.
• Moral self-righteousness: The perception of oneself as more ethical and deserving of good treatment compared to others.
• Rumination on past injustices: Dwelling on and replaying negative experiences, often with feelings of anger and resentment.
• Difficulty taking responsibility: Attributing negative outcomes to external factors rather than acknowledging one's own role.

Kaufman argues that while acknowledging genuine injustices is important, clinging to a victimhood identity can be detrimental. It can hinder personal growth, strain relationships, and fuel negativity. He emphasizes the importance of developing a more balanced perspective, acknowledging both external challenges and personal agency. The article offers strategies for fostering resilience

What Stops People From Standing Up for What’s Right?

Julie Sasse

Greater Good

Originally published 17 Jan 24

Here is an excerpt:

How can we foster moral courage?

Every person can try to become more morally courageous. However, it does not have to be a solitary effort. Instead, institutions such as schools, companies, or social media platforms play a significant role. So, what are concrete recommendations to foster moral courage?

• Establish and strengthen social and moral norms: With a solid understanding of what we consider right and wrong, it becomes easier to detect wrongdoings. Institutions can facilitate this process by identifying and modeling fundamental values. For example, norms and values expressed by teachers can be important points of reference for children and young adults.
• Overcome uncertainty: If it is unclear whether someone’s behavior is wrong, witnesses should feel comfortable to inquire, for example, by asking other bystanders how they judge the situation or a potential victim whether they are all right.
• Contextualize anger: In the face of wrongdoings, anger should not be suppressed since it can provide motivational fuel for intervention. Conversely, if someone expresses anger, it should not be diminished as irrational but considered a response to something unjust. 
• Provide and advertise reporting systems: By providing reporting systems, institutions relieve witnesses from the burden of selecting and evaluating individual means of intervention and reduce the need for direct confrontation.
• Show social support: If witnesses directly confront a perpetrator, others should be motivated to support them to reduce risks.

We see that there are several ways to make moral courage less difficult, but they do require effort from individuals and institutions. Why is that effort worth it? Because if more individuals are willing and able to show moral courage, more wrongdoings would be addressed and rectified—and that could help us to become a more responsible and just society.

The info is here.

Main points:

• Moral courage is the willingness to stand up for what's right despite potential risks.
• It's rare because of various factors like complexity of the internal process, situational barriers, and difficulty seeing the long-term benefits.
• Key stages involve noticing a wrongdoing, interpreting it as wrong, feeling responsible, believing in your ability to intervene, and accepting potential risks.
• Personality traits and situational factors influence these stages.

The Limits of Informed Consent for an Overwhelmed Patient: Clinicians’ Role in Protecting Patients and Preventing Overwhelm

J. Bester, C.M. Cole, & E. Kodish.

AMA J Ethics. 2016;18(9):869-886.

doi: 10.1001/journalofethics.2016.18.9.peer2-1609.

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the limits of informed consent with particular focus on ways in which various factors can overwhelm decision-making capacity. We introduce overwhelm as a phenomenon commonly experienced by patients in clinical settings and distinguish between emotional overwhelm and informational overload. We argue that in these situations, a clinician’s primary duty is prevention of harm and suggest ways in which clinicians can discharge this obligation. To illustrate our argument, we consider the clinical application of genetic sequencing testing, which involves scientific and technical information that can compromise the understanding and decisional capacity of most patients. Finally, we consider and rebut objections that this could lead to paternalism.

(cut)

Overwhelm and Information Overload

The claim we defend is a simple one: there are medical situations in which the information involved in making a decision is of such a nature that the decision-making capacity of a patient is overwhelmed by the sheer complexity or volume of information at hand. In such cases a patient cannot attain the understanding necessary for informed decision making, and informed consent is therefore not possible. We will support our thesis regarding informational overload by focusing specifically on the area of clinical whole genome sequencing—i.e., identification of an individual’s entire genome, enabling the identification and interaction of multiple genetic variants—as distinct from genetic testing, which tests for specific genetic variants.

We will first present ethical considerations regarding informed consent. Next, we will present three sets of factors that can burden the capacity of a patient to provide informed consent for a specific decision—patient, communication, and information factors—and argue that these factors may in some circumstances make it impossible for a patient to provide informed consent. We will then discuss emotional overwhelm and informational overload and consider how being overwhelmed affects informed consent. Our interest in this essay is mainly in informational overload; we will therefore consider whole genome sequencing as an example in which informational factors overwhelm a patient’s decision-making capacity. Finally, we will offer suggestions as to how the duty to protect patients from harm can be discharged when informed consent is not possible because of emotional overwhelm or informational overload.

(cut)

How should clinicians respond to such situations?

Surrogate decision making. One possible solution to the problem of informed consent when decisional capacity is compromised is to seek a surrogate decision maker. However, in situations of informational overload, this may not solve the problem. If the information has inherent qualities that would overwhelm a reasonable patient, it is likely to also overwhelm a surrogate. Unless the surrogate decision maker is a content expert who also understands the values of the patient, a surrogate decision maker will not solve the problem of informed consent. Surrogate decision making may, however, be useful for the emotionally overwhelmed patient who remains unable to provide informed consent despite additional support.

Shared decision making. Another possible solution is to make use of shared decision making (SDM). This approach relies on deliberation between clinician and patient regarding available health care choices, taking the best evidence into account. The clinician actively involves the patient and elicits patient values. The goal of SDM is often stated as helping patients arrive at informed decisions that respect what matters most to them.

It is not clear, however, that SDM will be successful in facilitating informed decisions when an informed consent process has failed. SDM as a tool for informed decision making is at its core dependent on the patient understanding the options presented and being able to describe the preferred option. Understanding and deliberating about what is at stake for each option is a key component of this use of SDM. Therefore, if the medical information is so complex that it overloads the patient’s decision-making capacity, SDM is unlikely to achieve informed decision making. But if a patient is emotionally overwhelmed by the illness experience and all that accompanies it, a process of SDM and support for the patient may eventually facilitate informed decision making.

The info is here.

Social Media and Morality

Van Bavel, J. J., Robertson, C. et al. (2023, June 6).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ywevq

Abstract

Nearly five billion people around the world now use social media, and this number continues to grow. One of the primary goals of social media platforms is to capture and monetize human attention. One means by which individuals and groups can capture attention and drive engagement on these platforms is by sharing morally and emotionally evocative content. We review a growing body of research on the interrelationship of social media and morality–as well the consequences for individuals and society. Moral content often goes “viral” on social media, and social media makes moral behavior (such as punishment) less costly. Thus, social media often acts as an accelerant for existing moral dynamics – amplifying outrage, status seeking, and intergroup conflict, while also potentially amplifying more constructive facets of morality, such as social support, pro-sociality, and collective action. We discuss trends, heated debates, and future directions in this emerging literature.

From Discussions and Future Directions

Addressing the interplay between social media and morality 

There is a growing recognition among scholars and the public that social media has deleterious consequences for society and there is a growing appetite for greater transparency and some form of regulation of social media platforms (Rathje et al., 2023). To address the adverse consequences of social media, solutions at the system level are necessary (e.g., Chater & Loewenstein, 2022), but individual- or group-level solutions may be useful for creating behavioral change before system-level change is in place and for increasing public support for system-level solutions (Koppel et. al., 2023). In the following section, we discuss a range of solutions that address the adverse consequences of the interplay between social media and morality.

Regulation is one of the most heavily debated ways of mitigating the adverse features of social media. Regulating social media can be done both on platforms as well at the national or cross-national level, but always involves discussions about who should decide what should be allowed on which platforms (Kaye, 2019). Currently, there is relatively little editorial oversight with the content even on mainstream platforms, yet the connotations with censorship makes regulation inherently controversial. For instance, Americans believe that social media companies censor political viewpoints (Vogels et al., 2020) and believe it is hard to regulate social media because people cannot agree upon what should and should not be removed (PewResearch Center, 2019). Moreover, authoritarian states can suppress dissent through the regulation of speech on social media.

In general, people on the political left are supportive of regulating social media platforms (Kozyreva, 2023; Rasmussen, 2022), reflecting liberals’ general tendency to more supportive, and conservatives' tendency to more opposing, of regulatory policies (e.g. Grossman, 2015). In the context of content on social media, one explanation is that left-leaning people infer more harm from aggressive behaviors. In other words, they may perceive immoral behaviors on social media as more harmful for the victim, which in turn justifies regulation (Graham 2009; Crawford 2017; Walter 2019; Boch 2020). There are conflicting results, however, on whether people oppose regulating hate speech (Bilewicz et. al. 2017; Rasmussen 2023a) because they use hate to derogate minority and oppressed groups (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Federico and Sidanius, 2002) or because of principled political preferences deriving from conservatism values (Grossman 2016; Grossman 2015; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991). While sensitivity to harm contributes to making people on the political left more supportive of regulating social media, it is contested whether opposition from the political right derives from group-based dominance or principled opposition.

Click the link above to get to the research.

Here is a summary from me:

• Social media can influence our moral judgments. Studies have shown that people are more likely to make moral judgments that align with the views of their social media friends and the content they consume on social media. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to pro-environmental content on social media were more likely to make moral judgments that favored environmental protection.
• Social media can lead to moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is a psychological process that allows people to justify harmful or unethical behavior. Studies have shown that social media can contribute to moral disengagement by making it easier for people to distance themselves from the consequences of their actions. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to violent content on social media were more likely to engage in moral disengagement.
• Social media can promote prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is behavior that is helpful or beneficial to others. Studies have shown that social media can promote prosocial behavior by connecting people with others who share their values and by providing opportunities for people to help others. For example, one study found that people who used social media to connect with others were more likely to volunteer their time to help others.
• Social media can be used to spread misinformation and hate speech. Misinformation is false or misleading information that is spread intentionally or unintentionally. Hate speech is speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of attributes such as race, religion, or sexual orientation. Social media platforms have been used to spread misinformation and hate speech, which can have a negative impact on society.

Overall, the research on social media and morality suggests that social media can have both positive and negative effects on our moral judgments and behavior. It is important to be aware of the potential risks and benefits of social media and to use it in a way that promotes positive moral values.

Characterizing empathy and compassion using computational linguistic analysis

Yaden, D. B., Giorgi, S., et al. (2023). 

Emotion. Advance online publication.

https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0001205

Abstract

Many scholars have proposed that feeling what we believe others are feeling—often known as “empathy”—is essential for other-regarding sentiments and plays an important role in our moral lives. Caring for and about others (without necessarily sharing their feelings)—often known as “compassion”—is also frequently discussed as a relevant force for prosocial motivation and action. Here, we explore the relationship between empathy and compassion using the methods of computational linguistics. Analyses of 2,356,916 Facebook posts suggest that individuals (N = 2,781) high in empathy use different language than those high in compassion, after accounting for shared variance between these constructs. Empathic people, controlling for compassion, often use self-focused language and write about negative feelings, social isolation, and feeling overwhelmed. Compassionate people, controlling for empathy, often use other-focused language and write about positive feelings and social connections. In addition, high empathy without compassion is related to negative health outcomes, while high compassion without empathy is related to positive health outcomes, positive lifestyle choices, and charitable giving. Such findings favor an approach to moral motivation that is grounded in compassion rather than empathy.

From the General Discussion

Linguistic topics related to compassion (without empathy) and empathy (without compassion) show clear relationships with four of the five personality factors. Topics related to compassion without empathy are marked by higher conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability. Empathy without compassion topics are more associated with introversion and are also moderately associated with neuroticism and lower conscientiousness.  The association of low emotional stability and conscientiousness is also in line with prior research that found “distress,”a construct with important parallels to empathy, being associated with fleeing from a helping situation (Batson et al., 1987) and with lower helping(Jordan et al., 2016;Schroeder et al., 1988; Twenge et al., 2007; and others).

In sum, it appears that compassion without empathy and empathy without compassion are at least somewhat distinct and have unique predictive validity in personality, health, and prosocial behavior.  While the mechanisms through which these different relationships occur remain unknown, some previous work bears on this issue.  As mentioned, other work has found that merely focusing on others resulted in more intentions to help others (Bloom, 2017;Davis,1983;Jordan et al., 2016), which helps to explain the relationship between the more other-focused compassion and donation behavior that we observed.

A pdf of the research is here.

In sum, high empathy without compassion is related to negative health outcomes, while high compassion without empathy is related to positive health outcomes. These findings suggest that compassion may be a more important factor for moral motivation than empathy.  Too much empathy may be overwhelming for high quality care.  Care about feelings, don't absorb the sharing of feelings.

Consciousness begins with feeling, not thinking

A. Damasio & H. Dimasio

iai.tv

Originally posted 20 APR 23

Please pause for a moment and notice what you are feeling now. Perhaps you notice a growing snarl of hunger in your stomach or a hum of stress in your chest. Perhaps you have a feeling of ease and expansiveness, or the tingling anticipation of a pleasure soon to come. Or perhaps you simply have a sense that you exist. Hunger and thirst, pain, pleasure and distress, along with the unadorned but relentless feelings of existence, are all examples of ‘homeostatic feelings’. Homeostatic feelings are, we argue here, the source of consciousness.

In effect, feelings are the mental translation of processes occurring in your body as it strives to balance its many systems, achieve homeostasis, and keep you alive. In a conventional sense feelings are part of the mind and yet they offer something extra to the mental processes. Feelings carry spontaneously conscious knowledge concerning the current state of the organism as a result of which you can act to save your life, such as when you respond to pain or thirst appropriately. The continued presence of feelings provides a continued perspective over the ongoing body processes; the presence of feelings lets the mind experience the life process along with other contents present in your mind, namely, the relentless perceptions that collect knowledge about the world along with reasonings, calculations, moral judgments, and the translation of all these contents in language form. By providing the mind with a ‘felt point of view’, feelings generate an ‘experiencer’, usually known as a self. The great mystery of consciousness in fact is the mystery behind the biological construction of this experiencer-self.

In sum, we propose that consciousness is the result of the continued presence of homeostatic feelings. We continuously experience feelings of one kind or another, and feelings naturally tell each of us, automatically, not only that we exist but that we exist in a physical body, vulnerable to discomfort yet open to countless pleasures as well. Feelings such as pain or pleasure provide you with consciousness, directly; they provide transparent knowledge about you. They tell you, in no uncertain terms, that you exist and where you exist, and point to what you need to do to continue existing – for example, treating pain or taking advantage of the well-being that came your way. Feelings illuminate all the other contents of mind with the light of consciousness, both the plain events and the sublime ideas. Thanks to feelings, consciousness fuses the body and mind processes and gives our selves a home inside that partnership.

That consciousness should come ‘down’ to feelings may surprise those who have been led to associate consciousness with the lofty top of the physiological heap. Feelings have been considered inferior to reason for so long that the idea that they are not only the noble beginning of sentient life but an important governor of life’s proceedings may be difficult to accept. Still, feelings and the consciousness they beget are largely about the simple but essential beginnings of sentient life, a life that is not merely lived but knows that it is being lived.

The info is here.

Why Americans Hate Political Division but Can’t Resist Being Divisive

Will Blakely & Kurt Gray

Moral Understanding Substack

Originally posted 21 FEB 23

No one likes polarization. According to a recent poll, 93% of Americans say it is important to reduce the country's current divides, including two-thirds who say it is very important to do so. In a recent Five-Thirty-Eight poll, out of a list of 20 issues, polarization ranked third on a list of the most important issues facing America. Which is… puzzling.

The puzzle is this: How can we be so divided if no one wants to be? Who are the hypocrites causing division and hatred while paying lip service to compromise and tolerance?

If you ask everyday Americans, they’ve got their answer. It’s the elites. Tucker Carlson, AOC, Donald Trump, and MSNBC. While these actors certainly are polarizing, it takes two to tango. We, the people, share some of the blame too. Even us, writing this newsletter, and even you, dear reader.

But this leaves us with a tricky question, why would we contribute to a divide that we can’t stand? To answer this question, we need to understand the biases and motivations that influence how we answer the question, “Who’s at fault here?” And more importantly, we need to understand the strategies that can get us out of conflict.

The Blame Game

The Blame Game comes in two flavors: either/or. Adam or Eve, Will Smith or Chris Rock, Amber Heard or Jonny Depp. When assigning blame in bad situations, our minds are dramatic. Psychology studies show that we tend to assign 100% of the blame to the person we see as the aggressor, and 0% to the side we see as the victim. So, what happens when all the people who are against polarization assign blame for polarization? You guessed it. They give 100% of the blame to the opposing party and 0% to their own. They “morally typecast” themselves as 100% the victim of polarization and the other side as 100% the perpetrator.

We call this moral “typecasting” because people’s minds firmly cast others into roles of victim and victimizer in the same way that actors get typecasted in certain roles. In the world of politics, if you’re a Democrat, you cast Republicans as victimizers, as consistently as Hollywood directors cast Kevin Hart as comic relief and Danny Trejo as a laconic villain.

But why do we rush to this all-or-nothing approach when the world is certainly more complicated? It’s because our brains love simplicity. In the realm of blame, we want one simple cause. In his recent book, “Complicit” Max Bazerman, professor at Harvard Business School, illustrated just how widespread this “monocausality bias” is. Bazerman gave a group of business executives the opportunity to allocate blame after reviewing a case of business fraud. 62 of the 78 business leaders wrote only one cause. Despite being given ample time and a myriad set of potential causes, these executives intuitively reached for their Ockham’s razor. In the same way, we all rush to blame a sputtering economy on the president, a loss on a kicker’s missed field goal, or polarization on the other side.

The info is here.

Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints

Fitouchi L., André J., & Baumard N.

To appear in L. Al-Shawaf & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.)

The Oxford Handbook of Evolution and the Emotions.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract

In recent decades, a large body of work has highlighted the importance of emotional processes in moral cognition. Since then, a heterogeneous bundle of emotions as varied as anger, guilt, shame, contempt, empathy, gratitude, and disgust have been proposed to play an essential role in moral psychology.  However, the inclusion of these emotions in the moral domain often lacks a clear functional rationale, generating conflations between merely social and properly moral emotions. Here, we build on (i) evolutionary theories of morality as an adaptation for attracting others’ cooperative investments, and on (ii) specifications of the distinctive form and content of moral cognitive representations. On this basis, we argue that only indignation (“moral anger”) and guilt can be rigorously characterized as moral emotions, operating on distinctively moral representations. Indignation functions to reclaim benefits to which one is morally entitled, without exceeding the limits of justice. Guilt functions to motivate individuals to compensate their violations of moral contracts. By contrast, other proposed moral emotions (e.g. empathy, shame, disgust) appear only superficially associated with moral cognitive contents and adaptive challenges. Shame doesn’t track, by design, the respect of moral obligations, but rather social valuation, the two being not necessarily aligned. Empathy functions to motivate prosocial behavior between interdependent individuals, independently of, and sometimes even in contradiction with the prescriptions of moral intuitions. While disgust is often hypothesized to have acquired a moral role beyond its pathogen-avoidance function, we argue that both evolutionary rationales and psychological evidence for this claim remain inconclusive for now.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have suggested that a specification of the form and function of moral representations leads to a clearer picture of moral emotions. In particular, it enables a principled distinction between moral and non-moral emotions, based on the particular types of cognitive representations they process. Moral representations have a specific content: they represent a precise quantity of benefits that cooperative partners owe each other, a legitimate allocation of costs and benefits that ought to be, irrespective of whether it is achieved by people’s actual behaviors. Humans intuit that they have a duty not to betray their coalition, that innocent people do not deserve to be harmed, that their partner has a right not to be cheated on. Moral emotions can thus be defined as superordinate programs orchestrating cognition, physiology and behavior in accordance with the specific information encoded in these moral representations.    On this basis, indignation and guilt appear as prototypical moral emotions. Indignation (“moral anger”) is activated when one receives fewer benefits than one deserves, and recruits bargaining mechanisms to enforce the violated moral contract. Guilt, symmetrically, is sensitive to one’s failure to honor one’s obligations toward others, and motivates compensation to provide them the missing benefits they deserve. By contrast, often-proposed “moral” emotions – shame, empathy, disgust – seem not to function to compute distinctively moral representations of cooperative obligations, but serve other, non-moral functions – social status management, interdependence, and pathogen avoidance (Figure 2). 

A pdf is here.

Young children show negative emotions after failing to help others

Gerdemann, S. C., Tippmann, J., et al (2022). 

PloS one, 17(4), e0266539.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0266539

Abstract

Self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and shame, motivate the adherence to social norms, including to norms for prosociality. The relevance of an observing audience to the expression of negative self-conscious emotions remains poorly understood. Here, in two studies, we investigated the influence of being observed on 4-to 5-year-old children's (N = 161) emotional response after failing to help someone in need and after failing to complete their own goal. As an index of children's emotional response, we recorded the change in children's upper body posture using a motion depth sensor imaging camera. Failing to help others lowered children's upper body posture regardless of whether children were observed by an audience or not. Children's emotional response was similar when they failed to help and when they failed to complete their own goal. In Study 2, 5-year-olds showed a greater decrease in upper body posture than 4-year-olds. Our findings suggest that being observed is not a necessary condition for young children to express a negative self-conscious emotion after failing to help or after failing to complete their own goal. We conclude that 5-year-olds, more so that 4-year-olds, show negative emotions when they fail to adhere to social norms for prosociality.

General discussion

The current studies represent the first investigation of children’s emotional response to failing to help others using a method that automatically and objectively record changes in children’s body posture. Our studies show that young children’s emotional response is similarly negative when they fail to help or fail to achieve their own goal in both an observed and unobserved set-ting. Specifically, in both studies, children expressed a greater reduction in upper body posture after they failed to help (Trial 1) than during the resolution of the situation moments later (Trial 2). This result was corroborated by the emotion valence coding of Study 1. While observation or goal context did not influence this emotional response, we did find evidence in Study2 that 5-year-olds expressed a greater reduction in upper body posture after failing to help than 4-year-olds. Moreover, in Study 2, children expressed a predominantly shame-like negative emotion after failing to help, suggesting that self-evaluative processes were involved in children’s emotional response.

The influence of observation

Children expressed similarly negative emotions regardless of whether they were observed or unobserved during a failure to help, suggesting that the presence of an audience is not required for young children to express a negative self-conscious emotion. It is worth noting that children were made aware of the observer’s presence twice during the studies and were told that the observer would watch them today, which is comparable to previous studies of the influence of observation on children’s prosocial behavior. Our findings thus raise questions about the role of others’ evaluation or judgment of oneself in young children’s expression of self-conscious emotions. Some scholars have argued that young children’s expression of shame following achievement-related failures is the result of observing adults knowing (or having the impression) that children have performed poorly until children are school-aged.

 The research is here.

The psychology of hate: Moral concerns differentiate hate from dislike

Pretus, C., Ray, J. L., et al. (2018, June 25). 

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/x9y2p

Abstract

We investigated whether any differences in the psychological conceptualization of hate and dislike were simply a matter of degree of negativity (i.e., hate falls on the end of the continuum of dislike) or also morality (i.e., hate is imbued with distinct moral components that distinguish it from dislike). In three lab studies in Canada and the US, participants reported disliked and hated attitude objects and rated each on dimensions including valence, attitude strength, morality, and emotional content. Quantitative and qualitative measures revealed that hated attitude objects were more negative than disliked attitude objects and associated with moral beliefs and emotions, even after adjusting for differences in negativity. In study four, we analyzed the rhetoric on real hate sites and complaint forums and found that the language used on prominent hate websites contained more words related to morality, but not negativity, relative to complaint forums.

Discussion

In our first study, we examined whether the conceptual differences between hate and dislike are simply a matter of degree of negativity or also a matter of morality. We found support for the intensity hypothesis—hated objects were viewed as more negative than disliked objects—suggesting that the difference between hate and dislike is indeed a matter of intensity. However, we also found support for the morality hypothesis—hated attitude objects were rated as more connected to participants’ core moral beliefs and were associated with higher levels of moral emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust) than disliked attitude objects—suggesting that the difference between hate and dislike may also be a matter of morality. We found convergent evidence for this latter hypothesis across quantitative and qualitative analyses, with self-reports, expressions of moral emotions, and spontaneous descriptions.

We note that differences in morality were attenuated when participants were asked about disliked attitudinal objects first. We discuss possible explanations of this order effect below. Importantly, the results supporting the morality hypothesis remained significant even when adjusting for negativity. Above and beyond the effect of negativity, both moral concerns and moral emotions explained the variance in ratings of hated versus disliked attitude objects. Likewise, participants spontaneously reported that hated objects were more closely tied to morality than disliked objects in their qualitative responses. These findings provide preliminary evidence that the conceptualization of hate may differ from dislike, and that morality may play a key role in explaining this difference.

The research is here.

Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample

Bago, B., Kovacs, M., Protzko, J. et al. 

Nat Hum Behav (2022).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01319-5

Abstract

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.

From the Discussion

In this research, we replicated the design of Greene et al. using a culturally diverse sample across 45 countries to test the universality of their results. Overall, our results support the proposition that the effect of personal force on moral judgements is likely culturally universal. This finding makes it plausible that the personal force effect is influenced by basic cognitive or emotional processes that are universal for humans and independent of culture. Our findings regarding the interaction between personal force and intention were more mixed. We found strong evidence for the interaction of personal force and intention among participants coming from Western countries regardless of familiarity and dilemma context (trolley or speedboat), fully replicating the results of Greene et al.. However, the evidence was inconclusive among participants from Eastern countries in all cases. Additionally, this interaction result was mixed for participants from countries in the Southern cluster. We only found strong enough evidence when people familiar with these dilemmas were included in the sample and only for the trolley (not speedboat) dilemma.

Our general observation is that the size of the interaction was smaller on the speedboat dilemmas in every cultural cluster. It is yet unclear whether this effect is caused by some deep-seated (and unknown) differences between the two dilemmas (for example, participants experiencing smaller emotional engagement in the speedboat dilemmas that changes response patterns) or by some unintended experimental confound (for example, an effect of the order of presentation of the dilemmas).

The research is here.

Parents think—incorrectly—that teaching their children that the world is a bad place is likely best for them

J. D. W. Clifton & Peter Meindl (2021)

The Journal of Positive Psychology

DOI: 10.1080/17439760.2021.2016907

Primal world beliefs (‘primals’) are beliefs about the world’s basic character, such as the world is dangerous. This article investigates probabilistic assumptions about the value of negative primals (e.g., seeing the world as dangerous keeps me safe). We first show such assumptions are common. For example, among 185 parents, 53% preferred dangerous world beliefs for their children. We then searched for evidence consistent with these intuitions in 3 national samples and 3 local samples of undergraduates, immigrants (African and Korean), and professionals (car salespeople, lawyers, and cops;), examining correlations between primals and eight life outcomes within 48 occupations (total N=4,535) . As predicted, regardless of occupation, more negative primals were almost never associated with better outcomes. Instead, they predicted less success, less job and life satisfaction, worse health, dramatically less flourishing, more negative emotion, more depression, and increased suicide attempts. We discuss why assumptions about the value of negative primals are nevertheless widespread and implications for future research.

From the General Discussion

When might very positive primals be damaging illusions (i.e., associated with negative outcomes)? Study 2 was a big-net search for these contexts. We examined eight outcomes, six samples, 4,535 unique subjects, and 48 occupations (n ≥ 30), including lawyers, doctors, police officers, professors, and so forth. This unearthed 1,860 significant correlations between primals and outcomes, and the overall pattern was clear. In 99.7% of these relationships, more negative primals were associated with worse outcomes, roughly categorized as slightly less job success, moderately less job satisfaction, much less life satisfaction, moderately worse health, much increased frequency of negative emotion and other depression symptoms, dramatically decreased psychological flourishing, and moderately increased likelihood of having attempted suicide. We also found no empirical justification for the popular moderation approach. In 297 of 297 significant differences in outcomes, those who saw the world as somewhat positive always experienced worse outcomes than those who saw the world as very positive. In sum, a robust correlational relationship exists between more negative primals and more negative outcomes, even when comparing positive beliefs to positive beliefs, even when comparing within occupation. The seemingly widespread meta-belief that associates negative primals with positive outcomes is unsupported.

The research is here.

A pdf to the research is here.