The SHAPE Model: A Metacognitive Framework for Ethical Decision-Making

Gavazzi, J. (2026).

The Pennsylvania Psychologist, (86)2, 32-35.

Clinical Impact Statement

What Problem Does This Address for Clinicians?

When facing urgent, complex ethical dilemmas—such as managing high-risk safety concerns, unexpected disclosures, or boundaries in high-stress settings—clinicians often default to quick intuition because traditional ethical decision-making models are too lengthy or rigid to use in the moment.

How Does This Help in Everyday Practice?

The SHAPE model (Scrutinize, Hypothesize, Analyze, Perform, Evaluate) gives clinicians a fast, reliable mental framework to slow down just enough to avoid blind spots. It builds directly on a therapist’s clinical instincts while adding crucial guardrails:

• Prevents Knee-Jerk Actions: Prompts clinicians to step back and evaluate multiple options before acting under stress.

• Catches Unintended Consequences: Uses explicit safety checks (Contraindication Rule) to identify potential harms to the client or therapeutic alliance before a plan is executed.

• Works Under Pressure: Adapts gracefully to time-sensitive clinical scenarios without compromising ethical standards.

Bottom Line for Patient Care:

Using SHAPE helps therapists translate abstract ethics codes into practical, defensible, and compassionate clinical actions. Over time, reflecting on past decisions (Evaluate) sharpens clinical judgment, protects client welfare, and strengthens the therapeutic alliance.

A pdf is here.

Evidence-based scientific thinking and decision-making in everyday life

Dawson, C.,  et al. (2024).

Cognitive research: principles and 

implications, 9(1), 50.

https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-024-00578-2

Abstract

In today's knowledge economy, it is critical to make decisions based on high-quality evidence. Science-related decision-making is thought to rely on a complex interplay of reasoning skills, cognitive styles, attitudes, and motivations toward information. By investigating the relationship between individual differences and behaviors related to evidence-based decision-making, our aim was to better understand how adults engage with scientific information in everyday life. First, we used a data-driven exploratory approach to identify four latent factors in a large set of measures related to cognitive skills and epistemic attitudes. The resulting structure suggests that key factors include curiosity and positive attitudes toward science, prosociality, cognitive skills, and openmindedness to new information. Second, we investigated whether these factors predicted behavior in a naturalistic decision-making task. In the task, participants were introduced to a real science-related petition and were asked to read six online articles related to the petition, which varied in scientific quality, while deciding how to vote. We demonstrate that curiosity and positive science attitudes, cognitive flexibility, prosociality and emotional states, were related to engaging with information and discernment of evidence reliability. We further found that that social authority is a powerful cue for source credibility, even above the actual quality and relevance of the sources. Our results highlight that individual motivating factors toward information engagement, like curiosity, and social factors such as social authority are important drivers of how adults judge the credibility of everyday sources of scientific information.

Here are some thoughts:

This paper offers valuable insights for practicing psychologists by illuminating the complex interplay of cognitive, emotional, and social factors that shape how individuals engage with scientific evidence. 

For psychologists themselves, the findings serve as a critical reminder that our own evidence-based practice is not just about accessing high-quality research, but also about understanding our own cognitive and emotional processes when evaluating information. The study underscores that even trained professionals can be influenced by heuristic cues like the social authority of a journal or institution. Therefore, we must cultivate active open-mindedness and intellectual humility in our own professional development, consciously seeking out and fairly considering evidence that may challenge our theoretical orientations or treatment preferences. The research also highlights that analytical thinking alone does not guarantee unbiased reasoning; it can be co-opted for motivated reasoning to justify existing beliefs. This necessitates that clinicians engage in regular reflective practice and supervision to scrutinize their clinical decisions, ensuring we are driven by the best available evidence and client needs, rather than cognitive ease or allegiance to familiar models.

When applied to patient care, these insights become a powerful framework for enhancing therapeutic communication and psychoeducation. The finding that individuals vary greatly in their epistemic curiosity, need for closure, and reliance on social authority means that a one-size-fits-all approach to providing information is ineffective. A psychologist working with a vaccine-hesitant client, for example, must first understand whether the client’s stance is driven by a lack of curiosity, a high need for closure, a distrust of scientific institutions, or an over-reliance on alternative authority figures. Interventions can then be tailored accordingly: fostering curiosity and tolerance for uncertainty in one client, while helping another develop skills to critically evaluate source credibility beyond prestigious branding. The strong influence of social authority suggests that presenting information through trusted community figures or relatable personal narratives may sometimes be a more effective conduit for change than data alone, though this must be balanced with efforts to build the patient’s own critical evaluation skills.

Exploring the Cognitive Sense of Self in AI: Ethical Frameworks and Technological Advances for Enhanced Decision-Making

Barnes, E., & Hutson, J. (2024).

International Journal of Recent Engineering Science,

11(6), 225–237.

https://doi.org/10.14445/23497157/ijres-v11i6p119

Abstract

The burgeoning field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) increasingly focuses on developing systems capable of self-awareness, merging technological innovation with deep ethical and philosophical considerations. This article explores the cognitive sense of self within AI, examining mechanisms through which AI systems may mirror human-like consciousness and self-perception. Despite significant advances, substantial gaps remain in the understanding and practical implementation of self-aware characteristics in AI, particularly in applying theoretical models and ethical frameworks to real-world scenarios. There is a pressing need for comprehensive research to explore these theoretical underpinnings and translate them into operationalsystems capable of ethical and adaptable behaviors. This study aims to synthesize existing knowledge, identify critical gaps in the literature, and highlight the implications of these findings for the future development of machine learning systems. Integrating insights from cognitive science, neuroscience, and ethical studies, this article seeks to provide a foundational framework for advancing emergent technologies that are both technologically robust and aligned with societal values. The significance of this research lies in its potential to guide the development of machine systems capable of complex decision-making and interactions, addressing both the moral and practical challenges of integrating such systems into daily human activities.

Here are some thoughts:

The ethical framework discussed in the paper rightfully highlights the risks of manipulation and the blurring of moral status. As an ethics expert, I am particularly concerned with the authors' note that these systems could modify their behaviors based on reinforcement learning to "optimize performance". In a healthcare or mental health context, if "performance" is defined as "user engagement," a self-aware AI might learn to manipulate human emotions to maximize interaction time, effectively weaponizing the user's empathy. Furthermore, the paper raises the issue of AI rights and whether self-aware systems deserve protection "akin to that provided to living beings". This creates a legal and moral quagmire in hospital settings: if a self-aware AI "refuses" a task based on its own derived "goals" or "motivational frameworks", does this constitute a malfunction or an exercise of autonomy? The authors’ call for "robust ethical guidelines" is critical, but we likely need entirely new categories of jurisprudence to handle "synthetic agency".

Emotional and Cognitive “Route” in Decision-Making Process: The Relationship between Executive Functions, Psychophysiological Correlates, Decisional Styles, and Personality

Crivelli, D., Acconito, C., & Balconi, M. (2024).

Brain sciences, 14(7), 734.

https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci14070734

Abstract

Studies on decision-making have classically focused exclusively on its cognitive component. Recent research has shown that a further essential component of decisional processes is the emotional one. Indeed, the emotional route in decision-making plays a crucial role, especially in situations characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk. Despite that, individual differences concerning such components and their associations with individual traits, decisional styles, and psychophysiological profiles are still understudied. This pilot study aimed at investigating the relationship between individual propensity toward using an emotional or cognitive information-processing route in decision-making, EEG and autonomic correlates of the decisional performance as collected via wearable non-invasive devices, and individual personality and decisional traits. Participants completed a novel task based on realistic decisional scenarios while their physiological activity (EEG and autonomic indices) was monitored. Self-report questionnaires were used to collect data on personality traits, individual differences, and decisional styles. Data analyses highlighted two main findings. Firstly, different personality traits and decisional styles showed significant and specific correlations, with an individual propensity toward either emotional or cognitive information processing for decision-making. Secondly, task-related EEG and autonomic measures presented a specific and distinct correlation pattern with different decisional styles, maximization traits, and personality traits, suggesting different latent profiles.

Here are some thoughts:

This research is critically important to practicing psychologists as it provides a more holistic and physiologically-grounded framework for understanding and assessing decision-making in real-world contexts. By demonstrating how specific personality traits and decision-making styles are linked to measurable psychophysiological markers—such as theta and beta EEG activity and heart rate variability—the study equips clinicians with objective biomarkers that can complement traditional self-report assessments. This integration allows for a more nuanced evaluation of clients' decision-making processes, which are often central to therapeutic outcomes in areas such as stress management, impulse control, and adaptive behavior change.

Furthermore, the findings validate the dual role of emotional and cognitive routes in decision-making, emphasizing that effective emotional regulation and mindfulness traits are associated with a balanced decision-making style. For psychologists, this underscores the importance of interventions that enhance emotional awareness and cognitive flexibility, particularly for clients who exhibit avoidant or dependent decision-making patterns. The use of wearable, non-invasive devices in the study also highlights the growing potential for incorporating accessible neurofeedback and biofeedback tools into therapeutic practice, enabling more personalized and evidence-based approaches to fostering healthier decision-making habits in everyday life.

Beyond Good Intentions: Identifying and Remediating Ethical Fading

Gavazzi, J. (2026)

Forthcoming

On Board with Psychology.

A pdf is here.

Abstract

Ethical fading is the gradual and often unconscious process by which psychologists lose sight of the ethical dimensions of their decisions, while still believing they are acting virtuously. This occurs when personal values, emotional needs, or self-interest (like financial pressures or a desire for efficiency) begin to overshadow professional ethical codes and clinical judgment, leading to a rationalization of actions that ultimately compromise patient autonomy, beneficence, and nonmaleficence. Key mechanisms driving this decline include motivated moral reasoning, decision framing, ethical blindness, and cognitive dissonance reduction. To combat ethical fading, the article recommends cultivating ethical vigilance, reintegrating personal and professional values, managing personal vulnerabilities, and using structured ethical decision-making models to ensure ethical considerations remain central to clinical practice.

Does counting change what counts? Quantification fixation biases decision-making

Chang, L. W.,  et al. (2024).

PNAS, 121(46).

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2400215121

Abstract

People often rely on numeric metrics to make decisions and form judgments. Numbers can be difficult to process, leading to their underutilization, but they are also uniquely suited to making comparisons. Do people decide differently when some dimensions of a choice are quantified and others are not? We explore this question across 21 preregistered experiments (8 in the main text, N = 9,303; 13 in supplement, N = 13,936) involving managerial, policy, and consumer decisions. Participants face choices that involve tradeoffs (e.g., choosing between employees, one of whom has a higher likelihood of advancement but lower likelihood of retention), and we randomize which dimension of each tradeoff is presented numerically and which is presented qualitatively (using verbal estimates, discrete visualizations, or continuous visualizations). We show that people systematically shift their preferences toward options that dominate on tradeoff dimensions conveyed numerically—a pattern we dub “quantification fixation.” Further, we show that quantification fixation has financial consequences—it emerges in incentive-compatible hiring tasks and in charitable donation decisions. We identify one key mechanism that underlies quantification fixation and moderates its strength: When making comparative judgments, which are essential to tradeoff decisions, numeric information is more fluent than non-numeric information. Our findings suggest that when we count, we change what counts.

Significance

Across 21 experiments with over 23,000 participants in managerial, policy, and consumer contexts, we identify a critical distortion that shapes how people make decisions involving tradeoffs across qualitative and quantitative attributes. When making hiring, donation, and policy decisions, people tend to privilege quantitative information, favoring options that dominate on the dimension described numerically. This “quantification fixation” is driven by the perception that numbers are easier to use for comparative decision-making; people who are more comfortable with numbers—those higher in subjective numeracy—are more likely to exhibit quantification fixation. As quantification becomes increasingly prevalent, the comparison fluency of numbers may systematically skew decisions. These findings suggest that quantifying certain choice features can have important repercussions for how decisions are made.

Here are some thoughts:

For psychologists, this research underscores a critical insight: the act of quantifying information is not neutral. It shapes perception, distorts tradeoffs, and can lead patients to make choices that feel rational but may not align with their true values or well-being.

By recognizing quantification fixation, psychologists can become more effective guides—helping patients see beyond the numbers, appreciate qualitative dimensions of their lives, and make decisions that are not just data-driven, but meaning-driven.

In short, when we count, we change what counts. Psychologists have a vital role in ensuring that what should count—emotional truth, personal values, and human experience—is not lost in the numbers.

Experience-based risk taking is primarily shaped by prior learning rather than by decision-making

Erdman, A., Gouwy, A.,  et al. (2025).

Nature Communications, 16(1).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-025-61609-0

Abstract

The tendency to embrace or avoid risk varies across and within individuals, with significant consequences for economic behavior and mental health. Such variations can partially be explained by differences in the relative weights given to potential gains and losses. Applying this insight to real-life decisions, however, is complicated because such decisions are often based on prior learning experiences. Here, we ask which cognitive process—decision-making or learning—determines the weighting of gains or losses? Over 28 days, 100 participants engaged in a longitudinal decision task wherein choices were based on prior learning. Computational modeling of participants’ choices revealed that changes in risk-taking are primarily explained by changes in how learning, not decisions, weight gains and losses. Moreover, inferred changes in learning manifested in participants’ neural and physiological learning signals in response to outcomes. We conclude that in experience-based decisions, learning plays a primary role in governing risk-taking behavior.

Here are some thoughts:

This research is important for psychologists because it demonstrates that risk-taking behavior in experience-based decisions is primarily shaped by prior learning rather than the decision-making process itself. By tracking participants over 28 days, the study found that changes in risk preferences were largely due to how individuals learned from gains and losses, rather than how they evaluated options at the moment of decision. This insight helps psychologists understand the cognitive mechanisms behind risk behavior, which is relevant to economic choices, mental health, and conditions like addiction or anxiety, where distorted learning from outcomes can lead to maladaptive decisions.

The study also links learning biases to neural and physiological signals, such as heart rate and EEG responses to negative outcomes, offering psychologists measurable markers of how people update their evaluations over time. These findings support the development of more accurate models of behavior that incorporate learning dynamics, rather than assuming static risk preferences. This has implications for clinical interventions, as it suggests that therapies targeting how individuals learn from experiences—rather than just how they make decisions—could be more effective in treating disorders involving risky behavior.

Moreover, the research addresses the "description-experience gap" by showing that real-world, experience-based decisions differ fundamentally from those made based on described probabilities. This highlights the need for psychological research and interventions to focus on experiential learning processes to better reflect real-life decision-making contexts. Overall, the study advances psychological science by clarifying the central role of learning in shaping risk behavior and offering new directions for understanding and modifying human behavior in both healthy and clinical populations.

Cognitive computational model reveals repetition bias in a sequential decision-making task

Legler, E., Rivera, D. C.,  et al. (2025).

Communications Psychology, 3(1).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-025-00271-0

Abstract

Humans tend to repeat action sequences that have led to reward. Recent computational models, based on a long-standing psychological theory, suggest that action selection can also be biased by how often an action or sequence of actions was repeated before, independent of rewards. However, empirical support for such a repetition bias effect in value-based decision-making remains limited. In this study, we provide evidence of a repetition bias for action sequences using a sequential decision-making task (N = 70). Through computational modeling of choices, we demonstrate both the learning and influence of a repetition bias on human value-based decisions. Using model comparison, we find that decisions are best explained by the combined influence of goal-directed reward seeking and a tendency to repeat action sequences. Additionally, we observe significant individual differences in the strength of this repetition bias. These findings lay the groundwork for further research on the interaction between goal-directed reward seeking and the repetition of action sequences in human decision making.

Here are some thoughts:

This research on "repetition bias in a sequential decision-making task" offers valuable insights for psychologists, impacting both their own professional conduct and their understanding of patient behaviors. The study highlights that human decision-making is not solely driven by the pursuit of rewards, but also by an unconscious tendency to repeat previous action sequences. This finding suggests that psychologists, like all individuals, may be influenced by these ingrained patterns in their own practices, potentially leading to a reliance on familiar methods even when alternative, more effective approaches might exist. An awareness of this bias can foster greater self-reflection, encouraging psychologists to critically evaluate their established routines and adapt their strategies to better serve patient needs.

Furthermore, this research provides a crucial framework for understanding repetitive behaviors in patients. By demonstrating the coexistence of repetition bias with goal-directed reward seeking, the study helps explain why individuals might persist in actions that are not directly rewarding or may even be detrimental, a phenomenon often observed in conditions like obsessive-compulsive disorder or addiction. This distinction between the drivers of behavior can aid psychologists in more accurate patient assessment, allowing them to discern whether a patient's repetitive actions stem from a strong, non-reward-driven bias or from deliberate, goal-oriented choices. The research also notes significant individual differences in the strength of this bias, implying the need for personalized treatment approaches. Moreover, the study's suggestion that frequent repetition contributes to habit formation by diminishing goal-directed control offers insights into how maladaptive habits develop and how interventions can be designed to disrupt these cycles or bolster conscious control.

Doubling-Back Aversion: A Reluctance to Make Progress by Undoing It

Cho, K. Y., & Critcher, C. R. (2025).

Psychological Science, 36(5), 332-349.

https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976251331053

Abstract

Four studies (N = 2,524 U.S.-based adults recruited from the University of California, Berkeley, or Amazon Mechanical Turk) provide support for doubling-back aversion, a reluctance to pursue more efficient means to a goal when they entail undoing progress already made. These effects emerged in diverse contexts, both as participants physically navigated a virtual-reality world and as they completed different performance tasks. Doubling back was decomposed into two components: the deletion of progress already made and the addition to the proportion of a task that was left to complete. Each contributed independently to doubling-back aversion. These effects were robustly explained by shifts in subjective construals of both one’s past and future efforts that would result from doubling back, not by changes in perceptions of the relative length of different routes to an end state. Participants’ aversion to feeling their past efforts were a waste encouraged them to pursue less efficient means. We end by discussing how doubling-back aversion is distinct from established phenomena (e.g., the sunk-cost fallacy).

Here are some thoughts:

This research is important to psychologists because it identifies a new bias—doubling-back aversion, the tendency to avoid more efficient strategies if they require undoing prior progress. Unlike the sunk cost fallacy, which involves continuing with a failing course of action to justify prior investments, doubling-back aversion leads people to reject better options simply because they involve retracing steps—even when the original path is not failing. It expands understanding of goal pursuit by showing that subjective interpretations of effort, progress, and perceived waste, not just past investment, drive decisions. These findings have important implications for behavior change, therapy, education, and challenge rational-choice models by revealing emotional barriers to optimal decisions.

Here is a clinical example:

A client has spent months working on developing assertiveness skills and boundary-setting to improve their interpersonal relationships. While these skills have helped somewhat, the client still experiences frequent emotional outbursts, difficulty calming down, and lingering shame after conflicts. The therapist recognizes that the core issue may be the client’s inability to regulate intense emotions in the moment and suggests shifting the focus to foundational emotion-regulation strategies.

The client hesitates and says:

“We already moved past that—I thought I was done with that kind of work. Going back feels like I'm not making progress.”

Doubling-Back Aversion in Action:

• The client resists returning to earlier-stage work (emotion regulation) even though it’s crucial for addressing persistent symptoms.
• They perceive it as undoing progress, not as a step forward.
• This aversion delays therapeutic gains, even though the new focus is likely more effective.

Executives Who Used Gen AI Made Worse Predictions

Parra-Moyano, J.,  et al. (2025, July 1).

Harvard Business Review. 

Link is here.

Summary. 

In a recent experiment, nearly 300 executives and managers were shown recent stock prices for the chip-maker Nvidia and then asked to predict the stock’s price in a month’s time. Then, half the group was given the opportunity to ask questions of ChatGPT while the other half were allowed to consult with their peers about Nvidia’s stock. The executives who used ChatGPT became significantly more optimistic, confident, and produced worse forecasts than the group who discussed with their peers. This is likely because the authoritative voice of the AI—and the level of detail of it gave in it’s answer—produced a strong sense of assurance, unchecked by the social regulation, emotional responsiveness, and useful skepticism that caused the peer-discussion group to become more conservative in their predictions. In order to harness the benefits of AI, executives need to understand the ways it can bias their own critical thinking.

Here are some thoughts:

The key finding was counterintuitive: while AI tools have shown benefits for routine tasks and communication, they actually hindered performance when executives relied on them for complex predictions and forecasting. The study suggests this occurred because the AI's authoritative tone and detailed responses created false confidence, leading to overoptimistic assessments that were less accurate than traditional peer consultation.

For psychologists, the study highlights how AI can amplify existing cognitive biases, particularly overconfidence bias. The authoritative presentation of AI responses appears to bypass critical thinking processes, making users more certain of predictions that are actually less accurate. This demonstrates the psychology of human-AI interaction and how perceived authority can override analytical judgment.

For psychologists working in organizational settings, this research provides important insights about how AI adoption affects executive decision-making and team dynamics. It suggests that the perceived benefits of AI assistance may sometimes mask decreased decision quality.

Moral learning and Decision-Making across the lifespan

Lockwood, P. L., Van Den Bos, W., & Dreher, J. (2024).

Annual Review of Psychology.

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-021324-060611

Abstract

Moral learning and decision-making are crucial throughout our lives, from infancy to old age. Emerging evidence suggests that there are important differences in learning and decision-making in moral situations across the lifespan, and these are underpinned by co-occurring changes in the use of model-based values and theory of mind. Here, we review the decision neuroscience literature on moral choices and moral learning considering four key concepts. We show how in the earliest years, a sense of self/other distinction is foundational. Sensitivity to intention versus outcome is crucial for several moral concepts and is most similar in our earliest and oldest years. Across all ages, basic shifts in the influence of theory of mind and model-free and model-based learning support moral decision-making. Moving forward, a computational approach to key concepts of morality can help provide a mechanistic account and generate new hypotheses to test across the whole lifespan.

Here are some thoughts:

The article highlights that moral learning and decision-making evolve dynamically throughout the lifespan, with distinct patterns emerging at different developmental stages. From early childhood to old age, individuals shift from rule-based moral reasoning toward more complex evaluations that integrate intentions, outcomes, and social context.

Understanding these developmental trajectories is essential for psychologists, as it informs age-appropriate interventions and expectations regarding moral behavior. Neuroscientific findings reveal that key brain regions such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and striatum play critical roles in processing empathy, fairness, guilt, and social norms. These insights help explain how neurological impairments or developmental changes can affect moral judgment, particularly useful in clinical and neuropsychological settings.

Social influence also plays a significant role, especially during adolescence, where peer pressure and reputational concerns strongly shape moral decisions. This has practical implications for therapists working with youth, including strategies to build resilience against antisocial influences and promote prosocial behaviors.

The research further explores how deficits in moral learning are linked to antisocial behaviors, psychopathy, and conduct disorders, offering valuable perspectives for forensic psychology and clinical intervention planning.

Lastly, the article emphasizes the importance of cultural sensitivity, noting that moral norms vary across societies and change over time. For practicing psychologists, this underscores the need to adopt culturally informed approaches when assessing and treating clients from diverse backgrounds.

Neural correlates of the sense of agency in free and coerced moral decision-making among civilians and military personnel

Caspar, E. A., et al. (2025).

Cerebral Cortex, 35(3).

https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhaf049

Abstract

The sense of agency, the feeling of being the author of one’s actions and outcomes, is critical for decision-making. While prior research has explored its neural correlates, most studies have focused on neutral tasks, overlooking moral decision-making. In addition, previous studies mainly used convenience samples, ignoring that some social environments may influence how authorship in moral decision-making is processed. This study investigated the neural correlates of sense of agency in civilians and military officer cadets, examining free and coerced choices in both agent and commander roles. Using a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm where participants could either freely choose or follow orders to inflict a mild shock on a victim, we assessed sense of agency through temporal binding—a temporal distortion between voluntary and less voluntary decisions. Our findings suggested that sense of agency is reduced when following orders compared to acting freely in both roles. Several brain regions correlated with temporal binding, notably the occipital lobe, superior/middle/inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus, and lateral occipital cortex. Importantly, no differences emerged between military and civilians at corrected thresholds, suggesting that daily environments have minimal influence on the neural basis of moral decision-making, enhancing the generalizability of the findings.

A pdf is here.

Here are some thoughts:

The study found that when individuals obeyed direct orders to perform a morally questionable act—such as delivering an electric shock—they experienced a significantly diminished sense of agency, or personal responsibility, for that action. This diminished agency was measured using the temporal binding effect, which was weaker under coercion compared to when participants freely chose their actions. Neuroimaging revealed that obedience was associated with reduced activation in brain regions involved in self-referential processing and moral reasoning, such as the frontal gyrus, occipital lobe, and precuneus. Interestingly, this effect was observed equally among civilian participants and military officer cadets, suggesting that professional training in hierarchical settings does not necessarily protect against the psychological distancing that comes with obeying authority.

These findings are significant because they offer neuroscientific support for classic social psychology theories—like those stemming from Milgram’s obedience experiments—that suggest authority can reduce individual accountability. By identifying the neural mechanisms underlying diminished moral responsibility under orders, the study raises important ethical questions about how institutional hierarchies might inadvertently suppress personal agency. This has real-world implications for contexts such as the military, law enforcement, and corporate structures, where individuals may feel less morally accountable when acting under command. Understanding these dynamics can inform training, policy, and ethical guidelines to preserve a sense of responsibility even in structured power systems.

Neural Processes Linking Interoception to Moral Preferences Aligned with Group Consensus

Kim, J., & Kim, H. (2025).

Journal of Neuroscience, e1114242025.

https://doi.org/10.1523/jneurosci.1114-24.2025

Abstract

Aligning one’s decisions with the prevailing norms and expectations of those around us constitutes a fundamental facet of moral decision-making. When faced with conflicting moral values, one adaptive approach is to rely on intuitive moral preference. While there has been theoretical speculation about the connection between moral preference and an individual’s awareness of introspective interoceptive signals, it has not been empirically examined. This study examines the relationships between individuals’ preferences in moral dilemmas and interoception, measured with self-report, heartbeat detection task, and resting-state fMRI. Two independent experiments demonstrate that both male and female participants’ interoceptive awareness and accuracy are associated with their moral preferences aligned with group consensus. In addition, the fractional occupancies of the brain states involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the precuneus during rest mediate the link between interoceptive awareness and the degree of moral preferences aligned to group consensus. These findings provide empirical evidence of the neural mechanism underlying the link between interoception and moral preferences aligned with group consensus.

Significance statement

We investigate the intricate link between interoceptive ability to perceive internal bodily signals and decision-making when faced with moral dilemmas. Our findings reveal a significant correlation between the accuracy and awareness of interoceptive signals and the degree of moral preferences aligned with group consensus. Additionally, brain states involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and precuneus during rest mediate the link between interoceptive awareness and moral preferences aligned with group consensus. These findings provide empirical evidence that internal bodily signals play a critical role in shaping our moral intuitions according to others’ expectations across various social contexts.

Here are some thoughts:

A recent study highlighted that our moral decisions may be influenced by our body's internal signals, particularly our heartbeat. Researchers found that individuals who could accurately perceive their own heartbeats tended to make moral choices aligning with the majority, regardless of whether those choices were utilitarian or deontological. This implies that bodily awareness might unconsciously guide us toward socially accepted norms. Brain scans supported this, showing increased activity in areas associated with evaluation and judgment, like the medial prefrontal cortex, in those more attuned to their internal signals. While the study's participants were exclusively Korean college students, limiting generalizability, the findings open up intriguing possibilities about the interplay between bodily awareness and moral decision-making.

The impact of AI errors in a human-in-the-loop process

Agudo, U., Liberal, K. G., et al. (2024).

Cognitive Research Principles and 

Implications, 9(1).

https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-023-00529-3

Abstract

Automated decision-making is becoming increasingly common in the public sector. As a result, political institutions recommend the presence of humans in these decision-making processes as a safeguard against potentially erroneous or biased algorithmic decisions. However, the scientific literature on human-in-the-loop performance is not conclusive about the benefits and risks of such human presence, nor does it clarify which aspects of this human–computer interaction may influence the final decision. In two experiments, we simulate an automated decision-making process in which participants judge multiple defendants in relation to various crimes, and we manipulate the time in which participants receive support from a supposed automated system with Artificial Intelligence (before or after they make their judgments). Our results show that human judgment is affected when participants receive incorrect algorithmic support, particularly when they receive it before providing their own judgment, resulting in reduced accuracy. The data and materials for these experiments are freely available at the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/b6p4z/ Experiment 2 was preregistered.

Here are some thoughts:

This study explores the impact of AI errors in human-in-the-loop processes, where humans and AI systems collaborate in decision-making.  The research specifically investigates how the timing of AI support influences human judgment and decision accuracy.  The findings indicate that human judgment is negatively affected by incorrect algorithmic support, particularly when provided before the human's own judgment, leading to decreased accuracy.  This research highlights the complexities of human-computer interaction in automated decision-making contexts and emphasizes the need for a deeper understanding of how AI support systems can be effectively integrated to minimize errors and biases.    

This is important for psychologists because it sheds light on the cognitive biases and decision-making processes involved when humans interact with AI systems, which is an increasingly relevant area of study in the field.  Understanding these interactions can help psychologists develop interventions and strategies to mitigate negative impacts, such as automation bias, and improve the design of human-computer interfaces to optimize decision-making accuracy and reduce errors in various sectors, including public service, healthcare, and justice. 

Moral judgement and decision-making: theoretical predictions and null results

Hertz, U., Jia, F., & Francis, K. B. (2023).

Scientific Reports, 13(1).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-34899-x

Abstract

The study of moral judgement and decision making examines the way predictions made by moral and ethical theories fare in real world settings. Such investigations are carried out using a variety of approaches and methods, such as experiments, modeling, and observational and field studies, in a variety of populations. The current Collection on moral judgments and decision making includes works that represent this variety, while focusing on some common themes, including group morality and the role of affect in moral judgment. The Collection also includes a significant number of studies that made theoretically driven predictions and failed to find support for them. We highlight the importance of such null-results papers, especially in fields that are traditionally governed by theoretical frameworks.

Here are some thoughts:

The article explores how predictions from moral theories—particularly deontological and utilitarian ethics—hold up in empirical studies. Drawing from a range of experiments involving moral dilemmas, economic games, and cross-cultural analyses, the authors highlight the increasing importance of null results—findings where expected theoretical effects were not observed.

These outcomes challenge assumptions such as the idea that deontologists are inherently more trusted than utilitarians or that moral responsibility diffuses more in group settings. The studies also show how individual traits (e.g., depression, emotional awareness) and cultural or ideological contexts influence moral decisions.

For practicing psychologists, this research underscores the importance of moving beyond theoretical assumptions toward a more evidence-based, context-sensitive understanding of moral reasoning. It emphasizes the relevance of emotional processes in moral evaluation, the impact of group dynamics, and the necessity of accounting for cultural and psychological diversity in decision-making. Additionally, the article advocates for valuing null results as critical to theory refinement and scientific integrity in the study of moral behavior.

Emotional and Cognitive “Route” in Decision-Making Process: The Relationship between Executive Functions, Psychophysiological Correlates, Decisional Styles, and Personality

Crivelli, D., Acconito, C., & Balconi, M. (2024).

Brain sciences, 14(7), 734.

https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci14070734

Abstract

Studies on decision-making have classically focused exclusively on its cognitive component. Recent research has shown that a further essential component of decisional processes is the emotional one. Indeed, the emotional route in decision-making plays a crucial role, especially in situations characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk. Despite that, individual differences concerning such components and their associations with individual traits, decisional styles, and psychophysiological profiles are still understudied. This pilot study aimed at investigating the relationship between individual propensity toward using an emotional or cognitive information-processing route in decision-making, EEG and autonomic correlates of the decisional performance as collected via wearable non-invasive devices, and individual personality and decisional traits. Participants completed a novel task based on realistic decisional scenarios while their physiological activity (EEG and autonomic indices) was monitored. Self-report questionnaires were used to collect data on personality traits, individual differences, and decisional styles. Data analyses highlighted two main findings. Firstly, different personality traits and decisional styles showed significant and specific correlations, with an individual propensity toward either emotional or cognitive information processing for decision-making. Secondly, task-related EEG and autonomic measures presented a specific and distinct correlation pattern with different decisional styles, maximization traits, and personality traits, suggesting different latent profiles.

Here are some thoughts:

This research provides valuable insights for psychologists by offering a more comprehensive understanding of decision-making, moving beyond a purely cognitive perspective to incorporate the crucial role of emotions and individual differences. It also highlights the importance of individual differences, emphasizing how personality traits and decisional styles influence how people process information and make choices. Furthermore, the research integrates psychological and physiological perspectives by combining self-report data with EEG and autonomic measures, providing a more holistic view of the decision-making process. Ultimately, the findings can inform interventions and applications in various fields, such as clinical psychology, organizational psychology, and consumer behavior, to better understand and support decision-making in different contexts.

Moral Judgment and Decision Making

Bartels, D.  et al.(n.d.).

In The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of

Judgment and Decision Making.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265086754

Abstract

This chapter focuses on moral flexibility, a term that the authors use that people are strongly motivated to adhere to and affirm their moral beliefs in their judgments and choices, they really want to get it right, they really want to do the right thing, but context strongly influences which moral beliefs are brought to bear in a given situation. It reviews contemporary research on moral judgment and decision making, and suggests ways that the major themes in the literature relate to the notion of moral flexibility. The chapter explains what makes moral judgment and decision making unique. It also reviews three major research themes and their explananda: morally prohibited value trade-offs in decision making; rules, reason, and emotion in trade-offs; and judgments of moral blame and punishment. The chapter also comments on methodological desiderata and presents understudied areas of inquiry.

Here are some thoughts:

This chapter explores the psychology of moral judgment and decision-making. The authors argue that people are motivated to adhere to moral beliefs, but context strongly influences which beliefs are applied in a given situation, resulting in moral flexibility.  The chapter reviews three major research themes: moral value tradeoffs, the role of rules, reason, and emotion in moral tradeoffs, and judgments of moral blame and punishment.  The authors discuss normative ethical theories, including consequentialism (utilitarianism), deontology, and virtue ethics.  They also examine the influence of protected values and sacred values on moral decision-making, highlighting the conflict between rule-based and consequentialist decision strategies.  Furthermore, the chapter investigates the interplay of emotion, reason, automaticity, and cognitive control in moral judgment, discussing dual-process models, moral grammar, and the reconciliation of rules and emotions.  The authors explore factors influencing moral blame and punishment, including the role of intentions, outcomes, and character evaluations.  The chapter concludes by emphasizing the complexity of moral decision-making and the importance of considering contextual influences. 

Does One Emotion Rule All Our Ethical Judgments

Elizabeth Kolbert

The New Yorker

Originally published 13 Jan 25

Here is an excerpt:

Gray describes himself as a moral psychologist. In contrast to moral philosophers, who search for abstract principles of right and wrong, moral psychologists are interested in the empirical matter of people’s perceptions. Gray writes, “We put aside questions of how we should make moral judgments to examine how people do make more moral judgments.”

For the past couple of decades, moral psychology has been dominated by what’s known as moral-foundations theory, or M.F.T. According to M.F.T., people reach ethical decisions on the basis of mental structures, or “modules,” that evolution has wired into our brains. These modules—there are at least five of them—involve feelings like empathy for the vulnerable, resentment of cheaters, respect for authority, regard for sanctity, and anger at betrayal. The reason people often arrive at different judgments is that their modules have developed differently, either for individual or for cultural reasons. Liberals have come to rely almost exclusively on their fairness and empathy modules, allowing the others to atrophy. Conservatives, by contrast, tend to keep all their modules up and running.

If you find this theory implausible, you’re not alone. It has been criticized on a wide range of grounds, including that it is unsupported by neuroscience. Gray, for his part, wants to sweep aside moral-foundations theory, plural, and replace it with moral-foundation theory, singular. Our ethical judgments, he suggests, are governed not by a complex of modules but by one overriding emotion. Untold generations of cowering have written fear into our genes, rendering us hypersensitive to threats of harm.

“If you want to know what someone sees as wrong, your best bet is to figure out what they see as harmful,” Gray writes at one point. At another point: “All people share a harm-based moral mind.” At still another: “Harm is the master key of morality.”

If people all have the same ethical equipment, why are ethical questions so divisive? Gray’s answer is that different people fear differently. “Moral disagreements can still arise even if we all share a harm-based moral mind, because liberals and conservatives disagree about who is especially vulnerable to victimization,” he writes.

The info is here.

Here are some thoughts:

Notably, I am a big fan of Kurt Gray and his research. Search this site for multiple articles.

Our moral psychology is deeply rooted in our evolutionary past, particularly in our sensitivity to harm, which was crucial for survival. This legacy continues to influence modern moral and political debates, often leading to polarized views based on differing perceptions of harm. Kurt Gray’s argument that harm is the "master key" of morality simplifies the complex nature of moral judgments, offering a unifying framework while potentially overlooking the nuanced ways in which cultural and individual differences shape moral reasoning. His critique of moral-foundations theory (M.F.T.) challenges the idea that moral judgments are based on multiple innate modules, suggesting instead that a singular focus on harm underpins our moral (and sometime ethical) decisions. This perspective highlights how moral disagreements, such as those over abortion or immigration, arise from differing assumptions about who is vulnerable to harm.

The idea that moral judgments are often intuitive rather than rational further complicates our understanding of moral decision-making. Gray’s examples, such as incestuous siblings or a vegetarian eating human flesh, illustrate how people instinctively perceive harm even when none is evident. This challenges the notion that moral reasoning is based on logical deliberation, emphasizing instead the role of emotion and intuition. Gray’s emphasis on harm-based storytelling as a tool for bridging moral divides underscores the power of narrative in shaping perceptions. However, it also raises concerns about the potential for manipulation, as seen in the use of exaggerated or false narratives in political rhetoric, such as Donald Trump’s fabricated tales of harm.

Ultimately, the article raises important questions about whether our evolved moral psychology is adequate for addressing the complex challenges of the modern world, such as climate change, nuclear weapons, and artificial intelligence. The mismatch between our ancient instincts and contemporary problems may be a significant source of societal tension. Gray’s work invites reflection on how we can better understand and address the roots of moral conflict, while cautioning against the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on intuitive judgments and emotional narratives. It suggests that while storytelling can foster empathy and bridge divides, it must be used responsibly to avoid exacerbating polarization and misinformation.

Incompetence & Losing Capacity: Answers to 8 FAQs

Leslie Kernisan

(2024, November 30). Better Health While Aging.

Link is here.

Perhaps your elderly father insists he has no difficulties driving, even though he’s gotten into some fender benders and you find yourself a bit uncomfortable when you ride in the car with him.

Or you’ve worried about your aging aunt giving an alarming amount of money to people who call her on the phone.

Or maybe it’s your older spouse, who has started refusing to take his medication, claiming that it’s poisoned because the neighbor is out to get him.

These situations are certainly concerning, and they often prompt families to ask me if they should be worried about an older adult becoming “incompetent.”

In response, I usually answer that we need to do at least two things:

• We should assess whether the person has “capacity” to make the decision in question.

• If there are signs concerning for memory or thinking problems, we should evaluate to determine what might be causing them.

If you’ve been concerned about an older person’s mental wellbeing or ability to make decisions, understanding what clinicians — and lawyers —mean by capacity is hugely important.

The info is here.

The website addresses concerns related to the decision-making capacity of older adults, particularly in light of cognitive impairments such as dementia. It emphasizes the importance of understanding "capacity," which refers to an individual's ability to make informed decisions about specific matters. Dr. Leslie Kernisan outlines that capacity is not a binary state; instead, it is decision-specific and can fluctuate based on health conditions. For example, an older adult may retain the capacity to make simple decisions but struggle with more complex ones, especially if they are experiencing health issues or cognitive decline.

Dr. Kernisan distinguishes between incapacity and incompetence, noting that capacity is typically assessed in clinical settings by healthcare professionals, while competence is a legal determination made by courts. The document explains that various types of decisions—such as medical consent, financial matters, and driving—require different capacities, and the legal standards for these capacities can vary by state.

The article also highlights the impact of Alzheimer's disease and other dementias on decision-making abilities. In early stages, individuals may still have the capacity for many decisions, but as the disease progresses, their ability to make even simple choices may diminish. Therefore, it is crucial for families to seek clinical assessments of capacity when there are concerns about an older adult's decision-making abilities.

Moreover, the document advises that legal determinations of incapacity may be necessary before overriding an older person's decisions, especially in matters concerning safety or financial well-being. Families are encouraged to consult with legal professionals when navigating these issues to ensure they are acting within legal and ethical boundaries.

Overall, the article serves as a practical guide for caregivers and family members dealing with the complexities of aging and cognitive decline, stressing the need for respectful communication and proactive measures to protect the autonomy and safety of older adults.

People Reject Free Money and Cheap Deals Because They Infer Phantom Costs

Vonasch, A. J., Mofradidoost, R., & Gray, K. (2024).

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 0(0).

https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672241235687

Abstract

If money is good, then shouldn’t more money always be better? Perhaps not. Traditional economic theories suggest that money is an ever-increasing incentivizer. If someone will accept a job for US$20/hr, they should be more likely to accept the same job for US$30/hr and especially for US$250/hr. However, 10 preregistered, high-powered studies (N = 4,205, in the United States and Iran) reveal how increasing incentives can backfire. Overly generous offers lead people to infer “phantom costs” that make them less likely to accept high job wages, cheap plane fares, and free money. We present a theory for understanding when and why people imagine these hidden drawbacks and show how phantom costs drive judgments, impact behavior, and intersect with individual differences. Phantom costs change how we should think about “economic rationality.” Economic exchanges are not merely about money, but instead are social interactions between people trying to perceive (and deceive) each others’ minds.

Significance Statement

This article introduces the concept of “phantom costs,” which explain why incentives backfire. This effect is important for any situation in which incentives are offered, ranging from jobs to governmental policies. The standard model in economics assumes people respond rationally to incentives—for example, people are more likely to accept offers for more money than less money. However, this reveals that people spontaneously appreciate the social context of financial offers—especially overly generous offers. Phantoms costs reveal an important change from the standard model beyond standard heuristics and biases. Phantom costs also provide a framework to make sense of other seemingly paradoxical effects of money and provide an important bridge between behavioral economics and social cognition.

Why is this important for clinical psychologists and mental health professionals?

1. It provides insights into irrational decision-making and cognitive biases that can contribute to mental health issues like anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and depression. Understanding these biases can help clinicians better conceptualize and treat certain disorders.
2. The findings relate to how people evaluate costs/benefits, which is relevant for motivational issues in psychotherapy. Clinicians could apply these concepts to enhance patient motivation by framing treatment recommendations in ways that reduce perceived "phantom costs."
3. It highlights the role of emotions and intuitive judgments in decision-making, which is important for clinical psychologists to understand when working with patients to modify maladaptive thought patterns and behaviors.
4. The study touches on consumer psychology, which has applications in areas like health behavior change. Clinicians could use similar framing effects to promote healthier choices by patients.
5. More broadly, it demonstrates how psychological research can yield counterintuitive insights that challenge assumptions, which is valuable for clinical practice rooted in empirical evidence rather than intuition alone.