Overconfidently conspiratorial: Conspiracy believers are dispositionally overconfident and massively overestimate how much others agree with them

Pennycook, G., Binnendyk, J., & Rand, D. G. 

(2022, December 5). PsyArXiv

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/d5fz2

Abstract

There is a pressing need to understand belief in false conspiracies. Past work has focused on the needs and motivations of conspiracy believers, as well as the role of overreliance on intuition. Here, we propose an alternative driver of belief in conspiracies: overconfidence. Across eight studies with 4,181 U.S. adults, conspiracy believers not only relied more intuition, but also overestimated their performance on numeracy and perception tests (i.e. were overconfident in their own abilities). This relationship with overconfidence was robust to controlling for analytic thinking, need for uniqueness, and narcissism, and was strongest for the most fringe conspiracies. We also found that conspiracy believers – particularly overconfident ones – massively overestimated (>4x) how much others agree with them: Although conspiracy beliefs were in the majority in only 12% of 150 conspiracies across three studies, conspiracy believers thought themselves to be in the majority 93% of the time.

Here is my summary:

The research found that people who believe in conspiracy theories are more likely to be overconfident in their own abilities and to overestimate how much others agree with them. This was true even when controlling for other factors, such as analytic thinking, need for uniqueness, and narcissism.

The researchers conducted a series of studies to test their hypothesis. In one study, they found that people who believed in conspiracy theories were more likely to overestimate their performance on numeracy and perception tests. In another study, they found that people who believed in conspiracy theories were more likely to overestimate how much others agreed with them about a variety of topics, including climate change and the 2016 US presidential election.

The researchers suggest that overconfidence may play a role in the formation and maintenance of conspiracy beliefs. When people are overconfident, they are more likely to dismiss evidence that contradicts their beliefs and to seek out information that confirms their beliefs. This can lead to a "filter bubble" effect, where people are only exposed to information that reinforces their existing beliefs.

The researchers also suggest that overconfidence may lead people to overestimate how much others agree with them about their conspiracy beliefs. This can make them feel more confident in their beliefs and less likely to question them.

The findings of this research have implications for understanding and addressing the spread of conspiracy theories. It is important to be aware of the role that overconfidence may play in the formation and maintenance of conspiracy beliefs. This knowledge can be used to develop more effective interventions to prevent people from falling for conspiracy theories and to help people who already believe in conspiracy theories to critically evaluate their beliefs.

Older Americans are more vulnerable to prior exposure effects in news evaluation.

Lyons, B. A. (2023). 

Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review.

https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-118

Outline

Older news users may be especially vulnerable to prior exposure effects, whereby news comes to be seen as more accurate over multiple viewings. I test this in re-analyses of three two-wave, nationally representative surveys in the United States (N = 8,730) in which respondents rated a series of mainstream, hyperpartisan, and false political headlines (139,082 observations). I find that prior exposure effects increase with age—being strongest for those in the oldest cohort (60+)—especially for false news. I discuss implications for the design of media literacy programs and policies regarding targeted political advertising aimed at this group.

Essay Summary

• I used three two-wave, nationally representative surveys in the United States (N = 8,730) in which respondents rated a series of actual mainstream, hyperpartisan, or false political headlines. Respondents saw a sample of headlines in the first wave and all headlines in the second wave, allowing me to determine if prior exposure increases perceived accuracy differentially across age.  

• I found that the effect of prior exposure to headlines on perceived accuracy increases with age. The effect increases linearly with age, with the strongest effect for those in the oldest age cohort (60+). These age differences were most pronounced for false news.

• These findings suggest that repeated exposure can help account for the positive relationship between age and sharing false information online. However, the size of this effect also underscores that other factors (e.g., greater motivation to derogate the out-party) may play a larger role. 

The beginning of the Implications Section

Web-tracking and social media trace data paint a concerning portrait of older news users. Older American adults were much more likely to visit dubious news sites in 2016 and 2020 (Guess, Nyhan, et al., 2020; Moore et al., 2023), and were also more likely to be classified as false news “supersharers” on Twitter, a group who shares the vast majority of dubious news on the platform (Grinberg et al., 2019). Likewise, this age group shares about seven times more links to these domains on Facebook than younger news consumers (Guess et al., 2019; Guess et al., 2021). 

Interestingly, however, older adults appear to be no worse, if not better, at identifying false news stories than younger cohorts when asked in surveys (Brashier & Schacter, 2020). Why might older adults identify false news in surveys but fall for it “in the wild?” There are likely multiple factors at play, ranging from social changes across the lifespan (Brashier & Schacter, 2020) to changing orientations to politics (Lyons et al., 2023) to cognitive declines (e.g., in memory) (Brashier & Schacter, 2020). In this paper, I focus on one potential contributor. Specifically, I tested the notion that differential effects of prior exposure to false news helps account for the disjuncture between older Americans’ performance in survey tasks and their behavior in the wild.

A large body of literature has been dedicated to exploring the magnitude and potential boundary conditions of the illusory truth effect (Hassan & Barber, 2021; Henderson et al., 2021; Pillai & Fazio, 2021)—a phenomenon in which false statements or news headlines (De keersmaecker et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2018) come to be believed over multiple exposures. Might this effect increase with age? As detailed by Brashier and Schacter (2020), cognitive deficits are often blamed for older news users’ behaviors. This may be because cognitive abilities are strongest in young adulthood and slowly decline beyond that point (Salthouse, 2009), resulting in increasingly effortful cognition (Hess et al., 2016). As this process unfolds, older adults may be more likely to fall back on heuristics when judging the veracity of news items (Brashier & Marsh, 2020). Repetition, the source of the illusory truth effect, is one heuristic that may be relied upon in such a scenario. This is because repeated messages feel easier to process and thus are seen as truer than unfamiliar ones (Unkelbach et al., 2019).

The essay is here.

Christ, Country, and Conspiracies? Christian Nationalism, Biblical Literalism, and Belief in Conspiracy Theories

Walker, B., & Vegter, A.

Journal for the Study of Religion

May 8, 2023.

The webpage is here.

Abstract

When misinformation is rampant, “fake news” is rising, and conspiracy theories are widespread, social scientists have a vested interest in understanding who is most susceptible to these false narratives and why. Recent research suggests Christians are especially susceptible to belief in conspiracy theories in the United States, but scholars have yet to ascertain the role of religiopolitical identities and epistomological approaches, specifically Christian nationalism and biblical literalism, in generalized conspiracy thinking. Because Christian nationalists sense that the nation is under cultural threat and biblical literalism provides an alternative (often anti-elite) source of information, we predict that both will amplify conspiracy thinking. We find that Christian nationalism and biblical literalism independently predict conspiracy thinking, but that the effect of Christian nationalism increases with literalism. Our results point to the contingent effects of Christian nationalism and the need for the religious variables in understanding conspiracy thinking.

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I could not find a free pdf.  Here is  summary.

The study's findings suggest that Christian nationalism and biblical literalism may be contributing factors to the rise of conspiracy theories in the United States. The study also suggests that efforts to address the problem of conspiracy theories may need to focus on addressing these underlying beliefs.

Here are some additional details from the study:

• The study surveyed a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults.
• The study found that 25% of Christian nationalists and 20% of biblical literalists believe in at least one conspiracy theory, compared to 12% of people who do not hold these beliefs.
• The study found that the belief in conspiracy theories is amplified when people feel that their nation is under cultural threat. For example, Christian nationalists who believe that the nation is under cultural threat are more likely to believe that the government is hiding information about extraterrestrial life.

Do conspiracy theorists think too much or too little?

N.M. Brashier

Current Opinion in Psychology

Volume 49, February 2023, 101504

Abstract

Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable? On the one hand, conspiracy theorists seem to disregard accuracy; they tend to endorse mutually incompatible conspiracies, think intuitively, use heuristics, and hold other irrational beliefs. But by definition, conspiracy theorists reject the mainstream explanation for an event, often in favor of a more complex account. They exhibit a general distrust of others and expend considerable effort to find ‘evidence’ supporting their beliefs. In searching for answers, conspiracy theorists likely expose themselves to misleading information online and overestimate their own knowledge. Understanding when elaboration and cognitive effort might backfire is crucial, as conspiracy beliefs lead to political disengagement, environmental inaction, prejudice, and support for violence.

Implications

People who are drawn to conspiracy theories exhibit other stable traits – like lower cognitive ability, intuitive thinking, and proneness to cognitive biases – that suggest they are ‘lazy thinkers.’ On the other hand, conspiracy theorists also exhibit extreme levels of skepticism and expend energy justifying their beliefs; this effortful processing can ironically reinforce conspiracy beliefs. Thus, people carelessly fall down rabbit holes at some points (e.g., when reading repetitive conspiratorial claims) and methodically climb down at others (e.g., when initiating searches online). Conspiracy theories undermine elections, threaten the environment, and harm human health, so it is vitally important that interventions aimed at increasing evaluation and reducing these beliefs do not inadvertently backfire.

The research is here.

The impact of economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs

Salvador Casara, B. G., Suitner, C., & Jetten, J.

(2022). Journal of Experimental Social 

Psychology, 98, 104245.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2021.104245

Abstract

Previous literature highlights the crucial role of economic inequality in triggering a range of negative societal outcomes. However, the relationship between economic inequality and the proliferation of conspiracy beliefs remains unexplored. Here, we explore the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs as an outcome of objective country-level (Study 1a, 1b, 1c), perceived (Study 2), and manipulated economic inequality (Studies 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b). In the correlational studies, both objective and perceived economic inequality were associated with greater conspiracy beliefs. In the experiments, participants in the high (compared to the low) inequality condition were more likely to endorse conspiratorial narratives. This effect was fully mediated by anomie (Studies 3a, 3b) suggesting that inequality enhances the perception that society is breaking down (anomie), which in turn increases conspiratorial thinking, possibly in an attempt to regain some sense of order and control. Furthermore, the link between economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs was stronger when participants endorsed a conspiracy worldview (Studies 4a, 4b). Moreover, conspiracy beliefs mediated the effect of the economic inequality manipulation on willingness to engage in collective action aimed at addressing economic inequality. The results show that economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs go hand in hand: economic inequality can cause conspiratorial thinking and conspiracy beliefs can motivate collective action against economic inequality.

From the General Discussion

It is also important to consider whether economic inequality triggers the endorsement of general or more specific conspiracy beliefs. Data from Studies 3a and 3b showed that the manipulation of economic inequality affects the endorsement of a wide range of conspiracy beliefs— general conspiracy beliefs as well as conspiracies that relate to the specific fictional society. In Studies 4a and 4b, we found that inequality enhanced the belief in conspiracies perpetrated by different groups in the specific fictional society (i.e., politicians, scientists, multinational companies, and pharmaceutical industries) while it did not affect participants’ conspiracy worldview. Future research should focus on the impact of economic inequality on the endorsement of specific versus more general conspiracy theories. It may well be the case that the relation between economic inequality and conspiracy belief endorsement is stronger when participants consider specific conspiracy beliefs that blame an outgroup for heightened anomie that results from economic inequality. Such conspiracy beliefs best serve the function of mobilizing collective ingroup action that might hold the promise of providing people with a sense of collective agency (or control; see Bukowski et al., 2017).

These results have important implications. First, those who are prone to believe in conspiracy theories are sometimes viewed as driven by irrationality — a vision that is indeed supported by a vast literature about the negative consequences of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Van der Linden, 2015). Other findings show that conspiracy beliefs are associated with dispositional constructs that are prodromal of mental disease, such as schizotypy and delusional thinking (Barron et al., 2018; Darwin et al., 2011). However, factors that trigger conspiracy beliefs are not always irrational and they may be driven by anomie-prompted socio-structural perceptions about societies, such as economic inequality. 

The research is here.

Their own worst enemy? Collective narcissists are willing to conspire against their in-group

M. Biddlestone, A. Cichocka, 

M. Główczewski, & A. Cislak

The British Psychological Society

Accepted: 11 April 2022

Abstract

Collective narcissism – a belief in in-group greatness that is not appreciated by others – is associated with using one's group for personal benefits. Across one pilot and four studies, we demonstrated that collective narcissism predicts readiness to conspire against in-group members (rmeta-analysis = .24). In Study 1, conducted in Poland (N = 361), collective narcissism measured in the context of national identity predicted readiness to engage in secret surveillance against one's own country's citizens. In Study 2 (N = 174; pre-registered), collective narcissism in UK workplace teams predicted intentions to engage in conspiracies against co-workers. In Study 3 (N = 471; pre-registered), US national narcissism predicted intentions to conspire against fellow citizens. Furthermore, conspiracy intentions accounted for the relationship between collective narcissism and beliefs in conspiracy theories about the in-group. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 1064; pre-registered), we corroborated the link between Polish national narcissism and conspiracy intentions against fellow citizens, further showing that these intentions were only directed towards group members that were perceived as moderately or strongly typical of the national in-group (but not when perceived in-group typicality was low). In-group identification was either negatively related (Studies 1 and 2) or unrelated (Studies 3 and 4) to conspiracy intentions (rmeta-analysis = .04). We discuss implications for research on conspiracy theories and populism.

Practitioner points

• Analysts should monitor cases of public endorsement of collective narcissism, which is a belief that one’s in-group (e.g. nation, organisation, or political party) is exceptional but underappreciated by others.
• As we show, collective narcissism is associated with a willingness to conspire against fellow in-group members and with support for in-group surveillance policies.
• Thus, groups cherishing such a defensive form of in-group identity are threatened from the inside, thereby warranting education aimed at identifying and avoiding potential exploitation from otherwise trusted members within their own groups.

From the General Discussion

Importantly,  given  the  correlational  nature  of  our  studies,  causality  was  not  established.  It  is  then  also possible that in-group conspiracy beliefs affected conspiracy intentions. For example, intentions to engage in conspiracies within one's group might be a response to a conviction that malevolent forces operate within one's society. Such beliefs and intentions might in fact form a positive feedback loop, which fuels a culture of intragroup suspicion and paranoia, making conspiracy narratives about the in- group more believable and further frustrating personal needs (see also Douglas et al., 2017). This also implies that the conspiracies those high in collective narcissism appear willing to engage in are unlikely to satisfy the frustrated personal needs they purport to serve.

A pdf is here.

Can Conspiracy Beliefs Be Beneficial? Longitudinal Linkages Between Conspiracy Beliefs, Anxiety, Uncertainty Aversion, and Existential Threat

Liekefett, L., Christ, O., & Becker, J. C. (2022). 

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211060965

Abstract

Research suggests that conspiracy beliefs are adopted because they promise to reduce anxiety, uncertainty, and threat. However, little research has investigated whether conspiracy beliefs actually fulfill these promises. We conducted two longitudinal studies (N Study 1 = 405, N Study 2 = 1,012) to examine how conspiracy beliefs result from, and in turn influence, anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat. Random intercept cross-lagged panel analyses indicate that people who were, on average, more anxious, uncertainty averse, and existentially threatened held stronger conspiracy beliefs. Increases in conspiracy beliefs were either unrelated to changes in anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat (Study 2), or even predicted increases in these variables (Study 1). In both studies, increases in conspiracy beliefs predicted subsequent increases in conspiracy beliefs, suggesting a self-reinforcing circle. We conclude that conspiracy beliefs likely do not have beneficial consequences, but may even reinforce the negative experience of anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat.

From the General Discussion

Are conspiracy beliefs beneficial or harmful for the individual?

In both studies, within-person increases in conspiracy beliefs did not predict reduced anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat. Increases in conspiracy beliefs were either unrelated to changes in these variables (Study 2) or even predicted increases in uncertainty aversion, anxiety, and existential threat (Study 1). This indicates that conspiracy beliefs are likely not beneficial in this regard. However, we cannot answer conclusively whether conspiracy beliefs, instead, reinforce the negative experience of anxiety, uncertainty, and threat: We observed these harmful effects only in Study 1. It may be that the time intervals in Study 2 were too long to observe these effects. It has been argued that the optimal time intervals to observe longitudinal relations are relatively short, especially for within-person effects (Dormann & Griffin, 2015), and that effect sizes typically decrease as time intervals get larger (Atkinson et al., 2000; Cohen, 1993; Dormann & Griffin, 2015; Hulin et al., 1990). This may explain why we observed only few within-person associations in Study 2.

We did not find within-person consequences of coronavirus-related conspiracy beliefs in Study 2. This may be due not only to long time intervals, but also to opposing effects that cancel each other out: Most coronavirus conspiracy beliefs contain some element that downplays the dangers of the virus, which might relieve distress. Yet, most of them also describe threatening scenarios of malevolent, secret forces, which should increase distress.

We revealed an additional way in which conspiracy beliefs may be harmful for the individual: Both studies found that increases in conspiracy beliefs predicted even further increases in conspiracy beliefs at the next measurement wave. This effect emerged for both short- and long-term distances, and indicates that conspiracy beliefs are part of a self-reinforcing cycle that results in more and more extreme attitudes (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2012).

The research is here.