Evidence-based scientific thinking and decision-making in everyday life

Dawson, C.,  et al. (2024).

Cognitive research: principles and 

implications, 9(1), 50.

https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-024-00578-2

Abstract

In today's knowledge economy, it is critical to make decisions based on high-quality evidence. Science-related decision-making is thought to rely on a complex interplay of reasoning skills, cognitive styles, attitudes, and motivations toward information. By investigating the relationship between individual differences and behaviors related to evidence-based decision-making, our aim was to better understand how adults engage with scientific information in everyday life. First, we used a data-driven exploratory approach to identify four latent factors in a large set of measures related to cognitive skills and epistemic attitudes. The resulting structure suggests that key factors include curiosity and positive attitudes toward science, prosociality, cognitive skills, and openmindedness to new information. Second, we investigated whether these factors predicted behavior in a naturalistic decision-making task. In the task, participants were introduced to a real science-related petition and were asked to read six online articles related to the petition, which varied in scientific quality, while deciding how to vote. We demonstrate that curiosity and positive science attitudes, cognitive flexibility, prosociality and emotional states, were related to engaging with information and discernment of evidence reliability. We further found that that social authority is a powerful cue for source credibility, even above the actual quality and relevance of the sources. Our results highlight that individual motivating factors toward information engagement, like curiosity, and social factors such as social authority are important drivers of how adults judge the credibility of everyday sources of scientific information.

Here are some thoughts:

This paper offers valuable insights for practicing psychologists by illuminating the complex interplay of cognitive, emotional, and social factors that shape how individuals engage with scientific evidence. 

For psychologists themselves, the findings serve as a critical reminder that our own evidence-based practice is not just about accessing high-quality research, but also about understanding our own cognitive and emotional processes when evaluating information. The study underscores that even trained professionals can be influenced by heuristic cues like the social authority of a journal or institution. Therefore, we must cultivate active open-mindedness and intellectual humility in our own professional development, consciously seeking out and fairly considering evidence that may challenge our theoretical orientations or treatment preferences. The research also highlights that analytical thinking alone does not guarantee unbiased reasoning; it can be co-opted for motivated reasoning to justify existing beliefs. This necessitates that clinicians engage in regular reflective practice and supervision to scrutinize their clinical decisions, ensuring we are driven by the best available evidence and client needs, rather than cognitive ease or allegiance to familiar models.

When applied to patient care, these insights become a powerful framework for enhancing therapeutic communication and psychoeducation. The finding that individuals vary greatly in their epistemic curiosity, need for closure, and reliance on social authority means that a one-size-fits-all approach to providing information is ineffective. A psychologist working with a vaccine-hesitant client, for example, must first understand whether the client’s stance is driven by a lack of curiosity, a high need for closure, a distrust of scientific institutions, or an over-reliance on alternative authority figures. Interventions can then be tailored accordingly: fostering curiosity and tolerance for uncertainty in one client, while helping another develop skills to critically evaluate source credibility beyond prestigious branding. The strong influence of social authority suggests that presenting information through trusted community figures or relatable personal narratives may sometimes be a more effective conduit for change than data alone, though this must be balanced with efforts to build the patient’s own critical evaluation skills.

This article won’t change your mind. Here’s why

Lubrano, S. S. (2025, May 18).

The Guardian.

Here is the link

Here is an excerpt:

There are lots of reasons why debate (and indeed, information-giving and argumentation in general) tends to be ineffective at changing people’s political beliefs. Cognitive dissonance, a phenomenon I studied as part of my PhD research, is one. This is the often unconscious psychological discomfort we feel when faced with contradictions in our own beliefs or actions, and it has been well documented. We can see cognitive dissonance and its effects at work when people rapidly “reason” in ways that are really attempts to mitigate their discomfort with new information about strongly held beliefs. For example, before Trump was convicted of various charges in 2024, only 17% of Republican voters believed felons should be able to be president; directly after his conviction, that number rose to 58%. To reconcile two contradictory beliefs (that presidents shouldn’t do x, and that Trump should be president), an enormous number of Republican voters simply changed their mind about the former. In fact, Republican voters shifted their views on more or less all the things Trump had been convicted of: fewer felt it was immoral to have sex with a porn star, pay someone to stay silent about an affair, or falsify a business record. Nor is this effect limited to Trump voters: research suggests we all rationalise in this way, in order to hold on to the beliefs that let us keep operating as we have been. Or, ironically, to change some of our beliefs in response to new information, but often only in order to not have to sacrifice other strongly held beliefs.

But it’s not just psychological phenomena like cognitive dissonance that make debates and arguments relatively ineffective. As I lay out in my book, probably the most important reason words don’t change minds is that two other factors carry far more influence: our social relationships; and our own actions and experiences.

Here are some thoughts:

The article discusses how people often resist changing their minds, even when presented with strong evidence, due to the psychological and social costs involved. It explains that beliefs are deeply tied to personal identity and social relationships, making individuals reluctant to alter them to avoid feelings of inconsistency or social rejection. The psychological mechanism at play is cognitive dissonance, where holding contradictory beliefs causes discomfort, leading people to reject new information that conflicts with their existing views. Additionally, motivated reasoning drives individuals to interpret evidence in a way that aligns with their preexisting beliefs to maintain emotional and social harmony. The article suggests that fostering open, non-confrontational discussions and emphasizing shared values can help reduce resistance to changing one’s mind, as it lessens the perceived threat to identity and social bonds.

Persuading people is a lot like psychotherapy because both require creating a safe, non-judgmental space where individuals can explore conflicting beliefs without feeling defensive, allowing change to emerge from within rather than through forceful confrontation.

Bounded ethicality and ethical fading in negotiations: Understanding unintended unethical behavior.

Rees, M., Tenbrunsel, A., & Bazerman, M. (2018).

Academy of Management Perspectives, 33(1), 26–42.

https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2017.0055

Abstract

The business scandals of the past several decades have led to the rising importance of ethics as a topic central to management scholarship. Behavioral scientists in particular have been attracted to the topic in far greater numbers, and the study of ethical decision making has emerged as a core subfield (Messick & Tenbrunsel, 1996). This paper draws on that framework and applies it to negotiations, arguing that not all unethical behavior is intentional; rather, negotiators fall prey to bounded ethicality, engaging in behavior that is contradictory to their values without realizing that they are doing so. We further argue that ethical fading—when individuals do not see the ethical implications of the situation or their action—is central to explaining why this occurs. Relying on past empirical research, we identify negotiation cues that have been linked to unethical behavior, and explore how they make a negotiator particularly vulnerable to ethical fading, resulting in subsequent unethical behavior. We discuss several opportunities for future research in the negotiation discipline and other disciplines that draw on motivated social exchange or assume intentionality, and conclude with a call for scholars to define normative standards as they pertain to negotiator ethics.

A pdf of the article is here.

Here are some thoughts:

The article explores how ethical failures in organizations often result not from intentional wrongdoing, but from cognitive limitations and unconscious biases that restrict individuals’ ability to act ethically. The authors argue that even well-intentioned people routinely engage in unethical behavior without realizing it due to bounded awareness—where individuals fail to see or act on all relevant ethical information. Factors such as implicit biases, motivated blindness, and outcome bias distort judgment and decision-making, making unethical actions seem acceptable. The article calls for greater structural and organizational changes, rather than solely relying on individual character or compliance efforts, to address these hidden ethical failures and promote more ethical behavior.

Are people too flawed, ignorant, and tribal for open societies?

Dan Williams

Conspicuous Cognition

Originally posted 13 July 24

This week and the next, I am on the faculty for a two-week summer school in Budapest on “The Human Mind and the Open Society”. Organised by Thom Scott-Phillips and Christophe Heintz, the summer school focuses “on how understanding the human mind as a tool for navigating a richly social existence can inform our understanding and advocacy of open society, and the ideals it represents”:

“The notion of open society is an attempt to answer the question of how we can effectively live together in large and modern environments. Its ideals include commitments to the rule of law, freedom of association, democratic institutions, and the free use of reason and critical analysis. Arguments in favour of these ideals necessarily depend on assumptions—sometimes hidden and unexamined—about the human mind.”

I agreed to take part in the summer school because it would allow me to interact with a group of fantastic researchers and because it brings together two of my favourite things: (1) evolutionary social science and (2) the ideals of open, liberal societies—ideals that I regard as some of humanity’s most important and most fragile achievements.

In my role, I am giving two lectures on “The epistemic challenges of open societies”. The first lecture explores four factors that distort the capacity of citizens within open societies to acquire accurate beliefs about the world: complexity, invisibility, ignorance, and tribalism.

The info is here.

Here are some thoughts:

The article/blog post discusses the concept of open societies, emphasizing two key ideals: democracy and the free exchange of ideas. Open societies are characterized by political equality, typically expressed through the principle of "one person, one vote," and they promote radical freedom of thought and expression, as advocated by J.S. Mill. The text argues that these features are believed to enhance the social production of knowledge and understanding, although this optimism may be challenged by the complexities of modern societies.

Complexity and Public Opinion

Modern societies face intricate issues like climate change and economic policies, which ordinary citizens are expected to address. However, it is questioned whether they are equipped to do so, as highlighted by Walter Lippmann's critique of democracy, which points out that even experts struggle to grasp these complexities. Furthermore, the phenomenon of "rational ignorance" is introduced, explaining that individuals may choose not to become politically informed due to the minimal impact their vote has on outcomes, leading to widespread political ignorance.

Motivated Cognition and Coalitional Psychology

Despite a minority of highly engaged citizens, the text notes that those involved in politics often exhibit biases due to motivated cognition, where beliefs are shaped by personal interests rather than objective truth. This is linked to coalitional psychology, where individuals advocate for their political groups, distorting their understanding of reality to align with group interests. The article concludes that while open societies rely on informed electorates, the dynamics of motivated cognition and coalitional allegiances complicate the pursuit of truth and informed decision-making in democratic contexts.

Political ideology and environmentalism impair logical reasoning

Keller, L., Hazelaar, F., et al. (2024).

Thinking & Reasoning, 30(1), 79–108.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2200976

Abstract

People are more likely to think statements are valid when they agree with them than when they do not. We conducted four studies analyzing the interference of self-reported ideologies with performance in a syllogistic reasoning task. Study 1 established the task paradigm and demonstrated that participants’ political ideology affects syllogistic reasoning for syllogisms with political content but not politically irrelevant syllogisms. The preregistered Study 2 replicated the effect and showed that incentivizing accuracy did not alleviate these differences. Study 3 revealed that syllogistic reasoning is affected by ideology in the presence and absence of such bonus payments for correctly judging the conclusions’ logical validity. In Study 4, we observed similar effects regarding a different ideological orientation: environmentalism. Again, monetary bonuses did not attenuate these effects. Taken together, the results of four studies highlight the harm of ideology regarding people’s logical reasoning.

Here is a summary:

This paper reports four studies investigating the influence of political ideology and environmentalism on logical reasoning performance using a syllogistic reasoning task. The key findings are:

1. People were more likely to judge the conclusion of a syllogism as valid when it aligned with their ideology (liberal, conservative, or environmentalist), even when the conclusion was logically invalid. Conversely, they were more likely to recognize flaws in conclusions that went against their ideology.
2. This ideological bias in reasoning occurred symmetrically across the political spectrum - both liberals and conservatives showed impaired logical reasoning for conclusions contradicting their ideology.
3. The bias persisted even when participants were offered monetary incentives for accurately judging the logical validity of conclusions, across online and lab studies in the US and Germany.
4. Political ideology and environmentalism did not impact logical reasoning for neutral, non-ideological syllogisms, suggesting the effect was specific to ideologically charged content.

The authors argue that ideological beliefs can negatively impact logical reasoning abilities in a systematic way when dealing with belief-consonant or belief-dissonant conclusions, even for abstract reasoning tasks devoid of real-world consequences. Monetary incentives failed to mitigate this ideological reasoning effect.

The Honest Broker versus the Epistocrat: Attenuating Distrust in Science by Disentangling Science from Politics

Senja Post & Nils Bienzeisler (2024)

Political Communication

DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2024.2317274

Abstract

People’s trust in science is generally high. Yet in public policy disputes invoking scientific issues, people’s trust in science is typically polarized, aligned with their political preferences. Theorists of science and democracy have reasoned that a polarization of trust in scientific information could be mitigated by clearly disentangling scientific claims from political ones. We tested this proposition experimentally in three German public policy disputes: a) school closures versus openings during the COVID-19 pandemic, b) a ban on versus a continuation of domestic air traffic in view of climate change, and c) the shooting of wolves in residential areas or their protection. In each case study, we exposed participants to one of four versions of a news item citing a scientist reporting their research and giving policy advice. The scientist’s quotes differed with regard to the direction and style of their policy advice. As an epistocrat, the scientist blurs the distinction between scientific and political claims, purporting to “prove” a policy and thereby precluding a societal debate over values and policy priorities. As an honest broker, the scientist distinguishes between scientific and political claims, presenting a policy option while acknowledging the limitations of their disciplinary scientific perspective of a broader societal problem. We find that public policy advice in the style of an honest broker versus that of an epistocrat can attenuate political polarization of trust in scientists and scientific findings by enhancing trust primarily among the most politically challenged.

The article is here.

Here is a summary:

This article dives into the issue of distrust in science and proposes a solution: scientists acting as "honest brokers".

The article contrasts two approaches scientists can take when communicating scientific findings for policy purposes.  An "epistocrat" scientist blurs the lines between science and politics. They present a specific policy recommendation based on their research, implying that this is the only logical course of action. This doesn't acknowledge the role of values and priorities in policy decisions, and can shut down public debate.

On the other hand, an "honest broker" scientist makes a clear distinction between science and politics. They present their research findings and the policy options that stem from them, but acknowledge the limitations of science in addressing broader societal issues. This approach allows for a public discussion about values and priorities, which can help build trust in science especially among those who might not agree with the scientist's political views.

The article suggests that by following the "honest broker" approach, scientists can help reduce the political polarization of trust in science. This means presenting the science clearly and openly, and allowing for a public conversation about how those findings should be applied.

Political ideology and environmentalism impair logical reasoning

Keller, L., Hazelaar, F., et al. (2023).

Thinking & Reasoning, 1–30.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2023.2200976

Abstract

People are more likely to think statements are valid when they agree with them than when they do not. We conducted four studies analyzing the interference of self-reported ideologies with performance in a syllogistic reasoning task. Study 1 established the task paradigm and demonstrated that participants’ political ideology affects syllogistic reasoning for syllogisms with political content but not politically irrelevant syllogisms. The preregistered Study 2 replicated the effect and showed that incentivizing accuracy did not alleviate these differences. Study 3 revealed that syllogistic reasoning is affected by ideology in the presence and absence of such bonus payments for correctly judging the conclusions’ logical validity. In Study 4, we observed similar effects regarding a different ideological orientation: environmentalism. Again, monetary bonuses did not attenuate these effects. Taken together, the results of four studies highlight the harm of ideology regarding people’s logical reasoning.

A pdf of the research is here.

Here is my summary:

The research explores how pre-existing ideologies, both political and environmental, can influence how people evaluate logical arguments.  The findings suggest that people are more likely to judge arguments as valid if they align with their existing beliefs, regardless of the argument's actual logical structure. This bias was observed for both liberals and conservatives, and for those with strong environmental convictions. Offering financial rewards for accurate reasoning didn't eliminate this effect.

Is Applied Ethics Morally Problematic?

Franz, D.J.

J Acad Ethics 20, 359–374 (2022).

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10805-021-09417-1

Abstract

This paper argues that applied ethics can itself be morally problematic. As illustrated by the case of Peter Singer’s criticism of social practice, morally loaded communication by applied ethicists can lead to protests, backlashes, and aggression. By reviewing the psychological literature on self-image, collective identity, and motivated reasoning three categories of morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism by applied ethicists are identified: serious psychological discomfort, moral backfiring, and hostile conflict. The most worrisome is moral backfiring: psychological research suggests that ethical criticism of people’s central moral convictions can reinforce exactly those attitudes. Therefore, applied ethicists unintentionally can contribute to a consolidation of precisely those social circumstances that they condemn to be unethical. Furthermore, I argue that the normative concerns raised in this paper are not dependent on the commitment to one specific paradigm in moral philosophy. Utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Rawlsian contractarianism all provide sound reasons to take morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism seriously. Only the case of deontological ethics is less clear-cut. Finally, I point out that the issues raised in this paper provide an excellent opportunity for further interdisciplinary collaboration between applied ethics and social sciences. I also propose strategies for communicating ethics effectively.

A pdf is here.

Here is my summary:

First, ethical criticism can cause serious psychological discomfort. People often have strong emotional attachments to their moral convictions, and being told that their beliefs are wrong can be very upsetting. In some cases, ethical criticism can even lead to anxiety, depression, and other mental health problems.

Second, ethical criticism can lead to moral backfiring. This is when people respond to ethical criticism by doubling down on their existing beliefs. Moral backfiring is thought to be caused by a number of factors, including motivated reasoning and the need to maintain a positive self-image.

Third, ethical criticism can lead to hostile conflict. When people feel threatened by ethical criticism, they may become defensive and aggressive. This can lead to heated arguments, social isolation, and even violence.

Franz argues that these negative consequences are not just hypothetical. He points to a number of real-world examples, such as the backlash against Peter Singer's arguments for vegetarianism.

The author concludes by arguing that applied ethicists should be aware of the ethical dimension of their own work. They should be mindful of the potential for their work to cause harm, and they should take steps to mitigate these risks. For example, applied ethicists should be careful to avoid making personal attacks on those who disagree with them. They should also be willing to engage in respectful dialogue with those who have different moral views.

People recognize and condone their own morally motivated reasoning

Cusimano, C., & Lombrozo, T. (2023).

Cognition, 234, 105379.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105379

Abstract

People often engage in biased reasoning, favoring some beliefs over others even when the result is a departure from impartial or evidence-based reasoning. Psychologists have long assumed that people are unaware of these biases and operate under an “illusion of objectivity.” We identify an important domain of life in which people harbor little illusion about their biases – when they are biased for moral reasons. For instance, people endorse and feel justified believing morally desirable propositions even when they think they lack evidence for them (Study 1a/1b). Moreover, when people engage in morally desirable motivated reasoning, they recognize the influence of moral biases on their judgment, but nevertheless evaluate their reasoning as ideal (Studies 2–4). These findings overturn longstanding assumptions about motivated reasoning and identify a boundary condition on Naïve Realism and the Bias Blind Spot. People's tendency to be aware and proud of their biases provides both new opportunities, and new challenges, for resolving ideological conflict and improving reasoning.

Highlights

• Dominant theories assume people form beliefs only under an illusion of objectivity.

• We document a boundary condition on this illusion: morally desirable biases.

• People endorse beliefs they regard as evidentially weak but morally desirable.

• People realize when they have just engaged in morally motivated reasoning.

• Accurate self-attributions of moral bias fully attenuate the ‘bias blind spot’.

From the General discussion

Our beliefs about our beliefs – including whether they are biased or justified – play a crucial role in guiding inquiry, shaping belief revision, and navigating disagreement. One line of research suggests that these judgments are almost universally characterized by an illusion of objectivity such that people consciously reason with the goal of being objective and basing their beliefs on evidence, and because of this, people nearly always assume that their current beliefs meet those standards. Another line of work suggests that people sometimes think that values legitimately bear on whether someone is justified to hold a belief (Cusimano & Lombrozo, 2021b). These findings raise the possibility, consistent with some prior theoretical proposals (Cusimano & Lombrozo, 2021a; Tetlock, 2002), that people will knowingly violate norms of impartiality, or knowingly maintain beliefs that lack evidential support, when doing so advances what they consider to be morally laudable goals. Two predictions follow. First, people should evaluate their beliefs in part based on their perceived moral value. And second, in situations in which people engage in morally motivated reasoning, they should recognize that they have done so and should evaluate their morally motivated reasoning as appropriate. We document support for these predictions across four studies (Table 1).

Conclusion

A great deal of work has assumed that people treat objectivity and evidence-based reasoning as cardinal norms governing their belief formation. This assumption has grown increasingly tenuous in light of recent work highlighting the importance of moral concerns in almost all facets of life. Consistent with this recent work, we find evidence that people’s evaluations of the moral quality of a proposition predict their subjective confidence that it is true, their likelihood of claiming that they believe it and know it, and the extent to which they take their belief to be justified. Moreover, people exhibit metacognitive awareness of this fact and approve of morality’s influence on their reasoning. People often want to be right, but they also want to be good – and they know it.

The research is here.

A framework for understanding reasoning errors: From fake news to climate change and beyond

Pennycook, G. (2022, August 31).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/j3w7d

Abstract

Humans have the capacity, but perhaps not always the willingness, for great intelligence. From global warming to the spread of misinformation and beyond, our species is facing several major challenges that are the result of the limits of our own reasoning and decision-making. So, why are we so prone to errors during reasoning? In this chapter, I will outline a framework for understanding reasoning errors that is based on a three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement (intuition, metacognition, and reason). The model has two key implications: 1) That a mere lack of deliberation and analytic thinking is a primary source of errors and 2) That when deliberation is activated, it generally reduces errors (via questioning intuitions and integrating new information) than increasing errors (via rationalization and motivated reasoning). In support of these claims, I review research showing the extensive predictive validity of measures that index individual differences in analytic cognitive style – even beyond explicit errors per se. In particular, analytic thinking is not only predictive of skepticism about a wide range of epistemically suspect beliefs (paranormal, conspiratorial, COVID-19 misperceptions, pseudoscience and alternative medicines) as well as decreased susceptibility to bullshit, fake news, and misinformation, but also important differences in people’s moral judgments and values as well as their religious beliefs (and disbeliefs). Furthermore, in some (but not all cases), there is evidence from experimental paradigms that support a causal role of analytic thinking in determining judgments, beliefs, and behaviors. The findings reviewed here provide some reason for optimism for the future: It may be possible to foster analytic thinking and therefore improve the quality of our decisions.

Evaluating the evidence: Does reason matter?

Thus far, I have prioritized explaining the various alternative frameworks. I will now turn to an in-depth review of some of the key relevant evidence that helps mediate between these accounts. I will organize this review around two key implications that emerge from the framework that I have proposed.

First, the primary difference between the three-stage model (and related dual-process models) and the social-intuitionist models (and related intuitionist models) is that the former argues that people should be able to overcome intuitive errors using deliberation whereas the latter argues that reason is generally infirm and therefore that intuitive errors will simply dominate. Thus, the reviewed research will investigate the apparent role of deliberation in driving people’s choices, beliefs, and behaviors.

Second, the primary difference between the three-stage model (and related dual-process models) and the identity-protective cognition model is that the latter argues that deliberation facilitates biased information processing whereas the former argues that deliberation generally facilitates accuracy. Thus, the reviewed research will also focus on whether deliberation is linked with inaccuracy in politically-charged or identity-relevant contexts.

The research is here.

COVID-19 and Politically Motivated Reasoning

Maguire, A., Persson, E., Västfjäll, D., & 

Tinghög, G. (2022). Medical Decision Making.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X221118078

Abstract

Background

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the world witnessed a partisan segregation of beliefs toward the global health crisis and its management. Politically motivated reasoning, the tendency to interpret information in accordance with individual motives to protect valued beliefs rather than objectively considering the facts, could represent a key process involved in the polarization of attitudes. The objective of this study was to explore politically motivated reasoning when participants assess information regarding COVID-19.

Design

We carried out a preregistered online experiment using a diverse sample (N = 1500) from the United States. Both Republicans and Democrats assessed the same COVID-19–related information about the health effects of lockdowns, social distancing, vaccination, hydroxychloroquine, and wearing face masks.

Results

At odds with our prestated hypothesis, we found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19. Moreover, we found no evidence supporting the idea that numeric ability or cognitive sophistication bolster politically motivated reasoning in the case of COVID-19. Instead, our findings suggest that participants base their assessment on prior beliefs of the matter.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more likely to be driven by lack of reasoning than politically motivated reasoning—a finding that opens potential avenues for combating political polarization about important health care topics.

Highlights

• Participants assessed numerical information regarding the effect of different COVID-19 policies.

• We found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19.

• Participants tend to base their assessment of COVID-19–related facts on prior beliefs of the matter.

• Politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more a result of lack of thinking than partisanship.

The research is here.

What Dilemma? Moral Evaluation Shapes Factual Belief

B. Lui, & P. Ditto

Social Psychological and Personality Science. 2013;4(3):316-323. doi:10.1177/1948550612456045

Abstract

Moral dilemmas—like the “trolley problem” or real-world examples like capital punishment—result from a conflict between consequentialist and deontological intuitions (i.e., whether ends justify means). The authors contend that people often resolve such moral conflict by aligning factual beliefs about consequences of acts with evaluations of the act’s inherent morality (i.e., morality independent of its consequences). In both artificial (Study 1) and real-world (Study 2) dilemmas, the more an act was deemed inherently immoral, the more it was seen as unlikely to produce beneficial consequences and likely to involve harmful costs. Coherence between moral evaluations and factual beliefs increased with greater moral conviction, self-proclaimed topical knowledge, and political conservatism (Study 2). Reading essays about the inherent morality or immorality of capital punishment (Study 3) changed beliefs about its costs and benefits, even though no information about consequences was supplied. Implications for moral reasoning and political conflict are discussed.

From the General Discussion

While individuals can and do appeal to principle in some cases to support their moral positions, we argue that this is a difficult stance psychologically because it conflicts with well-rehearsed economic intuitions urging that the most rational course of action is the one that produces the most favorable cost–benefit ratio. Our research suggests that people resolve such dilemmas by bringing cost–benefit beliefs into line with moral evaluations, such that the right course of action morally becomes the right course of action practically as well.Study 3 provides experimental confirmation of a pattern implied by both our own and others’ correlational research(e.g., Kahan, 2010): People shape their descriptive understand-ing of the world to fit their prescriptive understanding of it.

A pdf of the research is here.

Hidden wisdom or pseudo-profound bullshit? The effect of speaker admirability

Kara-Yakoubian, et al.

(2021, October 28).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/tpnkw

Abstract

How do people reason in response to ambiguous messages shared by admirable individuals? Using behavioral markers and self-report questionnaires, in two experiments (N = 571) we examined the influence of speakers’ admirability on meaning-seeking and wise reasoning in response to pseudo-profound bullshit. In both studies, statements that sounded superficially impressive but lacked intent to communicate meaning generated meaning-seeking, but only when delivered by high admirability speakers (e.g., the Dalai Lama) as compared to low admirability speakers (e.g., Kim Kardashian). The effect of speakers’ admirability on meaning-seeking was unique to pseudo-profound bullshit statements and was absent for mundane (Study 1) and motivational (Study 2) statements. In Study 2, participants also engaged in wiser reasoning for pseudo-profound bullshit (vs. motivational) statements and did more so when speakers were high in admirability. These effects occurred independently of the amount of time spent on statements or the complexity of participants’ reflections. It appears that pseudo-profound bullshit can promote epistemic reflection and certain aspects of wisdom, when associated with an admirable speaker.

From the General Discussion

Pseudo-profound language represents a type of misinformation (Čavojová et al., 2019b; Littrell et al., 2021; Pennycook & Rand, 2019a) where ambiguity reigns. Our findings suggest that source admirability could play an important role in the cognitive processing of ambiguous misinformation, including fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2020) and euphemistic language (Walker et al., 2021). For instance, in the case of fake news, people may be more inclined to engage in epistemic reflection if the source of an article is highly admirable. However, we also observed that statements from high (vs. low) admirability sources were judged as more profound and were better liked. Extended to misinformation, a combination of greater perceived profundity, liking, and acquired meaning could potentially facilitate the sharing of ambiguous fake news content throughout social networks. Increased reflective thinking (as measured by the CRT) has also been linked to greater discernment on social media, with individuals who score higher on the CRT being less likely to believe fake news stories and share this type of content (Mosleh et al., 2021; Pennycook & Rand, 2019a). Perhaps, people might engage in more epistemic reflection if the source of an article is highly admirable, which may in turn predict a decrease in the sharing behaviour of fake news. Similarly, people may be more inclined to engage in epistemic reflection for euphemistic language, such as the term “enhanced interrogation” used in replacement of “torture,” and conclude that this type of language means something other than what it refers to, if used by a more admirable (compared to a less admirable) individual.

A copy of the research is here.

Reconciling scientific and commonsense values to improve reasoning

C. Cusimano & T. Lombrozo

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Available online July 2021

Abstract

Scientific reasoning is characterized by commitments to evidence and objectivity. New research suggests that under some conditions, people are prone to reject these commitments, and instead sanction motivated reasoning and bias. Moreover, people’s tendency to devalue scientific reasoning likely explains the emergence and persistence of many biased beliefs. However, recent work in epistemology has identified ways in which bias might be legitimately incorporated into belief formation. Researchers can leverage these insights to evaluate when commonsense affirmation of bias is justified and when it is unjustified and therefore a good target for intervention.

Highlights

• People espouse a ‘lay ethics of belief’ that defines standards for how beliefs should be evaluated and formed.
• People vary in the extent to which they endorse scientific norms of reasoning, such as evidentialism and impartiality, in their own norms of belief. In some cases, people sanction motivated or biased thinking.
• Variation in endorsement of scientific norms predicts belief accuracy, suggesting that interventions that target norms could lead to more accurate beliefs.
• Normative theories in epistemology vary in whether, and how, they regard reasoning and belief formation as legitimately impacted by moral or pragmatic considerations.
• Psychologists can leverage knowledge of people’s lay ethics of belief, and normative arguments about when and whether bias is appropriate, to develop interventions to improve reasoning that are both ethical and effective.

Concluding remarks

It is no secret that humans are biased reasoners. Recent work suggests that these departures from scientific reasoning are not simply the result of unconscious bias, but are also a consequence of endorsing norms for belief that place personal, moral, or social good above truth.  The link between devaluing the ‘scientific ethos’ and holding biased beliefs suggests that, in some cases, interventions on the perceived value of scientific reasoning could lead to better reasoning and to better outcomes. In this spirit, we have offered a strategy for value debiasing.

The research is here.

Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief

Corey Cusimano & Tania Lombrozo

Cognition

19 January 2021

Abstract

When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one's friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral considerations affect how people evaluate others' beliefs. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally beneficial beliefs demand less evidence than morally risky beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and on that basis, sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.

From the General Discussion

5.2. Implications for motivated reasoning

Psychologists have long speculated that commonplace deviations from rational judgments and decisions could reflect commitments to different normative standards for decision making rather than merely cognitive limitations or unintentional errors (Cohen, 1981; Koehler, 1996; Tribe, 1971). This speculation has been largely confirmed in the domain of decision making, where work has documented that people will refuse to make certain decisions because of a normative commitment to not rely on certain kinds of evidence (Nesson, 1985; Wells, 1992), or because of a normative commitment to prioritize deontological concerns over utility-maximizing concerns (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2000). And yet, there has been comparatively little investigation in the domain of belief formation. While some work has suggested that people evaluate beliefs in ways that favor non-objective, or non-evidential criteria (e.g., Armor et al., 2008; Cao et al., 2019; Metz, Weisberg, & Weisberg, 2018; Tenney et al., 2015), this work has failed to demonstrate that people prescribe beliefs that violate what objective, evidence-based reasoning would warrant. To our knowledge, our results are the first to demonstrate that people will knowingly endorse non-evidential norms for belief, and specifically, prescribe motivated reasoning to others.

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Our findings suggest more proximate explanations for these biases: That lay people see these beliefs as morally beneficial and treat these moral benefits as legitimate grounds for motivated reasoning. Thus, overconfidence or over-optimism may persist in communities because people hold others to lower standards of evidence for adopting morally-beneficial optimistic beliefs than they do for pessimistic beliefs, or otherwise treat these benefits as legitimate reasons to ignore the evidence that one has.

The research is here.

The Cognitive Science of Fake News

Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. 

(2020, November 18). 

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ar96c

Abstract

We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share “fake news” and other misinformation online. Surprisingly, the evidence contradicts a common narrative whereby partisanship and politically motivated reasoning explain failures to discern truth from falsehood. Instead, poor truth discernment is linked to a lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge, and to the use of familiarity and other heuristics. Furthermore, there is a substantial disconnect between what people believe and what they will share on social media. This dissociation is largely driven by inattention, rather than purposeful sharing of misinformation. As a result, effective interventions can nudge social media users to think about accuracy, and can leverage crowdsourced veracity ratings to improve social media ranking algorithms.

From the Discussion

Indeed, recent research shows that a simple accuracy nudge intervention –specifically, having participants rate the accuracy of a single politically neutral headline (ostensibly as part of a pretest) prior to making judgments about social media sharing –improves the extent to which people discern between true and false news content when deciding what to share online in survey experiments. This approach has also been successfully deployed in a large-scale field experiment on Twitter, in which messages asking users to rate the accuracy of a random headline were sent to thousands of accounts who recently shared links to misinformation sites. This subtle nudge significantly increased the quality of the content they subsequently shared; see Figure3B. Furthermore, survey experiments have shown that asking participants to explain how they know if a headline is true of false before sharing it increases sharing discernment, and having participants rate accuracy at the time of encoding protects against familiarity effects."

Why Facts Are Not Enough: Understanding and Managing the Motivated Rejection of Science

Hornsey MJ. 

Current Directions in Psychological Science

2020;29(6):583-591. 

doi:10.1177/0963721420969364

Abstract

Efforts to change the attitudes of creationists, antivaccination advocates, and climate skeptics by simply providing evidence have had limited success. Motivated reasoning helps make sense of this communication challenge: If people are motivated to hold a scientifically unorthodox belief, they selectively interpret evidence to reinforce their preferred position. In the current article, I summarize research on six psychological roots from which science-skeptical attitudes grow: (a) ideologies, (b) vested interests, (c) conspiracist worldviews, (d) fears and phobias, (e) personal-identity expression, and (f) social-identity needs. The case is made that effective science communication relies on understanding and attending to these underlying motivations.

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Conclusion

This article outlines six reasons people are motivated to hold views that are inconsistent with scientific consensus. This perspective helps explain why education and explication of data sometimes has a limited impact on science skeptics, but I am not arguing that education and facts are pointless. Quite the opposite: The provision of clear, objective information is the first and best line of defense against misinformation, mythmaking, and ignorance. However, for polarizing scientific issues—for example, climate change, vaccination, evolution, and in-vitro meat—it is clear that facts alone will not do the job. Successful communication around these issues will require sensitive understandings of the psychological motivations people have for rejecting science and the flexibility to devise communication frames that align with or circumvent these motivations.

Bias in science: natural and social

Joshua May

Synthese 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02937-0

Abstract 

Moral, social, political, and other “nonepistemic” values can lead to bias in science, from prioritizing certain topics over others to the rationalization of questionable research practices. Such values might seem particularly common or powerful in the social sciences, given their subject matter. However, I argue first that the well documented phenomenon of motivated reasoning provides a useful framework for understanding when values guide scientific inquiry (in pernicious or productive ways). Second, this analysis reveals a parity thesis: values influence the social and natural sciences about equally, particularly because both are so prominently affected by desires for social credit and status, including recognition and career advancement. Ultimately, bias in natural and social science is both natural and social—that is, a part of human nature and considerably motivated by a concern for social status (and its maintenance). Whether the pervasive influence of values is inimical to the sciences is a separate question.

Conclusion 

We have seen how many of the putative biases that affect science can be explained and illuminated in terms of motivated reasoning, which yields a general understanding of how a researcher’s goals and values can influence scientific practice (whether positively or negatively). This general account helps to show that it is unwarranted to assume that such influences are significantly more prominent in the social sciences. The defense of this parity claim relies primarily on two key points. First, the natural sciences are also susceptible to the same values found in social science, particularly given that findings in many fields have social or political implications. Second, the ideological motivations that might seem to arise only in social science are minor compared to others. In particular, one’s reasoning is more often motivated by a desire to gain social credit (e.g. recognition among peers) than a desire to promote a moral or political ideology. Although there may be discernible differences in the quality of research across scientific domains, all are influenced by researchers’ values, as manifested in their motivations.

The research is here.

Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief

Cusimano, C., & Lombrozo, T. (2020, July 20).
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/7r5yb

Abstract

When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial assessment of the evidence (e.g., that one’s friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what would better fulfill a moral obligation (e.g., that the friend is innocent), people often believe in line with the latter. But is this how people think beliefs ought to be formed? We addressed this question across three studies and found that, across a diverse set of everyday situations, people treat moral considerations as legitimate grounds for believing propositions that are unsupported by objective, evidence-based reasoning. We further document two ways in which moral evaluations affect how people prescribe beliefs to others. First, the moral value of a belief affects the evidential threshold required to believe, such that morally good beliefs demand less evidence than morally bad beliefs. Second, people sometimes treat the moral value of a belief as an independent justification for belief, and so sometimes prescribe evidentially poor beliefs to others. Together these results show that, in the folk ethics of belief, morality can justify and demand motivated reasoning.

From the Discussion

Additionally, participants reported that moral concerns affected the standards of evidence that apply to belief, such that morally-desirable beliefs require less evidence than morally-undesirable beliefs. In Study 1, participants reported that, relative to an impartial observer with the same information, someone with a moral reason to be optimistic had a wider range of beliefs that could be considered“consistent with” and “based on” the evidence.  Critically however, the broader range of beliefs that were consistent with the same evidence were only beliefs that were more morally desirable; morally undesirable beliefs were not more consistent with the evidence. In Studies 2 and 3, participants agreed more strongly that someone who had a moral reason to adopt a desirable belief had sufficient evidence to do so compared to someone who lacked a moral reason, even though they formed the same belief on the basis of the same evidence.  Likewise, on average, participants judged that when someone adopted the morally undesirable belief, they were more often judged as having insufficient evidence for doing so relative to someone who lacked a moral reason (again, even though they formed the same belief on the basis of the same evidence).  Finally, in Study 2 (though not in Study 3), these judgments replicated using an indirect measure of evidentiary quality; namely, attributions of knowledge. In sum, these findings document that one reason people may prescribe a motivated belief to someone is because morality changes how much evidence they consider to be required to hold the belief in an evidentially-sound way.

Editor's Note: Huge implications for psychotherapy.

Morality justifies motivated reasoning

Corey Cusimano and Tania Lombrozo
Paper found online

Abstract

A great deal of work argues that people demand impartial, evidence-based reasoning from others. However, recent findings show that moral values occupy a cardinal position in people’s evaluation of others, raising the possibility that people sometimes prescribe morally-good but evidentially-poor beliefs. We report two studies investigating how people evaluate beliefs when these two ideals conflict and find that people regularly endorse motivated reasoning when it can be morally justified. Furthermore, we document two ways that moral considerations result in prescribed motivated reasoning. First, morality can provide an alternative justification for belief, leading people to prescribe evidentially unsupported beliefs to others. And, second, morality can affect how people evaluate the way evidence is weighed by lowering or raising the threshold of required evidence for morally good and bad beliefs, respectively. These results illuminate longstanding questions about the nature of motivated reasoning and the social regulation of belief.

From the General Discussion

These results can potentially explain the presence and persistence of certain motivated beliefs. In particular, morally-motivated beliefs could persist in part because people do not demand that they or others reason accurately or acquire equal evidence for their beliefs (Metz, Weisburg, & Weisburg, 2018). These findings also invite a reinterpretation of some classic biases, which are in general interpreted as unintentional errors (Kunda, 1990). We suggest instead that some apparent errors reflect convictions that one ought to be biased or discount evidence. Future work investigating biased belief formation should incorporate the perceived moral value of the belief.

The pdf can be found here.