Welcome to the Nexus of Ethics, Psychology, Morality, Philosophy and Health Care

Welcome to the nexus of ethics, psychology, morality, technology, health care, and philosophy
Showing posts with label Scientific Evidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Scientific Evidence. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Evidence-based scientific thinking and decision-making in everyday life

Dawson, C.,  et al. (2024).
Cognitive research: principles and 
implications, 9(1), 50.

Abstract

In today's knowledge economy, it is critical to make decisions based on high-quality evidence. Science-related decision-making is thought to rely on a complex interplay of reasoning skills, cognitive styles, attitudes, and motivations toward information. By investigating the relationship between individual differences and behaviors related to evidence-based decision-making, our aim was to better understand how adults engage with scientific information in everyday life. First, we used a data-driven exploratory approach to identify four latent factors in a large set of measures related to cognitive skills and epistemic attitudes. The resulting structure suggests that key factors include curiosity and positive attitudes toward science, prosociality, cognitive skills, and openmindedness to new information. Second, we investigated whether these factors predicted behavior in a naturalistic decision-making task. In the task, participants were introduced to a real science-related petition and were asked to read six online articles related to the petition, which varied in scientific quality, while deciding how to vote. We demonstrate that curiosity and positive science attitudes, cognitive flexibility, prosociality and emotional states, were related to engaging with information and discernment of evidence reliability. We further found that that social authority is a powerful cue for source credibility, even above the actual quality and relevance of the sources. Our results highlight that individual motivating factors toward information engagement, like curiosity, and social factors such as social authority are important drivers of how adults judge the credibility of everyday sources of scientific information.

Here are some thoughts:

This paper offers valuable insights for practicing psychologists by illuminating the complex interplay of cognitive, emotional, and social factors that shape how individuals engage with scientific evidence. 

For psychologists themselves, the findings serve as a critical reminder that our own evidence-based practice is not just about accessing high-quality research, but also about understanding our own cognitive and emotional processes when evaluating information. The study underscores that even trained professionals can be influenced by heuristic cues like the social authority of a journal or institution. Therefore, we must cultivate active open-mindedness and intellectual humility in our own professional development, consciously seeking out and fairly considering evidence that may challenge our theoretical orientations or treatment preferences. The research also highlights that analytical thinking alone does not guarantee unbiased reasoning; it can be co-opted for motivated reasoning to justify existing beliefs. This necessitates that clinicians engage in regular reflective practice and supervision to scrutinize their clinical decisions, ensuring we are driven by the best available evidence and client needs, rather than cognitive ease or allegiance to familiar models.

When applied to patient care, these insights become a powerful framework for enhancing therapeutic communication and psychoeducation. The finding that individuals vary greatly in their epistemic curiosity, need for closure, and reliance on social authority means that a one-size-fits-all approach to providing information is ineffective. A psychologist working with a vaccine-hesitant client, for example, must first understand whether the client’s stance is driven by a lack of curiosity, a high need for closure, a distrust of scientific institutions, or an over-reliance on alternative authority figures. Interventions can then be tailored accordingly: fostering curiosity and tolerance for uncertainty in one client, while helping another develop skills to critically evaluate source credibility beyond prestigious branding. The strong influence of social authority suggests that presenting information through trusted community figures or relatable personal narratives may sometimes be a more effective conduit for change than data alone, though this must be balanced with efforts to build the patient’s own critical evaluation skills.

Monday, November 22, 2021

Revisiting Daubert: Judicial Gatekeeping and Expert Ethics in Court

Young, G., Goodman-Delahunty, J.
Psychol. Inj. and Law (2021). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12207-021-09428-8

Abstract

This article calls for pragmatic modifications to legal practices for the admissibility of scientific evidence, including forensic psychological science. We submit that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and the other two cases in the U.S. Supreme Court trilogy on expert evidence have largely failed to accomplish their gatekeeping goals to assure the reliability of scientific evidence admitted in court. Reliability refers to validity in psychological terms. Part of the problem with Daubert’s application in court is the gatekeeping function that it ascribes to judges. Most Daubert admissibility challenges are rejected by judges, who might lack the requisite scientific expertise to make informed decisions; educating judges on science might not be an adequate solution. Like others who have put forth the idea, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 706, we suggest that court-appointed impartial experts can help judges to adjudicate competing claims on admissibility. We further recommend that an expert witness ethics code sworn to in legal proceedings should be mandatory in all jurisdictions. The journal Psychological Injury and Law calls for comments and further recommendations on modifying Daubert admissibility challenges and procedures in civil and criminal cases to develop best practices to mitigate adversarial allegiance and other unconscious biases in expert decision-making.

Advantages of an Expert Witness Ethics Code Sworn to in Legal Proceedings

We suggest that in the field of psychological injury, jurisdictions in which courts reinforce expert obligations via an ethics code for expert witnesses will lead to more balanced and impartial testimony. The essential principle guiding a science-based expert witness ethics code sworn to in legal proceedings is that the process of forensic assessment, as well as the subsequent proffer of testimony in court based on those assessments, should account for all the reliable evidence gathered in a particular case as determined by methodologies informed by scientific research in the relevant field.  This recommendation is in line with psychological research showing that expert bias is reduced when experts do not focus on a single question or hypothesis, but address a “line up” of competing and alternative conclusions and hypotheses (Dror, 2020). The components of the expert witness oath, like the appointment of a court-appointed expert, encourage experts to adopt a differential diagnosis approach, in which all different conclusions and their probability are presented, rather than one conclusion (Dror, 2020). Opinions, interpretations, and conclusions based on the data, information, and evidence will more likely be impartial, fully scientifically informed, and just.

Sunday, September 25, 2016

Why Facts Don’t Unify Us

By Tali Sharot and Cass Sunstein
The New York Times
Originally published September 2, 2016

Here is an excerpt:

These findings help explain polarization on many issues. With respect to the Affordable Care Act, for example, people encounter good news, to the effect that it has helped millions of people obtain health insurance, and also bad news, to the effect that health care costs and insurance premiums continue to increase. For the act’s supporters, the good news will have far more impact than the bad; for the opponents, the opposite is true. As the sheer volume of information increases, polarization will be heightened as well.

Essentially the same tale can be told with respect to immigration, terrorism, increases in the minimum wage — and candidates for the highest office in the land. Voters are now receiving a steady stream of both positive and negative information about Hillary Clinton and Donald J. Trump. Which kind of news will have a large impact will depend partly on people’s motivations and initial convictions.

But there’s an important qualification. In our experiment, a strong majority showed movement; few people were impervious to new information. Most people were willing to change their views, at least to some extent.

The article is here.

Saturday, June 14, 2014

Psychological Science's Replicability Crisis and What It Means for Science in the Courtroom

By Jason Michael Chin
Journal of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (Forthcoming)

Abstract:  
 
In response to what has been termed the “replicability crisis,” great changes are currently under way in how science is conducted and disseminated. Indeed, major journals are changing the way in which they evaluate science. Therefore, a question arises over how such change impacts law’s treatment of scientific evidence. The present standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts asks judges to play the role of gatekeeper, determining if the proffered evidence conforms with several indicia of scientific validity. The alternative legal framework, and one still used by several state courts, requires judges to simply evaluate whether a scientific finding or practice is generally accepted within science.

This Essay suggests that as much as the replicability crisis has highlighted serious issues in the scientific process, it has should have similar implications and actionable consequences for legal practitioners and academics. In particular, generally accepted scientific practices have frequently lagged behind prescriptions for best practices, which in turn affected the way science has been reported and performed. The consequence of this phenomenon is that judicial analysis of scientific evidence will still be impacted by deficient generally accepted practices. The Essay ends with some suggestions to help ensure that legal decisions are influenced by science’s best practices.

Download the essay here.