Practical Frameworks for Integrating Artificial Intelligence in Forensic Psychology

Rilen, S. (2026).

Journal of Forensic Psychology Research

and Practice, 1–39.

https://doi.org/10.1080/24732850.2026.2630383

The article is paywalled. Please contact the author for a copy of this article.

Abstract

The American Psychological Association (APA) provides broad guidance for generative Artificial Intelligence (gAI) use, yet forensic practice requires a specialized context for adversarial settings. This article proposes a four-step operational framework for ethical gAI integration grounded in forensic admissibility. It establishes operational mandates and readiness assessments followed by a risk-stratification model for tool selection distinguishing convergent from divergent tasks. It differentiates substantive from peripheral uses to guide disclosure decisions, and addresses admissibility considerations under Daubert and Frye. Sample disclosure language and visual aids help experts preserve credibility through methodological verification and systematic procedural rigor, rather than algorithmic trust.

Here are some thoughts:

The article establishes that while generative AI offers significant potential to enhance forensic psychology, its integration must be governed by a strict, four-step framework that prioritizes practitioner accountability, methodological transparency, and data security. Central to this is the principle of non-delegation of cognition, which mandates that forensic experts retain full ownership of all analytical reasoning and conclusions, using gAI only as an augmentative tool rather than a substitute for professional judgment. All gAI output must be treated with a zero-trust verification approach, requiring independent validation against primary sources to guard against hallucinations, omissions, and algorithmic bias. Furthermore, the framework draws a critical distinction between substantive use—which materially influences opinions and requires proactive disclosure in court reports—and peripheral use, which involves administrative support and only requires informed consent. Given the adversarial legal context, practitioners must demonstrate technical competence to explain gAI's probabilistic nature and limitations, ensuring their methodology can withstand scrutiny under Daubert or Frye standards. Data privacy is paramount, necessitating enterprise-grade tools with robust security pillars, including data quarantine and encryption, to preserve legal privilege. Ultimately, the article emphasizes that forensic practitioners are the gatekeepers of their methodology, and by embracing rigor, transparency, and continuous self-assessment, they can harness gAI's benefits while safeguarding the integrity of the justice system.

Crossing the Line: Daubert, Dual Roles, and the Admissibility of Forensic Mental Health Testimony

Gordon, S. G. (2016).

SSRN Electronic Journal.

Scholarly Works. 969.

Link is here.

Abstract

Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals often testify as forensic experts in civil commitment and criminal competency proceedings. When an individual clinician assumes both a treatment and a forensic role in the context of a single case, however, that clinician forms a dual relationship with the patient—a practice that creates a conflict of interest and violates professional ethical guidelines. The court, the parties, and the patient are all affected by this conflict and the biased testimony that may result from dual relationships. When providing forensic testimony, the mental health professional’s primary duty is to the court, not to the patient, and she has an obligation to give objective and truthful testimony. But this testimony can result in the patient’s detention or punishment, a legal outcome that implicates the mental health professional’s corresponding obligation to “do no harm” to the patient. Moreover, the conflict of interest created by a dual relationship can affect the objectivity and reliability of forensic testimony.

A dual clinical and forensic relationship with a single patient is contrary to quality patient care, and existing clinical and forensic ethical guidelines strongly discourage the practice. Notwithstanding the mental health community’s general consensus about the impropriety of the practice, many courts do not question the mental health professional’s ability to provide forensic testimony for a patient with whom she has a simultaneous clinical relationship. Moreover, some state statutes require or encourage clinicians at state-run facilities to engage in these multiple roles. This Article argues that the inherent conflict created by these dual roles does not provide a reliable basis for forensic mental health testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and should not be admitted as reliable expert testimony by courts. Because dual relationships are often initiated due to provider shortages and the unavailability of neutral forensic examiners, this Article will also discuss the use of telemedicine as a way to provide forensic evaluations in underserved areas, especially those where provider shortages have prompted mental health professionals to engage in dual clinical and forensic roles. Finally, this Article argues that courts should exercise their powers more broadly under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to appoint neutral and independent mental health experts to conduct forensic evaluations in civil commitment and criminal competency proceedings.

Here are some thoughts:

The article explores the ethical and legal complexities surrounding mental health professionals who serve in dual roles—both as clinicians and forensic evaluators. The article highlights how these dual relationships can compromise objectivity and reliability in forensic testimony, a concern widely recognized within the psychiatric and psychological communities. Despite professional ethical codes discouraging such practices, courts often fail to exclude testimony from clinicians offering forensic opinions about their own patients. This inconsistency is particularly problematic under the Daubert standard, which mandates that trial judges act as gatekeepers to ensure expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. The piece argues that violating professional ethical norms—such as those against dual relationships—should be considered when evaluating the admissibility of forensic mental health testimony, especially since these violations are seen as markers of unreliability by the relevant scientific community. Additionally, the article touches on the practical implications of these dual role dilemmas, including the impact on patient care, legal outcomes, and the integrity of the judicial process. It concludes with a call for courts to take professional ethics more seriously when assessing the admissibility of expert testimony in forensic mental health cases.

Revisiting Daubert: Judicial Gatekeeping and Expert Ethics in Court

Young, G., Goodman-Delahunty, J.

Psychol. Inj. and Law (2021). 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12207-021-09428-8

Abstract

This article calls for pragmatic modifications to legal practices for the admissibility of scientific evidence, including forensic psychological science. We submit that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and the other two cases in the U.S. Supreme Court trilogy on expert evidence have largely failed to accomplish their gatekeeping goals to assure the reliability of scientific evidence admitted in court. Reliability refers to validity in psychological terms. Part of the problem with Daubert’s application in court is the gatekeeping function that it ascribes to judges. Most Daubert admissibility challenges are rejected by judges, who might lack the requisite scientific expertise to make informed decisions; educating judges on science might not be an adequate solution. Like others who have put forth the idea, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 706, we suggest that court-appointed impartial experts can help judges to adjudicate competing claims on admissibility. We further recommend that an expert witness ethics code sworn to in legal proceedings should be mandatory in all jurisdictions. The journal Psychological Injury and Law calls for comments and further recommendations on modifying Daubert admissibility challenges and procedures in civil and criminal cases to develop best practices to mitigate adversarial allegiance and other unconscious biases in expert decision-making.

Advantages of an Expert Witness Ethics Code Sworn to in Legal Proceedings

We suggest that in the field of psychological injury, jurisdictions in which courts reinforce expert obligations via an ethics code for expert witnesses will lead to more balanced and impartial testimony. The essential principle guiding a science-based expert witness ethics code sworn to in legal proceedings is that the process of forensic assessment, as well as the subsequent proffer of testimony in court based on those assessments, should account for all the reliable evidence gathered in a particular case as determined by methodologies informed by scientific research in the relevant field.  This recommendation is in line with psychological research showing that expert bias is reduced when experts do not focus on a single question or hypothesis, but address a “line up” of competing and alternative conclusions and hypotheses (Dror, 2020). The components of the expert witness oath, like the appointment of a court-appointed expert, encourage experts to adopt a differential diagnosis approach, in which all different conclusions and their probability are presented, rather than one conclusion (Dror, 2020). Opinions, interpretations, and conclusions based on the data, information, and evidence will more likely be impartial, fully scientifically informed, and just.

The full article is here, behind a paywall.

Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?

By Neil Levy
J Ethics. 2014 Jun 1;18(2):171-185.

Abstract

In Minds, Brains, and Law, Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson argue that current attempts to use neuroscience to inform the theory and practice of law founder because they are built on confused conceptual foundations. Proponents of neurolaw attribute to the brain or to its parts psychological properties that belong only to people; this mistake vitiates many of the claims they make. Once neurolaw is placed on a sounder conceptual footing, Pardo and Patterson claim, we will see that its more dramatic claims are false or meaningless, though it might be able to provide inductive evidence for particular less dramatic claims (that a defendant may be lying, or lacks control over their behavior, for instance). In response, I argue that the central conceptual confusions identified by Pardo and Patterson are not confusions at all. Though some of the claims made by its proponents are hasty and sometimes they are confused, there are no conceptual barriers to attributing psychological properties to brain states. Neuroscience can play a role in producing evidence that is more reliable than subjective report or behavior; it therefore holds out the possibility of dramatically altering our self-conception as agents and thereby the law.

The entire article is here.

Psychological Science's Replicability Crisis and What It Means for Science in the Courtroom

By Jason Michael Chin
Journal of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (Forthcoming)

Abstract:  
 
In response to what has been termed the “replicability crisis,” great changes are currently under way in how science is conducted and disseminated. Indeed, major journals are changing the way in which they evaluate science. Therefore, a question arises over how such change impacts law’s treatment of scientific evidence. The present standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts asks judges to play the role of gatekeeper, determining if the proffered evidence conforms with several indicia of scientific validity. The alternative legal framework, and one still used by several state courts, requires judges to simply evaluate whether a scientific finding or practice is generally accepted within science.

This Essay suggests that as much as the replicability crisis has highlighted serious issues in the scientific process, it has should have similar implications and actionable consequences for legal practitioners and academics. In particular, generally accepted scientific practices have frequently lagged behind prescriptions for best practices, which in turn affected the way science has been reported and performed. The consequence of this phenomenon is that judicial analysis of scientific evidence will still be impacted by deficient generally accepted practices. The Essay ends with some suggestions to help ensure that legal decisions are influenced by science’s best practices.

Download the essay here.