Cognitive control and dishonesty

Speer, S. P., Smidts, A., & Boksem, M. A. (2022b).

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 26(9), 796–808.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.06.005

Abstract

Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one’s ‘moral default’: for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.

Significance

The precise role of cognitive control in dishonesty has been debated for many years, but now important strides have been made to resolve this debate.

Recently developed paradigms that allow for investigating dishonesty on the level of the choice rather than on the level of the individual have substantially improved our understanding of the adaptive role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty.

These new paradigms revealed that the role of cognitive control differs across people: for cheaters, it helps them to sometimes be honest, while for those who are generally honest, it allows them to cheat on occasion. Thus, cognitive control is not required for (dis)honesty per se but is required to override one’s moral default to be either honest or to cheat.

Individual differences in moral default are driven by balancing motivation for reward and upholding a moral self-image.

From Concluding remarks

The Will and Grace hypotheses have been debated for quite some time, but recently important strides have been made to resolve this debate. Key elements in this proposed resolution are (i) recognizing that there is heterogeneity between individuals, some default more towards honesty, whereas others have a stronger inclination towards dishonesty; (ii) recognizing that there is heterogeneity within individuals, cheaters can be honest sometimes and honest people do cheat on occasion; and (iii) the development of experimental paradigms that allow dishonesty to be investigated on the level of the choice, rather than only on the level of the individual or the group. These developments have substantially enhanced understanding of the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty: it is not required for being honest or dishonest per se, but it is required to override one’s moral default to either be honest or to cheat (Figure 1).

These insights open up novel research agendas and offer suggestions as to how to develop interventions to curtail dishonesty. Our review suggests three processes that may be targeted by such interventions: reward seeking, self-referential thinking, and cognitive control. Shaping contexts in ways that are conducive to honesty by targeting these processes may go a long way to increase honesty in everyday behavior.

The research is paywalled here.

Are Free Will Believers Nicer People? (Four Studies Suggest Not)

Crone DL, & Levy NL. 

Social Psychological and 

Personality Science. 2019;10(5):612-619. 

doi:10.1177/1948550618780732

Abstract

Free will is widely considered a foundational component of Western moral and legal codes, and yet current conceptions of free will are widely thought to fit uncomfortably with much research in psychology and neuroscience. Recent research investigating the consequences of laypeople’s free will beliefs (FWBs) for everyday moral behavior suggests that stronger FWBs are associated with various desirable moral characteristics (e.g., greater helpfulness, less dishonesty). These findings have sparked concern regarding the potential for moral degeneration throughout society as science promotes a view of human behavior that is widely perceived to undermine the notion of free will. We report four studies (combined N = 921) originally concerned with possible mediators and/or moderators of the abovementioned associations. Unexpectedly, we found no association between FWBs and moral behavior. Our findings suggest that the FWB–moral behavior association (and accompanying concerns regarding decreases in FWBs causing moral degeneration) may be overstated.

(Bold added by me.)

The research is here.

Dimensions of decision-making: An evidence-based classification of heuristics and biases

A. Ceschia and others
Personality and Individual Differences, 
Volume 146, 1 August 2019, Pages 188-200

Abstract

Traditionally, studies examining decision-making heuristics and biases (H&B) have focused on aggregate effects using between-subjects designs in order to demonstrate violations of rationality. Although H&B are often studied in isolation from others, emerging research has suggested that stable and reliable individual differences in rational thought exist, and similarity in performance across tasks are related, which may suggest an underlying phenotypic structure of decision-making skills. Though numerous theoretical and empirical classifications have been offered, results have been mixed. The current study aimed to clarify this research question. Participants (N = 289) completed a battery of 17 H&B tasks, assessed with a within-subjects design, that we selected based on a review of prior empirical and theoretical taxonomies. Exploratory and confirmatory analyses yielded a solution that suggested that these biases conform to a model composed of three dimensions: Mindware gaps, Valuation biases (i.e., Positive Illusions and Negativity effect), and Anchoring and Adjustment. We discuss these findings in relation to proposed taxonomies and existing studies on individual differences in decision-making.

A pdf of the research can be downloaded here.

Moralized Rationality: Relying on Logic and Evidence in the Formation and Evaluation of Belief Can Be Seen as a Moral Issue

Tomas Ståhl, Maarten P. Zaal, and Linda J. Skitka
PLOS One
Published November 16, 2017

Abstract

In the present article we demonstrate stable individual differences in the extent to which a reliance on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of beliefs is perceived as a moral virtue, and a reliance on less rational processes is perceived as a vice. We refer to this individual difference variable as moralized rationality. Eight studies are reported in which an instrument to measure individual differences in moralized rationality is validated. Results show that the Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS) is internally consistent, and captures something distinct from the personal importance people attach to being rational (Studies 1–3). Furthermore, the MRS has high test-retest reliability (Study 4), is conceptually distinct from frequently used measures of individual differences in moral values, and it is negatively related to common beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence (Study 5). We further demonstrate that the MRS predicts morally laden reactions, such as a desire for punishment, of people who rely on irrational (vs. rational) ways of forming and evaluating beliefs (Studies 6 and 7). Finally, we show that the MRS uniquely predicts motivation to contribute to a charity that works to prevent the spread of irrational beliefs (Study 8). We conclude that (1) there are stable individual differences in the extent to which people moralize a reliance on rationality in the formation and evaluation of beliefs, (2) that these individual differences do not reduce to the personal importance attached to rationality, and (3) that individual differences in moralized rationality have important motivational and interpersonal consequences.

The research is here.

Moralized Rationality: Relying on Logic and Evidence in the Formation and Evaluation of Belief Can Be Seen as a Moral Issue

Ståhl T, Zaal MP, Skitka LJ (2016)
PLoS ONE 11(11): e0166332. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166332

Abstract

In the present article we demonstrate stable individual differences in the extent to which a reliance on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of beliefs is perceived as a moral virtue, and a reliance on less rational processes is perceived as a vice. We refer to this individual difference variable as moralized rationality. Eight studies are reported in which an instrument to measure individual differences in moralized rationality is validated. Results show that the Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS) is internally consistent, and captures something distinct from the personal importance people attach to being rational (Studies 1–3). Furthermore, the MRS has high test-retest reliability (Study 4), is conceptually distinct from frequently used measures of individual differences in moral values, and it is negatively related to common beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence (Study 5). We further demonstrate that the MRS predicts morally laden reactions, such as a desire for punishment, of people who rely on irrational (vs. rational) ways of forming and evaluating beliefs (Studies 6 and 7). Finally, we show that the MRS uniquely predicts motivation to contribute to a charity that works to prevent the spread of irrational beliefs (Study 8). We conclude that (1) there are stable individual differences in the extent to which people moralize a reliance on rationality in the formation and evaluation of beliefs, (2) that these individual differences do not reduce to the personal importance attached to rationality, and (3) that individual differences in moralized rationality have important motivational and interpersonal consequences.

The article is here.