Out, damned spot: Can the “Macbeth Effect” be replicated?

Earp, B. D., Everett, J. A. C., et al. (2014).

Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 36(1), 91–98.

https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2013.856792

Abstract

Comments on an article by Zhong, and Liljenquist (see record 2004-22267-003). Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) reported evidence of a “Macbeth Effect” in social psychology: a threat to people's moral purity leads them to seek, literally, to cleanse themselves. In an attempt to build upon these findings, we conducted a series of direct replications of Study 2 from Z&L's seminal report. We used Z&L's original materials and methods, investigated samples that were more representative of the general population, investigated samples from different countries and cultures, and substantially increased the power of our statistical tests. Despite multiple good-faith efforts, however, we were unable to detect a “Macbeth Effect” in any of our experiments. We discuss these findings in the context of recent concerns about replicability in the field of experimental social psychology.

A pdf is here.

Here is my summary:

In a seminal study published in 2006, Zhong and Liljenquist introduced the concept of the "Macbeth Effect," which suggests that moral transgressions lead to a desire for physical cleansing. This phenomenon was inspired by Shakespeare's play "Macbeth," in which Lady Macbeth's obsession with washing her hands reflects her guilt over her murderous actions.

Building on Zhong and Liljenquist's work, Earp et al. (2014) conducted a series of experiments to replicate the Macbeth Effect. They used various methods, including manipulating participants' moral states through writing tasks and exposing them to reminders of moral cleanliness. However, despite their efforts, they were unable to consistently find evidence for the Macbeth Effect.

The authors' inability to replicate the original findings raises questions about the robustness of the Macbeth Effect. They suggest that more research is needed to understand the conditions under which moral transgressions lead to a desire for physical cleansing. Additionally, they emphasize the importance of conducting replications in psychological research to ensure the reliability of findings.

The hidden ‘replication crisis’ of finance

Robin Wigglesworth 

Financial Times

Originally published 15 NOV 2021

Here is an excerpt:

Is investing suffering from something similar?

That is the incendiary argument of Campbell Harvey, professor of finance at Duke university. He reckons that at least half of the 400 supposedly market-beating strategies identified in top financial journals over the years are bogus. Worse, he worries that many fellow academics are in denial about this.

“It’s a huge issue,” he says. “Step one in dealing with the replication crisis in finance is to accept that there is a crisis. And right now, many of my colleagues are not there yet.”

Harvey is not some obscure outsider or performative contrarian attempting to gain attention through needless controversy. He is the former editor of the Journal of Finance, a former president of the American Finance Association, and an adviser to investment firms like Research Affiliates and Man Group.

(cut)

Obviously, the stakes of the replication crisis are much higher in medicine, where lives can be in play. But it is not something that remains confined to the ivory towers of business schools, as investment groups often smell an opportunity to sell products based on apparently market-beating factors, Harvey argues. “It filters into the real world,” he says. “It definitely makes it into people’s portfolios.”

The info is here.

Bias in science: natural and social

Joshua May

Synthese 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02937-0

Abstract 

Moral, social, political, and other “nonepistemic” values can lead to bias in science, from prioritizing certain topics over others to the rationalization of questionable research practices. Such values might seem particularly common or powerful in the social sciences, given their subject matter. However, I argue first that the well documented phenomenon of motivated reasoning provides a useful framework for understanding when values guide scientific inquiry (in pernicious or productive ways). Second, this analysis reveals a parity thesis: values influence the social and natural sciences about equally, particularly because both are so prominently affected by desires for social credit and status, including recognition and career advancement. Ultimately, bias in natural and social science is both natural and social—that is, a part of human nature and considerably motivated by a concern for social status (and its maintenance). Whether the pervasive influence of values is inimical to the sciences is a separate question.

Conclusion 

We have seen how many of the putative biases that affect science can be explained and illuminated in terms of motivated reasoning, which yields a general understanding of how a researcher’s goals and values can influence scientific practice (whether positively or negatively). This general account helps to show that it is unwarranted to assume that such influences are significantly more prominent in the social sciences. The defense of this parity claim relies primarily on two key points. First, the natural sciences are also susceptible to the same values found in social science, particularly given that findings in many fields have social or political implications. Second, the ideological motivations that might seem to arise only in social science are minor compared to others. In particular, one’s reasoning is more often motivated by a desire to gain social credit (e.g. recognition among peers) than a desire to promote a moral or political ideology. Although there may be discernible differences in the quality of research across scientific domains, all are influenced by researchers’ values, as manifested in their motivations.

The research is here.