“The notion of open society is an attempt to answer the question of how we can effectively live together in large and modern environments. Its ideals include commitments to the rule of law, freedom of association, democratic institutions, and the free use of reason and critical analysis. Arguments in favour of these ideals necessarily depend on assumptions—sometimes hidden and unexamined—about the human mind.”
I agreed to take part in the summer school because it would allow me to interact with a group of fantastic researchers and because it brings together two of my favourite things: (1) evolutionary social science and (2) the ideals of open, liberal societies—ideals that I regard as some of humanity’s most important and most fragile achievements.
In my role, I am giving two lectures on “The epistemic challenges of open societies”. The first lecture explores four factors that distort the capacity of citizens within open societies to acquire accurate beliefs about the world: complexity, invisibility, ignorance, and tribalism.
Here are some thoughts:
The article/blog post discusses the concept of open societies, emphasizing two key ideals: democracy and the free exchange of ideas. Open societies are characterized by political equality, typically expressed through the principle of "one person, one vote," and they promote radical freedom of thought and expression, as advocated by J.S. Mill. The text argues that these features are believed to enhance the social production of knowledge and understanding, although this optimism may be challenged by the complexities of modern societies.
Complexity and Public Opinion
Modern societies face intricate issues like climate change and economic policies, which ordinary citizens are expected to address. However, it is questioned whether they are equipped to do so, as highlighted by Walter Lippmann's critique of democracy, which points out that even experts struggle to grasp these complexities. Furthermore, the phenomenon of "rational ignorance" is introduced, explaining that individuals may choose not to become politically informed due to the minimal impact their vote has on outcomes, leading to widespread political ignorance.
Motivated Cognition and Coalitional Psychology
Despite a minority of highly engaged citizens, the text notes that those involved in politics often exhibit biases due to motivated cognition, where beliefs are shaped by personal interests rather than objective truth. This is linked to coalitional psychology, where individuals advocate for their political groups, distorting their understanding of reality to align with group interests. The article concludes that while open societies rely on informed electorates, the dynamics of motivated cognition and coalitional allegiances complicate the pursuit of truth and informed decision-making in democratic contexts.
