The One That Got Away: Overestimation of Forgone Alternatives as a Hidden Source of Regret

Feiler, D., & Müller-Trede, J. (2022).

Psychological Science, 33(2), 314–324.

https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976211032657

Abstract

Past research has established that observing the outcomes of forgone alternatives is an important driver of regret. In this research, we predicted and empirically corroborated a seemingly opposite result: Participants in our studies were more likely to experience regret when they did not observe a forgone outcome than when it was revealed. Our prediction drew on two theoretical observations. First, feelings of regret frequently stem from comparing a chosen option with one’s belief about what the forgone alternative would have been. Second, when there are many alternatives to choose from under uncertainty, the perceived attractiveness of the almost-chosen alternative tends to exceed its reality. In four preregistered studies (Ns = 800, 599, 150, and 197 adults), we found that participants predictably overestimated the forgone path, and this overestimation caused undue regret. We discuss the psychological implications of this hidden source of regret and reconcile the ostensible contradiction with past research.

Statement of Relevance

Reflecting on our past decisions can often make us feel regret. Previous research suggests that feelings of regret stem from comparing the outcome of our chosen path with that of the unchosen path.  We present a seemingly contradictory finding: Participants in our studies were more likely to experience regret when they did not observe the forgone outcome than when they saw it. This effect arises because when there are many paths to choose from, and uncertainty exists about how good each would be, people tend to overestimate the almost-chosen path. An idealized view of the path not taken then becomes an unfair standard of comparison for the chosen path, which inflates feelings of regret. Excessive regret has been found to be associated with depression and anxiety, and our work suggests that there may be a hidden source of undue regret—overestimation of forgone paths—that may contribute to these problems.

The ending...

Finally, is overestimating the paths we do not take causing us too much regret? Although regret can have

benefits for experiential learning, it is an inherently negative emotion and has been found to be associated with depression and excessive anxiety (Kocovski et al., 2005; Markman & Miller, 2006; Roese et al., 2009). Because the regret in our studies was driven by biased beliefs, it may be excessive—after all, better-calibrated beliefs about forgone alternatives would cause less regret. Whether calibrating beliefs about forgone alternatives could also help in alleviating regret’s harmful psychological consequences is an important question for future research.

The research is here.

Important implications for psychotherapy....

(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions

Goldstein-Greenwood J, et al.

Personality and Social Psychology 

Bulletin. 2020;46(9):1303-1317. 

doi:10.1177/0146167219897662

Abstract

Sacrificial moral dilemmas, in which opting to kill one person will save multiple others, are definitionally suboptimal: Someone dies either way. Decision-makers, then, may experience regret about these decisions. Past research distinguishes affective regret, negative feelings about a decision, from cognitive regret, thoughts about how a decision might have gone differently. Classic dual-process models of moral judgment suggest that affective processing drives characteristically deontological decisions to reject outcome-maximizing harm, whereas cognitive deliberation drives characteristically utilitarian decisions to endorse outcome-maximizing harm. Consistent with this model, we found that people who made or imagined making sacrificial utilitarian judgments reliably expressed relatively more affective regret and sometimes expressed relatively less cognitive regret than those who made or imagined making deontological dilemma judgments. In other words, people who endorsed causing harm to save lives generally felt more distressed about their decision, yet less inclined to change it, than people who rejected outcome-maximizing harm.

General Discussion

Across four studies, we found that different sacrificial moral dilemma decisions elicit different degrees of affective and cognitive regret. We found robust evidence that utilitarian decision-makers who accept outcome-maximizing harm experience far more affective regret than their deontological decision-making counterparts who reject outcome-maximizing harm, and we found somewhat weaker evidence that utilitarian decision-makers experience less cognitive regret than deontological decision-makers.The significant interaction between dilemma decision and regret type predicted in H1 emerged both when participants freely endorsed dilemma decisions (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and were randomly assigned to imagine making a decision (Study 2). Hence, the present findings cannot simply be attributed to chronic differences in the types of regret that people who prioritize each decision experience. Moreover, we found tentative evidence for H2: Focusing on the counterfactual world in which they made the alternative decision attenuated utilitarian decision-makers’ heightened affective regret compared with factual reflection, and reduced differences in affective regret between utilitarian and deontological decision-makers (Study 4). Furthermore, our findings do not appear attributable to impression management concerns, as there were no differences between public and private reports of regret.

A pdf of the research is here.

When a Patient Regrets Having Undergone a Carefully and Jointly Considered Treatment Plan, How Should Her Physician Respond?

L. V. Selby and others
AMA J Ethics. 2020;22(5):E352-357.
doi: 10.1001/amajethics.2020.352.

Abstract

Shared decision making is best utilized when a decision is preference sensitive. However, a consequence of choosing between one of several reasonable options is decisional regret: wishing a different decision had been made. In this vignette, a patient chooses mastectomy to avoid radiotherapy. However, postoperatively, she regrets the more disfiguring operation and wishes she had picked the other option: lumpectomy and radiation. Although the physician might view decisional regret as a failure of shared decision making, the physician should reflect on the process by which the decision was made. If the patient’s wishes and values were explored and the decision was made in keeping with those values, decisional regret should be viewed as a consequence of decision making, not necessarily as a failure of shared decision making.

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Commentary

This case vignette highlights decisional regret, which is one of the possible consequences of the patient decision-making process when there are multiple treatment options available. Although the process of shared decision making, which appears to have been carried out in this case, is utilized to help guide the patient and the physician to come to a mutually acceptable and optimal health care decision, it clearly does not always obviate the risk of a patient’s regretting that decision after treatment. Ironically, the patient might end up experiencing more regret after participating in a decision-making process in which more rather than fewer options are presented and in which the patient perceives the process as collaborative rather than paternalistic. For example, among men with prostate cancer, those with lower levels of decisional involvement had lower levels of decisional regret. We argue that decisional regret does not mean that shared decision making is not best practice, even though it can result in patients being reminded of their role in the decision and associated personal regret with that decision.

The info is here.

Exceptionality Effect in Agency: Exceptional Choices Attributed Higher Free Will Than Routine

Fillon, A, Lantian, A., Feldman, G., & N'gbala, A.
PsyArXiv
Originally posted on 9 Nov 19

Abstract

Exceptionality effect is the widely cited phenomenon that people experience stronger regret regarding negative outcomes that are a result of more exceptional circumstances, compared to routine. We hypothesize that the exceptionality-routine attribution asymmetry would extend to attributions of freedom and responsibility. In Experiment 1 (N = 338), we found that people attributed more free will to exceptional behavior compared to routine, when the exception was due to self-choice rather than due to external circumstances. In Experiment 2 (N = 561), we replicated and generalized the effect of exceptionality on attributions of free will to other scenarios, with support for the classic exceptionality effect regarding regret and an extension to moral responsibility. In Experiment 3 (N = 128), we replicated these effects in a within-subject design. When using a classic experimental philosophy paradigm contrasting a deterministic and an indeterministic universe, we found that the results were robust across both contexts. We conclude that there is a consistent support for a link between exceptionality and free will attributions.

From the Conclusion:

Although based on different theoretical frameworks, our results on attributions of free will could be related to the findings of Bear and Knobe (2016). They found that a behavior that was performed “actively” rather than “passively” modifies people’s judgment about the compatibility of this behavior with causal determinism thesis. More concretely, people consider that a behavior performed actively (such as composing a highly technical legal document) is less possible (i.e., less compatible) in a causally deterministic universe than a behavior performed passively (such as impulsively shoplifting from a convenience store; Bear & Knobe, 2016). According to Bear and Knobe (2016), people relied on two cues to determine the active or passive feature of a behavior: mental effort and spontaneity (Bear & Knobe, 2016). By adopting this framework, we may assimilate an exceptional behavior to an active behavior (because its “breaking off from the flow of things,” and require mental effort and spontaneity) and a routine behavior to a passive effort (because it is “going with the flow,” and does not require a mental effort or spontaneity). In the same vein, an agent acting spontaneously is considered freer than an agent acting deliberately (Vierkantet al., 2019). Despite the fact that Vierkant et al. (2019) manipulated the agent’s choice (spontaneous vs. deliberate) in a within-design their study, it may suggest that when deliberation (or mental effort) and spontaneity are experimentally contrasted, it is spontaneity that seems to be the driving force behind the increase of perceived free will of the agent.

The research is here.

War Wounds That Time Alone Can't Heal

by Jane E. Brody
The New York Times
Originally published June 6, 2016

Here are two excerpts:
Therapists both within and outside the Department of Veterans Affairs increasingly recognize moral injury as the reason so many returning vets are self-destructive and are not helped, or only partly helped, by established treatments for PTSD.

Moral injury has some of the symptoms of PTSD, especially anger, depression, anxiety, nightmares, insomnia and self-medication with drugs or alcohol. And it may benefit from some of the same treatments. But moral injury has an added burden of guilt, grief, shame, regret, sorrow and alienation that requires a very different approach to reach the core of a sufferer’s psyche.

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Therapists who study and treat moral injury have found that no amount of medication can relieve the pain of trying to live with an unbearable moral burden. They say those suffering from moral injury contribute significantly to the horrific toll of suicide among returning vets — estimated as high as 18 to 22 a day in the United States, more than the number lost in combat.

The article is here.