Steven Lubet
Slate.com
Originally posted January 16, 2019
Here is an excerpt:
Chief Justice John Roberts addressed the anomaly of the missing ethics code in his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, acknowledging that the lower courts’ code is a good “starting point” for ethics inquiries. Nonetheless, he asserted that there is “no reason” to adopt a SCOTUS code because members of his court consult a wide variety of other sources for guidance. In addition, Roberts noted that current iterations of the judicial code do “not adequately answer some of the ethical considerations unique to the Supreme Court,” and that “no compilation of ethical rules can guarantee integrity.”
The chief justice’s observations are all reasonable, but they do not begin to justify the absence of a Supreme Court code. Nearly all of his explanations apply with equal force to every other court in the U.S., and yet those courts have, without exception, adopted written codes. It is true, of course, that no “compilation” of rules can guarantee compliance, but the same could be said for all other codes, ranging from the Bill of Rights to the Ten Commandments. He is right that existing judicial codes do not address issues “unique to the Supreme Court,” but that is why the proposed legislation allows “provisions that are applicable only” to SCOTUS justices.
The info is here.
Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 20, 2019
Sunday, January 22, 2017
State Supreme Court Ruling Expands 'Tarasoff' Duty for Washington State Clinicians
Psychiatric News Alert
Originally released January 3, 2017
A Washington state Supreme Court decision appears to significantly broaden the duty that psychiatrists and other mental health professionals in that state have to protect and warn potential victims of violence by a patient under their care.
In Volk v. De Meerleer, the Washington state Supreme Court expanded the so-called Tarasoff standard regarding a mental health professional's duty to protect and warn a third party of possible violence, asserting that the duty extends to any possible victim--even one that has not been specifically identified by the patient.
The ruling applies only to clinicians in Washington state. Although other states could conceivably adopt a similar standard, the ruling does not establish a legal precedent outside of Washington. (It was a 1976 case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, that established the principle that a mental health professional has the duty to protect a third party, specifically identified by a patient, that he or she may be potential victim of violence.)
Tarasoff has typically been interpreted to mean that the mental health provider owes a duty to the intended victim if the victim is identified or reasonably identifiable. But the new decision by the Washington state Supreme Court suggests that the duty is more expansive and that the provider may have an obligation to probe statements about violence to determine whether there is an intended victim and/or to infer intended victims from past sessions.
The decision creates a new category of "medical negligence," rendering clinicians in Washington state potentially legally liable if it is determined that they should have known someone would be a victim of violence. APA signed on to an amicus brief with the Washington State Medical Society and six other groups saying that a lower court's finding that mental health professionals owe a duty of care to the general public, not just to reasonably identifiable third parties, places an unfair burden on clinicians.
APA CEO and Medical Director Saul Levin, M.D., M.P.A., said the ruling is a troubling one. "The court's ruling in Volk v. De Meerleer places clinicians in Washington state in a difficult position and could have detrimental effects on the patient-psychiatrist relationship," he said. "To the extent that a similar standard of liability could be adopted in other states, it should be of concern to psychiatrists and mental health professionals everywhere. APA will continue to follow developments in Washington state and continue to advocate for a fair and rational approach to Tarasoff duties."
APA President Maria A. Oquendo, M.D., Ph.D., echoed those remarks. "Holding mental health professionals liable to third-party victims who were not identifiable as targets of actual threats places an unreasonable burden on mental health professionals," she said. "This decision marks a significant departure from previous case law concerning Tarasoff duties. Leaving it to a jury to determine whether a mental health provider 'should have known' that a patient would be dangerous has a real potential to interfere with treatment of mental health patients."
Marvin Swartz, M.D., chair of the APA Committee on Judicial Action, told Psychiatric News that the decision potentially undermines the traditional understanding of physician liability. "Expanding physician liability to a new doctrine of 'medical negligence' suggests that courts and juries might begin to adopt a liability standard akin to strict product liability rather than the established standards of medical malpractice," he said. "The likely result would be a serious undermining of the physician/patient relationship."
Originally released January 3, 2017
A Washington state Supreme Court decision appears to significantly broaden the duty that psychiatrists and other mental health professionals in that state have to protect and warn potential victims of violence by a patient under their care.
In Volk v. De Meerleer, the Washington state Supreme Court expanded the so-called Tarasoff standard regarding a mental health professional's duty to protect and warn a third party of possible violence, asserting that the duty extends to any possible victim--even one that has not been specifically identified by the patient.
The ruling applies only to clinicians in Washington state. Although other states could conceivably adopt a similar standard, the ruling does not establish a legal precedent outside of Washington. (It was a 1976 case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, that established the principle that a mental health professional has the duty to protect a third party, specifically identified by a patient, that he or she may be potential victim of violence.)
Tarasoff has typically been interpreted to mean that the mental health provider owes a duty to the intended victim if the victim is identified or reasonably identifiable. But the new decision by the Washington state Supreme Court suggests that the duty is more expansive and that the provider may have an obligation to probe statements about violence to determine whether there is an intended victim and/or to infer intended victims from past sessions.
The decision creates a new category of "medical negligence," rendering clinicians in Washington state potentially legally liable if it is determined that they should have known someone would be a victim of violence. APA signed on to an amicus brief with the Washington State Medical Society and six other groups saying that a lower court's finding that mental health professionals owe a duty of care to the general public, not just to reasonably identifiable third parties, places an unfair burden on clinicians.
APA CEO and Medical Director Saul Levin, M.D., M.P.A., said the ruling is a troubling one. "The court's ruling in Volk v. De Meerleer places clinicians in Washington state in a difficult position and could have detrimental effects on the patient-psychiatrist relationship," he said. "To the extent that a similar standard of liability could be adopted in other states, it should be of concern to psychiatrists and mental health professionals everywhere. APA will continue to follow developments in Washington state and continue to advocate for a fair and rational approach to Tarasoff duties."
APA President Maria A. Oquendo, M.D., Ph.D., echoed those remarks. "Holding mental health professionals liable to third-party victims who were not identifiable as targets of actual threats places an unreasonable burden on mental health professionals," she said. "This decision marks a significant departure from previous case law concerning Tarasoff duties. Leaving it to a jury to determine whether a mental health provider 'should have known' that a patient would be dangerous has a real potential to interfere with treatment of mental health patients."
Marvin Swartz, M.D., chair of the APA Committee on Judicial Action, told Psychiatric News that the decision potentially undermines the traditional understanding of physician liability. "Expanding physician liability to a new doctrine of 'medical negligence' suggests that courts and juries might begin to adopt a liability standard akin to strict product liability rather than the established standards of medical malpractice," he said. "The likely result would be a serious undermining of the physician/patient relationship."
Wednesday, September 7, 2016
APA Signs Onto Amicus Brief Supporting Confidentiality
Aaron Levin
Psychiatric News
Originally published August 11, 2016
APA has signed on to an amicus curiae brief with the California Psychiatric Association and the California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists in a case before the California Supreme Court with important implications for patient confidentiality and clinicians’ liability.
APA is concerned that a ruling in favor of the plaintiff would change the existing California standard (the so-called Tarasoff rule) requiring action when “a patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.”
The case, Rosen v. Regents of the UCLA, arose when Damon Thompson, a student treated by UCLA’s counseling service, attacked and stabbed a fellow student, Katherine Rosen.
Under California law, a therapist has a “duty to protect” a potential victim if the patient makes a reasonably identifiable threat to harm a specific person.
The entire article is here.
Psychiatric News
Originally published August 11, 2016
APA has signed on to an amicus curiae brief with the California Psychiatric Association and the California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists in a case before the California Supreme Court with important implications for patient confidentiality and clinicians’ liability.
APA is concerned that a ruling in favor of the plaintiff would change the existing California standard (the so-called Tarasoff rule) requiring action when “a patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.”
The case, Rosen v. Regents of the UCLA, arose when Damon Thompson, a student treated by UCLA’s counseling service, attacked and stabbed a fellow student, Katherine Rosen.
Under California law, a therapist has a “duty to protect” a potential victim if the patient makes a reasonably identifiable threat to harm a specific person.
The entire article is here.
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
Finding Risks, Not Answers, in Gene Tests
By Denise Grady and Andrew Pollack
The New York Times
Originally published September 22, 2014
Jennifer was 39 and perfectly healthy, but her grandmother had died young from breast cancer, so she decided to be tested for mutations in two genes known to increase risk for the disease.
When a genetic counselor offered additional tests for 20 other genes linked to various cancers, Jennifer said yes. The more information, the better, she thought.
The results, she said, were “surreal.” She did not have mutations in the breast cancer genes, but did have one linked to a high risk of stomach cancer. In people with a family history of the disease, that mutation is considered so risky that patients who are not even sick are often advised to have their stomachs removed. But no one knows what the finding might mean in someone like Jennifer, whose family has not had the disease.
The entire article is here.
The New York Times
Originally published September 22, 2014
Jennifer was 39 and perfectly healthy, but her grandmother had died young from breast cancer, so she decided to be tested for mutations in two genes known to increase risk for the disease.
When a genetic counselor offered additional tests for 20 other genes linked to various cancers, Jennifer said yes. The more information, the better, she thought.
The results, she said, were “surreal.” She did not have mutations in the breast cancer genes, but did have one linked to a high risk of stomach cancer. In people with a family history of the disease, that mutation is considered so risky that patients who are not even sick are often advised to have their stomachs removed. But no one knows what the finding might mean in someone like Jennifer, whose family has not had the disease.
The entire article is here.
Thursday, June 19, 2014
IQ Cutoff for Death Penalty Struck Down by Supreme Court
By Sara Reardon and Nature News Blog
Scientific American
Originally posted on May 28, 2014
When deciding whether a defendant is too intellectually disabled to receive the death penalty, courts must take into account inherent variability in IQ scores, the US Supreme Court ruled today.
In its 5-4 decision, the court said that it is unconstitutional for states like Florida to use an IQ score of 70 as a cutoff above which a defendant is considered to be intelligent enough to understand the consequences of his or her actions.
The entire article is here.
Scientific American
Originally posted on May 28, 2014
When deciding whether a defendant is too intellectually disabled to receive the death penalty, courts must take into account inherent variability in IQ scores, the US Supreme Court ruled today.
In its 5-4 decision, the court said that it is unconstitutional for states like Florida to use an IQ score of 70 as a cutoff above which a defendant is considered to be intelligent enough to understand the consequences of his or her actions.
The entire article is here.
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
Neuroscience and the law
Nature Reviews Neuroscience
September 2013 Vol 14 No 9
New insights into the neural processes that underlie cognition and behaviour have led to discussions about the relevance of these discoveries for the criminal justice system. Conversely, laws can influence neuroscience, for example, with regard to psychoactive drugs and stem cell research. Nature Reviews Neuroscience presents a series of articles that explore the interaction between neuroscience and the law.
There are three articles at this site are behind paywalls.
The neuroscience of memory: implications for the courtroom
Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. L. Stark
Effects of Schedule I drug laws on neuroscience research and treatment innovation
David J. Nutt, Leslie A. King & David E. Nichols
The influence of neuroscience on US Supreme Court decisions about adolescents' criminal culpability
Laurence Steinberg
These articles can be found here.
September 2013 Vol 14 No 9
New insights into the neural processes that underlie cognition and behaviour have led to discussions about the relevance of these discoveries for the criminal justice system. Conversely, laws can influence neuroscience, for example, with regard to psychoactive drugs and stem cell research. Nature Reviews Neuroscience presents a series of articles that explore the interaction between neuroscience and the law.
There are three articles at this site are behind paywalls.
The neuroscience of memory: implications for the courtroom
Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. L. Stark
Effects of Schedule I drug laws on neuroscience research and treatment innovation
David J. Nutt, Leslie A. King & David E. Nichols
The influence of neuroscience on US Supreme Court decisions about adolescents' criminal culpability
Laurence Steinberg
These articles can be found here.
Wednesday, March 13, 2013
No Scientific Basis for Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage, Key Associations Argue
Leading mental health groups file briefs in Supreme Court cases challenging Defense of Marriage Act, California’s Proposition 8
American Psychological Association
Press Release
Released on March 1, 2013
There is no valid scientific basis for denying same-sex couples the right to legal marriage, or to deprive them of considerable benefits of the institution, according to legal briefs filed with the U.S. Supreme Court by the American Psychological Association and other leading mental health associations.
“Empirical research demonstrates that the psychological and social aspects of committed relationships between same-sex partners largely resemble those of heterosexual partnerships,” the briefs state. “Like heterosexual couples, same-sex couples form deep emotional attachments and commitments. Heterosexual and same-sex couples alike face similar issues concerning intimacy, love, equity, loyalty and stability, and they go through similar processes to address those issues.”
Denying recognition to legally married same-sex couples stigmatizes them, according to the “friend of the court” briefs filed in the cases of Hollingsworth v. Perry, which challenges California’s Proposition 8, and U.S. v. Windsor, which challenges the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Perry is slated to be argued before the court on March 26; Windsor will be argued on March 27.
The briefs cite empirical scientific evidence that demonstrate that “homosexuality is a normal expression of human sexuality, is generally not chosen and is highly resistant to change.” Likewise, “there is no scientific basis for concluding that gay and lesbian parents are any less fit or capable than heterosexual parents, or that their children are any less psychologically healthy and well-adjusted,” according to the briefs.
The entire release is here.
American Psychological Association
Press Release
Released on March 1, 2013
There is no valid scientific basis for denying same-sex couples the right to legal marriage, or to deprive them of considerable benefits of the institution, according to legal briefs filed with the U.S. Supreme Court by the American Psychological Association and other leading mental health associations.
“Empirical research demonstrates that the psychological and social aspects of committed relationships between same-sex partners largely resemble those of heterosexual partnerships,” the briefs state. “Like heterosexual couples, same-sex couples form deep emotional attachments and commitments. Heterosexual and same-sex couples alike face similar issues concerning intimacy, love, equity, loyalty and stability, and they go through similar processes to address those issues.”
Denying recognition to legally married same-sex couples stigmatizes them, according to the “friend of the court” briefs filed in the cases of Hollingsworth v. Perry, which challenges California’s Proposition 8, and U.S. v. Windsor, which challenges the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Perry is slated to be argued before the court on March 26; Windsor will be argued on March 27.
The briefs cite empirical scientific evidence that demonstrate that “homosexuality is a normal expression of human sexuality, is generally not chosen and is highly resistant to change.” Likewise, “there is no scientific basis for concluding that gay and lesbian parents are any less fit or capable than heterosexual parents, or that their children are any less psychologically healthy and well-adjusted,” according to the briefs.
The entire release is here.
Friday, December 30, 2011
Supreme Court hears case involving medical record disclosure
An HIV-positive pilot
claims the government is liable for releasing his medical history during a
joint-agency investigation.
By Alicia Gallegos,
amednews staff.
Originally posted Dec. 26, 2011.
Originally posted Dec. 26, 2011.
The U.S. Supreme Court has
heard oral arguments in a case centering on whether the government is liable
for disclosing to another agency the medical history of an HIV-positive
patient.
The Social Security
Administration admits that it violated federal law when it shared a pilot's
medical records with the Federal Aviation Administration. But government
attorneys say the federal Privacy Act allows recovery for economic damages
only, not for emotional distress.
The case emphasizes the
importance of adhering to national privacy laws, such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, said Alexander Wohl, a law professor at the
Washington College of Law and a contributor to the Supreme Court's blog.
"It reinforces the
impact of those laws. Doctors have their own legal standards," but they
still need to be careful not to violate their patients' privacy, he said.
(cut)
Case at a glance
Is the government liable
for noneconomic damages for disclosing a person's medical records to another
agency?
A federal court said no.
The court ruled that the government violated the Privacy Act but is not
responsible for noneconomic damages. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed. It ruled that when a federal agency intentionally or willfully fails
to uphold its record-keeping obligations under the law, Congress intended that
the plaintiff be entitled to recover both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.
The case is before the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments Nov. 30.
Impact: Attorneys for the
plaintiff say a ruling for the government would significantly limit recoveries
for people whose privacy is violated by government agencies. In addition,
whistle-blowers, including doctors, who report instances of fraud and abuse
would face greater disincentives to expose misconduct. A ruling for the
plaintiff would lead to more lawsuits against the government for overly broad
claims related to the Privacy Act, government attorneys say. A decision is
expected in 2012.
The entire story can be
read here.
Monday, December 5, 2011
Thomas, Kagan and the Health Care Case
By MARK SHERMAN
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) — Conservative interest groups and Republican lawmakers want Justice Elena Kagan off the health care case. Liberals and Democrats in Congress say it's Justice Clarence Thomas who should sit it out.
Neither justice is budging — the right decision, according to many ethicists and legal experts.
None of the parties in the case has asked the justices to excuse themselves. But underlying the calls on both sides is their belief that the conservative Thomas is a sure vote to strike down President Barack Obama's health care law and that the liberal Kagan is certain to uphold the main domestic achievement of the man who appointed her.
The stakes are high in the court's election-year review of a law aimed at extending coverage to more than 30 million people. Both sides have engaged in broad legal and political maneuvering for the most favorable conditions surrounding the court's consideration of the case.
Taking away just one vote potentially could tip the outcome on the nine-justice court.
The entire article can be read here.
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