Firt, E.
AI & Soc (2024).
Abstract
In the research field of machine ethics, we commonly categorize artificial moral agents into four types, with the most advanced referred to as a full ethical agent, or sometimes a full-blown Artificial Moral Agent (AMA). This type has three main characteristics: autonomy, moral understanding and a certain level of consciousness, including intentional mental states, moral emotions such as compassion, the ability to praise and condemn, and a conscience. This paper aims to discuss various aspects of full-blown AMAs and presents the following argument: the creation of full-blown artificial moral agents, endowed with intentional mental states and moral emotions, and trained to align with human values, does not, by itself, guarantee that these systems will have human morality. Therefore, it is questionable whether they will be inclined to honor and follow what they perceive as incorrect moral values. we do not intend to claim that there is such a thing as a universally shared human morality, only that as there are different human communities holding different sets of moral values, the moral systems or values of the discussed artificial agents would be different from those held by human communities, for reasons we discuss in the paper.
Here are some thoughts:
This article discusses the complex implications of creating advanced artificial moral agents (AMAs) and the potential future coexistence of these agents with hybrid humans. The authors present a compelling argument that full-blown AMAs, despite being designed to align with human values, may not necessarily share or adhere to human morality.
The key insight here is that even if we create AMAs with autonomy, moral understanding, and consciousness, their moral systems may fundamentally differ from those of human communities. This challenges the assumption that equipping AI systems with human-like emotions and empathy will ensure they behave in ways we consider proper or controllable.
The authors raise an important question about the feasibility of aligning the values of sophisticated AMAs with human values, especially if these agents develop moral systems that are incomprehensible or foreign to us. This presents a significant challenge in terms of trust and control, as we cannot assume these agents will follow moral principles that contradict their own inner convictions.
The discussion on hybrid humans adds another layer of complexity to this ethical landscape. As humans integrate more with technology, their moral perspectives may shift, potentially becoming more sympathetic to the different moral values of full ethical agents. This evolution could lead to a scenario where the distinction between hybrid humans and AMAs becomes increasingly blurred.
From a clinical psychology perspective, this raises fascinating questions about the nature of morality, consciousness, and identity. How might the integration of artificial components into human beings affect their moral decision-making processes and emotional responses? As psychologists, we must consider the potential psychological impacts of such radical changes on individuals and society as a whole.
Furthermore, the ethical dilemmas presented here highlight the need for interdisciplinary collaboration in addressing these future challenges. Psychologists, ethicists, AI researchers, and policymakers must work together to navigate the complex terrain of artificial morality and its implications for human society.
In conclusion, this article underscores the importance of carefully considering the long-term consequences of creating advanced artificial moral agents. It challenges us to think deeply about the nature of morality, the potential divergence between human and artificial ethical systems, and how we might prepare for a future where the lines between human and artificial intelligence become increasingly blurred.
