The Illusion of Moral Objectivity: A Learned Framework An Exploration of Morality as a Social Construct

Noah Cottle

Thesis for: Neuropsychology & Philosophy

DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.16238.73286

Abstract

This paper explores the argument that morality is not an innate, universal truth but rather a

construct learned through socialization, cultural exposure, and environmental conditioning.

Challenging the notion of objective moral values, it posits that human beings are born without a

fixed moral compass and instead develop their sense of right and wrong through the values and

beliefs taught to them. Drawing on psychological, sociological, and historical perspectives, this

work investigates how moral frameworks differ across cultures and time periods, revealing the

malleability of ethical systems. The paper concludes that morality is a fluid structure—often

mistaken for objective truth—shaped by the narratives and authorities that define it.

A pdf is here.

Here are some thoughts:

The thesis presents a compelling argument that morality is not an innate or universal human truth, but rather a social construct developed through conditioning, cultural immersion, and the influence of authority. Drawing from psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history, the paper contends that humans are born without a fixed moral compass and instead acquire their moral frameworks through a process of environmental shaping. From early childhood, individuals are taught what is "right" or "wrong" through reinforcement, punishment, observation, and repeated narratives. These teachings are often internalized so deeply that they are mistaken for moral intuition or truth. However, what feels instinctively moral is more accurately the product of learned emotional associations and cultural conditioning.

Cottle further demonstrates that moral beliefs vary drastically across cultures and historical periods, undermining the notion of a single objective morality. Practices such as honor killings, child labor, slavery, or same-sex marriage have been alternately viewed as virtuous or immoral depending on the time and place—highlighting morality’s fluidity rather than its universality. This perspective is reinforced by psychological research on moral development, including theories of operant conditioning and moral intuition, which show that moral responses are heavily influenced by emotions, authority figures, and exposure rather than by logic or reason.

Importantly, the paper explores how morality is often shaped and enforced by those in power—religious leaders, governments, and social institutions—which raises critical questions about who defines moral standards and whose interests those standards serve. Morality, in this view, becomes a tool for maintaining social order and control rather than a reflection of universal justice. The text also critiques the binary between moral absolutism and relativism, advocating instead for moral pluralism—a more nuanced stance that recognizes multiple coexisting moral systems, yet still allows for critical reflection, ethical responsibility, and the pursuit of greater justice.

For psychologists, this work is especially relevant. It aligns with longstanding psychological theories about learning, development, and socialization, but pushes further by encouraging professionals to interrogate the origins of moral beliefs in both themselves and their clients. Understanding morality as constructed opens up rich therapeutic possibilities—helping clients disentangle moral distress from inherited values, explore cultural identity, and develop personal ethics grounded in intentionality rather than unexamined tradition. It also challenges psychologists to approach ethical issues with humility and flexibility, fostering cultural competence and critical awareness in their work. Moreover, in a field governed by professional codes of ethics, this perspective encourages ongoing dialogue about how those codes are shaped, whose voices are represented, and how they might evolve to better reflect justice and inclusion.

Ultimately, The Illusion of Moral Objectivity is not a call to abandon morality, but rather an invitation to take it more seriously—to recognize its human origins, question its assumptions, and participate actively in its ongoing construction. For psychologists, this insight reinforces the importance of ethical maturity, cultural sensitivity, and critical self-reflection in both clinical practice and broader social engagement.

Culture points the moral compass: Shared basis of culture and morality

Matsuo, A., & Brown, C. M. (2022).

Culture and Brain, 10(2), 113–139.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40167-022-00106-3

Abstract

The present work reviews moral judgment from the perspective of culture. Culture is a dynamic system of human beings interacting with their environment, and morality is both a product of this system and a means of maintaining it. When members of a culture engage in moral judgment, they communicate their “social morality” and gain a reputation as a productive member who contributes to the culture’s prosperity. People in different cultures emphasize different moral domains, which is often understood through the individualism-collectivism distinction that is widely utilized in cultural psychology. However, traditional morality research lacks the interactive perspective of culture, where people communicate with shared beliefs about what is good or bad. As a consequence, past work has had numerous limitations and even potential confounds created by methodologies that are grounded in the perspective of WEIRD (i.e., Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) cultures. Great attention should be paid to the possibly misleading assumption that researchers and participants share the same understanding of the stimuli. We must address this bias in sampling and in the minds of researchers and better clarify the concept of culture in intercultural morality research. The theoretical and practical findings from research on culture can then contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms of moral judgment.

The article is paywalled. So, I tried to give more of a summary. Here it is:

This article discusses moral judgment from a cultural perspective. The authors argue that morality is a product of culture and helps to maintain it. They claim that people from different cultures emphasize different moral domains, which is often understood using the individualism-collectivism distinction. The authors also suggest that traditional morality research lacks an interactive perspective of culture, where people communicate shared beliefs about what is good or bad, and that this past research has had limitations and potential confounds due to methodologies that are grounded in WEIRD cultures.    

The authors discuss theories of moral judgment, including Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of stages of moral development, the social intuitionist model, and moral pluralism. They claim that moral judgment is a complex process involving self-recognition, social cognition, and decision-making and that the brain is designed to process multiple moralities in different ways. They also explore the social function of morality, stating that behaving morally according to the standards of one’s group helps people be included in the group, and moral norms are used to identify desirable and undesirable group membership.    

In a significant part of the article, the authors discuss the concept of culture, defining it as a structured system of making sense of the environment, which shapes individuals in order to fit into their environment. They explain that the need to belong is a basic human motivation, and people form groups as a means of survival and reproduction. Norms applied to a particular group regulate group members’ behaviors, and culture emerges from these norms. The authors use the individualism-collectivism dimension, a common concept in cultural psychology, to explain how people from different cultures perceive and interpret the world in different ways. They claim that culture is a dynamic interaction between humans and their environment and that moral judgment achieves its social function because people assume that ingroup members share common representations of what is right or wrong. 

Consensus, controversy, and chaos in the attribution of characteristics to the morally exceptional

Fleeson, W., Furr, R. et al. (2023).

Journal of Personality, 92(3), 715–734.

https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12867

Abstract

Objective

What do people see as distinguishing the morally exceptional from others? To handle the problem that people may disagree about who qualifies as morally exceptional, we asked subjects to select and rate their own examples of morally exceptional, morally average, and immoral people.

Method

Subjects rated each selected exemplar on several enablers of moral action and several directions of moral action. By applying the logic underlying stimulus sampling in experimental design, we evaluated perceivers’ level of agreement about the characteristics of the morally exceptional, even though perceivers rated different targets.

Results

Across three studies, there was strong subjective consensus on who is morally exceptional: those who are empathetic and prone to guilt, those who reflect on moral issues and identify with morality, those who have self-control and actually enact moral behaviors, and those who care about harm, compassion, fairness, and honesty. Deep controversies also existed about the moral directions pursued by those seen as morally exceptional: People evaluated those who pursued similar values and made similar decisions more favorably.

Conclusion

Strong consensus suggests characteristics that may push a person to go beyond normal expectations, that the study of moral exceptionality is not overly hindered by disagreement over who is morally exceptional, and that there is some common ground between disagreeing camps.

The article is linked above.

Here are some thoughts:

The research explores the perception of morally exceptional individuals compared to those deemed typically moral or immoral, revealing a significant consensus on the characteristics that distinguish moral exceptionalism. Across three studies, participants identified that those considered morally exceptional possess traits such as empathy, self-control, and a strong moral identity, which enable them to act on their moral judgments. This consensus offers optimism for further research into moral exceptionalism, suggesting that despite widespread disagreement on specific moral issues, there is a shared understanding of the enablers of moral behavior.

The findings indicate that while there is agreement on the attributes of morally exceptional individuals, controversies arise regarding the moral judgments they make. Notably, individuals who share similar moral values with perceivers are more likely to be recognized as morally exceptional. This highlights a potential area for future research to explore these dynamics further.

The results also contribute to the understanding of moral pluralism, indicating that while there is consensus on the processes that characterize moral exceptionality, there remains considerable debate over the specific moral domains valued by these individuals. This suggests that moral exemplars may not exhibit unified virtue across all moral domains, prompting further investigation into how moral understanding can be enhanced through recognition of moral processes rather than solely focusing on moral content.

In summary, the research reveals a complex landscape of moral perception, where agreement exists on the enablers of moral action, yet significant differences persist in the moral judgments made by individuals. This duality presents opportunities for fostering dialogue and understanding across diverse moral perspectives.