Moral agency under oppression

Hirji, S. (2024).

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13105

Abstract

In Huckleberry Finn, a thirteen-year old white boy in antebellum Missouri escapes from his abusive father and befriends a runaway slave named Jim. On a familiar reading of the novel, both Huck and Jim are, in their own ways, morally impressive, transcending the unjust circumstances in which they find themselves in to treat each other as equals. Huck saves Jim's life from two men looking for runaway slaves, and later Jim risks his chance at freedom to save Huck's friend Tom. I want to complicate the idea that Huck and Jim are morally commendable for what they do. More generally, I want to explore how oppression undermines the moral agency of the oppressed, and to some degree, the oppressor. In §1 I take a careful look at Jim's choice, arguing that his enslavement compromises his moral agency. In §2 I show how Jim's oppression also shapes the extent to which Huck can be praiseworthy for his action. In §3, I consider the consequences for thinking about the moral agency of the oppressed, and in §4 I explore the limitations of the concept of moral worth for theorizing in cases of oppression.

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Here are some thoughts: 

This article examines moral agency within the context of oppression, using Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn as a case study. The author challenges the conventional interpretation of Huck and Jim's actions as morally commendable, arguing that Jim's enslavement fundamentally restricts his agency, regardless of his choices. This limitation, the author contends, also impacts the assessment of Huck's actions, suggesting his seemingly virtuous choices are inadvertently shaped by the system of oppression. The article further explores how established moral philosophical concepts inadequately address the complexities of moral agency under oppression, proposing a nuanced understanding that considers both capacity and the ability to fully express that capacity in action. Finally, the article broadens its scope to consider contemporary instances of oppression, demonstrating the persistent challenges to moral agency in various social contexts.

Enhancement and desert

Thomas Douglas
Politics, Philosophy & Economics
https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18810439

Abstract

It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social–psychological research and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three arguments that might be offered in its favour and argue that each either shows only that enhancements undermine desert in special circumstances or succeeds only under assumptions that deprive the appeal to desert of much of its dialectic interest.