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Showing posts with label Praiseworthiness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Praiseworthiness. Show all posts

Thursday, December 7, 2023

How moral bioenhancement affects perceived praiseworthiness

Lucas, S., Douglas, T., & Faber, N. S. (2023).

Abstract

Psychological literature indicates that actions performed with the assistance of cognition-enhancing biomedical technologies are often deemed to be less praiseworthy than similar actions performed without such assistance. This study examines (i) whether this result extends to the bioenhancement of moral capacities, and (ii) if so, what explains the effect of moral bioenhancement on perceived praiseworthiness. The findings indicate that actions facilitated by morally bioenhanced individuals are considered less deserving of praise than similar actions facilitated by ‘traditional’ moral enhancement—for example, moral self-education. This diminished praise does not seem to be driven by an aversion to (moral) bioenhancement per se. Instead, it appears to be primarily attributable to a perceived lack of effort exerted by bioenhanced individuals in the course of their moral enhancement. Our findings advance the philosophical discourse on the foundations of praise in the context of moral bioenhancement by elucidating the empirical basis underlying some assumptions commonly employed to argue for or against the permissibility of moral bioenhancement.

It is an open source article.  Link above works.

My summary:

This research shows whether people are less likely to praise morally bioenhanced individuals for their actions. The authors found that people do perceive morally bioenhanced individuals as less deserving of praise than those who achieve moral enhancement through traditional means, such as moral self-education.

The authors argue that this diminished praise is not due to an aversion to moral bioenhancement per se, but rather to a perceived lack of effort on the part of the bioenhanced individual. In other words, people believe that bioenhanced individuals have not had to work as hard to achieve their moral excellence, and therefore deserve less praise for their accomplishments.

This finding has important implications for the development and use of moral bioenhancement technologies. If people are less likely to praise morally bioenhanced individuals, it could lead to a number of negative consequences, such as social stigma and discrimination. Additionally, it could discourage people from using moral bioenhancement technologies, even if they believe that these technologies could help them to become more moral people.

Thursday, March 14, 2019

Actions speak louder than outcomes in judgments of prosocial behavior.

Yudkin, D. A., Prosser, A. M. B., & Crockett, M. J. (2018).
Emotion. Advance online publication.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000514

Abstract

Recently proposed models of moral cognition suggest that people’s judgments of harmful acts are influenced by their consideration both of those acts’ consequences (“outcome value”), and of the feeling associated with their enactment (“action value”). Here we apply this framework to judgments of prosocial behavior, suggesting that people’s judgments of the praiseworthiness of good deeds are determined both by the benefit those deeds confer to others and by how good they feel to perform. Three experiments confirm this prediction. After developing a new measure to assess the extent to which praiseworthiness is influenced by action and outcome values, we show how these factors make significant and independent contributions to praiseworthiness. We also find that people are consistently more sensitive to action than to outcome value in judging the praiseworthiness of good deeds, but not harmful deeds. This observation echoes the finding that people are often insensitive to outcomes in their giving behavior. Overall, this research tests and validates a novel framework for understanding moral judgment, with implications for the motivations that underlie human altruism.

Thursday, December 20, 2018

Enhancement and desert

Thomas Douglas
Politics, Philosophy & Economics
https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X18810439

Abstract

It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social–psychological research and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three arguments that might be offered in its favour and argue that each either shows only that enhancements undermine desert in special circumstances or succeeds only under assumptions that deprive the appeal to desert of much of its dialectic interest.