Martuza, J., Thorbjørnsen, H., & Sjåstad, H.
(2024, June 27).
Abstract
Beliefs about the dishonesty of other people can shape our collective behavior in powerful ways. How accurate are these beliefs? And do we believe that other people are similarly, more, or less dishonest than they truly are? In a research program on moral decision-making consisting of 31 different effects (N = 8,127), initially designed to test a broad collection of different hypotheses, participants were placed in various situations where they could lie for personal gain, without any repercussions or detection risk. Crucially, we also asked all participants to estimate what percentage of other people would lie in a similar situation. Conducting an internal meta-analysis across all experiments, including both incentivized choice experiments and hypothetical marketplace scenarios, the results revealed a substantial overestimation of others' dishonesty by an average of 14 percentage points (meta-analytic effect: Hedge’s g = 0.58). That is, people are less dishonest than we tend to think, in which about 70% of our participants told the truth despite having a financial incentive to lie. These findings reveal a pervasive tendency to overestimate the actual dishonesty of other people, suggesting a biased belief that the world is less moral than it truly is. Does belief accuracy matter? In a new experiment using an information treatment based on our meta-analytic results (N = 981), providing correct information about actual honesty levels did not only lead to more positive honesty beliefs, but also to a broader enhancement of pro-social expectations – including higher interpersonal trust, fairness and helpfulness beliefs, and reduced cynicism.
My interpretation:
The meta-analysis reveals a significant overestimation of others' dishonesty by an average of 14 percentage points, with a meta-analytic effect of Hedge's g = 0.58. This finding, based on 31 effect sizes and over 8,000 participants, supports the overestimation hypothesis of dishonesty and proves robust across variations in methods and procedures.
Further research demonstrates the impact of correcting these biased beliefs. Informing people about actual honesty rates led to more positive pro-social expectations, including higher interpersonal trust, increased fairness and helpfulness beliefs, and lower cynicism. These findings have important implications, challenging the 'wisdom of crowds' approach in moral judgment and contributing to our understanding of the mixed effects of social norm nudges.
The study highlights the importance of data-based views for leaders and policymakers. However, it's crucial to note the limitations of this research, including its focus on American participants, the potential gap between experimental tasks and real-world complexity, and the use of mostly one-shot belief reports.
In conclusion, this research provides robust evidence that people tend to overestimate others' dishonesty. Moreover, correcting these biased beliefs can positively impact social thinking and expectations, potentially leading to more trusting and cooperative societies. Important points for clinical psychologists.
