By Simon M. Outram and Bob Stewart
J Med Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102147
Abstract
This paper proposes that the sponsorship of sport by nutritional supplements and sport drinks companies should be re-examined in the light of ethical concerns about the closeness of this relationship. A short overview is provided of the sponsorship of sport, arguing that ethical concerns about its appropriateness remain despite the imposition of severe restrictions on tobacco sponsorship. Further, the paper examines the main concerns about supplement use and sports drinks with respect to efficacy, health and the risks of doping. Particular consideration is given to the health implications of these concerns. It is suggested that they, of themselves, do not warrant the restriction of sponsorship by companies producing supplements and sports drinks. Nevertheless, it is argued that sports sponsorship does warrant further ethical examination—above and beyond that afforded to other sponsors of sport—as sport sponsorship is integral to the perceived need for such products. In conclusion, it is argued that sport may have found itself lending unwarranted credibility to products which would otherwise not necessarily be seen as beneficial for participation in sports and exercise or as inherently healthy products.
The entire article is here.
Thursday, October 16, 2014
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
Friends or foes: Is empathy necessary for moral behavior?
Jean Decety and Jason M. Cowell
Perspectives on Psychological Science
2014, Vol. 9(5) 525 –537
Abstract
In the past decade, a flurry of empirical and theoretical research on morality and empathy has taken place, and interest and usage in the media and the public arena have increased. At times, in both popular culture and academia, morality and empathy are used interchangeably, and quite often the latter is considered to play a foundational role for the former. In this article, we argue that although there is a relationship between morality and empathy, it is not as straightforward as apparent at first glance. Moreover, it is critical to distinguish among the different facets of empathy (emotional sharing, empathic concern, and perspective taking), as each uniquely influences moral cognition and predicts differential outcomes in moral behavior. Empirical evidence and theories from evolutionary biology as well as developmental, behavioral, and affective and social neuroscience are comprehensively integrated in support of this argument. The wealth of findings illustrates a complex and equivocal relationship between morality and empathy. The key to understanding such relations is to be more precise on the concepts being used and, perhaps, abandoning the muddy concept of empathy.
(cut)
Is Empathy a Necessary Concept?
To wrap up on a provocative note, it may be advanta-geous in the future for scholars interested in the science of morality to refrain from using the catch-all term of empathy, which applies to a myriad of processes and phenomena and, as a result, yields confusion in both understanding and predictive ability. In both academic and applied domains—such medicine, ethics, law, and policy—empathy has become an enticing, but muddy, notion, potentially leading to misinterpretation. If ancient Greek philosophy has taught us anything, it is that when a concept is attributed with so many meanings, it is at risk for losing function.
The entire article is here.
Perspectives on Psychological Science
2014, Vol. 9(5) 525 –537
Abstract
In the past decade, a flurry of empirical and theoretical research on morality and empathy has taken place, and interest and usage in the media and the public arena have increased. At times, in both popular culture and academia, morality and empathy are used interchangeably, and quite often the latter is considered to play a foundational role for the former. In this article, we argue that although there is a relationship between morality and empathy, it is not as straightforward as apparent at first glance. Moreover, it is critical to distinguish among the different facets of empathy (emotional sharing, empathic concern, and perspective taking), as each uniquely influences moral cognition and predicts differential outcomes in moral behavior. Empirical evidence and theories from evolutionary biology as well as developmental, behavioral, and affective and social neuroscience are comprehensively integrated in support of this argument. The wealth of findings illustrates a complex and equivocal relationship between morality and empathy. The key to understanding such relations is to be more precise on the concepts being used and, perhaps, abandoning the muddy concept of empathy.
(cut)
Is Empathy a Necessary Concept?
To wrap up on a provocative note, it may be advanta-geous in the future for scholars interested in the science of morality to refrain from using the catch-all term of empathy, which applies to a myriad of processes and phenomena and, as a result, yields confusion in both understanding and predictive ability. In both academic and applied domains—such medicine, ethics, law, and policy—empathy has become an enticing, but muddy, notion, potentially leading to misinterpretation. If ancient Greek philosophy has taught us anything, it is that when a concept is attributed with so many meanings, it is at risk for losing function.
The entire article is here.
Finding Risks, Not Answers, in Gene Tests
By Denise Grady and Andrew Pollack
The New York Times
Originally published September 22, 2014
Jennifer was 39 and perfectly healthy, but her grandmother had died young from breast cancer, so she decided to be tested for mutations in two genes known to increase risk for the disease.
When a genetic counselor offered additional tests for 20 other genes linked to various cancers, Jennifer said yes. The more information, the better, she thought.
The results, she said, were “surreal.” She did not have mutations in the breast cancer genes, but did have one linked to a high risk of stomach cancer. In people with a family history of the disease, that mutation is considered so risky that patients who are not even sick are often advised to have their stomachs removed. But no one knows what the finding might mean in someone like Jennifer, whose family has not had the disease.
The entire article is here.
The New York Times
Originally published September 22, 2014
Jennifer was 39 and perfectly healthy, but her grandmother had died young from breast cancer, so she decided to be tested for mutations in two genes known to increase risk for the disease.
When a genetic counselor offered additional tests for 20 other genes linked to various cancers, Jennifer said yes. The more information, the better, she thought.
The results, she said, were “surreal.” She did not have mutations in the breast cancer genes, but did have one linked to a high risk of stomach cancer. In people with a family history of the disease, that mutation is considered so risky that patients who are not even sick are often advised to have their stomachs removed. But no one knows what the finding might mean in someone like Jennifer, whose family has not had the disease.
The entire article is here.
Tuesday, October 14, 2014
Is It Possible to Create an Anti-Love Drug?
By Maia Szalavitz
New York Magazine - Science of Us
Originally posted May 19, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
A drug that precisely targets only one specific relationship for destruction may be decades away, but drugs that interfere with specific aspects of love like sexual desire are already here. And as scientists begin to tease out the chemical chronology and specific brain systems involved in love, they are already investigating how existing medications taken in carefully timed ways could, for example, prevent the "bonding hormone" oxytocin from initiating or sustaining a relationship.
This could forever change what it means to sever romantic ties. And the ramifications go beyond “Please let me forget”–type situations à la Eternal Sunshine. Anti-love drugs could also provide an intriguing new “treatment” for those trapped in abusive relationships.
The entire article is here.
New York Magazine - Science of Us
Originally posted May 19, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
A drug that precisely targets only one specific relationship for destruction may be decades away, but drugs that interfere with specific aspects of love like sexual desire are already here. And as scientists begin to tease out the chemical chronology and specific brain systems involved in love, they are already investigating how existing medications taken in carefully timed ways could, for example, prevent the "bonding hormone" oxytocin from initiating or sustaining a relationship.
This could forever change what it means to sever romantic ties. And the ramifications go beyond “Please let me forget”–type situations à la Eternal Sunshine. Anti-love drugs could also provide an intriguing new “treatment” for those trapped in abusive relationships.
The entire article is here.
The Moral Instinct
By Steven Pinker
The New York Times
Originally posted January 13, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
The Moralization Switch
The starting point for appreciating that there is a distinctive part of our psychology for morality is seeing how moral judgments differ from other kinds of opinions we have on how people ought to behave. Moralization is a psychological state that can be turned on and off like a switch, and when it is on, a distinctive mind-set commandeers our thinking. This is the mind-set that makes us deem actions immoral (“killing is wrong”), rather than merely disagreeable (“I hate brussels sprouts”), unfashionable (“bell-bottoms are out”) or imprudent (“don’t scratch mosquito bites”).
The first hallmark of moralization is that the rules it invokes are felt to be universal. Prohibitions of rape and murder, for example, are felt not to be matters of local custom but to be universally and objectively warranted. One can easily say, “I don’t like brussels sprouts, but I don’t care if you eat them,” but no one would say, “I don’t like killing, but I don’t care if you murder someone.”
The entire article is here.
The New York Times
Originally posted January 13, 2013
Here is an excerpt:
The Moralization Switch
The starting point for appreciating that there is a distinctive part of our psychology for morality is seeing how moral judgments differ from other kinds of opinions we have on how people ought to behave. Moralization is a psychological state that can be turned on and off like a switch, and when it is on, a distinctive mind-set commandeers our thinking. This is the mind-set that makes us deem actions immoral (“killing is wrong”), rather than merely disagreeable (“I hate brussels sprouts”), unfashionable (“bell-bottoms are out”) or imprudent (“don’t scratch mosquito bites”).
The first hallmark of moralization is that the rules it invokes are felt to be universal. Prohibitions of rape and murder, for example, are felt not to be matters of local custom but to be universally and objectively warranted. One can easily say, “I don’t like brussels sprouts, but I don’t care if you eat them,” but no one would say, “I don’t like killing, but I don’t care if you murder someone.”
The entire article is here.
Monday, October 13, 2014
Frans de Waal’s “The Bonobo and the Atheist”
By John Archibald Wheerler
Helian Unbound
Originally posted October 12, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
In theory, de Waal is certainly a subjective moralist. As he puts it, “the whole point of my book is to argue a bottom up approach” to morality, as opposed to the top down approach: “The view of morality as a set of immutable principles, or laws, that are ours to discover.” The “bottom” de Waal refers to are evolved emotional traits. In his words:
The entire blog post is here.
Helian Unbound
Originally posted October 12, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
In theory, de Waal is certainly a subjective moralist. As he puts it, “the whole point of my book is to argue a bottom up approach” to morality, as opposed to the top down approach: “The view of morality as a set of immutable principles, or laws, that are ours to discover.” The “bottom” de Waal refers to are evolved emotional traits. In his words:
The moral law is not imposed from above or derived from well-reasoned principles; rather, it arises from ingrained values that have been there since the beginning of time.
and
My views are in line with the way we know the human mind works, with visceral reactions arriving before rationalizations, and also with the way evolution produces behavior. A good place to start is with an acknowledgment of our background as social animals, and how this background predisposes us to treat each other. This approach deserves attention at a time in which even avowed atheists are unable to wean themselves from a semireligious morality, thinking that the world would be a better place if only a white-coated priesthood could take over from the frocked one.So far, so good. I happen to be a subjective moralist myself, and agree with de Waal on the origins of morality. However, reading on, we find confirmation of a prediction made long ago by Friedrich Nietzsche. In Human, All Too Human, he noted the powerful human attachment to religion and the “metaphysics” of the old philosophers. He likened the expansion of human knowledge to a ladder, or tree, up which humanity was gradually climbing. As we reached the top rungs, however, we would begin to notice that the old beliefs that had supplied us with such great emotional satisfaction in the past were really illusions.
The entire blog post is here.
The human race evolved to be fair for selfish reasons
By Rachel Kendal
The Conversation
Originally posted September 19, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
Biologists are surprised by this tendency to behave fairly. The theory of evolution by natural selection predicts that individuals should behave in ways to maximise their inclusive fitness. So behaviours are only selected, and hence evolve, if they ensure the survival and reproduction of the actor or kin whom contain copies of the actor’s genes. However, the behaviour displayed by children seems to be at a detriment to themselves, especially when those who benefit from their selfless behaviour are not the children’s kin.
A child’s sense of fairness, egalitarianism, or aversion to inequality can actually be hampered by instruction to “be fair” and rewarding of this behaviour. That is because what is the child’s intrinsic motivation, becomes a need to follow externally imposed rules. And, as we all know, following rules we believe in is far easier than following rules that are imposed upon us, despite attendant punishments for not doing so.
The entire article is here.
The Conversation
Originally posted September 19, 2014
Here is an excerpt:
Biologists are surprised by this tendency to behave fairly. The theory of evolution by natural selection predicts that individuals should behave in ways to maximise their inclusive fitness. So behaviours are only selected, and hence evolve, if they ensure the survival and reproduction of the actor or kin whom contain copies of the actor’s genes. However, the behaviour displayed by children seems to be at a detriment to themselves, especially when those who benefit from their selfless behaviour are not the children’s kin.
A child’s sense of fairness, egalitarianism, or aversion to inequality can actually be hampered by instruction to “be fair” and rewarding of this behaviour. That is because what is the child’s intrinsic motivation, becomes a need to follow externally imposed rules. And, as we all know, following rules we believe in is far easier than following rules that are imposed upon us, despite attendant punishments for not doing so.
The entire article is here.
Sunday, October 12, 2014
The Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on Seeking and Participating in Mental Health Care
Patrick W. Corrigan, Benjamin G. Druss, and Deborah A. Perlick
Psychological Science in the Public Interest 2014, Vol. 15(2) 37–70.
Summary
Treatments have been developed and tested to successfully reduce the symptoms and disabilities of many mental illnesses. Unfortunately, people distressed by these illnesses often do not seek out services or choose to fully engage in them. One factor that impedes care seeking and undermines the service system is mental illness stigma. In this article, we review the complex elements of stigma in order to understand its impact on participating in care. We then summarize public policy considerations in seeking to tackle stigma in order to improve treatment engagement. Stigma is a complex construct that includes public, self, and structural components. It directly affects people with mental illness, as well as their support system, provider network, and community resources. The effects of stigma are moderated by knowledge of mental illness and cultural relevance. Understanding stigma is central to reducing its negative impact on care seeking and treatment engagement. Separate strategies have evolved for counteracting the effects of public, self, and structural stigma. Programs for mental health providers may be especially fruitful for promoting care engagement. Mental health literacy, cultural competence, and family engagement campaigns also mitigate stigma’s adverse impact on care seeking. Policy change is essential to overcome the structural stigma that undermines government agendas meant to promote mental health care. Implications for expanding the research program on the connection between stigma and care seeking are discussed.
The entire article is here.
Psychological Science in the Public Interest 2014, Vol. 15(2) 37–70.
Summary
Treatments have been developed and tested to successfully reduce the symptoms and disabilities of many mental illnesses. Unfortunately, people distressed by these illnesses often do not seek out services or choose to fully engage in them. One factor that impedes care seeking and undermines the service system is mental illness stigma. In this article, we review the complex elements of stigma in order to understand its impact on participating in care. We then summarize public policy considerations in seeking to tackle stigma in order to improve treatment engagement. Stigma is a complex construct that includes public, self, and structural components. It directly affects people with mental illness, as well as their support system, provider network, and community resources. The effects of stigma are moderated by knowledge of mental illness and cultural relevance. Understanding stigma is central to reducing its negative impact on care seeking and treatment engagement. Separate strategies have evolved for counteracting the effects of public, self, and structural stigma. Programs for mental health providers may be especially fruitful for promoting care engagement. Mental health literacy, cultural competence, and family engagement campaigns also mitigate stigma’s adverse impact on care seeking. Policy change is essential to overcome the structural stigma that undermines government agendas meant to promote mental health care. Implications for expanding the research program on the connection between stigma and care seeking are discussed.
The entire article is here.
Saturday, October 11, 2014
The psychology of martyrdom: Making the ultimate sacrifice in the name of a cause
By Jocelyn Belanger, Julie Caouette, Keren Sharvit, and Michelle Dugas
Personality and Social Psychology
107.3 (Sep 2014): 494-515.
Abstract
Martyrdom is defined as the psychological readiness to suffer and sacrifice one’s life for a cause. An integrative set of 8 studies investigated the concept of martyrdom by creating a new tool to quantitatively assess individuals’ propensity toward self-sacrifice. Studies 1A–1C consisted of psychometric work attesting to the scale’s unidimensionality, internal consistency, and temporal stability while examining its nomological network. Studies 2A–2B focused on the scale’s predictive validity, especially as it relates to extreme behaviors and suicidal terrorism. Studies 3–5 focused on the influence of self-sacrifice on automatic decision making, costly and altruistic behaviors, and morality judgments. Results involving more than 2,900 participants from different populations, including a terrorist sample, supported the proposed conceptualization of martyrdom and demonstrated its importance for a vast repertoire of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena. Implications and future directions for the psychology of terrorism are discussed.
Introduction
Dying for a cause? The very concept seems perplexing and bizarre. How could people in their right mind be willing to sacrifice their lives for an idea? Are we not hedonistic beings created to seek pleasure and avoid pain and motivated to survive above all? Yet the phenomenon of self-sacrifice is real enough, and suicide bombing seems to have become terrorists’ weapon of choice in recent years. Though social scientists’ interest in the psychology of self-sacrifice has been accentuated as of late (e.g., Gambetta, 2006; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, & Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Pape, 2006), the idea of self-sacrifice or martyrdom is hardly new: Accounts of individuals dying on the altar of religious and political ideologies existed long before the tragedy of 9/11, the Japanese kamikaze of World War II, or even the crucifixion of Jesus Christ millennia ago. Yet it appears that no quick and easy answer can be conjured up to explain this phenomenon.
The entire article is here, behind a paywall.
Personality and Social Psychology
107.3 (Sep 2014): 494-515.
Abstract
Martyrdom is defined as the psychological readiness to suffer and sacrifice one’s life for a cause. An integrative set of 8 studies investigated the concept of martyrdom by creating a new tool to quantitatively assess individuals’ propensity toward self-sacrifice. Studies 1A–1C consisted of psychometric work attesting to the scale’s unidimensionality, internal consistency, and temporal stability while examining its nomological network. Studies 2A–2B focused on the scale’s predictive validity, especially as it relates to extreme behaviors and suicidal terrorism. Studies 3–5 focused on the influence of self-sacrifice on automatic decision making, costly and altruistic behaviors, and morality judgments. Results involving more than 2,900 participants from different populations, including a terrorist sample, supported the proposed conceptualization of martyrdom and demonstrated its importance for a vast repertoire of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena. Implications and future directions for the psychology of terrorism are discussed.
Introduction
Dying for a cause? The very concept seems perplexing and bizarre. How could people in their right mind be willing to sacrifice their lives for an idea? Are we not hedonistic beings created to seek pleasure and avoid pain and motivated to survive above all? Yet the phenomenon of self-sacrifice is real enough, and suicide bombing seems to have become terrorists’ weapon of choice in recent years. Though social scientists’ interest in the psychology of self-sacrifice has been accentuated as of late (e.g., Gambetta, 2006; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, & Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2014; Pape, 2006), the idea of self-sacrifice or martyrdom is hardly new: Accounts of individuals dying on the altar of religious and political ideologies existed long before the tragedy of 9/11, the Japanese kamikaze of World War II, or even the crucifixion of Jesus Christ millennia ago. Yet it appears that no quick and easy answer can be conjured up to explain this phenomenon.
The entire article is here, behind a paywall.
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