Beauty of the Beast: Beauty as an important dimension in the moral standing of animals

Klebl, C. et al.

Journal of Environmental Psychology

Volume 75, June 2021, 101624

Abstract

Conservationists have sought to identify avenues through which to gain public support for efforts to halt the accelerating decline in animal diversity. Previous research has identified perceived internal qualities of animals that lead people to view them as deserving of protection for their own sake; that is, increase their moral standing. In two studies, we found that perceived beauty is an external aesthetic quality that leads people to attribute moral standing to animals independently from animals' perceived mental capacities associated with patiency or agency, and dispositional harmfulness, as well as other factors likely to influence moral standing. In Study 1, we found that beauty perceptions predicted moral standing independently from perceived patiency, agency, and harmfulness across a wide range of animal species. In Study 2 (pre-registered), we found that beauty causally influenced moral standing attributions to animals independently from animals’ perceived internal qualities, as well as their perceived similarity to humans, familiarity, and edibility. Our findings provide insight into another factor which contributes to the perceived moral status of animals, and therefore may help conservationists to identify the most effective ways to attract funds for conservation efforts.

Highlights

• Beauty perceptions predict moral standing attributions across a wide range of animal species.

• Beauty predicts moral standing independently from perceived patiency, agency, and harmfulness.

• Beauty causally influences moral standing attributions independently from other factors linked to moral standing.

• May help conservationists to identify the most effective ways to attract funds for the conservation of endangered species.

Conclusion

Human activities pose serious threats to the earth's biodiversity. Today, it is more urgent than ever to gain public support for conservation efforts in order to halt the accelerating decline in animal diversity. The present investigation suggests that animals' beauty leads people to view animals as having moral standing, independent from their perceived mental capacities, disposition to act benevolently, as well as their perceived similarity to humans, familiarity, and edibility. This validates conservation strategies focussing on animals' aesthetic appeals such as the use of beautiful flagship species to attract fund for a broad range of endangered species including less aesthetically appealing animals (Veríssimo et al., 2017). Our findings may help to better calibrate future conservation appeals based on the idiosyncratic qualities of animals that are the target of conservation campaigns. As such, they may contribute to identifying new avenues through which to gain greater public support for conservation efforts by making people recognize that animals have a moral status independent from human interests.

The research is here.

The Grounds of Moral Status

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
First published on March 14, 2013

An entity has moral status if and only if it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the entity's own sake, such that it can be wronged. For instance, an animal may be said to have moral status if its suffering is at least somewhat morally bad, on account of this animal itself and regardless of the consequences for other beings, and acting unjustifiably against its interests is not only wrong, but wrongs the animal. Others owe it to the animal to avoid acting in this way. Some philosophers think of moral status as coming in degrees, reserving the notion of full moral status (FMS) for the highest degree of status.

Sometimes the term “moral standing” rather than “moral status” is used, but typically these terms have the same meaning. Some philosophers employ the language of “moral considerability” but this term is extremely ambiguous. Some use it as an alternate expression for “moral status” which is understood to come in degrees. In other cases the phrase is used to mean FMS. Act Utilitarians employ yet a third notion of moral considerability, which is a matter of having one's interests (e.g., the intensity, duration, etc. of one's pleasure or pain) factored into the calculus to determine which action minimizes the bad and maximizes the good. To avoid these ambiguities, this entry will use the terminology of “moral status” and “FMS.” 

After reviewing which entities have been thought to have moral status and what is involved in having FMS, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status, this article will survey different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

The entire article is here.