Understanding Responses to Moral Dilemmas

Deontological Inclinations, Utilitarian Inclinations, and General Action Tendencies

Bertram Gawronski, Paul Conway, Joel B. Armstrong, Rebecca Friesdorf, and Mandy Hütter
In: J. P. Forgas, L. Jussim, & P. A. M. Van Lange (Eds.). (2016). Social psychology of morality. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Introduction

For  centuries,  societies  have  wrestled  with  the  question  of  how  to  balance  the  rights of the individual versus the greater good (see Forgas, Jussim, & Van Lange, this volume); is it acceptable to ignore a person’s rights in order to increase the overall well-being of a larger number of people? The contentious nature of this issue is reflected in many contemporary examples, including debates about whether it is legitimate to cause harm in order to protect societies against threats (e.g., shooting an abducted passenger plane to prevent a terrorist attack) and whether it is acceptable to refuse life-saving support for some people in order to protect the well-being  of  many  others  (e.g.,  refusing  the  return  of  American  citizens  who  became infected with Ebola in Africa for treatment in the US). These issues have captured the attention of social scientists, politicians, philosophers, lawmakers, and citizens alike, partly because they involve a conflict between two moral principles.

The  first  principle,  often  associated  with  the  moral  philosophy  of  Immanuel  Kant, emphasizes the irrevocable universality of rights and duties. According to the principle of deontology, the moral status of an action is derived from its consistency with context-independent norms (norm-based morality). From this perspective, violations of moral norms are unacceptable irrespective of the anticipated outcomes (e.g.,  shooting  an  abducted  passenger  plane  is  always  immoral  because it violates  the moral norm not to kill others). The second principle, often associated with the moral philosophy of John Stuart Mill, emphasizes the greater good. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of an action depends on its outcomes, more  specifically  its consequences  for  overall  well-being  (outcome-based  morality).

The book chapter is here.

Microaggression, macro harm

By Regina Rini
The Los Angeles Times
Originally published on October 15, 2015

Here is an excerpt:

There is a serious problem with Campbell and Manning's moral history, and exposing it helps us see that the culture of victimhood label is misleading. Their history is a history of the dominant moral culture: It describes the mores of those social groups with the greatest access to power. Think about the culture of honor and notice how limited it must have been. If you were a woman in medieval Europe, you were not expected or permitted to respond to insults with aggression. Even if you were a lower-class man, you certainly would not have drawn your sword in response to an insult from a superior.

Now think about the culture of dignity, which Campbell and Manning claim “existed perhaps in its purest form among respectable people in the homogenous towns of mid-20th century America.” Another thing that existed among the “respectable people” in those towns was approval of racial segregation; “homogenous towns” did not arise by accident.

People of color, women, gay people, immigrants: none could rely on the authorities to respond fairly to reports of mistreatment.

The cultures of honor and dignity left many types of people with no recognized way of responding to moral mistreatment.

The entire article is here.

Morality and the Religious Mind: Why Theists and Nontheists Differ

By Azim Shariff, Jared Piazza, and Stephanie R. Kramer
Science and Society

Religions have come to be intimately tied to morality and much recent research has shown that theists and nontheists differ in their moral behavior and decision making along several dimensions.  Here we discuss how these empirical trends can be explained by fundamental differences in group commitment, motivations for pro-sociality, cognitive styles, and meta-ethics. We conclude that by elucidating key areas of moral congruence.

The entire article is here.

Where Does Morality Come From?

By John Corvino
Published on Mar 27, 2013

Is it possible to have a foundation for moral beliefs without appealing to Scripture? John Corvino argues that it is, making a plea for humility from all parties in the debate. At the same time, he challenges his fellow liberals to reject the claim that "morality is a private matter."

Chief of Army message regarding unacceptable behaviour

Published on Jun 12, 2013

Message from the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO, to the Australian Army following the announcement on Thursday, 13 June 2013 of civilian police and Defence investigations into allegations of unacceptable behaviour by Army members.





This video was made in response to news reports to the following:

Australian news outlets reported last week that at least 17 soldiers circulated video of themselves having sex with women. The videos were shared without the women's knowledge. Some of the material was distributed over military computer networks, and those under investigation include a lieutenant colonel and a major, Morrison told reporters on Thursday.

The following quote is from a CNN story found here.

Editorial notes: This video is an interesting and thought-provoking way to share unequivocal moral and ethical standards to the military community under his leadership.  Also interesting is the number of comments and the wide variety of responses to this video.

Additionally, compare and contrast this response to the United States military's response to the increased reports of sexual assault in our military community.  The responses are not the same.

Ethics Without Borders

By Cynthia Schoeman
The Ethics Monitor

For organisations that strive to be ethical, there are two important criteria for earning and maintaining an ethical status: the continual, consistent application of their values to all their stakeholders and their on-going adherence to all applicable laws and regulations. If a company’s commitment to their values or their compliance with regulations is intermittent or applied selectively, it erodes their ethical standing. The constancy of ethical behaviour reflects the practice of “ethics without borders”.

Borderless ethics necessitates that the organisation has a very inclusive ethical boundary, whereby ethics is exercised beyond self-interest and includes all stakeholders affected by the company’s operations. By contrast, an exclusive ethical boundary, which implies that ethics is exercised only for the organisation’s own benefit and relative to a select few stakeholders (typically shareholders), totally contradicts an approach of ethics without borders. While the exclusion of other stakeholders does not necessarily mean that the company is behaving unethically, it does highlight the fact that the company prioritises their own goals and needs above others’ or that they don’t give equal priority to their various stakeholders – such as communities who are impacted by the company’s operations. Added to that, organisations are rarely obliged - for example, by law - to include all stakeholder groups formally within their ethical boundary. So, although such companies may not be technically behaving unethically or illegally, their limited application of ethics means that they would rarely be regarded as an ethical organisation.

There is a further challenge to following an approach of ethics without borders. This emanates from the recurring discourse in workplace ethics that ethics differs for different people, cultures, countries and situations. This view needs to be addressed not only because it appears to invalidate the possibility for ethics without borders, but also because it undermines the pursuit of common and shared organisational ethics. The globalised nature of the world of work particularly makes for a multitude of differences in the workplace. Yet, ironically, globalisation makes the practice of ethics without borders all the more valuable, not least for the clarity it offers all affected parties and the fairness it embodies by operating in terms of the same ethics globally.

The entire story is here.

Editor's Note: This article has direct connections to individual psychologists in private practice, businesses in general, state psychological associations, and the American Psychological Association.

Google helps bring hotline to human-trafficking battle

By Yamiche Alcindor
USA Today
Originally posted April 9, 2013

A $3 million grant from Google helped get an anti-human-trafficking hotline up and running today — the latest data-sharing effort aimed at fighting the growing problem.

The Global Human Trafficking Hotline Network, launched with Google's grant, will allow organizations working in the USA, Southeast Asia and Europe to standardize data, identify trends and combine statistics for a more comprehensive look at the issue.

"Right now, most of the hotlines around the world are doing great work but operating in isolation," said Bradley Myles, CEO of Polaris Project, a non-profit group that runs the U.S. human trafficking hotline. "The fight has to be more thoughtful, so collaboration and partnerships in this field can keep up and get ahead of the innovation of traffickers."

Polaris Project, Liberty Asia, a non-profit group that does work in Southeast Asia, and La Strada International, which focuses on parts of Europe, have been jointly awarded a Google Global Impact Award and will work to stitch together their different hotlines.

The entire story is here.

The Grounds of Moral Status

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
First published on March 14, 2013

An entity has moral status if and only if it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the entity's own sake, such that it can be wronged. For instance, an animal may be said to have moral status if its suffering is at least somewhat morally bad, on account of this animal itself and regardless of the consequences for other beings, and acting unjustifiably against its interests is not only wrong, but wrongs the animal. Others owe it to the animal to avoid acting in this way. Some philosophers think of moral status as coming in degrees, reserving the notion of full moral status (FMS) for the highest degree of status.

Sometimes the term “moral standing” rather than “moral status” is used, but typically these terms have the same meaning. Some philosophers employ the language of “moral considerability” but this term is extremely ambiguous. Some use it as an alternate expression for “moral status” which is understood to come in degrees. In other cases the phrase is used to mean FMS. Act Utilitarians employ yet a third notion of moral considerability, which is a matter of having one's interests (e.g., the intensity, duration, etc. of one's pleasure or pain) factored into the calculus to determine which action minimizes the bad and maximizes the good. To avoid these ambiguities, this entry will use the terminology of “moral status” and “FMS.” 

After reviewing which entities have been thought to have moral status and what is involved in having FMS, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status, this article will survey different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

The entire article is here.

The Boundaries of the Moral (and Legal) Community

By Brian Leiter
The Expanding Moral Community
Alabama Law Review, Vol. 64(3), 511-531.

Let me invite you to step back from the parochial political disputes that dominate public life in America and most other modern democracies, as well as from the internecine academic quarrels characteristic of so much professionalized scholarship in the modern academy, and reflect, instead, on the broader sweep of moral and political thought, in both the philosophical and practical realm, over the past two or three hundred years.  What must immediately strike any observer of this period is the remarkable expansion it has witnessed of what I will henceforth call “the moral community,” that is, the community of creatures that are thought entitled to equal moral consideration, whatever the precise details of what such consideration involves—that is, whether it is a matter of showing “respect,” recognizing the “dignity” of each, or “maximizing the utility or well-being” of each, or some other formulation.  I am speaking here about our official ideologies and discourse, not necessarily all our actual practices and laws, though they gradually follow suit over the course of a century or so. But at the level of ideology, reflected in both ordinary moral opinion and in the work of philosophers, we in the West—ignorance of the relevant philosophical and legal traditions requires me to remain agnostic on the proverbial “East,” though the trends seem to be similar—have largely abandoned the ideas that gender, race, ethnicity, religion, class, and now even sexual orientation are morally relevant attributes in the sense that they are attributes that determine the basic moral consideration to which one is entitled. To be sure, in particular contexts, these characteristics may matter because of the context. So, for example, I take it most would still think it morally unproblematic to consider race in casting the lead role in Shakespeare’s Othello, and most of us would still think it morally unproblematic that a man contemplating marriage gives some consideration to the gender or religion of his potential mate. 

The entire article is here.