Dahl, A. (2023).
Psychological Inquiry, 34(2), 53–79.
Abstract
Psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain “morality” actually talk about very different things. This article argues that we need to define morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative. Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others’ welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well plus the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.
Here are some thoughts:
The article discusses the importance of defining morality in psychological research and the challenges associated with this task. Dahl argues that all psychological research on morality relies on definitions, but these definitions often go unstated, leading to communication problems and intractable disagreements when researchers use different unstated definitions.
The article examines four common approaches to defining morality: linguistic (whatever people call "moral"), functionalist (defined by social function), evaluating (collection of right actions), and normative (all judgments about right and wrong). After discussing the difficulties with each approach, Dahl proposes an alternative definition of morality: "obligatory concerns with others' welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns." This definition is described as technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive.
The article emphasizes the need for clear definitions to communicate across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and advance the field of moral psychology. Dahl provides examples of debates in moral psychology (e.g., about obedience to authority, harm-based morality) that are complicated by lack of clear definitions. In conclusion, while defining morality is challenging due to its many meanings in ordinary language, Dahl argues that a workable scientific definition is both possible and necessary for progress in the field of moral psychology.
