Higher cognitive ability linked to weaker moral foundations in UK adults

Zakharin, M., & Bates, T. C. (2025).

Intelligence, 111, 101930.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2025.101930

Abstract

Existing research on the relationship between cognitive ability and moral foundations has yielded contradictory results. While some studies suggest that higher cognitive ability is associated with more enlightened moral intuitions, others indicate it may weaken moral foundations. To address this ambiguity, we conducted two studies (total N = 1320) using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2 (MFQ-2) with UK residents. Both Study 1 and Study 2 (preregistered) revealed negative links between cognitive ability and moral foundations. In Study 1, structural models showed negative links between general intelligence (g) and both binding (−0.24) and individualizing (−0.19) foundations. These findings replicated closely in Study 2, with similar coefficients (−0.25 and − 0.18, respectively). Higher verbal ability was specifically associated with lower purity scores. These findings suggest a negative association between cognitive ability and moral foundations, challenging existing theories relating to intelligence and moral intuitions. However, causal direction remains uncertain.

Highlights

• Tested association of intelligence and moral foundations.

• Higher ability linked to lower individualizing and binding.

• Lower Proportionality, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity.

• Lower Equality and Care.

• Verbal ability linked specifically to impurity.

• Replicated in pre-registered large study.

Here are some thoughts:

This research is significant for psychologists as it clarifies the complex relationship between intelligence and moral reasoning. The study found that higher general cognitive ability (g) is negatively associated with all six moral foundations—care, equality, proportionality, loyalty, authority, and purity—suggesting that greater analytical thinking may suppress intuitive moral responses rather than enhance them. This supports what the authors call the Morality Suppression Model , which proposes that higher cognitive ability weakens emotional-moral intuitions rather than reinforcing them. Importantly, the study replicates its findings in two large, independent samples using robust and validated tools like the Moral Foundations Questionnaire-2 (MFQ-2) and the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR), making the results highly credible.

The findings challenge common assumptions that higher intelligence leads to stronger or more "enlightened" moral values. Instead, they show that higher intelligence correlates with a general weakening of moral intuitions across both liberal (individualizing) and conservative (binding) domains. For instance, verbal reasoning was specifically linked to lower endorsement of the purity foundation, suggesting that linguistic sophistication may lead individuals to question traditional norms related to bodily sanctity or self-restraint. These insights contribute to dual-process theories of cognition by showing that reflective thinking can override intuitive moral judgments.

Moreover, the research has implications for understanding ideological differences, as it counters the tendency to view those with opposing moral views as less intelligent. It also informs educational and policy-related efforts aimed at ethical reasoning, particularly in professions requiring high-level decision-making. By demonstrating that the relationship between cognitive ability and moral foundations is consistent across genders and replicated in preregistered studies, this work offers a solid empirical basis for future exploration into how cognitive processes shape moral values.

Decision-Making competence: more than intelligence?

De Bruin, W. B., Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2020).

Current Directions in Psychological Science, 

29(2), 186–192.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420901592

Abstract

Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. Historically, psychological research on decision-making has examined how well people follow these principles under carefully manipulated experimental conditions. When individual differences received attention, researchers often assumed that individuals with higher fluid intelligence would perform better. Here, we describe the development and validation of individual-differences measures of decision-making competence. Emerging findings suggest that decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence). Although fluid intelligence tends to decline with age, older adults may be able to maintain decision-making competence by leveraging age-related improvements in these other skills. We discuss implications for interventions and future research.

Here are some thoughts:

This article explores the concept of decision-making competence, or the ability to make good decisions, as defined by principles of rational choice. The authors highlight the development and validation of measures to assess decision-making competence, suggesting that it involves more than just fluid intelligence and includes aspects like motivation, emotion regulation, and experience. They then analyze age differences in decision-making competence, finding that older adults may perform better than younger adults on some tasks due to their greater experience. The article concludes with implications for interventions to improve decision-making competence, proposing strategies that target cognitive skills, motivation, emotion regulation, and experience. The authors aim to provide a more nuanced understanding of how decision-making competence develops and how it can be enhanced, ultimately promoting better decision-making and improved well-being across the lifespan.

Challenges to capture the big five personality traits in non-WEIRD populations

Rachid Laajaj, Karen Macours, and others
Science Advances  10 Jul 2019:
Vol. 5, no. 7
DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aaw5226

Abstract

Can personality traits be measured and interpreted reliably across the world? While the use of Big Five personality measures is increasingly common across social sciences, their validity outside of western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) populations is unclear. Adopting a comprehensive psychometric approach to analyze 29 face-to-face surveys from 94,751 respondents in 23 low- and middle-income countries, we show that commonly used personality questions generally fail to measure the intended personality traits and show low validity. These findings contrast with the much higher validity of these measures attained in internet surveys of 198,356 self-selected respondents from the same countries. We discuss how systematic response patterns, enumerator interactions, and low education levels can collectively distort personality measures when assessed in large-scale surveys. Our results highlight the risk of misinterpreting Big Five survey data and provide a warning against naïve interpretations of personality traits without evidence of their validity.

The research is here.

To think critically, you have to be both analytical and motivated

John Timmer
ARS Techica
Originally published November 15, 2017

Here is an excerpt:

One of the proposed solutions to this issue is to incorporate more critical thinking into our education system. But critical thinking is more than just a skill set; you have to recognize when to apply it, do so effectively, and then know how to respond to the results. Understanding what makes a person effective at analyzing fake news and conspiracy theories has to take all of this into account. A small step toward that understanding comes from a recently released paper, which looks at how analytical thinking and motivated skepticism interact to make someone an effective critical thinker.

Valuing rationality

The work comes courtesy of the University of Illinois at Chicago's Tomas Ståhl and Jan-Willem van Prooijen at VU Amsterdam. This isn't the first time we've heard from Ståhl; last year, he published a paper on what he termed "moralizing epistemic rationality." In it, he looked at people's thoughts on the place critical thinking should occupy in their lives. The research identified two classes of individuals: those who valued their own engagement with critical thinking, and those who viewed it as a moral imperative that everyone engage in this sort of analysis.

The information is here.

The target article is here.