The use and misuse of informed consent in reporting sexual intimacy violations.

Behnke, S. H., Thomas, J. T., et al. (2023).

Professional Psychology:

Research and Practice, 54(2), 135–146.

https://doi.org/10.1037/pro0000510

Abstract

A client’s disclosure of sexual contact with a previous treating psychologist raises challenging ethical, legal, and clinical considerations. Following a vignette that describes a psychologist’s thoughtful anticipation of such a disclosure by amending his informed consent form to allow reporting of previous sexual contact with a psychotherapist, these articles explore how the American Psychological Association’s Ethics Code, jurisdictional laws, and clinical considerations contribute to a psychologist’s decision-making in such a circumstance. The articles discuss ways to integrate ethics, law, and clinical care in the psychologist’s response to the client’s disclosure.

Public Significance Statement—This article addresses psychologist-client sexual contact. This issue is significant to promote client autonomy, to protect the public, and to enhance the ethics and integrity of the profession.

Here are some thoughts:

This article offers a rich, multidimensional exploration of a complex ethical dilemma: how a current treating psychologist should respond when a client discloses sexual contact with a previous therapist. Rather than presenting a single authoritative stance, the article thoughtfully weaves together multiple, diverse perspectives—ethical, legal, clinical, feminist, and philosophical—demonstrating the nuanced reality of ethical decision-making in psychology.

Stephen Behnke grounds the discussion in the APA Ethics Code and jurisdictional law, introducing a pragmatic “three-door” framework (client consent, legal mandate, legal permission) to guide disclosure decisions. 

Janet Thomas builds on this by emphasizing the primacy of the therapeutic alliance and warning against well-intentioned but potentially coercive practices that prioritize professional or societal agendas over the client’s healing process.

Lenore Walker adds a critical feminist and trauma-informed lens, arguing that mandatory reporting—even if framed as protective—can retraumatize survivors by stripping them of autonomy, echoing broader concerns about institutional betrayal. 

Finally, David DeMatteo introduces a philosophical dimension, contrasting deontological (duty-based) and teleological (consequence-based) ethics to illustrate how competing moral frameworks can lead to divergent conclusions in the absence of clear legal mandates. Together, these perspectives underscore that ethical practice is not merely about rule-following but requires ongoing reflection, contextual awareness, and a deep commitment to client self-determination.

The article thus models integrative ethical reasoning—balancing professional responsibility with clinical sensitivity, legal compliance with human dignity, and societal protection with individual healing.

Deep Ethics: The Long-Term Quest to Decide Right from Wrong

Simon Beard
www.bbc.com
Originally posted June 18, 2019

Here is an excerpt:

Our sense of right and wrong goes back a long way, so it can be helpful to distinguish between ethics and “morality”. Morality is an individual’s, largely intuitive and emotional, sense of how they should treat others. It has probably existed for hundreds of thousands of years, and maybe even in other species. Ethics, on the other hand, is a formalised set of principles that claim to represent the truth about how people should behave. For instance, while almost everyone has a strong moral sense that killing is wrong and that it simply “mustn’t be done”, ethicists have long sought to understand why killing is wrong and under what circumstances (war, capital punishment, euthanasia) it may still be permissible.

Put a small group of people together in relative isolation and this natural moral sense will usually be enough to allow them to get along. However, at some point in our history, human societies became so large and complex that new principles of organisation were needed. Originally these were likely simple buttresses to our pre-existing emotions and intuitions: invoking a supernatural parent might bring together multiple kinship groups or identifying a common enemy might keep young men from fighting each other.

However, such buttresses are inherently unstable and attempts to codify more enduring principles began shortly after our ancestors began to form stable states. From the earliest written accounts, we see appeals to what are recognisably ethical values and principles.

The information is here.

Is There A Difference Between Ethics And Morality In Business?

Bruce Weinstein
Forbes.com
Originally published February 23, 2018

Here is an excerpt:

In practical terms, if you use both “ethics” and “morality” in conversation, the people you’re speaking with will probably take issue with how you’re using these terms, even if they believe they’re distinct in some way.

The conversation will then veer from whatever substantive ethical point you were trying to make (“Our company has an ethical and moral responsibility to hire and promote only honest, accountable people”) to an argument about the meaning of the words “ethical” and “moral.” I had plenty of those arguments as a graduate student in philosophy, but is that the kind of discussion you really want to have at a team meeting or business conference?

You can do one of three things, then:

1. Use “ethics” and “morality” interchangeably only when you’re speaking with people who believe they’re synonymous.

2. Choose one term and stick with it.

3. Minimize the use of both words and instead refer to what each word is broadly about: doing the right thing, leading an honorable life and acting with high character.

As a professional ethicist, I’ve come to see #3 as the best option. That way, I don’t have to guess whether the person I’m speaking with believes ethics and morality are identical concepts, which is futile when you’re speaking to an audience of 5,000 people.

The information is here.

Note: I do not agree with everything in this article, but it is worth contemplating.

The Definition of Morality

Gert, Bernard and Gert, Joshua
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming

The topic of this entry is not—at least directly—moral theory; rather, it is the definition of morality. Moral theories are large and complex things; definitions are not. The question of the definition of morality is the question of identifying the target of moral theorizing. Identifying this target enables us to see different moral theories as attempting to capture the very same thing. In this way, the distinction between a definition of morality and a moral theory parallels the distinction John Rawls (1971: 9) drew between the general concept of justice and various detailed conceptions of it. Rawls’ terminology, however, suggests a psychological distinction, and also suggests that many people have conceptions of justice. But the definition/theory distinction is not psychological, and only moral theorists typically have moral theories.

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either

1. descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or


2. normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.

Which of these two senses of “morality” a theorist is using plays a crucial, although sometimes unacknowledged, role in the development of an ethical theory. If one uses “morality” in its descriptive sense, and therefore uses it to refer to codes of conduct actually put forward by distinct groups or societies, one will almost certainly deny that there is a universal morality that applies to all human beings. The descriptive use of “morality” is the one used by anthropologists when they report on the morality of the societies that they study. Recently, some comparative and evolutionary psychologists (Haidt 2006; Hauser 2006; De Waal 1996) have taken morality, or a close anticipation of it, to be present among groups of non-human animals: primarily, but not exclusively, other primates.

The entire entry is here.