Taylor, M. R. (2024).
Journal of the American Philosophical
Association, 1–20.
Abstract
Galen Strawson (2004) has championed an influential argument against the view that a life is, or ought to be, understood as a kind of story with temporal extension. The weight of his argument rests on his self-report of his experience of life as lacking the form or temporal extension necessary for narrative. And though this argument has been widely accepted, I argue that it ought to have been rejected. On one hand, the hypothetical non-diachronic life Strawson proposes would likely be psychologically fragmented. On the other, it would certainly be morally diminished, for it would necessarily lack the capacity for integrity.
Conclusion
I have argued that Strawson's account is unsuccessful in undermining the central theses of Narrativism. As an attack on the descriptive elements of Narrativism, his report falls short of compelling evidence. Further, and independently, the normative dimensions of Strawson's proposed episodic life would require major revisions in moral theorizing. They also run counter to caring about one's own life by precluding the possibility of integrity. Accordingly, the notion of the fully flourishing episodic life ought to be rejected.
Here are some thoughts:
Strawson's argument against Narrativism has become highly influential in philosophical discussions of selfhood and personal identity. However, there are strong reasons to be skeptical of both the descriptive and normative claims Strawson makes about "Episodic" individuals who lack a sense of narrative self-understanding.
On the descriptive side, Strawson provides little evidence beyond his own introspective report to support the existence of non-pathological Episodic individuals. This is problematic, as loss of narrative coherence is typically associated with acute trauma or personality disorders. In cases of trauma, the inability to form a coherent narrative of events is linked to feelings of disconnection, lack of control, and impaired cognitive functioning. This also could be a function of moral injury, which is another type of trauma-based experience. Similarly, the "fragmentation of the narrative self" in personality disorders leads to difficulty with long-term planning, commitment, and authentic agency.
Given these associations between narrative disruption and mental health issues, we should be hesitant to accept Strawson's claim that Episodicity represents a benign variation in human psychology. The fact that Strawson cites no empirical studies and relies primarily on his interpretation of historical authors' writings further undermines the descriptive aspect of his argument. Without stronger evidence, we lack justification for believing that non-pathological Episodic lives are a common phenomenon.
