Jaeger, B., & Wilks, M. (2021).
Cognitive Science.
Abstract
People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.
Here is my take:
The authors begin by reviewing the literature on the moral circle, which is the group of beings that people believe are worthy of moral consideration. They note that both target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) have been shown to influence moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of these two types of characteristics remains unclear.
To address this question, the authors conducted two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In each study, participants were asked to rate how much moral concern they felt for a variety of targets, including humans, animals, and robots. Participants were also asked to complete a questionnaire about their own moral values and beliefs.
The authors' analysis revealed that both target and judge characteristics explained significant amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. However, they also found that the interaction between target and judge characteristics was just as important as target and judge characteristics separately. This means that the moral circle is not simply a function of either target or judge characteristics, but rather of the complex interaction between the two.
The authors' findings have important implications for our understanding of the moral circle. They show that moral inclusion is not simply a matter of whether or not a target possesses certain characteristics (e.g., sentience, intelligence). Rather, it also depends on the characteristics of the judge, as well as the interaction between the two.
The authors' findings also have important implications for applied ethics. For example, they suggest that ethicists should be careful to avoid making generalizations about the moral status of entire groups of beings. Instead, they should consider the individual characteristics of both the target and the judge when making moral judgments.
