3:AM Magazine
Interview by Richard Marshall
Here are some excerpts:
3:AM: You’ve developed an ethical theory around ‘care.’ You see this as an alternative to the dominant ethical theories of the last couple of centuries. It’s important to you that it isn’t an ethics to be added on to Kantianism or utilitarianism or virtue ethics. Can you say something about why it is so important that a care ethics is not an adjunct but is a fresh start? The Kantian Christine Korsgaard has placed reciprocity and human relations at the heart of Kantianism. Onora O’Neill has argued that justice and care are not opposed. In the light of these views, would you still defend the break, or would you be happier to see it as a continuation?
VH: I don’t find it satisfactory merely to add some considerations of care to the traditional moral theories for reasons similar to why it is not enough to simply insert women into the traditional structures of society and politics built on gender domination. Feminists should understand that the structures themselves have to change. The history of ethics shows it to be a very biased enterprise. Very roughly, what men have done in public life has been deemed important and relevant to moral theory, and what women have done in the household has been considered irrelevant. I think it plausible to see Kantian ethics and utilitarianism as expansions to the whole of morality of what can be thought appropriate for law and for public policy.
I have come to see, in contrast, caring relations as the wider network, and the ethics of care as the comprehensive morality, within which we should develop legal and political institutions. Caring relations should be guided by the ethics of care, which we can best understand and which is most applicable in contexts of families and friendship. But we can and should also have weaker forms of caring relations with all persons, and within these, the more limited institutions of law should be guided, roughly, by Kantian norms, and the more limited political institutions by utilitarian ones. Yes I see the legal and political as importantly different, and both as significantly different from the contexts of family and friendship. This is a very oversimplified statement of a complex position but I try to clarify and delineate these matters in my written work.
3:AM: So ‘care’ is at the heart of this new ethic but it isn’t to replace justice. So how do you get from care to justice in your system? Do we end up losing the common use of ‘care’ for a more term of art, technical use, as is the wont with philosophers? And isn’t that a cheat?
VH: Yes, various Kantians are trying to acknowledge the concerns of care, and various philosophers interested in the ethics of care are trying to combine it with Kantian ethics. I think the ethics of care has the resources to be an alternative moral theory that can include persuasive aspects of Kantian ethics and also of utilitarianism and virtue theory. It’s nevertheless a feminist ethics that includes the goal of overcoming gender domination, in our thinking as well as our institutions. And I see it as the more comprehensive view. Korsgaard and O’Neill are still Kantians, though more persuasive ones than some traditional Kantians. I think ethics should start with a vast amount of experience (the experience of caring and being cared for) overlooked by traditional moral theories, and see how the many important and valid concerns of other moral theories can be brought into care ethics. I think it is a strength of care ethics that it is based on experience. It is experience which everyone has had: no one would have survived without enormous amounts of care, in childhood at least. Most women, and increasingly men, have also had a great deal of experience providing care, especially for children.
The entire interview is here.
Virginia Held has written: Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics, Justice and Care: Essential Reading in Feminist Ethics, and The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global.