The Psychological Origins of Conspiracy Theory Beliefs: Big Events with Small Causes Amplify Conspiratorial Thinking

Vonasch, A., Dore, N., & Felicite, J.

(2022, January 20). 

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/3j9xg

Abstract

Three studies supported a new model of conspiracy theory belief: People are most likely to believe conspiracy theories that explain big, socially important events with smaller, intuitively unappealing official explanations. Two experiments (N = 577) used vignettes about fictional conspiracy theories and measured online participants’ beliefs in the official causes of the events and the corresponding conspiracy theories. We experimentally manipulated the size of the event and its official cause. Larger events and small official causes decreased belief in the official cause and this mediated increased belief in the conspiracy theory, even after controlling for individual differences in paranoia and distrust. Study 3 established external validity and generalizability by coding the 78 most popular conspiracy theories on Reddit. Nearly all (96.7%) popular conspiracy theories explain big, socially important events with smaller, intuitively unappealing official explanations. By contrast, events not producing conspiracy theories often have bigger explanations.

General Discussion

Three studies supported the HOSE (heuristic of sufficient explanation) of conspiracy theory belief. Nearly all popular conspiracy theories sampled were about major events with small official causes deemed too small to sufficiently explain the event. Two experiments involving invented conspiracy theories supported the proposed causal mechanism. People were less likely to believe the official explanation was true because it was relatively small and the event was relatively big. People’s beliefs in the conspiracy theory were mediated by their disbelief in the official explanation. Thus, one reason people believe conspiracy theories is because they offer a bigger explanation for a seemingly implausibly large effect of a small cause.

HOSE helps explain why certain conspiracy theories become popular but others do not. Like evolutionarily fit genes are especially likely to spread to subsequent generations, ideas (memes) with certain qualities are most likely to spread and thus become popular (Dawkins, 1976). HOSE explains that conspiracy theories spread widely because people are strongly motivated to learn an explanation for important events (Douglas, et al., 2017; 2019), and are usually unsatisfied with counterintuitively small explanations that seem insufficient to explain things. Conspiracy theories are typically inspired by events that people perceive to be larger than their causes could plausibly produce. Some conspiracy theories may be inevitable because small causes do sometimes counterintuitively cause big events: via the exponential spread of a microscopic virus or the interconnected, chaotic nature of events like the flap of a butterfly’s wings changing weather across the world (Gleick, 2008). Therefore, itmay be impossible to prevent all conspiracy theories from developing.

The research is here.

A framework for understanding reasoning errors: From fake news to climate change and beyond

Pennycook, G. (2022, August 31).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/j3w7d

Abstract

Humans have the capacity, but perhaps not always the willingness, for great intelligence. From global warming to the spread of misinformation and beyond, our species is facing several major challenges that are the result of the limits of our own reasoning and decision-making. So, why are we so prone to errors during reasoning? In this chapter, I will outline a framework for understanding reasoning errors that is based on a three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement (intuition, metacognition, and reason). The model has two key implications: 1) That a mere lack of deliberation and analytic thinking is a primary source of errors and 2) That when deliberation is activated, it generally reduces errors (via questioning intuitions and integrating new information) than increasing errors (via rationalization and motivated reasoning). In support of these claims, I review research showing the extensive predictive validity of measures that index individual differences in analytic cognitive style – even beyond explicit errors per se. In particular, analytic thinking is not only predictive of skepticism about a wide range of epistemically suspect beliefs (paranormal, conspiratorial, COVID-19 misperceptions, pseudoscience and alternative medicines) as well as decreased susceptibility to bullshit, fake news, and misinformation, but also important differences in people’s moral judgments and values as well as their religious beliefs (and disbeliefs). Furthermore, in some (but not all cases), there is evidence from experimental paradigms that support a causal role of analytic thinking in determining judgments, beliefs, and behaviors. The findings reviewed here provide some reason for optimism for the future: It may be possible to foster analytic thinking and therefore improve the quality of our decisions.

Evaluating the evidence: Does reason matter?

Thus far, I have prioritized explaining the various alternative frameworks. I will now turn to an in-depth review of some of the key relevant evidence that helps mediate between these accounts. I will organize this review around two key implications that emerge from the framework that I have proposed.

First, the primary difference between the three-stage model (and related dual-process models) and the social-intuitionist models (and related intuitionist models) is that the former argues that people should be able to overcome intuitive errors using deliberation whereas the latter argues that reason is generally infirm and therefore that intuitive errors will simply dominate. Thus, the reviewed research will investigate the apparent role of deliberation in driving people’s choices, beliefs, and behaviors.

Second, the primary difference between the three-stage model (and related dual-process models) and the identity-protective cognition model is that the latter argues that deliberation facilitates biased information processing whereas the former argues that deliberation generally facilitates accuracy. Thus, the reviewed research will also focus on whether deliberation is linked with inaccuracy in politically-charged or identity-relevant contexts.

The research is here.

Boundary Issues of Concern

Charles Dike

Psychiatric News

Originally posted 25 AUG 22

Here is an excerpt:

There are, of course, less prominent but equally serious boundary violations other than sexual relations with patients or a patients’ relatives. The case of Dr. Jerome Oremland, a prominent California psychiatrist, is one example. According to a report by KQED on October 3, 2016, John Pierce, a patient, alleged that his psychiatrist, Dr. Oremland, induced Mr. Pierce to give him at least 12 works of highly valued art. The psychiatrist argued that the patient had consented to their business dealings and that the art he had received from the patient was given willingly as payment for psychiatric treatment. The patient further alleged that Dr. Oremland used many of their sessions to solicit art, propose financial schemes (including investments), and discuss other subjects unrelated to treatment. Furthermore, the patient allegedly made repairs in Dr. Oremland’s home, offices, and rental units; helped clear out the home of Dr. Oremland’s deceased brother; and cleaned his pool. Mr. Pierce began therapy with Dr. Oremland in 1984 but brought a lawsuit against him in 2015. The court trial began shortly after Dr. Oremland’s death in 2016, and Dr. Oremland’s estate eventually settled with Mr. Pierce. In addition to being a private practitioner, Dr. Oremland had been chief of psychiatry at the Children’s Hospital in San Francisco and a clinical professor of psychiatry at UCSF. He also wrote books on the intersection of art and psychology.

(cut)

There are less dramatic but still problematic boundary crossings such as when a psychiatrist in private practice agrees that a patient may pay off treatment costs by doing some work for the psychiatrist. Other examples include a psychiatrist hiring a patient, for example, a skilled plumber, to work in the psychiatrist’s office or home at the patient’s going rate or obtaining investment tips from a successful investment banker patient. In these situations, questions arise about the physician-patient relationship. Even when the psychiatrist believes he or she is treating the patient fairly—such as paying the going rate for work done for the psychiatrist—the psychiatrist is clueless regarding how the patient is interpreting the arrangement: Does the patient experience it as exploitative? What are the patient’s unspoken expectations? What if the patient’s work in the psychiatrist’s office is inferior or the investment advice results in a loss? Would these outcomes influence the physician-patient relationship? Even compassionate acts such as writing off the bill of patients who are unable to pay or paying for an indigent patient’s medications should make the psychiatrist pause for thought. To avoid potential misinterpretation of the psychiatrist’s intentions or complaints of inequitable practices or favoritism, the psychiatrist should be ready to do the same for other indigent patients. It would be better to establish neutral policies for all indigent patients than to appear to favor some over others.

The article is here.

9th Circuit Upholds Ban on Conversion Therapy for Minors in First Amendment Challenge

Debra Cassens Weiss

ABA Journal

Originally published 7 SEPT 22

Washington state’s ban on conversion therapy for minors does not violate the First or 14th Amendments, a federal appeals court ruled on Tuesday.

The San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the law, which subjects licensed therapists to discipline if they practice therapy that seeks to change the sexual orientation or gender identity of a person under age 18.

The appeals court said the law was intended to prevent psychological harm to LGBTQ minors subjected to conversion therapy, including depression, self-stigma and emotional distress.

The appeals court ruled against Christian marriage and family counselor Brian Tingley, who claimed the ban on conversion therapy for minors violated his free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment. He also claimed the Washington state law was unconstitutionally vague under the 14th Amendment.

The appeals court noted its 2014 decision, Pickup v. Brown, upheld a nearly identical law in California. Tingley had argued, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated the Pickup decision in 2018 when it ruled for anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers challenging California’s required notice on the availability of state-subsidized abortions.

The Supreme Court held the abortion-notice law was a content-based restriction that was likely unconstitutional. The case was National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra.

The info is here.

This company is about to grow new organs in a person for the first time

Jessica Hamzelou

MIT Technology Review

Originally posted 25 AUG 22

Here is an excerpt:

Livers have a unique ability to regenerate. Cut away half an animal’s liver, and it will grow back. Human livers damaged by toxins or alcohol can usually regrow too. But some diseases can cause extensive damage from which the liver can’t recover. For these diseases, the treatment of choice is usually a liver transplant.

Transplants aren’t always an option for people who are very unwell, however. That’s why Eric Lagasse and his colleagues at LyGenesis have taken this different approach. Lagasse, a stem-cell biologist at the University of Pittsburgh, has spent years researching cell-based treatments for liver disease. Around 10 years ago, he was experimenting with the idea of injecting cells from healthy livers into diseased ones in mice.

It is difficult to access the livers of small, 25-gram mice, which Lagasse was studying, so instead he and his colleagues injected the cells into the spleens of mice with liver disease. They found that the cells were able to migrate from the spleen to the liver. To find out if they could migrate from other organs, Lagasse’s team injected liver cells at various sites in the mice’s bodies.

Only a small number of mice survived. When Lagasse and his colleagues later performed autopsies on those survivors, “I was very surprised,” he recalls. “We had a mini liver present … where the lymph node would be.”

Little incubators

Lymph nodes are small, bean-shaped structures found throughout the body. They play a crucial role in our immune health, making cells that help fight infections. And while Lagasse was initially surprised that liver cells could multiply and grow in lymph nodes, it makes sense, he says. 

Lymph nodes are natural homes for rapidly dividing cells, even if those are usually immune cells. Lymph nodes also have a good blood supply, which can aid the growth of new tissue.

The info is here.

Gender-diverse teams produce more novel and higher-impact scientific ideas

Yang, Y., Tian, T. Y., et al. (2022, August 29). 

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(36).

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2200841119

Abstract

Science’s changing demographics raise new questions about research team diversity and research outcomes. We study mixed-gender research teams, examining 6.6 million papers published across the medical sciences since 2000 and establishing several core findings. First, the fraction of publications by mixed-gender teams has grown rapidly, yet mixed-gender teams continue to be underrepresented compared to the expectations of a null model. Second, despite their underrepresentation, the publications of mixed-gender teams are substantially more novel and impactful than the publications of same-gender teams of equivalent size. Third, the greater the gender balance on a team, the better the team scores on these performance measures. Fourth, these patterns generalize across medical subfields. Finally, the novelty and impact advantages seen with mixed-gender teams persist when considering numerous controls and potential related features, including fixed effects for the individual researchers, team structures, and network positioning, suggesting that a team’s gender balance is an underrecognized yet powerful correlate of novel and impactful scientific discoveries.

Significance

Science teams made up of men and women produce papers that are more novel and highly cited than those of all-men or all-women teams. These performance advantages increase the greater the team’s gender balance and appear nearly universal. On average, they hold for small and large teams, the 45 subfields of medicine, and women- or men-led teams and generalize to published papers in all science fields over the last 20 y. Notwithstanding these benefits, gender-diverse teams remain underrepresented in science when compared to what is expected if the teams in the data had been formed without regard to gender. These findings reveal potentially new gender and teamwork synergies that correlate with scientific discoveries and inform diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives.

Discussion

Conducting an analysis of 6.6 million published papers from more than 15,000 different medical journals worldwide, we find that mixed-gender teams—teams combining women and men scientists—produce more novel and more highly cited papers than all-women or all-men teams. Mixed-gender teams publish papers that are up to 7% more novel and 14.6% more likely to be upper-tail papers than papers published by same-gender teams, results that are robust to numerous institutional, team, and individual controls and further generalize by subfield. Finally, in exploring gender in science through the lens of teamwork, the results point to a potentially transformative approach for thinking about and capturing the value of gender diversity in science.

Another key finding of this work is that mixed-gender teams are significantly underrepresented compared to what would be expected by chance. This underrepresentation is all the more striking given the findings that gender-diverse teams produce more novel and high-impact research and suggests that gender-diverse teams may have substantial untapped potential for medical research. Nevertheless, the underrepresentation of gender-diverse teams may reflect research showing that women receive less credit for their successes than do men teammates, which in turn inhibits the formation of gender-diverse teams and women’s success in receiving grants, prizes, and promotions.

The research is here.

Surprisingly Happy to Have Helped: Underestimating Prosociality Creates a Misplaced Barrier to Asking for Help

Zhao, X., & Epley, N. (2022).

Psychological Science.

https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976221097615

Abstract

Performing acts of kindness increases well-being, yet people can be reluctant to ask for help that would enable others’ kindness. We suggest that people may be overly reluctant because of miscalibrated expectations about others’ prosocial motivation, underestimating how positively others will feel when asked for help. A pretest identified that interest in asking for help was correlated with expectations of how helpers would think and feel, but a series of scenarios, recalled experiences, and live interactions among adult participants in the United States (total N = 2,118) indicated that those needing help consistently underestimated others’ willingness to help, underestimated how positively helpers would feel, and overestimated how inconvenienced helpers would feel. These miscalibrated expectations stemmed from underestimating helpers’ prosocial motivation while overestimating compliance motivation. This research highlights a limitation of construing help-seeking through a lens of compliance by scholars and laypeople alike. Undervaluing prosociality could create a misplaced barrier to asking for help when needed.

From the Discussion section

Prosocial actions, such as performing random acts of kindness, tend to improve well-being for both those who perform prosocial acts as well as for those who receive them. Indeed, those who performed a random act of kindness in our experiments reported feeling significantly more positive than they normally do, and two of the experiments confirmed that performers felt better than participants who were not given the opportunity to perform a random act of kindness. Another found that people performing acts of kindness felt more positive after being kind than they reported feeling at the beginning of the experiment. Being more prosocial did not come at a cost to people’s own well-being; it enhanced it.

Daily life, however, affords many opportunities for engaging in prosocial activities that people may not take. We believe our research suggests one possible reason why: that those performing random acts of kindness undervalue the positive impact they are having on recipients. People’s choices are often guided by either an implicit or explicit calculation of expected value (Becker, 1993). Underestimating how positive a recipient would feel after even a small act of kindness could lead people to engage in prosocial actions less often than might be optimal for both their own and others’ well-being.

Across a variety of different actions, in many different contexts, performers systematically perceived their random act of kindness to be a more minor action than recipients perceived it to be and systematically underestimated how positive recipients would feel afterward. Performers were not confused, of course, that recipients would feel good about their experience. In all cases performers expected recipients to feel more positive than they normally do. Nevertheless, performers were still systematically miscalibrated as recipients felt even better than expected.

A pdf of an earlier draft is here.

7 tell-tale red flags of medical gaslighting

Ashley Laderer

Insider.com

Originally published 29 AUG 2022

Here is an except:

"Medical gaslighting is a term recently used to describe when health care providers dismiss a patient's concerns, feelings, or complaints," says Faith Fletcher, an assistant professor in the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of Medicine and a senior advisor to the Hastings Center, a bioethics research institute. 

Numerous studies over the years have found examples of medical gaslighting, whether it's interrupting a patient or misdiagnosing them based on unconscious biases about race or gender. Gaslighting in the medical field tends to affect marginalized groups the most.

"These interactions don't take place in a vacuum and are rooted in long-standing structural and social injustices such as racism, sexism, and class oppression in the US healthcare system," Fletcher says. 

Here are seven signs your doctor may be gaslighting you and the consequences it can have on your health.

1. They interrupt you

2. They rush you 

3. They won't discuss your symptoms with you

4. They let underlying biases affect diagnosis 

5. They say it's all in your head

6. They question the legitimacy of your medical history 

7. They're uncollaborative on treatment options

The information is here.

A Normative Approach to Artificial Moral Agency

Behdadi, D., Munthe, C.

Minds & Machines 30, 195–218 (2020).

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09525-8

Abstract

This paper proposes a methodological redirection of the philosophical debate on artificial moral agency (AMA) in view of increasingly pressing practical needs due to technological development. This “normative approach” suggests abandoning theoretical discussions about what conditions may hold for moral agency and to what extent these may be met by artificial entities such as AI systems and robots. Instead, the debate should focus on how and to what extent such entities should be included in human practices normally assuming moral agency and responsibility of participants. The proposal is backed up by an analysis of the AMA debate, which is found to be overly caught in the opposition between so-called standard and functionalist conceptions of moral agency, conceptually confused and practically inert. Additionally, we outline some main themes of research in need of attention in light of the suggested normative approach to AMA.

Free will and Autonomy

Several AMA debaters have claimed that free will is necessary for being a moral agent (Himma 2009; Hellström 2012; Friedman and Kahn 1992). Others make a similar (and perhaps related) claim that autonomy is necessary (Lin et al. 2008; Schulzke 2013). In the AMA debate, some argue that artificial entities can never have free will (Bringsjord 1992; Shen 2011; Bringsjord 2007) while others, like James Moor (2006, 2009), are open to the possibility that future machines might acquire free will.Footnote15 Others (Powers 2006; Tonkens 2009) have proposed that the plausibility of a free will condition on moral agency may vary depending on what type of normative ethical theory is assumed, but they have not developed this idea further.

Despite appealing to the concept of free will, this portion of the AMA debate does not engage with key problems in the free will literature, such as the debate about compatibilism and incompatibilism (O’Connor 2016). Those in the AMA debate assume the existence of free will among humans, and ask whether artificial entities can satisfy a source control condition (McKenna et al. 2015). That is, the question is whether or not such entities can be the origins of their actions in a way that allows them to control what they do in the sense assumed of human moral agents.

An exception to this framing of the free will topic in the AMA debate occurs when Johnson writes that ‘… the non-deterministic character of human behavior makes it somewhat mysterious, but it is only because of this mysterious, non-deterministic aspect of moral agency that morality and accountability are coherent’ (Johnson 2006 p. 200). This is a line of reasoning that seems to assume an incompatibilist and libertarian sense of free will, assuming both that it is needed for moral agency and that humans do possess it. This, of course, makes the notion of human moral agents vulnerable to standard objections in the general free will debate (Shaw et al. 2019). Additionally, we note that Johnson’s idea about the presence of a ‘mysterious aspect’ of human moral agents might allow for AMA in the same way as Dreyfus and Hubert’s reference to the subconscious: artificial entities may be built to incorporate this aspect.

The question of sourcehood in the AMA debate connects to the independence argument: For instance, when it is claimed that machines are created for a purpose and therefore are nothing more than advanced tools (Powers 2006; Bryson 2010; Gladden 2016) or prosthetics (Johnson and Miller 2008), this is thought to imply that machines can never be the true or genuine source of their own actions. This argument questions whether the independence required for moral agency (by both functionalists and standardists) can be found in a machine. If a machine’s repertoire of behaviors and responses is the result of elaborate design then it is not independent, the argument goes. Floridi and Sanders question this proposal by referring to the complexity of ‘human programming’, such as genes and arranged environmental factors (e.g. education). 

The info is here.