David Ewing Duncan
Wired.com
Originally published March 27, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
There are also the ethics of using a powerful new technology to muck around with life’s basic coding. Theoretically, scientists could one day manufacture genomes, human or otherwise, almost as easily as writing code on a computer, transforming digital DNA on someone’s laptop into living cells of, say, Homo sapiens. Mindful of the controversy, Church and his HGP-Write colleagues insist that minting people is not their goal, though the sheer audacity of making genome-scale changes to human DNA is enough to cause controversy. “People get upset if you put a gene from another species into something you eat,” says Stanford bioethicist and legal scholar Henry Greely. “Now we’re talking about a thorough rewriting of life? Hairs will stand on end. Hackles will be raised.”
Raised hackles or not, Church and his team are forging ahead. “We want to start with a human Y,” he says, referring to the male sex chromosome, which he explains has the fewest genes of a person’s 23 chromosomes and is thus easier to build. And he doesn’t want to synthesize just any Y chromosome. He and his team want to use the Y chromosome sequence from an actual person’s genome: mine.
“Can you do that?” I stammer.
“Of course we can—with your permission,” he says, reminding me that it would be easy to tap into my genome, since it was stored digitally in his lab’s computers as part of an effort he launched in 2005 called the Personal Genome Project.
The article is here.
Tuesday, April 24, 2018
When therapists face discrimination
Zara Abrams
The Monitor on Psychology - April 2018
Here is an excerpt:
Be aware of your own internalized biases.
Reflecting on their own social, cultural and political perspectives means practitioners are less likely to be caught off guard by something a client says. “It’s important for psychologists to be aware of what a client’s biases and prejudices are bringing up for them internally, so as not to project that onto the client—it’s important to really understand what’s happening,” says Kathleen Brown, PhD, a licensed clinical psychologist and APA fellow.
For Kelly, the Atlanta-based clinical psychologist, this means she’s careful not to assume that resistant clients are treating her disrespectfully because she’s African American. Sometimes her clients, who are referred for pre-surgical evaluation and treatment, are difficult or even hostile
because their psychological intervention was mandated.
Foster an open dialogue about diversity and identity issues.
“The benefit of having that conversation, even though it can be scary or uncomfortable to bring it up in the room, is that it prevents it from festering or interfering with your ability to provide high-quality care to the client,” says Illinois-based clinical psychologist Robyn Gobin, PhD, who has experienced ageism from patients. She responds to ageist remarks by exploring what specific concerns the client has regarding her age (like Turner, she looks young). If she’s met with criticism, she tries to remain receptive, understanding that the client is vulnerable and any hostility the client expresses reflects concern for his or her own well-being. By being open and frank from the start, she shows her clients the appropriate way to confront their biases in therapy.
Of course, practitioners approach these conversations differently. If a client makes a prejudiced remark about another group, Buckman says labeling the comment as “offensive” shifts the attention from the client onto her. “It doesn’t get to the core of what’s going on with them. In the long run, exploring a way to shift how the client interacts with the ‘other’ is probably more valuable than standing up for a group in the moment.”
The information is here.
The Monitor on Psychology - April 2018
Here is an excerpt:
Be aware of your own internalized biases.
Reflecting on their own social, cultural and political perspectives means practitioners are less likely to be caught off guard by something a client says. “It’s important for psychologists to be aware of what a client’s biases and prejudices are bringing up for them internally, so as not to project that onto the client—it’s important to really understand what’s happening,” says Kathleen Brown, PhD, a licensed clinical psychologist and APA fellow.
For Kelly, the Atlanta-based clinical psychologist, this means she’s careful not to assume that resistant clients are treating her disrespectfully because she’s African American. Sometimes her clients, who are referred for pre-surgical evaluation and treatment, are difficult or even hostile
because their psychological intervention was mandated.
Foster an open dialogue about diversity and identity issues.
“The benefit of having that conversation, even though it can be scary or uncomfortable to bring it up in the room, is that it prevents it from festering or interfering with your ability to provide high-quality care to the client,” says Illinois-based clinical psychologist Robyn Gobin, PhD, who has experienced ageism from patients. She responds to ageist remarks by exploring what specific concerns the client has regarding her age (like Turner, she looks young). If she’s met with criticism, she tries to remain receptive, understanding that the client is vulnerable and any hostility the client expresses reflects concern for his or her own well-being. By being open and frank from the start, she shows her clients the appropriate way to confront their biases in therapy.
Of course, practitioners approach these conversations differently. If a client makes a prejudiced remark about another group, Buckman says labeling the comment as “offensive” shifts the attention from the client onto her. “It doesn’t get to the core of what’s going on with them. In the long run, exploring a way to shift how the client interacts with the ‘other’ is probably more valuable than standing up for a group in the moment.”
The information is here.
Monday, April 23, 2018
Shared Decision-making for PTSD
Juliette Harik, PhD
PTSD Research Quarterly (2018) Volume 29 (1)
Here is an excerpt:
Although several different shared decision-making models exist (for a review see Lin & Fagerlin, 2014), one useful approach conceptualizes shared decision-making as consisting of three phases
(Elwyn et al., 2012): choice talk, option talk, and decision talk. Choice talk involves communicating
to patients that there is a decision to make and that they can be involved in this decision to the extent
that they are comfortable. Option talk consists of sharing accurate and comprehensive information
about treatment options. Ideally, this involves the use of a decision aid, which is an educational tool
such as a website, brochure, or video designed to help patients understand and compare various
options (for a review, see Stacey et al., 2017). The third and final step, decision talk, consists of an
exploration of the patient’s preferences and what matters most to him or her. The process of shared
decision-making is intended to help the patient develop informed preferences, and ultimately arrive
at the decision that is best for him or her. Importantly, patients with the same clinical condition may arrive at very different treatment decisions on the basis of unique values and preferences.
Shared decision-making has been evaluated most often among patients facing care decisions for chronic medical conditions, especially cancer. In medical patients, shared decision-making has been linked with greater confidence in the treatment decision, improved satisfaction with decision-making and with treatment, greater self-efficacy, and increased trust in the provider (Joosten et al., 2008; Shay & Lafata, 2015). In mental health, shared decision-making has been most often evaluated in the context of depression, yielding mixed results on both satisfaction and treatment outcomes (Duncan, Best, & Hagen, 2010). Fewer studies have evaluated the effectiveness of shared decision-making for other mental health conditions such as PTSD.
The information is here.
PTSD Research Quarterly (2018) Volume 29 (1)
Here is an excerpt:
Although several different shared decision-making models exist (for a review see Lin & Fagerlin, 2014), one useful approach conceptualizes shared decision-making as consisting of three phases
(Elwyn et al., 2012): choice talk, option talk, and decision talk. Choice talk involves communicating
to patients that there is a decision to make and that they can be involved in this decision to the extent
that they are comfortable. Option talk consists of sharing accurate and comprehensive information
about treatment options. Ideally, this involves the use of a decision aid, which is an educational tool
such as a website, brochure, or video designed to help patients understand and compare various
options (for a review, see Stacey et al., 2017). The third and final step, decision talk, consists of an
exploration of the patient’s preferences and what matters most to him or her. The process of shared
decision-making is intended to help the patient develop informed preferences, and ultimately arrive
at the decision that is best for him or her. Importantly, patients with the same clinical condition may arrive at very different treatment decisions on the basis of unique values and preferences.
Shared decision-making has been evaluated most often among patients facing care decisions for chronic medical conditions, especially cancer. In medical patients, shared decision-making has been linked with greater confidence in the treatment decision, improved satisfaction with decision-making and with treatment, greater self-efficacy, and increased trust in the provider (Joosten et al., 2008; Shay & Lafata, 2015). In mental health, shared decision-making has been most often evaluated in the context of depression, yielding mixed results on both satisfaction and treatment outcomes (Duncan, Best, & Hagen, 2010). Fewer studies have evaluated the effectiveness of shared decision-making for other mental health conditions such as PTSD.
The information is here.
Bad science puts innocent people in jail — and keeps them there
Radley Balko and Tucker Carrington
The Washington Post
Originally posted March 21, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
At the trial level, juries hear far too much dubious science, whether it’s an unproven field like bite mark matching or blood splatter analysis, exaggerated claims in a field like hair fiber analysis, or analysts testifying outside their area of expertise. It’s difficult to say how many convictions have involved faulty or suspect forensics, but the FBI estimated in 2015 that its hair fiber analysts had testified in about 3,000 cases — and that’s merely one subspecialty of forensics, and only at the federal level. Extrapolating from the database of DNA exonerations, the Innocence Project estimates that bad forensics contributes to about 45 percent of wrongful convictions.
But flawed evidence presented at trial is only part of the problem. Even once a field of forensics or a particular expert has been discredited, the courts have made it extremely difficult for those convicted by bad science to get a new trial.
The Supreme Court makes judges responsible for determining what is good science. They already decide what evidence is allowed at trial, so asking them to do the same for expert testimony may seem intuitive. But judges are trained to do legal analyses, not scientific ones. They generally deal with challenges to expert testimony by looking at what other judges have said. If a previous court has allowed a field of forensic evidence, subsequent courts will, too.
The article is here.
Note: These issues also apply to psychologists in the courtroom.
The Washington Post
Originally posted March 21, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
At the trial level, juries hear far too much dubious science, whether it’s an unproven field like bite mark matching or blood splatter analysis, exaggerated claims in a field like hair fiber analysis, or analysts testifying outside their area of expertise. It’s difficult to say how many convictions have involved faulty or suspect forensics, but the FBI estimated in 2015 that its hair fiber analysts had testified in about 3,000 cases — and that’s merely one subspecialty of forensics, and only at the federal level. Extrapolating from the database of DNA exonerations, the Innocence Project estimates that bad forensics contributes to about 45 percent of wrongful convictions.
But flawed evidence presented at trial is only part of the problem. Even once a field of forensics or a particular expert has been discredited, the courts have made it extremely difficult for those convicted by bad science to get a new trial.
The Supreme Court makes judges responsible for determining what is good science. They already decide what evidence is allowed at trial, so asking them to do the same for expert testimony may seem intuitive. But judges are trained to do legal analyses, not scientific ones. They generally deal with challenges to expert testimony by looking at what other judges have said. If a previous court has allowed a field of forensic evidence, subsequent courts will, too.
The article is here.
Note: These issues also apply to psychologists in the courtroom.
Sunday, April 22, 2018
What is the ethics of ageing?
Christopher Simon Wareham
Journal of Medical Ethics 2018;44:128-132.
Abstract
Applied ethics is home to numerous productive subfields such as procreative ethics, intergenerational ethics and environmental ethics. By contrast, there is far less ethical work on ageing, and there is no boundary work that attempts to set the scope for ‘ageing ethics’ or the ‘ethics of ageing’. Yet ageing is a fundamental aspect of life; arguably even more fundamental and ubiquitous than procreation. To remedy this situation, I examine conceptions of what the ethics of ageing might mean and argue that these conceptions fail to capture the requirements of the desired subfield. The key reasons for this are, first, that they view ageing as something that happens only when one is old, thereby ignoring the fact that ageing is a process to which we are all subject, and second that the ageing person is treated as an object in ethical discourse rather than as its subject. In response to these shortcomings I put forward a better conception, one which places the ageing person at the centre of ethical analysis, has relevance not just for the elderly and provides a rich yet workable scope. While clarifying and justifying the conceptual boundaries of the subfield, the proposed scope pleasingly broadens the ethics of ageing beyond common negative associations with ageing.
The article is here.
Journal of Medical Ethics 2018;44:128-132.
Abstract
Applied ethics is home to numerous productive subfields such as procreative ethics, intergenerational ethics and environmental ethics. By contrast, there is far less ethical work on ageing, and there is no boundary work that attempts to set the scope for ‘ageing ethics’ or the ‘ethics of ageing’. Yet ageing is a fundamental aspect of life; arguably even more fundamental and ubiquitous than procreation. To remedy this situation, I examine conceptions of what the ethics of ageing might mean and argue that these conceptions fail to capture the requirements of the desired subfield. The key reasons for this are, first, that they view ageing as something that happens only when one is old, thereby ignoring the fact that ageing is a process to which we are all subject, and second that the ageing person is treated as an object in ethical discourse rather than as its subject. In response to these shortcomings I put forward a better conception, one which places the ageing person at the centre of ethical analysis, has relevance not just for the elderly and provides a rich yet workable scope. While clarifying and justifying the conceptual boundaries of the subfield, the proposed scope pleasingly broadens the ethics of ageing beyond common negative associations with ageing.
The article is here.
Saturday, April 21, 2018
A Systematic Review and Meta‐Synthesis of Qualitative Research Into Mandatory Personal Psychotherapy During Training
David Murphy, Nisha Irfan, Harriet Barnett, Emma Castledine, & Lily Enescu
Counseling and Psychotherapy Research
First published February 23, 2018
Abstract
Background
This study addresses the thorny issue of mandatory personal psychotherapy within counselling and psychotherapy training. It is expensive, emotionally demanding and time‐consuming. Nevertheless, proponents argue that it is essential in protecting the public and keeping clients safe; to ensure psychotherapists develop high levels of self‐awareness and gain knowledge of interpersonal dynamics; and that it enhances therapist effectiveness. Existing evidence about these potential benefits is equivocal and is largely reliant on small‐scale qualitative studies.
Method
We carried out a systematic review of literature searched within five major databases. The search identified 16 published qualitative research studies on the topic of mandatory personal psychotherapy that matched the inclusion criteria. All studies were rated for quality. The findings from individual studies were thematically analysed through a process of meta‐synthesis.
Results
Meta‐synthesis showed studies on mandatory psychotherapy had reported both positive and hindering factors in almost equal number. Six main themes were identified: three positive and three negative. Positive findings were related to personal and professional development, experiential learning and therapeutic benefits. Negative findings related to ethical imperatives do no harm, justice and integrity.
Conclusion
When mandatory personal psychotherapy is used within a training programme, courses must consider carefully and put ethical issues at the forefront of decision‐making. Additionally, the requirement of mandatory psychotherapy should be positioned and identified as an experiential pedagogical device rather than fulfilling a curative function. Recommendations for further research are made.
The research is here.
Counseling and Psychotherapy Research
First published February 23, 2018
Abstract
Background
This study addresses the thorny issue of mandatory personal psychotherapy within counselling and psychotherapy training. It is expensive, emotionally demanding and time‐consuming. Nevertheless, proponents argue that it is essential in protecting the public and keeping clients safe; to ensure psychotherapists develop high levels of self‐awareness and gain knowledge of interpersonal dynamics; and that it enhances therapist effectiveness. Existing evidence about these potential benefits is equivocal and is largely reliant on small‐scale qualitative studies.
Method
We carried out a systematic review of literature searched within five major databases. The search identified 16 published qualitative research studies on the topic of mandatory personal psychotherapy that matched the inclusion criteria. All studies were rated for quality. The findings from individual studies were thematically analysed through a process of meta‐synthesis.
Results
Meta‐synthesis showed studies on mandatory psychotherapy had reported both positive and hindering factors in almost equal number. Six main themes were identified: three positive and three negative. Positive findings were related to personal and professional development, experiential learning and therapeutic benefits. Negative findings related to ethical imperatives do no harm, justice and integrity.
Conclusion
When mandatory personal psychotherapy is used within a training programme, courses must consider carefully and put ethical issues at the forefront of decision‐making. Additionally, the requirement of mandatory psychotherapy should be positioned and identified as an experiential pedagogical device rather than fulfilling a curative function. Recommendations for further research are made.
The research is here.
Friday, April 20, 2018
Making a Thinking Machine
Leah Winerman
The Monitor on Psychology - April 2018
Here is an excerpt:
A 'Top Down' Approach
Now, psychologists and AI researchers are looking to insights from cognitive and developmental psychology to address these limitations and to capture aspects of human thinking that deep neural networks can’t yet simulate, such as curiosity and creativity.
This more “top-down” approach to AI relies less on identifying patterns in data, and instead on figuring out mathematical ways to describe the rules that govern human cognition. Researchers can then write those rules into the learning algorithms that power the AI system. One promising avenue for this method is called Bayesian modeling, which uses probability to model how people reason and learn about the world. Brenden Lake, PhD, a psychologist and AI researcher at New York University, and his colleagues, for example, have developed a Bayesian AI system that can accomplish a form of one-shot learning. Humans, even children, are very good at this—a child only has to see a pineapple once or twice to understand what the fruit is, pick it out of a basket and maybe draw an example.
Likewise, adults can learn a new character in an unfamiliar language almost immediately.
The article is here.
The Monitor on Psychology - April 2018
Here is an excerpt:
A 'Top Down' Approach
Now, psychologists and AI researchers are looking to insights from cognitive and developmental psychology to address these limitations and to capture aspects of human thinking that deep neural networks can’t yet simulate, such as curiosity and creativity.
This more “top-down” approach to AI relies less on identifying patterns in data, and instead on figuring out mathematical ways to describe the rules that govern human cognition. Researchers can then write those rules into the learning algorithms that power the AI system. One promising avenue for this method is called Bayesian modeling, which uses probability to model how people reason and learn about the world. Brenden Lake, PhD, a psychologist and AI researcher at New York University, and his colleagues, for example, have developed a Bayesian AI system that can accomplish a form of one-shot learning. Humans, even children, are very good at this—a child only has to see a pineapple once or twice to understand what the fruit is, pick it out of a basket and maybe draw an example.
Likewise, adults can learn a new character in an unfamiliar language almost immediately.
The article is here.
Feds: Pitt professor agrees to pay government more than $130K to resolve claims of research grant misdeeds
Sean D. Hamill and Jonathan D. Silver
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Originally posted March 21, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
A prolific researcher, Mr. Schunn, pulled in more than $50 million in 24 NSF grants over the past 20 years, as well as another $25 million in 24 other grants from the military and private foundations, most of it researching how people learn, according to his personal web page.
Now, according to the government, Mr. Schunn must “provide certifications and assurances of truthfulness to NSF for up to five years, and agree not to serve as a reviewer, adviser or consultant to NSF for a period of three years.”
But all that may be the least of the fallout from Mr. Schunn’s settlement, according to a fellow researcher who worked on a grant with him in the past.
Though the settlement only involved fraud accusations on four NSF grants from 2006 to 2016, it will bring additional scrutiny to all of his work, not only of the grants themselves, but results, said Joseph Merlino, president of the 21st Century Partnership for STEM Education, a nonprofit based in Conshohocken.
“That’s what I’m thinking: Can I trust the data he gave us?” Mr. Merlino said of a project that he worked on with Mr. Schunn, and for which they just published a research article.
The information is here.
Note: The article refers to Dr. Schunn as Mr. Shunn throughout, even though he has a PhD in Psychology at Carnegie Mellon University.
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Originally posted March 21, 2018
Here is an excerpt:
A prolific researcher, Mr. Schunn, pulled in more than $50 million in 24 NSF grants over the past 20 years, as well as another $25 million in 24 other grants from the military and private foundations, most of it researching how people learn, according to his personal web page.Now, according to the government, Mr. Schunn must “provide certifications and assurances of truthfulness to NSF for up to five years, and agree not to serve as a reviewer, adviser or consultant to NSF for a period of three years.”
But all that may be the least of the fallout from Mr. Schunn’s settlement, according to a fellow researcher who worked on a grant with him in the past.
Though the settlement only involved fraud accusations on four NSF grants from 2006 to 2016, it will bring additional scrutiny to all of his work, not only of the grants themselves, but results, said Joseph Merlino, president of the 21st Century Partnership for STEM Education, a nonprofit based in Conshohocken.
“That’s what I’m thinking: Can I trust the data he gave us?” Mr. Merlino said of a project that he worked on with Mr. Schunn, and for which they just published a research article.
The information is here.
Note: The article refers to Dr. Schunn as Mr. Shunn throughout, even though he has a PhD in Psychology at Carnegie Mellon University.
Thursday, April 19, 2018
Common Sense for A.I. Is a Great Idea
Carissa Veliz
www.slate.com
Originally posted March 19, 2018
At the moment, artificial intelligence may have perfect memories and be better at arithmetic than us, but they are clueless. It takes a few seconds of interaction with any digital assistant to realize one is not in the presence of a very bright interlocutor. Among some of the unexpected items users have found in their shopping lists after talking to (or near) Amazon’s Alexa are 150,000 bottles of shampoo, sled dogs, “hunk of poo,” and a girlfriend.
The mere exasperation of talking to a digital assistant can be enough to miss human companionship, feel nostalgia of all things analog and dumb, and foreswear any future attempts at communicating with mindless pieces of metal inexplicably labelled “smart.” (Not to mention all the privacy issues.) A.I. not understanding what a shopping list is, and the kinds of items that are appropriate to such lists, is evidence of a much broader problem: They lack common sense.
The Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, or AI2, created by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, has announced it is embarking on a new research $125 million initiative to try to change that. “To make real progress in A.I., we have to overcome the big challenges in the area of common sense,” Allen told the New York Times. AI2 takes common sense to include the “infinite set of facts, heuristics, observations … that we bring to the table when we address a problem, but the computer doesn’t.” Researchers will use a combination of crowdsourcing, machine learning, and machine vision to create a huge “repository of knowledge” that will bring about common sense. Of paramount importance among its uses is to get A.I. to “understand what’s harmful to people.”
The information is here.
www.slate.com
Originally posted March 19, 2018
At the moment, artificial intelligence may have perfect memories and be better at arithmetic than us, but they are clueless. It takes a few seconds of interaction with any digital assistant to realize one is not in the presence of a very bright interlocutor. Among some of the unexpected items users have found in their shopping lists after talking to (or near) Amazon’s Alexa are 150,000 bottles of shampoo, sled dogs, “hunk of poo,” and a girlfriend.
The mere exasperation of talking to a digital assistant can be enough to miss human companionship, feel nostalgia of all things analog and dumb, and foreswear any future attempts at communicating with mindless pieces of metal inexplicably labelled “smart.” (Not to mention all the privacy issues.) A.I. not understanding what a shopping list is, and the kinds of items that are appropriate to such lists, is evidence of a much broader problem: They lack common sense.
The Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, or AI2, created by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, has announced it is embarking on a new research $125 million initiative to try to change that. “To make real progress in A.I., we have to overcome the big challenges in the area of common sense,” Allen told the New York Times. AI2 takes common sense to include the “infinite set of facts, heuristics, observations … that we bring to the table when we address a problem, but the computer doesn’t.” Researchers will use a combination of crowdsourcing, machine learning, and machine vision to create a huge “repository of knowledge” that will bring about common sense. Of paramount importance among its uses is to get A.I. to “understand what’s harmful to people.”
The information is here.
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