What Is Happening to Our Country? How Psychology Can Respond to Political Polarization, Incivility and Intolerance

As political events in Europe and America got stranger and more violent over the last year, I found myself thinking of the phrase “things fall apart; the center cannot hold.” I didn’t know its origin so I looked it up, found the poem The Second Coming, by W. B. Yeats, and found a great deal of wisdom. Yeats wrote it in 1919, just after the First World War and at the beginning of the Irish War of Independence.

The entire web page is here.

Empirical Approaches to Moral Character

Miller, Christian B.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming

The turn of the century saw a significant increase in the amount of attention being paid by philosophers to empirical issues about moral character. Dating back at least to Plato and Aristotle in the West, and Confucius in the East, philosophers have traditionally drawn on empirical data to some extent in their theorizing about character. One of the main differences in recent years has been the source of this empirical data, namely the work of social and personality psychologists on morally relevant thought and action.

This entry briefly examines four recent empirical approaches to moral character. It will draw on the psychology literature where appropriate, but the main focus will be on the significance of that work for philosophers interested in better understanding moral character. The four areas are situationism, the CAPS model, the Big Five model, and the VIA. The remainder of this entry devotes a section to each of them.

The entry is here.

Would You Cheat? Cheating Behavior, Human Nature, and Decision-Making

Piotr M. Patrzyk
Published in Student Pulse

Abstract

Cheating is a pervasive behavior among humans. Due to its unethicality, it has captured an attention of many scholars in a wide range of disciplines. Numerous theories have been put forward in order to explain this behavior. In this article I review some of the experimental findings concerning cheating and propose an explanation of how people make decisions about engagement or refraining from it. Underlying mechanisms, as well as their origin are discussed.


Questions concerning human nature provoke controversy across disciplines,  particularly when it comes to explaining evil or immoral behaviors. Endeavors to explain actions that are considered immoral strike at a fundamental philosophical issue: whether  people are innately good and it is the world that corrupts them; or whether people are innately evil and their tainted proclivities are more or less inevitable.

Here is part of the conclusion:

Moral hypocrisy is the natural state of the human mind because it is the best strategy for reproduction. People develop norms in order to compel others to do what they want, but do not follow them themselves because it would be too costly. Maintaining a good reputation is the essential goal of an individual living in a society based on indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987) so decisions concerning ethical issues are sensitive to these considerations. As Akerlof, frequently cited in economical literature on cheating, points out:  "[t]here is a return to appearing honest, but not to being honest” (1983, p. 57). It would make no sense if individuals made decisions based on what is objectively moral or immoral. Moral reputation pays, and as such individuals make decisions to maximize their perceived moral reputation,  both internally and externally.

The paper is here.

Fundamentality and the Mind-Body Problem

Philip Goff
Erkenntnis
August 2016, Volume 81, Issue 4, pp 881–898

Abstract

In the recent metaphysics literature, a number of philosophers have independently endeavoured to marry sparse ontology to abundant truth. The aim is to keep ontological commitments minimal, whilst allowing true sentences to quantify over a vastly greater range of entities than those which they are ontologically committed to. For example, an ontological commitment only to concrete, microscopic simples might be conjoined with a commitment to truths such as ‘There are twenty people working in this building’ and ‘There are prime numbers greater than 5.’ I argue that a significant challenge to this project comes from the philosophy of mind. As Theodore Sider has pointed out, anti-physicalism is consistent with a sparse ontology. However, I will try to show that the premises of the standard anti-physicalist arguments can be used to form an argument to the conclusion that sentences which quantify over subjects of experience ontologically commit us to subjects of experience. Truths about consciousness cannot be bought more cheaply than their superficial grammar suggests.

The article is here.

The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement

J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard
Forthcoming in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

Abstract

A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held by both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge.  This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement  rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws from recent work by Leon Kass (2004), Michael Sandel (2009), and John Harris (2011) to the effect that ‘enhanced’ cognitive achievements are (by effectively removing obstacles to success) not worthy of pursuit, or are otherwise ‘trivial’.  Third, we show how the cognitive achievement account of cognitive enhancement proposed here fits snugly with recent active externalist approaches (e.g., extended cognition) in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

The paper is here.

Gender, identity, and bioethics

Elizabeth A. Dietz
The Hastings Center Report
First published: 15 July 2016

Abstract

Transgender people and issues have come to the forefront of public consciousness over the last year. Caitlyn Jenner' very public transition, heightened media coverage of the murders of transgender women of color, and the panicked passage of North Carolina's “bathroom bill” (House Bill 2), mean that conversations about transgender health and well-being are no longer happening only within small communities. The idea that transgender issues are bioethical issues is not new, but I think that increased public awareness of transgender people and the ways that their health is affected by systems that bioethics already engages with offers an opportunity for scholarship that works to improve transgender health in meaningful ways.

The article is here.

The Controversial Issue of Euthanasia in Patients With Psychiatric Illness

Emilie Olie & Philippe Courtet
JAMA. 2016;316(6):656-657

A main objective of legalization of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (EAS) is to ease suffering (ie, physical pain and loss of autonomy elicited by an irreversible serious disease), when a terminally ill patient's pain is overwhelming despite palliative care. It implies that there is no reasonable alternative in the patient's situation, with no prospect of improvement of a painful condition or global functioning. Because mental disorders are among the most disabling illnesses, requests for EAS based on unbearable mental suffering caused by severe psychiatric disease may possibly increase. EAS may be differentiated from suicide because EAS results in death without self-inflicted behavior, yet both are driven by a desire to end life. This raises the question: Should the management of patients with psychiatric disorders requesting EAS be considered for suicide prevention?

Mental illness increases suicidal risk and requires treatment. Nevertheless, evidence-based medical and psychosocial treatments currently are not provided to the majority of patients with psychiatric diseases who would benefit. Even if these therapies were prescribed, about 30% of depressed patients are treatment resistant. Patients may have undergone treatments destined to fail or they may have refused potential effective therapeutics. Nevertheless, the probability of disease remission increases with number of different treatments attempted. Given these uncertainties and that there are no valid indicators to predict the response to treatment, there is no reliable mechanism to define incurable disease and determine medical futility for psychiatric care. Considering euthanasia for psychiatric patients may reinforce poor expectations of the medical community for mental illness treatment and contribute to a relative lack of progress in developing more effective therapeutic strategies.

The article is here.

I feel therefore I am

How exactly did consciousness become a problem? And why, after years off the table, is it a hot research subject now?

Margaret Wertheim

Aeon

Originally published December 1, 2015

Here is an excerpt:

Here again we meet the subject of pain, both physical and emotional. Can misery be ‘explained’ by synaptic firing? Can happiness? Some years ago, I discussed this issue with Father George Coyne, a Jesuit priest and astronomer who was then Director of the Vatican Observatory. I asked him what he thought of the notion that when the 12th‑century Hildegard of Bingen was having her visions of God, perhaps she was having epileptic fits. He had no problem with the fits. Indeed, he thought that when something so powerful was going on in a mind, there would necessarily be neurological correlates. Hildegard might well have been an epileptic, Father Coyne opined; that didn’t mean God wasn’t also talking to her.

Pain is surely like this too: it must have neurological correlates otherwise we wouldn’t be able to react to withdraw a hand from a flame and save our bodies from damage. (People who lose the ability to feel pain quickly succumb to injuries.) At the same time, pain transcends its physical dimensions, as do the many species of misery catalogued in Dante’s Hell, and represented to us in daily news accounts of the effects of war on millions of people today.

The article is here.

Administration Paints Rosy Future For Obamacare Marketplaces

By Phil Galewitz
Kaiser Health News
Originally published August 11, 2016

Despite dire warnings from Republicans and some large insurers about the stability of the Affordable Care Act exchanges, an Obama administration report released Thursday indicated the individual health insurance market has steadily added healthier and lower-risk consumers.

Medical costs per enrollee in the exchanges in 2015 were unchanged compared with 2014, according to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. In contrast, per-member health costs rose between 3 percent and 6 percent in the broader U.S. insurance market, which includes 154 million people who get coverage through their employer and the 55 million people on Medicare, the report said.

Aviva Aron-Dine, senior counselor to U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Burwell, said the data was encouraging when many insurers have announced double-digit rate increases for 2017 and others have pulled back in some states to curtail financial losses.

The article is here.