By Carolyn Y. Johson
The Boston Globe
Originally published May 30, 2014
When former Harvard psychology professor Marc Hauser was found solely responsible in a series of six scientific misconduct cases in 2012, he distanced himself from the problems, portraying them as an unfortunate consequence of his heavy workload. He said he took responsibility, “whether or not I was directly involved.”
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The 85-page report details instances in which Hauser changed data so that it would show a desired effect. It shows that he more than once rebuffed or downplayed questions and concerns from people in his laboratory about how a result was obtained. The report also describes “a disturbing pattern of misrepresentation of results and shading of truth” and a “reckless disregard for basic scientific standards.”
The entire article is here.
Wednesday, June 25, 2014
Tuesday, June 24, 2014
Can Classic Moral Stories Promote Honesty in Children?
By Kang Lee, Victoria Talwar, Anjanie McCarthy, Ilana Ross, Angela Evans & Cindy Arruda
Published online before print June 13, 2014, doi: 10.1177/0956797614536401
Psychological Science June 13, 2014
Abstract
The classic moral stories have been used extensively to teach children about the consequences of lying and the virtue of honesty. Despite their widespread use, there is no evidence whether these stories actually promote honesty in children. This study compared the effectiveness of four classic moral stories in promoting honesty in 3- to 7-year-olds. Surprisingly, the stories of “Pinocchio” and “The Boy Who Cried Wolf” failed to reduce lying in children. In contrast, the apocryphal story of “George Washington and the Cherry Tree” significantly increased truth telling. Further results suggest that the reason for the difference in honesty-promoting effectiveness between the “George Washington” story and the other stories was that the former emphasizes the positive consequences of honesty, whereas the latter focus on the negative consequences of dishonesty. When the “George Washington” story was altered to focus on the negative consequences of dishonesty, it too failed to promote honesty in children.
The entire article is here.
Email the author for a copy here.
Published online before print June 13, 2014, doi: 10.1177/0956797614536401
Psychological Science June 13, 2014
Abstract
The classic moral stories have been used extensively to teach children about the consequences of lying and the virtue of honesty. Despite their widespread use, there is no evidence whether these stories actually promote honesty in children. This study compared the effectiveness of four classic moral stories in promoting honesty in 3- to 7-year-olds. Surprisingly, the stories of “Pinocchio” and “The Boy Who Cried Wolf” failed to reduce lying in children. In contrast, the apocryphal story of “George Washington and the Cherry Tree” significantly increased truth telling. Further results suggest that the reason for the difference in honesty-promoting effectiveness between the “George Washington” story and the other stories was that the former emphasizes the positive consequences of honesty, whereas the latter focus on the negative consequences of dishonesty. When the “George Washington” story was altered to focus on the negative consequences of dishonesty, it too failed to promote honesty in children.
The entire article is here.
Email the author for a copy here.
Scale of medical decisions shifts to offer varied balances of power
By Karen Ravn
The Los Angeles Times
Originally published June 6, 2014
Patients never used to worry about making healthcare decisions. They didn't have to. Their doctors made just about all of their decisions for them. Everyone simply assumed that doctors knew what was best.
But that paternalistic view of doctors as know-it-alls has gone by the board, says Dr. Clarence Braddock, vice dean for education at the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA. "Now doctors are seen as the experts on medical information and choices," he explains, "but patients are seen as the experts on what those choices mean in their own lives."
The upshot? Doctors still make decisions sometimes, but sometimes patients make them, and sometimes doctors and patients make them together.
The entire article is here.
The Los Angeles Times
Originally published June 6, 2014
Patients never used to worry about making healthcare decisions. They didn't have to. Their doctors made just about all of their decisions for them. Everyone simply assumed that doctors knew what was best.
But that paternalistic view of doctors as know-it-alls has gone by the board, says Dr. Clarence Braddock, vice dean for education at the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA. "Now doctors are seen as the experts on medical information and choices," he explains, "but patients are seen as the experts on what those choices mean in their own lives."
The upshot? Doctors still make decisions sometimes, but sometimes patients make them, and sometimes doctors and patients make them together.
The entire article is here.
Monday, June 23, 2014
Updated Definition of Paternalism
By Gerald Dworkin
Stanford Encyclopedia
Updated June 4, 2014
Here are two excerpts:
Paternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm. The issue of paternalism arises with respect to restrictions by the law such as anti-drug legislation, the compulsory wearing of seatbelts, and in medical contexts by the withholding of relevant information concerning a patient's condition by physicians. At the theoretical level it raises questions of how persons should be treated when they are less than fully rational.
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Weak vs. strong paternalism
A weak paternalist believes that it is legitimate to interfere with the means that agents choose to achieve their ends, if those means are likely to defeat those ends. So if a person really prefers safety to convenience then it is legitimate to force them to wear seatbelts. A strong paternalist believes that people may have mistaken, confused or irrational ends and it is legitimate to interfere to prevent them from achieving those ends. If a person really prefers the wind rustling through their hair to increased safety it is legitimate to make them wear helmets while motorcycling because their ends are irrational or mistaken. Another way of putting this: we may interfere with mistakes about the facts but not mistakes about values. So if a person tries to jump out of a window believing he will float gently to the ground we may restrain him. If he jumps because he believes that it is important to be spontaneous we may not.
The entire definition is here.
Editor's note: Psychologists need to contemplate paternalism in many facets of care. Not just with the example of suicide, there are host of other ways psychologist's may act paternalistically. Think informed consent, goals in treatment, intrusive advocacy, respect for patient autonomy, and the collaborative nature of the therapeutic relationship, to name a few.
Stanford Encyclopedia
Updated June 4, 2014
Here are two excerpts:
Paternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm. The issue of paternalism arises with respect to restrictions by the law such as anti-drug legislation, the compulsory wearing of seatbelts, and in medical contexts by the withholding of relevant information concerning a patient's condition by physicians. At the theoretical level it raises questions of how persons should be treated when they are less than fully rational.
(cut)
Weak vs. strong paternalism
A weak paternalist believes that it is legitimate to interfere with the means that agents choose to achieve their ends, if those means are likely to defeat those ends. So if a person really prefers safety to convenience then it is legitimate to force them to wear seatbelts. A strong paternalist believes that people may have mistaken, confused or irrational ends and it is legitimate to interfere to prevent them from achieving those ends. If a person really prefers the wind rustling through their hair to increased safety it is legitimate to make them wear helmets while motorcycling because their ends are irrational or mistaken. Another way of putting this: we may interfere with mistakes about the facts but not mistakes about values. So if a person tries to jump out of a window believing he will float gently to the ground we may restrain him. If he jumps because he believes that it is important to be spontaneous we may not.
The entire definition is here.
Editor's note: Psychologists need to contemplate paternalism in many facets of care. Not just with the example of suicide, there are host of other ways psychologist's may act paternalistically. Think informed consent, goals in treatment, intrusive advocacy, respect for patient autonomy, and the collaborative nature of the therapeutic relationship, to name a few.
Quebec passes landmark end-of-life-care bill
Act respecting end-of-life care, Bill 52, allows terminally ill patients to choose death
By CBC News
Originally posted June 5, 2014
Terminally ill patients in Quebec now have the right to choose to die.
The non-partisan Bill 52, also known as an act respecting end-of-life care, passed Thursday afternoon in a free vote at the National Assembly in Quebec City.
The entire story is here.
Bill 52 is here.
By CBC News
Originally posted June 5, 2014
Terminally ill patients in Quebec now have the right to choose to die.
The non-partisan Bill 52, also known as an act respecting end-of-life care, passed Thursday afternoon in a free vote at the National Assembly in Quebec City.
The entire story is here.
Bill 52 is here.
Sunday, June 22, 2014
Mental Suffering and the DSM-5
By Stijn Vanheule
DxSummit.org
Originally published June 3, 2014
In his writings on the topic of diagnosis, the French philosopher and physician Georges Canguilhem makes a crucial distinction between pathology and abnormality, thus paving the way for the studies of his student Michel Foucault on the topics of psychiatric power and biopolitics. In Canguilhem’s view, decision making about normality and abnormality is generally based on two factors. One starts from the observation that there is variability in the ways human beings function: individuals present with a variety of behaviours just as their mental life is characterized by a variety of beliefs and experiences, of which some are more prevalent than others. Then, a judgment is made about (ab-)normality; this tends to be based on a norm or standard against which all behaviours are evaluated and considered as deviant or not.
At this level, two possibilities open: a judgement is made based on either psychosocial criteria or statistical norms.
The entire article is here.
DxSummit.org
Originally published June 3, 2014
In his writings on the topic of diagnosis, the French philosopher and physician Georges Canguilhem makes a crucial distinction between pathology and abnormality, thus paving the way for the studies of his student Michel Foucault on the topics of psychiatric power and biopolitics. In Canguilhem’s view, decision making about normality and abnormality is generally based on two factors. One starts from the observation that there is variability in the ways human beings function: individuals present with a variety of behaviours just as their mental life is characterized by a variety of beliefs and experiences, of which some are more prevalent than others. Then, a judgment is made about (ab-)normality; this tends to be based on a norm or standard against which all behaviours are evaluated and considered as deviant or not.
At this level, two possibilities open: a judgement is made based on either psychosocial criteria or statistical norms.
The entire article is here.
Saturday, June 21, 2014
Morality pills: reality or science fiction?
The complexities of ethics and the brain make it difficult for scientists to develop a pill to enhance human morals
By Molly Crockett
The Guardian
Originally published June 3, 2014
Could we create a "morality pill"? Once the stuff of science fiction, recent studies in neuroscience have shown that brain chemicals can subtly influence some aspects of moral judgments and decisions. However, science is very far from creating pills that can turn sinners into saints, as I have argued many times before. So imagine my surprise when I came across the headline, “‘Morality Pills’ Close to Reality, Claims Scientist”– referring to a lecture I gave recently in London. (I asked the newspaper where the reporter got his misinformation, but received no response to my query.)
The entire story is here.
By Molly Crockett
The Guardian
Originally published June 3, 2014
Could we create a "morality pill"? Once the stuff of science fiction, recent studies in neuroscience have shown that brain chemicals can subtly influence some aspects of moral judgments and decisions. However, science is very far from creating pills that can turn sinners into saints, as I have argued many times before. So imagine my surprise when I came across the headline, “‘Morality Pills’ Close to Reality, Claims Scientist”– referring to a lecture I gave recently in London. (I asked the newspaper where the reporter got his misinformation, but received no response to my query.)
The entire story is here.
Friday, June 20, 2014
Want to Change Academic Publishing? Just Say No
By Hugh Gusterson
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Originally published September 23, 2012
Here is an excerpt:
When I look at the work I do as an academic social scientist and the remuneration I receive, I see a pattern that makes little sense. This is especially the case with regard to publishing. If I review a book for a newspaper or evaluate a book for a university press, I get paid, but if I referee an article for a journal, I do not. If I publish a book, I get royalties. If I publish an opinion piece in the newspaper, I get a couple of hundred dollars. Once a magazine paid me $5,000 for an article.
But I get paid nothing directly for the most difficult, time-consuming writing I do: peer-reviewed academic articles. In fact a journal that owned the copyright to one of my articles made me pay $400 for permission to reprint my own writing in a book of my essays.
The entire article is here.
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Originally published September 23, 2012
Here is an excerpt:
When I look at the work I do as an academic social scientist and the remuneration I receive, I see a pattern that makes little sense. This is especially the case with regard to publishing. If I review a book for a newspaper or evaluate a book for a university press, I get paid, but if I referee an article for a journal, I do not. If I publish a book, I get royalties. If I publish an opinion piece in the newspaper, I get a couple of hundred dollars. Once a magazine paid me $5,000 for an article.
But I get paid nothing directly for the most difficult, time-consuming writing I do: peer-reviewed academic articles. In fact a journal that owned the copyright to one of my articles made me pay $400 for permission to reprint my own writing in a book of my essays.
The entire article is here.
Senators Scold Mehmet Oz For Diet Scams
By Maggie Fox
NBC News
Originally posted June 18, 2014
Dr. Mehmet Oz, a celebrity doctor who frequently extols weight-loss products on his syndicated television show, got a harsh scolding from several senators on Tuesday at a hearing about bogus diet product ads.
Oz was held up as the power driving many of the fraudulent ads, even as he argued he was himself the victim of the scammers. The hearing is a follow-up to the Federal Trade Commission’s crackdown last January against fake diet products.
“I don’t get why you need to say this stuff because you know it’s not true,” Missouri Sen. Claire McCaskill, a Democrat who chairs a Senate subcommittee on consumer protection, said at the hearing. “So why, when you have this amazing megaphone…why would you cheapen your show by saying things like that?”
The entire article is here.
NBC News
Originally posted June 18, 2014
Dr. Mehmet Oz, a celebrity doctor who frequently extols weight-loss products on his syndicated television show, got a harsh scolding from several senators on Tuesday at a hearing about bogus diet product ads.
Oz was held up as the power driving many of the fraudulent ads, even as he argued he was himself the victim of the scammers. The hearing is a follow-up to the Federal Trade Commission’s crackdown last January against fake diet products.
“I don’t get why you need to say this stuff because you know it’s not true,” Missouri Sen. Claire McCaskill, a Democrat who chairs a Senate subcommittee on consumer protection, said at the hearing. “So why, when you have this amazing megaphone…why would you cheapen your show by saying things like that?”
The entire article is here.
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