Ethics in the world of automated algorithmic decision-making – A Posthumanist perspective

Cecez-Kecmanovic, D. (2025).

Information and Organization, 35(3), 100587.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2025.100587

Abstract

The grand humanist project of technological advancements has culminated in fascinating intelligent technologies and AI-based automated decision-making systems (ADMS) that replace human decision-makers in complex social processes. Widespread use of ADMS, underpinned by humanist values and ethics, it is claimed, not only contributes to more effective and efficient, but also to more objective, non-biased, fair, responsible, and ethical decision-making. Growing literature however shows paradoxical outcomes: ADMS use often discriminates against certain individuals and groups and produces detrimental and harmful social consequences. What is at stake is the reconstruction of reality in the image of ADMS, that threatens our existence and sociality. This presents a compelling motivation for this article which examines a) on what bases are ADMS claimed to be ethical, b) how do ADMS, designed and implemented with the explicit aim to act ethically, produce individually and socially harmful consequences, and c) can ADMS, or more broadly, automated algorithmic decision-making be ethical. This article contributes a critique of dominant humanist ethical theories underpinning the development and use of ADMS and demonstrates why such ethical theories are inadequate in understanding and responding to ADMS' harmful consequences and emerging ethical demands. To respond to such ethical demands, the article contributes a posthumanist relational ethics (that extends Barad's agential realist ethics with Zigon's relational ethics) that enables novel understanding of how ADMS performs harmful effects and why ethical demands of subjects of decision-making cannot be met. The article also explains why ADMS are not and cannot be ethical and why the very concept of automated decision-making in complex social processes is flowed and dangerous, threatening our sociality and humanity.

Here are some thoughts:

This article offers a critical posthumanist analysis of automated algorithmic decision-making systems (ADMS) and their ethical implications, with direct relevance for psychologists concerned with fairness, human dignity, and social justice. The author argues that despite claims of objectivity, neutrality, and ethical superiority, ADMS frequently reproduce and amplify societal biases—leading to discriminatory, harmful outcomes in domains like hiring, healthcare, criminal justice, and welfare. These harms stem not merely from flawed data or design, but from the foundational humanist assumptions underpinning both ADMS and conventional ethical frameworks (e.g., deontological and consequentialist ethics), which treat decision-making as a detached, rational process divorced from embodied, relational human experience. Drawing on Barad’s agential realism and Zigon’s relational ethics, the article proposes a posthumanist relational ethics that centers on responsiveness, empathic attunement, and accountability within entangled human–nonhuman assemblages. From this perspective, ADMS are inherently incapable of ethical decision-making because they exclude the very relational, affective, and contextual dimensions—such as compassion, dialogue, and care—that constitute ethical responsiveness in complex social situations. The article concludes that automating high-stakes human decisions is not only ethically untenable but also threatens sociality and humanity itself.

Artificial intelligence and consent: a feminist anti-colonial critique

Varon, J., & Peña, P. (2021). 

Internet Policy Review, 10(4).

https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.4.1602

Abstract

Feminist theories have extensively debated consent in sexual and political contexts. But what does it mean to consent when we are talking about our data bodies feeding artificial intelligence (AI) systems? This article builds a feminist and anti-colonial critique about how an individualistic notion of consent is being used to legitimate practices of the so-called emerging Digital Welfare States, focused on digitalisation of anti-poverty programmes. The goal is to expose how the functional role of digital consent has been enabling data extractivist practices for control and exclusion, another manifestation of colonialism embedded in cutting-edge digital technology.

Here is an excerpt:

Another important criticism of this traditional idea of consent in sexual relationships is the forced binarism of yes/no. According to Gira Grant (2016), consent is not only given but also is built from multiple factors such as the location, the moment, the emotional state, trust, and desire. In fact, for this author, the example of sex workers could demonstrate how desire and consent are different, although sometimes confused as the same. For her there are many things that sex workers do without necessarily wanting to. However, they give consent for legitimate reasons.

It is also important how we express consent. For feminists such as Fraisse (2012), there is no consent without the body. In other words, consent has a relational and communication-based (verbal and nonverbal) dimension where power relationships matter (Tinat, 2012; Fraisse, 2012). This is very relevant when we discuss “tacit consent” in sexual relationships. In another dimension of how we express consent, Fraisse (2012) distinguishes between choice (the consent that is accepted and adhered to) and coercion (the "consent" that is allowed and endured).

According to Fraisse (2012), the critical view of consent that is currently claimed by feminist theories is not consent as a symptom of contemporary individualism; it has a collective approach through the idea of “the ethics of consent”, which provides attention to the "conditions" of the practice; the practice adapted to a contextual situation, therefore rejecting universal norms that ignore the diversified conditions of domination (Fraisse, 2012).

In the same sense, Lucia Melgar (2012) asserts that, in the case of sexual consent, it is not just an individual right, but a collective right of women to say "my body is mine" and from there it claims freedom to all bodies. As Sarah Ahmed (2017, n.p.) states “for feminism: no is a political labor”. In other words, “if your position is precarious you might not be able to afford no. [...] This is why the less precarious might have a political obligation to say no on behalf of or alongside those who are more precarious”. Referring to Éric Fassin, Fraisse (2012) understands that in this feminist view, consent will not be “liberal” anymore (as a refrain of the free individual), but “radical”, because, as Fassin would call, seeing in a collective act, it could function as some sort of consensual exchange of power.

The info is here.

Relational Ethics in Therapeutic Practice

Kenneth J. Gergen

Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy 2015, 36, 409–418

Abstract

A therapist’s ethical values will not always match those of his/her clients; nor may the values they share be congenial with those central to their acquaintances outside. To whose values should a therapist then be responsible?  Here it is useful to think in terms of first and second order ethics. First order ethics are those common to everyday life; they are under continuous production, and may or may not be fully articulated. They are also in frequent conflict, inciting animosity and hatred. A second order ethic, however, is one that places the supreme value on the relational process from which all ethics spring. It is thus an ethic that prizes those actions that can bring multiple and conflicting voices into productive communication. Illustrative therapeutic practices are provided.

Here is part of the conclusion:

As I am proposing, the ethical posture of the therapist extends far beyond the therapeutic relationship. The therapeutic life-world ripples across an extended sea of relationships. It is in this respect that the relational ethic explored here is also one that incorporates – without condoning – all traditions of moral value. It seeks to move beyond the local worlds in which we dwell and to build bridges among them. This does not mean sacrificing one’s values as a therapist, nor sympathising with all those
proclivities from which clients draw satisfaction. But it does mean resisting the temptation to be right; to know the good. It means enabling the process by which multiple worlds become mutually infused.

A pdf can be downloaded here.