Born this way? How high-tech conversion therapy could undermine gay rights

By Andrew Vierra and Brian Earp
The Conversation
Originally published on April 21, 2015

Here is an excerpt:

We fully agree with the President and believe that this is a step in the right direction. Of course, in addition to being unsafe as well as ethically unsound, current conversion therapy approaches aren’t actually effective at doing what they claim to do – changing sexual orientation.

But we also worry that this may be a short-term legislative solution to what is really a conceptual problem.

The question we ought to be asking is “what will happen if and when scientists do end up developing safe and effective technologies that can alter sexual orientation?”

Based on current scientific research, it is not unlikely that medical researchers – in the not-too-distant future – will know enough about the genetic, epigenetic, neurochemical and other brain-level factors that are involved in shaping sexual orientation that these variables could in fact be successfully modified.

The entire article is here.

Nana Cams: Personal Surveillance Video and Privacy in the Age of Self Embellishment

by Craig Klugman, Ph.D.
Bioethics.net
Originally posted September 10, 2014

In David Eggers’ novel, The Circle, a fictional internet company creates and encourages users to video stream their lives. Wearing a small camera, people can share every experience of every day with whomever wants to follow them…except to the bathroom. The first streamers become instant celebrities and instant villains. The result is the end of privacy as anyone has known it. The upshot, according to the fictional company, is that if people know they are being watched (or might be being watched), people will behave more civilly. The echoes of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon notwithstanding, at the end of the book the protagonist suddenly wonders if the recording of all lives comes at too high a cost.

The entire blog post is here.

Moral enhancement, freedom, and what we (should) value in moral behaviour

By David DeGrazia
J Med Ethics 2014;40:361-368 doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-101157

Abstract

The enhancement of human traits has received academic attention for decades, but only recently has moral enhancement using biomedical means – moral bioenhancement (MB) – entered the discussion. After explaining why we ought to take the possibility of MB seriously, the paper considers the shape and content of moral improvement, addressing at some length a challenge presented by reasonable moral pluralism. The discussion then proceeds to this question: Assuming MB were safe, effective, and universally available, would it be morally desirable? In particular, would it pose an unacceptable threat to human freedom? After defending a negative answer to the latter question – which requires an investigation into the nature and value of human freedom – and arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with MB, the paper closes with reflections on what we should value in moral behaviour.

The entire article is here.

Why Can’t We Talk About Race?

By Noliwe Rooks
Chronicle Vita
Originally posted March 4, 2014

Last November Shannon Gibney, a professor of English and African-diaspora studies at Minneapolis Community and Technical College, was formally reprimanded for making three white male students in her class uncomfortable during a conversation about contemporary instances of structural racism.

Reportedly, one of those students broke into Gibney’s lecture to ask why white men were always portrayed as “the bad guys.” Gibney says she asked them not to interrupt her lecture and pointed out that she never said white men were at fault. But the exchanges continued, and she eventually told the three students that they were free to leave the class and file a complaint if they were uncomfortable. They did, and the reprimand was the result.

The entire story is here.

Paul Russell on Free Will and Responsibility

Many philosophical theories try to evade the uncomfortable truth that luck and fate play a role in the conduct of our moral lives, argues philosopher Paul Russell. He chooses the best books on free will and responsibility.

Fivebooks.com
Interview by Nigel Warburton
Originally published December 3, 2013

Here is an excerpt:

Q: Most people feel, to some degree, in control of how they behave. There may be moments when they become irrational and other forces take over,  or where outside people force them to do things, but if I want to raise my hand or say “Stop!” those things seem to be easily within my conscious control. We also feel very strongly that people, including ourselves, merit praise and blame for the actions they perform because it’s us that’s performing them. It’s not someone else doing those things. And if we do something wrong, knowingly, it’s right to blame us for that.

A: That’s right. The common sense view — although we may articulate it in different ways in different cultures — is that there is some relevant sense in which we are in control and we are morally accountable. What makes philosophy interesting is that sceptical arguments can be put forward that appear to undermine or discredit our confidence in this common sense position. One famous version of this difficulty has theological roots. If, as everyone once assumed, there is a God, who creates the world and has the power to decide all that happens in it, then our common sense view of ourselves as free agents seems to be threatened, since God controls and guides everything that happens – including all our actions. Similar or related problems seem to arise with modern science.

The entire interview is here.

Authors call for 'digital bill of rights'

BBC News
Originally published December 10, 2013

Hundreds of authors from around the world have written to the United Nations urging it to create an international bill of digital rights.

More than 500 writers signed the open letter condemning the scale of state surveillance following recent leaks about UK and US Government activities.

Ian McEwan, Tom Stoppard and Will Self are among the British signatories.

"To maintain any validity, our democratic rights must apply in virtual as in real space," the letter says.

The entire story is here.

Moral responsibility for (un)healthy behaviour

Rebecca C H Brown
Journal of Medical Ethics
J Med Ethics 2013;39:695-698 doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100774

Abstract

Combating chronic, lifestyle-related disease has become a healthcare priority in the developed world. The role personal responsibility should play in healthcare provision has growing pertinence given the growing significance of individual lifestyle choices for health. Media reporting focussing on the ‘bad behaviour’ of individuals suffering lifestyle-related disease, and policies aimed at encouraging ‘responsibilisation’ in healthcare highlight the importance of understanding the scope of responsibility ascriptions in this context. Research into the social determinants of health and psychological mechanisms of health behaviour could undermine some commonly held and tacit assumptions about the moral responsibility of agents for the sorts of lifestyles they adopt. I use Philip Petit's conception of freedom as ‘fitness to be held responsible’ to consider the significance of some of this evidence for assessing the moral responsibility of agents. I propose that, in some cases, factors outside the agent's control may influence behaviour in such a way as to undermine her freedom along the three dimensions described by Pettit: freedom of action; a sense of identification with one's actions; and whether one's social position renders one vulnerable to pressure from more powerful others.

The entire article is here.

Does non-belief in free will make us better or worse?

Studies have shown that people who believe things happen randomly and not through our own choice often behave much worse than those who believe the opposite.

By Tom Stafford
BBC - Future
Originally published September 25, 2013

Are you reading this because you chose to? Or are you doing so as a result of forces beyond your control?

After thousands of years of philosophy, theology, argument and meditation on the riddle of free will, I’m not about to solve it for you in this column (sorry). But what I can do is tell you about some thought-provoking experiments by psychologists, which suggest that, regardless of whether we have free will or not, whether we believe we do can have a profound impact on how we behave.

The issue is simple: we all make choices, but could those choices be made otherwise? From a religious perspective it might seem as if a divine being knows all, including knowing in advance what you will choose (so your choices could not be otherwise). Or we can take a physics-based perspective?

The entire story is here.

Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning and Julian Assange: our new heroes

As the NSA revelations have shown, whistleblowing is now an essential art. It is our means of keeping 'public reason' alive

By Slavoj Žižek
The Guardian
Originally published September 3, 2013

Here is an excerpt:

Back in 1843, the young Karl Marx claimed that the German ancien regime "only imagines that it believes in itself and demands that the world should imagine the same thing". In such a situation, to put shame on those in power becomes a weapon. Or, as Marx goes on: "The actual pressure must be made more pressing by adding to it consciousness of pressure, the shame must be made more shameful by publicising it."

This, exactly, is our situation today: we are facing the shameless cynicism of the representatives of the existing global order, who only imagine that they believe in their ideas of democracy, human rights etc. What happens in WikiLeaks disclosures is that the shame – theirs, and ours for tolerating such power over us – is made more shameful by publicising it. What we should be ashamed of is the worldwide process of the gradual narrowing of the space for what Kant called the Immanuel "public use of reason".

In his classic text, What Is Enlightenment?, Kant contrasts "public" and "private" use of reason – "private" is for Kant the communal-institutional order in which we dwell (our state, our nation …), while "public" is the transnational universality of the exercise of one's reason: "The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The private use of one's reason, on the other hand, may often be very narrowly restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. By public use of one's reason I understand the use that a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him."

The entire article is here.

Internet Access Is Not a Human Right

By VINTON G. CERF
The New York Times
Published: January 4, 2012 (and still relevant today)

Here is an excerpt:

Over the past few years, courts and parliaments in countries like France and Estonia have pronounced Internet access a human right.

But that argument, however well meaning, misses a larger point: technology is an enabler of rights, not a right itself. There is a high bar for something to be considered a human right. Loosely put, it must be among the things we as humans need in order to lead healthy, meaningful lives, like freedom from torture or freedom of conscience. It is a mistake to place any particular technology in this exalted category, since over time we will end up valuing the wrong things. For example, at one time if you didn’t have a horse it was hard to make a living. But the important right in that case was the right to make a living, not the right to a horse. Today, if I were granted a right to have a horse, I’m not sure where I would put it.

The entire piece is here.

Privacy and the Threat to the Self

By MICHAEL P. LYNCH
The New York Times - Opinionator
Originally published June 22, 2013

In the wake of continuing revelations of government spying programs and the recent Supreme Court ruling on DNA collection – both of which push the generally accepted boundaries against state intrusion on the person — the issue of privacy is foremost on the public mind. The frequent mantra, heard from both media commentators and government officials, is that we face a “trade-off” between safety and convenience on one hand and privacy on the other. We just need, we are told, to find the right balance.

This way of framing the issue makes sense if you understand privacy solely as a political or legal concept. And its political importance is certainly part of what makes privacy so important: what is private is what is yours alone to control, without interference from others or the state. But the concept of privacy also matters for another, deeper reason. It is intimately connected to what it is to be an autonomous person.

What makes your thoughts your thoughts? One answer is that you have what philosophers sometimes call “privileged access” to them. This means at least two things. First, you access them in a way I can’t. Even if I could walk a mile in your shoes, I can’t know what you feel in the same way you can: you see it from the inside so to speak. Second, you can, at least sometimes, control what I know about your thoughts. You can hide your true feelings from me, or let me have the key to your heart.

The entire story is here.

Reviewing Autonomy

Implications of the Neurosciences and the Free Will Debate for the Principle of Respect for the Patient's Autonomy

Sabine Muller & Henrik Walter. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. New York: Apr 2010. Vol. 19, Iss. 2; pg. 205, 13 pgs

Introduction

Beauchamp and Childress have performed a great service by strengthening the principle of respect for the patient's autonomy against the paternalism that dominated medicine until at least the 1970s. Nevertheless, we think that the concept of autonomy should be elaborated further. We suggest such an elaboration built on recent developments within the neurosciences and the free will debate. The reason for this suggestion is at least twofold: First, Beauchamp and Childress neglect some important elements of autonomy. Second, neuroscience itself needs a conceptual apparatus to deal with the neural basis of autonomy for diagnostic purposes. This desideratum is actually increasing because modern therapy options can considerably influence the neural basis of autonomy itself.

Beauchamp and Childress analyze autonomous actions in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences (coercion, persuasion, and manipulation) that determine their actions. ¹ In terms of the free will debate, the absence of external controlling influences, their third criterion, corresponds to the freedom of action: to do what one wants to do without being hindered to do so. Criteria one and two are related to volition: that a choice is intentional, that is, that it has a certain goal that is properly understood by the person choosing.

According to Beauchamp and Childress, the principle of autonomy implies that patients have the right to choose between different medical therapy options taking into account risks and benefits as well as their personal situation and individual values. To enable an autonomous decision the procedure of informed consent ² has been developed. This procedure has become the gold standard in almost every part of medicine. Importantly, Beauchamp and Childress demand respect for a patient's autonomy under the premise that the patient is able to act in a sufficiently autonomous manner. ³ The crucial question in a special situation is whether this is the case.

Let us consider the example of the recent controversial discussion of Body Integrity Identity disorder: ⁴ If a patient asks a physician to amputate one of his legs although it neither hurts nor is deformed, paralyzed, or ugly (in the patient's view), and if the patient understands the consequences of the amputation and is not controlled by external influences, then one could deduce from the principle of respect for the patient's autonomy that the physician should amputate the leg. Although some commentators regard this as self-evident, we think that the case is not yet made, as it is important which internal processes have led to the wish of the patient.

We propose to add a fourth criterion for autonomous actions, namely, freedom of internal coercive influences. In the case of the patient who desires an amputation, it would have to be investigated whether his decision is based on internal coercion. Clear examples for that would be an acute episode of schizophrenia or a brain tumor. More controversial are neurotic beliefs, obsession and compulsion, severe personality disorders, or neurological dysfunctions not accessible with conventional diagnostic tools.

Although Beauchamp and Childress have not elaborated the principle of autonomy with regard to internal coercions, they clearly argue that the obligations to respect autonomy do not apply to persons who show a substantial lack of autonomy because they are immature, incapacitated, ignorant, coerced, or exploited, for example, infants, irrationally suicidal individuals, severely demented subjects, or drug-dependent patients. ⁵ But these kinds of patients are treated in medical ethics as exceptions and therefore as marginal cases. They are not considered to be important for the formulation of the principles.

The rest of the article can be found here.  Without access to PubMed.gov, it is not available for free.  A university library may also be helpful in reading the entire article.