The new self-care: It’s not all about you.

Barnett, J. E., & Homany, G. (2022).

Practice Innovations, 7(4), 313–326.

https://doi.org/10.1037/pri0000190

Abstract

Clinical work as a mental health practitioner can be very rewarding and gratifying. It also may be stressful, difficult, and emotionally demanding for the clinician. Failure to sufficiently attend to one’s own functioning through appropriate ongoing self-care activities can have significant consequences for the practitioner’s personal and professional functioning to include experiencing symptoms of burnout and compassion fatigue that may result in problems with professional competence. The American Psychological Association (2017) ethics code mandates ongoing self-monitoring and self-assessment to determine when one’s competence is at risk or already degraded and the need to then take needed corrective actions. Yet research findings demonstrate how flawed self-assessment is and that many clinicians will not know when assistance is needed or what support or interventions are needed. Instead, a communitarian approach to self-care is recommended. This involves creating and actively utilizing a competence constellation of engaged colleagues who assess and support each other on an ongoing basis. Recommendations are made for creating a self-care plan that integrates both one’s independent self-care activities and a communitarian approach. The role of this approach for promoting ongoing wellness and maintaining one’s clinical competence while preventing burnout and problems with professional competence is accentuated. The use of this approach as a preventive activity as well as one for overcoming clinician biases and self-assessment flaws is explained with recommendations provided for practical steps each mental health practitioner can take now and moving forward.

Impact Statement

This article addresses the important connections between clinical competence, threats to it, and the role of self-care for promoting ongoing clinical competence. The fallacy of accurate self-assessment of one’s competence and self-care needs is addressed, and support is provided for a communitarian approach to self-care and the maintenance of competence.

A pdf is here.

Communitarianism revisited

Etzioni, A. (2014).

Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(3), 241–260.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2014.951142

Abstract

This article provides a retrospective account and analysis of communitarianism. Drawing upon the author's involvement with the political branch of communitarianism, it attempts to summarize both the history of the school of thought as well as its most prominent ideas. These include the communitarian emphasis on the common good; the effort to find an acceptable balance between individual rights and social responsibilities; the basis of social order; and the need to engage in substantive moral dialogues. The article closes with a discussion of cultural relativism according to which communities ought to be the ultimate arbitrators of the good and a universalistic position.

A pdf of this article is here.

Here are some thoughts:

This article offers a comprehensive overview and critical reflection on the evolution of communitarian thought, particularly as it relates to political philosophy and public life. Etzioni traces the historical roots of communitarianism, highlighting its emphasis on the common good, the balance between individual rights and social responsibilities, and the necessity of substantive moral dialogue within communities. He notes that while communitarianism is a relatively small school in academic philosophy, its core ideas-such as prioritizing the welfare of the community alongside individual freedoms-are deeply embedded in various religious, political, and cultural traditions across the world.

The article explores the resurgence of communitarian ideas in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to the perceived excesses of individualism promoted by liberalism and laissez-faire conservatism. Etzioni discusses the tension between individual autonomy and communal obligations, arguing for a nuanced approach that seeks equilibrium between these often competing values, adapting as societal conditions change. He also addresses critiques of communitarianism, including concerns about its potential association with authoritarianism and the vagueness of the concept of "community."

For practicing psychologists, this article is significant because it underscores the importance of considering both individual and collective dimensions in understanding human behavior, ethical decision-making, and therapeutic practice. Recognizing the interplay between personal autonomy and social context can enhance psychologists’ ability to support clients in navigating moral dilemmas, fostering social connectedness, and promoting well-being within diverse communities.

Communitarianism, Properly Understood

Chang, Y. L. (2022).

Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 35(1), 117–139.

doi:10.1017/cjlj.2021.21

Abstract

Communitarianism has been misunderstood. According to some of its proponents, it supports the ‘Asian values’ argument that rights are incompatible with communitarian Asia because it prioritises the collective interest over individual rights and interests. Similarly, its critics are sceptical of its normative appeal because they believe that communitarianism upholds the community’s wants and values at all costs. I dispel this misconception by providing an account of communitarianism, properly understood. It is premised on the idea that we are partially constituted by our communal attachments, or constitutive communities, which are a source of value to our lives. Given the partially constituted self, communitarianism advances the thin common good of inclusion. In this light, communitarianism, properly understood, is wholly compatible with rights, and is a potent source of solutions to controversial issues that plague liberal societies, such as the right of a religious minority to wear its religious garment in public.

Here are some thoughts:

The article addresses the misunderstanding of communitarianism, particularly the notion that it clashes with individual rights. It argues that communitarianism, when correctly interpreted, values both the individual and the community. The author suggests that individuals are partly formed by their community ties, which are a source of value. Therefore, communitarianism encourages the inclusion of individuals within their communities. The article concludes by illustrating how this understanding of communitarianism can safeguard individual rights, using the European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) decision on the French burqa ban as an example.

An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism.

Metz, T. (2012).

Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 387–402. 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9302-y

Abstract

The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no moral status to any of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way.

From the end of the article:

Those deeply committed to holism and individualism, or even a combination of them, may well not be convinced by this discussion. Diehard holists will reject the idea that anything other than a group can ground moral status, while pure individualists will reject the recurrent suggestion that two beings that are internally identical (foetus v neonate, severely mentally incapacitated human v animal) could differ in their moral status. However, my aim has not been to convince anyone to change her mind, or even to provide a complete justification for doing so. My goals have instead been the more limited ones of articulating a new, modal-relational account of moral status grounded in sub-Saharan moral philosophy, demonstrating that it avoids the severe parochialism facing existing relational accounts, and showing that it accounts better than standard Western theories for a variety of widely shared intuitions about what has moral status and to what degree. Many of these intuitions are captured by neither holism nor individualism and have lacked a firm philosophical foundation up to now. Of importance here is the African theory’s promise to underwrite the ideas that humans and animals have a moral status grounded in the same property that differs in degree, that severely mentally incapacitated humans have a greater moral status than animals with the same internal properties, and that a human’s moral status increases as it develops from the embryonic to foetal to neo-natal stages.

The article is here.