Gray, K., Schein, C., & Ward, A. F. (2014).
Journal of experimental psychology.
General, 143(4), 1600–1615.
Abstract
When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition.
Here are some thoughts:
This research paper explores the psychological theory of dyadic morality, which posits that our moral cognition is structured around a template of a wrongdoing agent and a suffering patient (victim). The authors argue that this dyadic template leads to an automatic and implicit process called "dyadic completion," where individuals perceive victims and harm even in situations considered objectively harmless wrongs. Across five studies, the researchers found that ostensibly harmless immoral acts are indeed perceived as having victims, activate concepts related to harm, and increase perceptions of suffering. This suggests that the perception of harm is fundamental to our intuitive understanding of immorality and challenges theories that assume the psychological reality of victimless wrongs, as well as standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding. The concept of dyadic completion also implies that moral dilemmas contrasting wrongness and harm might not reflect typical moral cognition.
