Sterri, A. B., & Earp, B. D. (in press).
In C. Véliz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Digital Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abstract
What, if anything, is wrong with having sex with a robot? For the sake of this chapter, the authors will assume that sexbots are ‘mere’ machines that are reliably identifiable as such, despite their human-like appearance and behaviour. Under these stipulations, sexbots themselves can no more be harmed, morally speaking, than your dishwasher. However, there may still be something wrong about the production, distribution, and use of such sexbots. In this chapter, the authors examine whether sex with robots is intrinsically or instrumentally wrong and critically assess different regulatory responses. They defend a harm reduction approach to sexbot regulation, analogous to the approach that has been considered in other areas, concerning, for example, drugs and sex work.
Conclusion
Even if sexbots never become sentient, we have good reasons to be concerned with their production, distribution, and use. Our seemingly private activities have social meanings that we do not necessarily intend, but which can be harmful to others. Sex can both be beautiful and valuable—and ugly or profoundly harmful. We therefore need strong ethical norms to guide human sexual behaviour, regardless of the existence of sexbots. Interaction with new technologies could plausibly improve our sexual relationships, or make things worse (see Nyholm et al. forthcoming, for a theoretical overview). In this chapter, we have explored some ways in which a harm reduction framework may have the potential to bring about the alleged benefits of sexbots with a minimum of associated harms. But whatever approach is taken, the goal should be to ensure that our relationships with robots conduce to, rather than detract from, the equitable flourishing of our fellow human beings.
