By Jesse
J.
Prinz
Forthcoming in P. Goldie and A. Coplan (Eds.). Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological
Perspectives. Oxford University Press.)
1.
Introduction
It
is
widely
believed
that
empathy
is
a
good
thing,
from
a
moral
point
of
view.
It
is
something
we
should
cultivate
because
it
makes
us
better
people.
Perhaps
that’s
true.
But
it is
also
sometimes
suggested
that
empathy
is
somehow
necessary for
morality.
That
is
the
hypothesis
I
want
to
interrogate
and
challenge.
Not
only
is
there
little
evidence
for
the
claim
that
empathy
is
necessary,
there
is
also
reason
to
think
empathy
can
interfere
with
the
ends
of
morality.
A
capacity
for
empathy
might
make
us
better
people,
but
placing
empathy
at
the
center
of
our
moral
lives
may
be
ill‐advised.
That
is
not
to
say
that
morality
shouldn’t
centrally
involve
emotions.
I
think
emotions
are
essential
for
moral
judgment
and
moral
motivation
(Prinz,
2007).
It’s
just
that
empathetic
emotions
are
not
ideally
suited
for
these
jobs.
Before
embarking
on
this
campaign
against
empathy,
I
want
to
say
a
little
more
about
the
target
of the
attack.
What
is
empathy?
And
what
would
it
mean
to say
empathy
is
necessary
for
morality?
With
respect
to
the
first
question,
much
has
been
written.
Theories
of
empathy
abound.
Batson
et
al.
(1995:
1042)
define
empathy
as,
“as
an other‐oriented
emotional
response
congruent
with
the
perceived
welfare
of
another
person.”
This is
not
the
definition
I
will
be
using.
Batson’s
construct
might
be
better
characterized
as
“concern,”
because
of
its
focus
on
another
person’s
welfare.
Indeed,
in
much
of
his
research
he
talks
about
“empathetic
concern.”
Notice
that
this
construct
seems
to
be
a
combination
of
two
separable
things.
Being
concerned
for
someone
is
worrying
about
their
welfare,
which
is
something
one
can
do
even
if
one
doesn’t feel
what
it
would
be
like
to
be
in
their
place.
One
can
have
concern
for
a
plant,
for
example,
and
an
insect,
or
even
an
artifact,
like
a
beautiful
building that
has
into
disrepair.
Empathy,
seems
to
connote
a
kind
of
feeling
that
has
to
be
at
last
possible
for the
object
of
empathy.
If
so,
“empathetic
concern”
combines
two
different
things—a
find
of
feeling‐for
an
object
and
a
feeling‐on‐behalf‐of
an
object.
Much
of
the
empirical
literature,
including
the
superb
research
that
Batson
has
done,
fails
to
isolate
these
components,
and,
as
a
result,
some
of
the
existing
studies
are
confounded.
They
purport
to
show
the
value
of
empathy,
but
may
really
show
the
value
of
concern.
My
focus
below
will
be
on
empathy,
and
I
leave
it
as
an
open
possibility
that
concern
is
highly
important,
if
not
necessary,
for
morality.
Indeed,
concern
often
seems
to
involve
an
element
kind
of
moral
anger,
which
I
will
argue
is
very
important
to
morality.
The entire article is here.
