How and why people want to be more moral

Sun, J., Wilt, J. A., Meindl, et al. (2023).

Journal of Personality.

https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12812

Abstract

Objective

What types of moral improvements do people wish to make? Do they hope to become more good, or less bad? Do they wish to be more caring? More honest? More loyal? And why exactly do they want to become more moral? Presumably, most people want to improve their morality because this would benefit others, but is this in fact their primary motivation? Here, we begin to investigate these questions.

Method

Across two large, preregistered studies (N = 1818), participants provided open-ended descriptions of one change they could make in order to become more moral; they then reported their beliefs about and motives for this change.

Results

In both studies, people most frequently expressed desires to improve their compassion and more often framed their moral improvement goals in terms of amplifying good behaviors than curbing bad ones. The strongest predictor of moral motivation was the extent to which people believed that making the change would have positive consequences for their own well-being.

Conclusions

Together, these studies provide rich descriptive insights into how ordinary people want to be more moral, and show that they are particularly motivated to do so for their own sake.

The research is paywalled here.

My summary:

• People most frequently expressed desires to improve their compassion. This suggests that people are motivated to become more moral in order to be more caring and helpful to others.

• People more often framed their moral improvement goals in terms of amplifying good behaviors than curbing bad ones. This suggests that people are motivated to become more moral by doing more good things, rather than by simply avoiding doing bad things.

• The strongest predictor of moral motivation was the extent to which people believed that making the change would have positive consequences for their own well-being. This suggests that people are motivated to become more moral for their own sake, as well as for the sake of others.

Burnout Is About Your Workplace, Not Your People

Jennifer Moss

Harvard Business Review

Originally posted 11 December 2019

We tend to think of burnout as an individual problem, solvable by “learning to say no,” more yoga, better breathing techniques, practicing resilience — the self-help list goes on. But evidence is mounting that applying personal, band-aid solutions to an epic and rapidly evolving workplace phenomenon may be harming, not helping, the battle. With “burnout” now officially recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO), the responsibility for managing it has shifted away from the individual and towards the organization. Leaders take note: It’s now on you to build a burnout strategy.

The Non-Classification Classification

The term “burnout” originated in the 1970s, and for the past 50 years, the medical community has argued about how to define it. As the debate grows increasingly contentious, the most recent WHO announcement may have caused more confusion than clarity. In May, the WHO included burnout in its International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) and immediately the public assumed that burnout would now be considered a medical condition. The WHO then put out an urgent clarification stating, “Burn-out is included in the 11th Revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) as an occupational phenomenon, not a medical condition… reasons for which people contact health services but that are not classed as illnesses or health conditions.”

Although the WHO is now working on guidelines to help organizations with prevention strategies, most still have no idea what to do about burnout. Since it was explicitly not classified as a medical condition, the case is less about liability for employers and more about the impact on employee well-being and the massive associated costs.

The Emotional and Financial Toll

When Stanford researchers looked into how workplace stress affects health costs and mortality in the United States (pdf), they found that it led to spending of nearly $190 billion — roughly 8% of national  healthcare outlays — and nearly 120,000 deaths each year. Worldwide, 615 million suffer from depression and anxiety and, according to a recent WHO study, which costs the global workforce an estimated $1 trillion in lost productivity each year. Passion-driven and caregiving roles such as doctors and nurses  are some of the most susceptible to burnout, and the consequences can mean life or death; suicide rates among caregivers are dramatically higher than that of the general public — 40% higher for men and 130% higher for women.

The info is here.

Summary: Burnout is a serious problem that can have a significant impact on individuals and organizations. It is important to understand that burnout is not just about the individual, but also about the workplace environment. There are a number of factors that can contribute to burnout, including unfair treatment, unmanageable workload, lack of role clarity, lack of communication and support from managers, and unreasonable time pressure.

The Moral Crisis of America’s Doctors

Wendy Dean & Elisabeth Rosenthal

The New York Times

Orignally posted 15 July 23

Here is an excerpt:

Some doctors acknowledged that the pressures of the system had occasionally led them to betray the oaths they took to their patients. Among the physicians I spoke to about this, a 45-year-old critical-care specialist named Keith Corl stood out. Raised in a working-class town in upstate New York, Corl was an idealist who quit a lucrative job in finance in his early 20s because he wanted to do something that would benefit people. During medical school, he felt inspired watching doctors in the E.R. and I.C.U. stretch themselves to the breaking point to treat whoever happened to pass through the doors on a given night. “I want to do that,” he decided instantly. And he did, spending nearly two decades working long shifts as an emergency physician in an array of hospitals, in cities from Providence to Las Vegas to Sacramento, where he now lives. Like many E.R. physicians, Corl viewed his job as a calling. But over time, his idealism gave way to disillusionment, as he struggled to provide patients with the type of care he’d been trained to deliver. “Every day, you deal with somebody who couldn’t get some test or some treatment they needed because they didn’t have insurance,” he said. “Every day, you’re reminded how savage the system is.”

Corl was particularly haunted by something that happened in his late 30s, when he was working in the emergency room of a hospital in Pawtucket, R.I. It was a frigid winter night, so cold you could see your breath. The hospital was busy. When Corl arrived for his shift, all of the facility’s E.R. beds were filled. Corl was especially concerned about an elderly woman with pneumonia who he feared might be slipping into sepsis, an extreme, potentially fatal immune response to infection. As Corl was monitoring her, a call came in from an ambulance, informing the E.R. staff that another patient would soon be arriving, a woman with severe mental health problems. The patient was familiar to Corl — she was a frequent presence in the emergency room. He knew that she had bipolar disorder. He also knew that she could be a handful. On a previous visit to the hospital, she detached the bed rails on her stretcher and fell to the floor, injuring a nurse.

In a hospital that was adequately staffed, managing such a situation while keeping tabs on all the other patients might not have been a problem. But Corl was the sole doctor in the emergency room that night; he understood this to be in part a result of cost-cutting measures (the hospital has since closed). After the ambulance arrived, he and a nurse began talking with the incoming patient to gauge whether she was suicidal. They determined she was not. But she was combative, arguing with the nurse in an increasingly aggressive tone. As the argument grew more heated, Corl began to fear that if he and the nurse focused too much of their attention on her, other patients would suffer needlessly and that the woman at risk of septic shock might die.

Corl decided he could not let that happen. Exchanging glances, he and the nurse unplugged the patient from the monitor, wheeled her stretcher down the hall, and pushed it out of the hospital. The blast of cold air when the door swung open caused Corl to shudder. A nurse called the police to come pick the patient up. (It turned out that she had an outstanding warrant and was arrested.) Later, after he returned to the E.R., Corl could not stop thinking about what he’d done, imagining how the medical-school version of himself would have judged his conduct. “He would have been horrified.”

The info is here, paywalled.

Summary: The article explores the moral distress that many doctors are experiencing in the United States healthcare system. Doctors are feeling increasingly pressured to make decisions based on financial considerations rather than what is best for their patients. This is leading to a number of problems, including:

• Decreased quality of care: Doctors are being forced to cut corners on care, which is leading to worse outcomes for patients.
• Increased burnout: Doctors are feeling increasingly stressed and burned out, which is making it difficult for them to provide quality care.
• Loss of moral compass: Doctors are feeling like they are losing their moral compass, as they are being forced to make decisions that they know are not in the best interests of their patients.

The article concludes by calling for a number of reforms to the healthcare system, including:

• Paying doctors based on quality of care, not volume of services: This would incentivize doctors to provide the best possible care, rather than just the most profitable care.
• Giving doctors more control over their practice:This would allow doctors to make decisions based on what is best for their patients, rather than what is best for their employers.
• Supporting doctors' mental health: Doctors need to be supported through the challenges of providing care in the current healthcare system.

Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility

Porter, T., Elnakouri, A., Meyers, E.A. et al. 

Nat Rev Psychol 1, 524–536 (2022).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-022-00081-9

Abstract

In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote — intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas, including researchers studying leadership and organizational behaviour, personality science, positive psychology, judgement and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to the study of intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring intellectual humility and identify the common element: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the limitations of one’s beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different measurement approaches, we highlight factors that influence intellectual humility, from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence concerning the benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making, interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional and cultural value.

Importance of intellectual humility

The willingness to recognize the limits of one’s knowledge and fallibility can confer societal and individual benefits, if expressed in the right moment and to the proper extent. This insight echoes the philosophical roots of intellectual humility as a virtue. State and trait intellectual humility have been associated with a range of cognitive, social and personality variables (Table 2). At the societal level, intellectual humility can promote societal cohesion by reducing group polarization and encouraging harmonious intergroup relationships. At the individual level, intellectual humility can have important consequences for wellbeing, decision-making and academic learning.

Notably, empirical research has provided little evidence regarding the generalizability of the benefits or drawbacks of intellectual humility beyond the unique contexts of WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic) societies. With this caveat, below is an initial set of findings concerning the implications of possessing high levels of intellectual humility. Unless otherwise specified, the evidence below concerns trait-level intellectual humility. After reviewing these benefits, we consider attempts to improve an individual’s intellectual humility and confer associated benefits.

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Individual benefits

Intellectual humility might also have direct consequences for individuals’ wellbeing. People who reason about social conflicts in an intellectually humbler manner and consider others’ perspectives (components of wise reasoning) are more likely to report higher levels of life satisfaction and less negative affect compared to people who do not. Leaders who are higher in intellectual humility are also higher in emotional intelligence and receive higher satisfaction ratings from their followers, which suggests that intellectual humility could benefit professional life. Nonetheless, intellectual humility is not associated with personal wellbeing in all contexts: religious leaders who see their religious beliefs as fallible have lower wellbeing relative to leaders who are less intellectually humble in their beliefs.

Intellectual humility might also help people to make well informed decisions. Intellectually humbler people are better able to differentiate between strong and weak arguments, even if those arguments go against their initial beliefs9. Intellectual humility might also protect against memory distortions. Intellectually humbler people are less likely to claim falsely that they have seen certain statements before116. Likewise, intellectually humbler people are more likely to scrutinize misinformation and are more likely to intend to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.

Lastly, intellectual humility is positively associated with knowledge acquisition, learning and educational achievement. Intellectually humbler people are more motivated to learn and more knowledgeable about general facts. Likewise, intellectually humbler high school and university students expend greater effort when learning difficult material, are more receptive to assignment feedback and earn higher grades.

Despite evidence of individual benefits associated with intellectual humility, much of this work is correlational. Thus, associations could be the product of confounding factors such as agreeableness, intelligence or general virtuousness. Longitudinal or experimental studies are needed to address the question of whether and under what circumstances intellectual humility promotes individual benefits. Notably, philosophical theorizing about the situation-specific virtuousness of the construct suggests that high levels of intellectual humility are unlikely to benefit all people in all situations.

The info is here.

What is intellectual humility? Intellectual humility is the ability to recognize the limits of one's knowledge and to be open to new information and perspectives.

Predictors of intellectual humility: There are a number of factors that can predict intellectual humility, including:

• Personality traits: People who are high in openness to experience and agreeableness are more likely to be intellectually humble.
• Cognitive abilities: People who are better at thinking critically and evaluating evidence are also more likely to be intellectually humble.
• Cultural factors: People who live in cultures that value open-mindedness and tolerance are more likely to be intellectually humble.

Consequences of intellectual humility: Intellectual humility has a number of positive consequences, including:

• Better decision-making: Intellectually humble people are more likely to make better decisions because they are more open to new information and perspectives.
• Enhanced learning: Intellectually humble people are more likely to learn from their mistakes and to grow as individuals.
• Stronger relationships: Intellectually humble people are more likely to have strong relationships because they are more willing to listen to others and to consider their perspectives.

Overall, intellectual humility is a valuable trait that can lead to a number of positive outcomes.

Shake-up at top psychiatric institute following suicide in clinical trial

Brendan Borrell

Spectrum News

Originally posted 31 July 23

Here are two excerpts:

The audit and turnover in leadership comes after the halting of a series of clinical trials conducted by Columbia psychiatrist Bret Rutherford, which tested whether the drug levodopa — typically used to treat Parkinson’s disease — could improve mood and mobility in adults with depression.

During a double-blind study that began in 2019, a participant in the placebo group died by suicide. That study was suspended prior to completion, according to an update posted on ClinicalTrials.gov in 2022.

Two published reports based on Rutherford’s pilot studies have since been retracted, as Spectrum has previously reported. The National Institute of Mental Health has terminated Rutherford’s trials and did not renew funding of his research grant or K24 Midcareer Award.

Former members of Rutherford’s laboratory describe it as a high-pressure environment that often put publications ahead of study participants. “Research is important, but not more so than the lives of those who participate in it,” says Kaleigh O’Boyle, who served as clinical research coordinator there from 2018 to 2020.

Although Rutherford’s faculty page is still active, he is no longer listed in the directory at Columbia University, where he was associate professor, and the voicemail at his former number says he is no longer checking it. He did not respond to voicemails and text messages sent to his personal phone or to emails sent to his Columbia email address, and Cantor would not comment on his employment status.

The circumstances around the suicide remain unclear, and the institute has previously declined to comment on Rutherford’s retractions. Veenstra-VanderWeele confirmed that he is the new director but did not respond to further questions about the situation.

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In January 2022, the study was temporarily suspended by the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health, following the suicide. It is unknown whether that participant had been taking any antidepressant medication prior to the study.

Four of Rutherford’s published studies were subsequently retracted or corrected for issues related to how participants taking antidepressants at enrollment were handled.

One retraction notice published in February indicates tapering could be challenging and that the researchers did not always stick to the protocol. One-third of the participants taking antidepressants were unable to successfully taper off of them.

The info is here.

Note: The article serves as a cautionary tale about the risks of clinical trials. While clinical trials can be a valuable way to test new drugs and treatments, they also carry risks. Participants in clinical trials may be exposed to experimental drugs that have not been fully tested, and they may experience side effects that are not well-understood.  Ethical researchers must follow guidelines and report accurate results.

Harvard professor accused of research fraud files defamation lawsuit against university, academics

Alex Koller

The Boston Globe

Originally posted 4 August 23

Here is an excerpt:

In the filing, Gino, a renowned behavioral scientist who studies the psychology of decisions, denied having ever falsified or fabricated data. She alleged that Harvard’s investigation into her work was unfair and biased.

The lawsuit alleges that the committee did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Gino “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” falsified or fabricated data, as Harvard policy required, and “ignored” exculpatory evidence. The suit also decries Data Colada’s posts as a “vicious, defamatory smear campaign.” The blog’s inquiries into Gino’s work initially sparked Harvard’s investigation.

In a statement posted to LinkedIn Wednesday, Gino refuted allegations against her and explained her decision to take legal action against Harvard and Data Colada.

“I want to be very clear: I have never, ever falsified data or engaged in research misconduct of any kind,” she wrote. “Today I had no choice but to file a lawsuit against Harvard University and members of the Data Colada group, who worked together to destroy my career and reputation despite admitting they have no evidence proving their allegations.”

She added that the university and authors “reached outrageous conclusions based entirely on inference, assumption, and implausible leaps of logic.”

The lawsuit accuses all of the defendants of defamation, and also accuses Harvard of gender discrimination, breach of contract, and bad faith and unfair dealing with Gino, who has been a tenured professor of business administration at Harvard since 2014.

Gino was first notified by Harvard of fraud allegations against her work in October 2021, according to the suit. She then learned that the university would conduct its own investigation in April 2022.

The filing alleges that Harvard’s investigation committee interviewed six of Gino’s collaborators and two research assistants, all of whom defended the integrity of Gino’s practices and said they had no evidence Gino had ever pressured anyone to produce a specific result.

The info is here.

Cheap promises: Evidence from loan repayment pledges in an online experiment

Bhanot, S. P. (2017).

Journal of Economic Behavior & 

Organization, 142, 250-261.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.003

Abstract

Across domains, people struggle to follow through on their commitments. This can happen for many reasons, including dishonesty, forgetfulness, or insufficient intrinsic motivation. Social scientists have explored the reasons for persistent failures to follow through, suggesting that eliciting explicit promises can be an effective way to motivate action. This paper presents a field experiment that tests the effect of explicit promises, in the form of “honor pledges,” on loan repayment rates. The experiment was conducted with LendUp, an online lender, and targeted 4,883 first-time borrowers with the firm. Individuals were randomized into four groups, with the following experimental treatments: (1) having no honor pledge to complete (control); (2) signing a given honor pledge; (3) re-typing the same honor pledge as in (2) before signing; and (4) coming up with a personal honor pledge to type and sign. I also randomized whether or not borrowers were reminded of the honor pledge they signed prior to the repayment deadline. The results suggest that the honor pledge treatments had minimal impacts on repayment, and that reminders of the pledges were similarly ineffective. This suggests that borrowers who fail to repay loans do so not because of dishonesty or behavioral biases, but because they suffer from true financial hardship and are simply unable to repay.

Discussion

Literature in experimental economics and psychology often finds impacts of promises and explicit honor pledges on behavior, and in particular on reducing dishonest behavior. However, the results of this field experiment suggest no meaningful effects from an explicit promise (and indeed, a salient promise) on loan repayment behavior in a real-world setting, with money at stake. Furthermore, a self-written honor pledge was no more efficacious than any other, and altering the salience of the honor pledge, both at loan initiation and in reminder emails, had negligible impacts on outcomes. In other words, I find no evidence for the hypotheses that salience, reminders, or personalization strengthen the impact of a promise on behavior.  Indeed, the results of the study suggest that online loan repayment is a domain where such behavioral tools do not have an impact on decisions. This is a significant result, because it provides insights into why borrowers might fail to repay loans; most notably, it suggests that the failure to repay short-term loans may not be a question of dishonest behavior or behavioral biases, but rather an indication of true financial hardship. Simply put, when repayment is not financially possible, framing, reminders, or other interventions utilizing behavioral science are of limited use.

A pdf of the research is here.

Social Media and Morality

Van Bavel, J. J., Robertson, C. et al. (2023, June 6).

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ywevq

Abstract

Nearly five billion people around the world now use social media, and this number continues to grow. One of the primary goals of social media platforms is to capture and monetize human attention. One means by which individuals and groups can capture attention and drive engagement on these platforms is by sharing morally and emotionally evocative content. We review a growing body of research on the interrelationship of social media and morality–as well the consequences for individuals and society. Moral content often goes “viral” on social media, and social media makes moral behavior (such as punishment) less costly. Thus, social media often acts as an accelerant for existing moral dynamics – amplifying outrage, status seeking, and intergroup conflict, while also potentially amplifying more constructive facets of morality, such as social support, pro-sociality, and collective action. We discuss trends, heated debates, and future directions in this emerging literature.

From Discussions and Future Directions

Addressing the interplay between social media and morality 

There is a growing recognition among scholars and the public that social media has deleterious consequences for society and there is a growing appetite for greater transparency and some form of regulation of social media platforms (Rathje et al., 2023). To address the adverse consequences of social media, solutions at the system level are necessary (e.g., Chater & Loewenstein, 2022), but individual- or group-level solutions may be useful for creating behavioral change before system-level change is in place and for increasing public support for system-level solutions (Koppel et. al., 2023). In the following section, we discuss a range of solutions that address the adverse consequences of the interplay between social media and morality.

Regulation is one of the most heavily debated ways of mitigating the adverse features of social media. Regulating social media can be done both on platforms as well at the national or cross-national level, but always involves discussions about who should decide what should be allowed on which platforms (Kaye, 2019). Currently, there is relatively little editorial oversight with the content even on mainstream platforms, yet the connotations with censorship makes regulation inherently controversial. For instance, Americans believe that social media companies censor political viewpoints (Vogels et al., 2020) and believe it is hard to regulate social media because people cannot agree upon what should and should not be removed (PewResearch Center, 2019). Moreover, authoritarian states can suppress dissent through the regulation of speech on social media.

In general, people on the political left are supportive of regulating social media platforms (Kozyreva, 2023; Rasmussen, 2022), reflecting liberals’ general tendency to more supportive, and conservatives' tendency to more opposing, of regulatory policies (e.g. Grossman, 2015). In the context of content on social media, one explanation is that left-leaning people infer more harm from aggressive behaviors. In other words, they may perceive immoral behaviors on social media as more harmful for the victim, which in turn justifies regulation (Graham 2009; Crawford 2017; Walter 2019; Boch 2020). There are conflicting results, however, on whether people oppose regulating hate speech (Bilewicz et. al. 2017; Rasmussen 2023a) because they use hate to derogate minority and oppressed groups (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Federico and Sidanius, 2002) or because of principled political preferences deriving from conservatism values (Grossman 2016; Grossman 2015; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991). While sensitivity to harm contributes to making people on the political left more supportive of regulating social media, it is contested whether opposition from the political right derives from group-based dominance or principled opposition.

Click the link above to get to the research.

Here is a summary from me:

• Social media can influence our moral judgments. Studies have shown that people are more likely to make moral judgments that align with the views of their social media friends and the content they consume on social media. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to pro-environmental content on social media were more likely to make moral judgments that favored environmental protection.
• Social media can lead to moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is a psychological process that allows people to justify harmful or unethical behavior. Studies have shown that social media can contribute to moral disengagement by making it easier for people to distance themselves from the consequences of their actions. For example, one study found that people who were exposed to violent content on social media were more likely to engage in moral disengagement.
• Social media can promote prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is behavior that is helpful or beneficial to others. Studies have shown that social media can promote prosocial behavior by connecting people with others who share their values and by providing opportunities for people to help others. For example, one study found that people who used social media to connect with others were more likely to volunteer their time to help others.
• Social media can be used to spread misinformation and hate speech. Misinformation is false or misleading information that is spread intentionally or unintentionally. Hate speech is speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of attributes such as race, religion, or sexual orientation. Social media platforms have been used to spread misinformation and hate speech, which can have a negative impact on society.

Overall, the research on social media and morality suggests that social media can have both positive and negative effects on our moral judgments and behavior. It is important to be aware of the potential risks and benefits of social media and to use it in a way that promotes positive moral values.

The persistence of cognitive biases in financial decisions across economic groups

Ruggeri, K., Ashcroft-Jones, S. et al.

Sci Rep 13, 10329 (2023).

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-36339-2

Abstract

While economic inequality continues to rise within countries, efforts to address it have been largely ineffective, particularly those involving behavioral approaches. It is often implied but not tested that choice patterns among low-income individuals may be a factor impeding behavioral interventions aimed at improving upward economic mobility. To test this, we assessed rates of ten cognitive biases across nearly 5000 participants from 27 countries. Our analyses were primarily focused on 1458 individuals that were either low-income adults or individuals who grew up in disadvantaged households but had above-average financial well-being as adults, known as positive deviants. Using discrete and complex models, we find evidence of no differences within or between groups or countries. We therefore conclude that choices impeded by cognitive biases alone cannot explain why some individuals do not experience upward economic mobility. Policies must combine both behavioral and structural interventions to improve financial well-being across populations.

From the Discussion section

This study aimed to determine if rates of cognitive biases were different between positive deviants and low-income adults in a way that might explain some elements of what impedes or facilitates upward economic mobility. We anticipated finding small-to-moderate effects between groups indicating positive deviants were less prone to biases involving risk and uncertainty in financial choices. However, across a sample of nearly 5000 participants from 27 countries, of which 1458 were low-income or positive deviants, we find no evidence of any difference in the rates of cognitive biases—minor or otherwise—and no systematic variability to indicate patterns vary globally.

In sum, we find clear evidence that resistance to cognitive biases is not a factor contributing to or impeding upward economic mobility in our sample. Taken along with related work showing that temporal choice anomalies are tied more to economic environment rather than individual financial circumstances, our findings are (unintentionally) a major validation of arguments (especially that of Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir) stating that poorer individuals are not uniquely prone to cognitive biases that alone explain protracted poverty. It also supports arguments that scarcity is a greater driver of decisions, as individuals of different income groups are equally influenced by biases and context-driven cues.

What makes these findings particularly reliable is that multiple possible approaches to analyses had to be considered while working with the data, some of which were considered into extreme detail before selecting the optimal approach. As our measures were effective at eliciting biases on a scale to be expected based on existing research, and as there were relatively low correlations between individual biases (e.g., observing loss aversion in one participant is not necessarily a strong predictor of also observing any other specific bias), we conclude that there is no evidence from our sample to support that biases are directly associated with potentially harming optimal choices uniquely amongst low-income individuals.

Conclusion

We sought to determine if individuals that had overcome low-income childhoods showed significantly different rates of cognitive biases from individuals that remained low-income as adults. We comprehensively reject our initial hypotheses and conclude that outcomes are not tied—at least not exclusively or potentially even meaningfully—to resistance to cognitive biases. Our research does not reject the notion that individual behavior and decision-making may directly relate to upward economic mobility. Instead, we narrowly conclude that biased decision-making does not alone explain a significant proportion of population-level economic inequality. Thus, any attempts to reduce economic inequality must involve both behavioral and structural aspects. Otherwise, similar decisions between disadvantaged individuals may not lead to similar outcomes. Where combined effectively, it will be possible to assess if genuine impact has been made on the financial well-being of individuals and populations.