by Iain Brassington
British Medical Journal Blogs
Originally posted June 6, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
Basically, the problem is this: that the model for debating contests is, presumably, based around the idea that debate is an effective way to whittle bad ideas away from good; if each participant is a doughty falsificationist, and equally able in debate as his opponent, then at the end of a process of debate, we’ll be closer to the truth of the matter than we were at the start. So far, so good. But there’s a handful of fairly obvious problems with that model. First, that doesn’t lend itself to the idea that there is a winner and a loser in any particular debate. Second, a shoddy argument presented by a good speaker might win a competitive debate over a good argument presented by a diffident speaker. We might hope that a competent judge would account for that, but it’d be better if there wasn’t any need to solve what looks to be a structural problem to begin with. Third – which is related, but probably more importantly when it comes to ethics – someone with a good understanding of the moral arguments and who is a decent orator might stand a fair chance of winning an argument; but it doesn’t follow that a good orator who’s won an argument has any particular understanding of the moral arguments. Debating contests reward people for being good at debate; but that’s presumably not the true end of ethics education. Fourth, this kind of strategy is possibly OK in politics, in which the point of oratory is to persuade people to adopt a certain cause; and so debating competitions might provide training for that. (I suspect that that’s something like the rationale behind things like the IofI’s competition in schools: it’s directed at developing a certain set of skills, with one eye on a vivacious public debate. Whatever my private suspicions of the IofI generally, that doesn’t seem like a bad idea.) But ethical debate is qualitatively different. It isn’t really about winning converts. Or, at least: one might hope that a convincing argument would have moral gravity and attract agreement, but the mood of the thing is different.
The article is here.
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
Tuesday, June 14, 2016
The Immoral Landscape? Scientists Are Associated with Violations of Morality
Rutjens BT, Heine SJ
(2016) PLoS ONE 11(4): e0152798.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152798
Abstract
Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.
The article is here.
(2016) PLoS ONE 11(4): e0152798.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152798
Abstract
Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.
The article is here.
There’s No Such Thing as Free Will
By Stephen Cave
The Atlantic
Originally posted June 2016
Here are two excerpts:
The 20th-century nature-nurture debate prepared us to think of ourselves as shaped by influences beyond our control. But it left some room, at least in the popular imagination, for the possibility that we could overcome our circumstances or our genes to become the author of our own destiny. The challenge posed by neuroscience is more radical: It describes the brain as a physical system like any other, and suggests that we no more will it to operate in a particular way than we will our heart to beat. The contemporary scientific image of human behavior is one of neurons firing, causing other neurons to fire, causing our thoughts and deeds, in an unbroken chain that stretches back to our birth and beyond. In principle, we are therefore completely predictable. If we could understand any individual’s brain architecture and chemistry well enough, we could, in theory, predict that individual’s response to any given stimulus with 100 percent accuracy.
(cut)
The big problem, in Harris’s view, is that people often confuse determinism with fatalism. Determinism is the belief that our decisions are part of an unbreakable chain of cause and effect. Fatalism, on the other hand, is the belief that our decisions don’t really matter, because whatever is destined to happen will happen—like Oedipus’s marriage to his mother, despite his efforts to avoid that fate.
The article is here.
The Atlantic
Originally posted June 2016
Here are two excerpts:
The 20th-century nature-nurture debate prepared us to think of ourselves as shaped by influences beyond our control. But it left some room, at least in the popular imagination, for the possibility that we could overcome our circumstances or our genes to become the author of our own destiny. The challenge posed by neuroscience is more radical: It describes the brain as a physical system like any other, and suggests that we no more will it to operate in a particular way than we will our heart to beat. The contemporary scientific image of human behavior is one of neurons firing, causing other neurons to fire, causing our thoughts and deeds, in an unbroken chain that stretches back to our birth and beyond. In principle, we are therefore completely predictable. If we could understand any individual’s brain architecture and chemistry well enough, we could, in theory, predict that individual’s response to any given stimulus with 100 percent accuracy.
(cut)
The big problem, in Harris’s view, is that people often confuse determinism with fatalism. Determinism is the belief that our decisions are part of an unbreakable chain of cause and effect. Fatalism, on the other hand, is the belief that our decisions don’t really matter, because whatever is destined to happen will happen—like Oedipus’s marriage to his mother, despite his efforts to avoid that fate.
The article is here.
Monday, June 13, 2016
Morality in business: Oxymoron?
By Elfren S. Cruz
The Philippine Star
Updated May 26, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
Today, the Filipino businessman like business leaders around the world, are confronted with moral questions that cannot be decided simply on the basis of what is “good for the company.” There is the issue of the minimum wage vs. the living wage that institutions like the Catholic Church have been advocating for more than a century. Then there is the issue of contractualization and the continuing practice of hiring “casuals” who will be laid off after a few months work and then rehired again to avoid giving them regular status.
Tax evasion and money laundering through tax havens in places like the British Virgin Islands are now considered as an integral part of doing business. And when transparency about financial transactions and bank accounts are demanded, businessmen object on the basis of the “right to privacy.”
The article is here.
The Philippine Star
Updated May 26, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
Today, the Filipino businessman like business leaders around the world, are confronted with moral questions that cannot be decided simply on the basis of what is “good for the company.” There is the issue of the minimum wage vs. the living wage that institutions like the Catholic Church have been advocating for more than a century. Then there is the issue of contractualization and the continuing practice of hiring “casuals” who will be laid off after a few months work and then rehired again to avoid giving them regular status.
Tax evasion and money laundering through tax havens in places like the British Virgin Islands are now considered as an integral part of doing business. And when transparency about financial transactions and bank accounts are demanded, businessmen object on the basis of the “right to privacy.”
The article is here.
Are research ethics guidelines culturally competent?
Ben Gray, Jo Hilder, Lindsay Macdonald, Rachel Tester, Anthony Dowell, & Maria Stubbe
Research Ethics May 20, 2016
Abstract
Research ethics guidelines grew out of several infamous episodes where research subjects were exploited. There is significant international synchronization of guidelines. However, indigenous groups in New Zealand, Canada and Australia have criticized these guidelines as being inadequate for research involving indigenous people and have developed guidelines from their own cultural perspectives. Whilst traditional research ethics guidelines place a lot of emphasis on informed consent, these indigenous guidelines put much greater emphasis on interdependence and trust. This article argues that traditional guidelines are premised on relationships of equal power, and that often the researcher has more power that is not fully equalized by providing information. Where there is a relationship of unequal power, then focusing on interdependence and trust is more likely to achieve ethical safety. We illustrate this thesis by describing the detail of a research project looking at the use of interpreters, where we video-recorded live consultations and then interviewed the patient, interpreter and doctor. We conclude by suggesting that mainstream research ethics guidelines should pay more attention to the development of a trustworthy relationship between subject and researcher, and that, following the lead from clinical medicine, we should develop a culturally competent ethical framework for research on human subjects.
The article is here.
Research Ethics May 20, 2016
Abstract
Research ethics guidelines grew out of several infamous episodes where research subjects were exploited. There is significant international synchronization of guidelines. However, indigenous groups in New Zealand, Canada and Australia have criticized these guidelines as being inadequate for research involving indigenous people and have developed guidelines from their own cultural perspectives. Whilst traditional research ethics guidelines place a lot of emphasis on informed consent, these indigenous guidelines put much greater emphasis on interdependence and trust. This article argues that traditional guidelines are premised on relationships of equal power, and that often the researcher has more power that is not fully equalized by providing information. Where there is a relationship of unequal power, then focusing on interdependence and trust is more likely to achieve ethical safety. We illustrate this thesis by describing the detail of a research project looking at the use of interpreters, where we video-recorded live consultations and then interviewed the patient, interpreter and doctor. We conclude by suggesting that mainstream research ethics guidelines should pay more attention to the development of a trustworthy relationship between subject and researcher, and that, following the lead from clinical medicine, we should develop a culturally competent ethical framework for research on human subjects.
The article is here.
Sunday, June 12, 2016
Free to punish: a motivated account of free will belief.
Clark CJ, Luguri JB, Ditto PH, Knobe J, Shariff AF, Baumeister RF
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2014 Apr;106(4):501-13.
Abstract
Belief in free will is a pervasive phenomenon that has important consequences for prosocial actions and punitive judgments, but little research has investigated why free will beliefs are so widespread. Across 5 studies using experimental, survey, and archival data and multiple measures of free will belief, we tested the hypothesis that a key factor promoting belief in free will is a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors. In Study 1, participants reported greater belief in free will after considering an immoral action than a morally neutral one. Study 2 provided evidence that this effect was due to heightened punitive motivations. In a field experiment (Study 3), an ostensibly real classroom cheating incident led to increased free will beliefs, again due to heightened punitive motivations. In Study 4, reading about others' immoral behaviors reduced the perceived merit of anti-free-will research, thus demonstrating the effect with an indirect measure of free will belief. Finally, Study 5 examined this relationship outside the laboratory and found that the real-world prevalence of immoral behavior (as measured by crime and homicide rates) predicted free will belief on a country level. Taken together, these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society.
The article is here.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2014 Apr;106(4):501-13.
Abstract
Belief in free will is a pervasive phenomenon that has important consequences for prosocial actions and punitive judgments, but little research has investigated why free will beliefs are so widespread. Across 5 studies using experimental, survey, and archival data and multiple measures of free will belief, we tested the hypothesis that a key factor promoting belief in free will is a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors. In Study 1, participants reported greater belief in free will after considering an immoral action than a morally neutral one. Study 2 provided evidence that this effect was due to heightened punitive motivations. In a field experiment (Study 3), an ostensibly real classroom cheating incident led to increased free will beliefs, again due to heightened punitive motivations. In Study 4, reading about others' immoral behaviors reduced the perceived merit of anti-free-will research, thus demonstrating the effect with an indirect measure of free will belief. Finally, Study 5 examined this relationship outside the laboratory and found that the real-world prevalence of immoral behavior (as measured by crime and homicide rates) predicted free will belief on a country level. Taken together, these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society.
The article is here.
Saturday, June 11, 2016
Scientists Are Just as Confused About the Ethics of Big-Data Research as You
Sarah Zhang
Wired Magazine
Originally published May 20, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
Shockingly, though, the researchers behind both of those big data blowups never anticipated public outrage. (The OkCupid research does not seem to have gone through any kind of ethical review process, and a Cornell ethics review board approved the Facebook experiment.) And that shows just how untested the ethics of this new field of research is. Unlike medical research, which has been shaped by decades of clinical trials, the risks—and rewards—of analyzing big, semi-public databases are just beginning to become clear.
And the patchwork of review boards responsible for overseeing those risks are only slowly inching into the 21st century. Under the Common Rule in the US, federally funded research has to go through ethical review. Rather than one unified system though, every single university has its own institutional review board, or IRB. Most IRB members are researchers at the university, most often in the biomedical sciences. Few are professional ethicists.
The article is here.
Wired Magazine
Originally published May 20, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
Shockingly, though, the researchers behind both of those big data blowups never anticipated public outrage. (The OkCupid research does not seem to have gone through any kind of ethical review process, and a Cornell ethics review board approved the Facebook experiment.) And that shows just how untested the ethics of this new field of research is. Unlike medical research, which has been shaped by decades of clinical trials, the risks—and rewards—of analyzing big, semi-public databases are just beginning to become clear.
And the patchwork of review boards responsible for overseeing those risks are only slowly inching into the 21st century. Under the Common Rule in the US, federally funded research has to go through ethical review. Rather than one unified system though, every single university has its own institutional review board, or IRB. Most IRB members are researchers at the university, most often in the biomedical sciences. Few are professional ethicists.
The article is here.
Friday, June 10, 2016
Decriminalizing Mental Illness — The Miami Model
John K. Iglehart
N Engl J Med 2016; 374:1701-1703
Here is an excerpt:
Miami-Dade’s initiative was launched in 2000, when Judge Leifman, frustrated by the fact that people with mental disorders were cycling through his court repeatedly, created the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Criminal Mental Health Project (CMHP). As Leifman explained, “When I became a judge . . . I had no idea I would become the gatekeeper to the largest psychiatric facility in the State of Florida. . . . Of the roughly 100,000 bookings into the [county] jail every year, nearly 20,000 involve people with serious mental illnesses requiring intensive psychiatric treatment while incarcerated. . . . Because community-based delivery systems are often fragmented, difficult to navigate, and slow to respond to critical needs, many individuals with the most severe and disabling forms of mental illnesses . . . fall through the cracks and land in the criminal justice or state hospital systems” that emphasize crisis resolution rather than “promoting ongoing stable recovery and community integration.”
The article is here.
N Engl J Med 2016; 374:1701-1703
Here is an excerpt:
Miami-Dade’s initiative was launched in 2000, when Judge Leifman, frustrated by the fact that people with mental disorders were cycling through his court repeatedly, created the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Criminal Mental Health Project (CMHP). As Leifman explained, “When I became a judge . . . I had no idea I would become the gatekeeper to the largest psychiatric facility in the State of Florida. . . . Of the roughly 100,000 bookings into the [county] jail every year, nearly 20,000 involve people with serious mental illnesses requiring intensive psychiatric treatment while incarcerated. . . . Because community-based delivery systems are often fragmented, difficult to navigate, and slow to respond to critical needs, many individuals with the most severe and disabling forms of mental illnesses . . . fall through the cracks and land in the criminal justice or state hospital systems” that emphasize crisis resolution rather than “promoting ongoing stable recovery and community integration.”
The article is here.
Lay attitudes toward deception in medicine: Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence
Jonathan Pugh, Guy Kahanea, Hannah Maslena & Julian Savulescua
AJOB Empirical Bioethics
Volume 7, Issue 1, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
In these cases, two fundamental principles of medical ethics—the principle of beneficence and the principle of respect for autonomy—appear to conflict (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). While ethicists have long been interested in the conflict between these two principles in cases of deception in medical practice, there is comparatively little empirical evidence concerning whether lay people—the potential targets of such deception—regard deception as morally acceptable across different medical contexts. Empirical studies that have been carried out thus far have concerned patient attitudes toward deception in specific medical contexts, such as cancer treatment (Jenkins, Fallowfield, and Saul, 2001; Yu and Bernstein 2011), palliative care, (Fallowfield, Jenkins, and Beveridge 2002), or more generally the use of placebo treatments in medical practice (Chen and Johnson, 2009; Hull et al. 2013). Similar studies have also been carried out on physician attitudes toward deception in these contexts (Howick et al. 2013; Lynöe, Mattsson, and Sandlund 1993).
However, several important dimensions of deception in medicine have not yet been addressed. Previous empirical studies have not directly compared patient attitudes toward deception across different medical contexts, nor have they investigated the relationship between patient attitudes toward deception in medicine and their attitudes toward truthfulness in nonmedical contexts. It remains unclear whether observed attitudes to deception reflect more general views about deception or whether they are specific to the medical sphere or even to particular medical contexts.
The article is here.
AJOB Empirical Bioethics
Volume 7, Issue 1, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
In these cases, two fundamental principles of medical ethics—the principle of beneficence and the principle of respect for autonomy—appear to conflict (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). While ethicists have long been interested in the conflict between these two principles in cases of deception in medical practice, there is comparatively little empirical evidence concerning whether lay people—the potential targets of such deception—regard deception as morally acceptable across different medical contexts. Empirical studies that have been carried out thus far have concerned patient attitudes toward deception in specific medical contexts, such as cancer treatment (Jenkins, Fallowfield, and Saul, 2001; Yu and Bernstein 2011), palliative care, (Fallowfield, Jenkins, and Beveridge 2002), or more generally the use of placebo treatments in medical practice (Chen and Johnson, 2009; Hull et al. 2013). Similar studies have also been carried out on physician attitudes toward deception in these contexts (Howick et al. 2013; Lynöe, Mattsson, and Sandlund 1993).
However, several important dimensions of deception in medicine have not yet been addressed. Previous empirical studies have not directly compared patient attitudes toward deception across different medical contexts, nor have they investigated the relationship between patient attitudes toward deception in medicine and their attitudes toward truthfulness in nonmedical contexts. It remains unclear whether observed attitudes to deception reflect more general views about deception or whether they are specific to the medical sphere or even to particular medical contexts.
The article is here.
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