By Lauren Cassani Davis
The Atlantic
Originally published February 5, 2016
Daily life is peppered with moral decisions. Some are so automatic that they fail to register—like holding the door for a mother struggling with a stroller, or resisting a passing urge to elbow the guy who cut you in line at Starbucks. Others chafe a little more, like deciding whether or not to give money to a figure rattling a cup of coins on a darkening evening commute. A desire to help, a fear of danger, and a cost-benefit analysis of the contents of my wallet; these gut reactions and reasoned arguments all swirl beneath conscious awareness.
While society urges people towards morally commendable choices with laws and police, and religious traditions stipulate good and bad through divine commands, scriptures, and sermons, the final say lies within each of our heads. Rational thinking, of course, plays a role in how we make moral decisions. But our moral compasses are also powerfully influenced by the fleeting forces of disgust, fondness, or fear.
Should subjective feelings matter when deciding right and wrong? Philosophers have debated this question for thousands of years. Some say absolutely: Emotions, like our love for our friends and family, are a crucial part of what give life meaning, and ought to play a guiding role in morality. Some say absolutely not: Cold, impartial, rational thinking is the only proper way to make a decision. Emotion versus reason—it’s one of the oldest and most epic standoffs we know.
The article is here.
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
American attitudes toward nudges
Janice Y. Jung and Barbara A. Mellers
Judgment and Decision Making
Vol. 11, No. 1, January 2016, pp. 62-74
To successfully select and implement nudges, policy makers need a psychological understanding of who opposes nudges, how they are perceived, and when alternative methods (e.g., forced choice) might work better. Using two representative samples, we examined four factors that influence U.S. attitudes toward nudges – types of nudges, individual dispositions, nudge perceptions, and nudge frames. Most nudges were supported, although opt-out defaults for organ donations were opposed in both samples. “System 1” nudges (e.g., defaults and sequential orderings) were viewed less favorably than “System 2” nudges (e.g., educational opportunities or reminders). System 1 nudges were perceived as more autonomy threatening, whereas System 2 nudges were viewed as more effective for better decision making and more necessary for changing behavior. People with greater empathetic concern tended to support both types of nudges and viewed them as the “right” kind of goals to have. Individualists opposed both types of nudges, and conservatives tended to oppose both types. Reactant people and those with a strong desire for control opposed System 1 nudges. To see whether framing could influence attitudes, we varied the description of the nudge in terms of the target (Personal vs. Societal) and the reference point for the nudge (Costs vs. Benefits). Empathetic people were more supportive when framing highlighted societal costs or benefits, and reactant people were more opposed to nudges when frames highlighted the personal costs of rejection.
The article is here.
Judgment and Decision Making
Vol. 11, No. 1, January 2016, pp. 62-74
To successfully select and implement nudges, policy makers need a psychological understanding of who opposes nudges, how they are perceived, and when alternative methods (e.g., forced choice) might work better. Using two representative samples, we examined four factors that influence U.S. attitudes toward nudges – types of nudges, individual dispositions, nudge perceptions, and nudge frames. Most nudges were supported, although opt-out defaults for organ donations were opposed in both samples. “System 1” nudges (e.g., defaults and sequential orderings) were viewed less favorably than “System 2” nudges (e.g., educational opportunities or reminders). System 1 nudges were perceived as more autonomy threatening, whereas System 2 nudges were viewed as more effective for better decision making and more necessary for changing behavior. People with greater empathetic concern tended to support both types of nudges and viewed them as the “right” kind of goals to have. Individualists opposed both types of nudges, and conservatives tended to oppose both types. Reactant people and those with a strong desire for control opposed System 1 nudges. To see whether framing could influence attitudes, we varied the description of the nudge in terms of the target (Personal vs. Societal) and the reference point for the nudge (Costs vs. Benefits). Empathetic people were more supportive when framing highlighted societal costs or benefits, and reactant people were more opposed to nudges when frames highlighted the personal costs of rejection.
The article is here.
Monday, February 22, 2016
Morality is a muscle. Get to the gym.
Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry
The Week
Originally published January 18, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
Take the furor over "trigger warnings" in college classes and textbooks. One side believes that in order to protect the sensitivities of some students, professors or writers should warn readers or students about some at the beginning of an article or course about controversial topics. Another side says that if someone can't handle rough material, then he can stop reading or step out of the room, and that trigger warnings are an unconscionable affront to freedom of thought. Interestingly, both schools clearly believe that there is one moral stance which takes the form of a rule that should be obeyed always and everywhere. Always and everywhere we should have trigger warnings to protect people's sensibilities, or always and everywhere we should not.
Both sides need a lecture in virtue ethics.
If I try to stretch my virtue of empathy, it doesn't seem at all absurd to me to imagine that, say, a young woman who has been raped might be made quite uncomfortable by a class discussion of rape in literature, and that this is something to which we should be sensitive. But the trigger warning people maybe should think more about the moral imperative to develop the virtue of courage, including intellectual courage. Then it seems to me that if you just put aside grand moral questions about freedom of inquiry, simple basic human courtesy would mean a professor would try to take account a trauma victim's sensibilities while teaching sensitive material, and students would understand that part of the goal of a college class is to challenge them. We don't need to debate universal moral values, we just need to be reminded to exercise virtue more.
The article is here.
The Week
Originally published January 18, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
Take the furor over "trigger warnings" in college classes and textbooks. One side believes that in order to protect the sensitivities of some students, professors or writers should warn readers or students about some at the beginning of an article or course about controversial topics. Another side says that if someone can't handle rough material, then he can stop reading or step out of the room, and that trigger warnings are an unconscionable affront to freedom of thought. Interestingly, both schools clearly believe that there is one moral stance which takes the form of a rule that should be obeyed always and everywhere. Always and everywhere we should have trigger warnings to protect people's sensibilities, or always and everywhere we should not.
Both sides need a lecture in virtue ethics.
If I try to stretch my virtue of empathy, it doesn't seem at all absurd to me to imagine that, say, a young woman who has been raped might be made quite uncomfortable by a class discussion of rape in literature, and that this is something to which we should be sensitive. But the trigger warning people maybe should think more about the moral imperative to develop the virtue of courage, including intellectual courage. Then it seems to me that if you just put aside grand moral questions about freedom of inquiry, simple basic human courtesy would mean a professor would try to take account a trauma victim's sensibilities while teaching sensitive material, and students would understand that part of the goal of a college class is to challenge them. We don't need to debate universal moral values, we just need to be reminded to exercise virtue more.
The article is here.
Will Your Ethics Hold Up Under Pressure?
Ron Carucci
Forbes
Originally published FEB 3, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
In an ironic appeal to self-interest, for which Haidt readily acknowledges the paradox, he says there are four important reasons “ethics pays.” First, there is the cost of reputation, which most analysts and experts acknowledge links closely to share price performance. Second, ethical organizations have lower costs of capital, as evidenced by Deutsche Bank’s commitment to focus on clients with higher ethical standards. Third, the white-hot war for talent, both recruiting and retaining top talent, takes a painful hit with an ethical scandal. Conversely, the best talent wants to associate with the best reputed companies. And finally, the astronomical cost of cleaning up an ethical mess can soar into the billions after shareholder losses, lawsuits, fines, and PR costs are added up. Still those aren’t the real reasons to focus on this, claims Haidt. The longer-term benefits to a world with greater ethical substance far outweigh the costs of cutting corners for short-term gains. Sadly, unethical choices have paid well for too many executives.
The article is here.
Forbes
Originally published FEB 3, 2016
Here is an excerpt:
In an ironic appeal to self-interest, for which Haidt readily acknowledges the paradox, he says there are four important reasons “ethics pays.” First, there is the cost of reputation, which most analysts and experts acknowledge links closely to share price performance. Second, ethical organizations have lower costs of capital, as evidenced by Deutsche Bank’s commitment to focus on clients with higher ethical standards. Third, the white-hot war for talent, both recruiting and retaining top talent, takes a painful hit with an ethical scandal. Conversely, the best talent wants to associate with the best reputed companies. And finally, the astronomical cost of cleaning up an ethical mess can soar into the billions after shareholder losses, lawsuits, fines, and PR costs are added up. Still those aren’t the real reasons to focus on this, claims Haidt. The longer-term benefits to a world with greater ethical substance far outweigh the costs of cutting corners for short-term gains. Sadly, unethical choices have paid well for too many executives.
The article is here.
Sunday, February 21, 2016
Epistemology, Communication and Divine Command Theory
By John Danaher
Philosophical Disquisitions
Originally posted July 21, 2015
I have written about the epistemological objection to divine command theory (DCT) on a previous occasion. It goes a little something like this: According to proponents of the DCT, at least some moral statuses (like the fact that X is forbidden, or that X is bad) depend for their existence on God’s commands. In other words, without God’s commands those moral statuses would not exist. It would seem to follow that in order for anyone to know whether X is forbidden/bad (or whatever), they would need to have epistemic access to God’s commands. That is to say, they would need to know that God has commanded X to be forbidden/bad. The problem is that there is a certain class of non-believers — so-called ‘reasonable non-believers’ — who don’t violate any epistemic duties in their non-belief. Consequently, they lack epistemic access to God’s commands without being blameworthy for lacking this access. For them, X cannot be forbidden or bad.
This has been termed the ‘epistemological objection’ to DCT, and I will stick with that name throughout, but it may be a bit of a misnomer. This objection is not just about moral epistemology; it is also about moral ontology. It highlights the fact that at least some DCTs include a (seemingly) epistemic condition in their account of moral ontology. Consequently, if that condition is violated it implies that certain moral facts cease to exist (for at least some people). This is a subtle but important point: the epistemological objection does have ontological implications.
The blog post is here.
Philosophical Disquisitions
Originally posted July 21, 2015
I have written about the epistemological objection to divine command theory (DCT) on a previous occasion. It goes a little something like this: According to proponents of the DCT, at least some moral statuses (like the fact that X is forbidden, or that X is bad) depend for their existence on God’s commands. In other words, without God’s commands those moral statuses would not exist. It would seem to follow that in order for anyone to know whether X is forbidden/bad (or whatever), they would need to have epistemic access to God’s commands. That is to say, they would need to know that God has commanded X to be forbidden/bad. The problem is that there is a certain class of non-believers — so-called ‘reasonable non-believers’ — who don’t violate any epistemic duties in their non-belief. Consequently, they lack epistemic access to God’s commands without being blameworthy for lacking this access. For them, X cannot be forbidden or bad.
This has been termed the ‘epistemological objection’ to DCT, and I will stick with that name throughout, but it may be a bit of a misnomer. This objection is not just about moral epistemology; it is also about moral ontology. It highlights the fact that at least some DCTs include a (seemingly) epistemic condition in their account of moral ontology. Consequently, if that condition is violated it implies that certain moral facts cease to exist (for at least some people). This is a subtle but important point: the epistemological objection does have ontological implications.
The blog post is here.
Saturday, February 20, 2016
Moral Nativism and Moral Psychology
By Paul Bloom
The Social Psychology of Morality 01/2012
DOI: 10.1037/13091-004
ABSTRACT
Moral psychology is both old and new. Old because moral thought has long been a central focus of theology and philosophy. Indeed, many of the theories that we explore today were proposed first by scholars such as Aristotle, Kant, and Hume. Young because the scientific study of morality—and, specifically, the study of what goes on in a person's head when making a moral judgment—has been a topic of serious inquiry only over the last couple of decades. Even now, it is just barely mainstream. This chapter is itself a combination of the old and the new. I am going to consider two broad questions that would have been entirely familiar to philosophers such as Aristotle, but are also the topic of considerable contemporary research and theorizing: (1) What is our natural human moral endowment? (2) To what extent are moral judgments the products of our emotions? I will have the most to say about the first question, and will review a body of empirical work that bears on it; much of this research is still in progress. The answer to the second question will be briefer and more tentative, and will draw in part upon this empirical work.
The article is here.
The Social Psychology of Morality 01/2012
DOI: 10.1037/13091-004
ABSTRACT
Moral psychology is both old and new. Old because moral thought has long been a central focus of theology and philosophy. Indeed, many of the theories that we explore today were proposed first by scholars such as Aristotle, Kant, and Hume. Young because the scientific study of morality—and, specifically, the study of what goes on in a person's head when making a moral judgment—has been a topic of serious inquiry only over the last couple of decades. Even now, it is just barely mainstream. This chapter is itself a combination of the old and the new. I am going to consider two broad questions that would have been entirely familiar to philosophers such as Aristotle, but are also the topic of considerable contemporary research and theorizing: (1) What is our natural human moral endowment? (2) To what extent are moral judgments the products of our emotions? I will have the most to say about the first question, and will review a body of empirical work that bears on it; much of this research is still in progress. The answer to the second question will be briefer and more tentative, and will draw in part upon this empirical work.
The article is here.
Friday, February 19, 2016
Mental health on college campuses: A look at the numbers
By Sarah Sabatke
USA Today
Originally published January 30, 2016
Approximately 42,773 Americans commit suicide every year, according to the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, many of whom are college students.
The University of Pennsylvania, Tulane University, Appalachian State University and Yale University, among others, made national headlines in recent years after student suicides rocked their campus communities, highlighting a growing need for comprehensive mental healthcare on college campuses.
The page of statistics and infographics is here.
USA Today
Originally published January 30, 2016
Approximately 42,773 Americans commit suicide every year, according to the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, many of whom are college students.
The University of Pennsylvania, Tulane University, Appalachian State University and Yale University, among others, made national headlines in recent years after student suicides rocked their campus communities, highlighting a growing need for comprehensive mental healthcare on college campuses.
The page of statistics and infographics is here.
A Time to Fly and a Time to Die: Suicide Tourism and Assisted Dying in Australia Considered
Hadeel Al-Alosi
UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2016-04
January 8, 2016
Abstract:
Recently, a series of high-profile court cases have led the Director of Public Prosecution in the United Kingdom to publish a policy clarifying the exercise of its discretion in assisted suicide. Importantly, the experience in the United Kingdom serves as a timely reminder that Australia too should formulate its own guideline that detail how prosecutorial discretion will be exercised in cases of assisted suicide. This is especially given the fact that many Australian citizens are travelling to jurisdictions where assistance in dying is legal. Any policy should not, however, distract from addressing law reform on voluntary euthanasia. Australian legislators should be consulting with the public in order to represent the opinion of the majority. Nevertheless, any future policy and law reform implemented should provide adequate safeguards and be guided by the principle of individual autonomy.
The paper is here.
UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2016-04
January 8, 2016
Abstract:
Recently, a series of high-profile court cases have led the Director of Public Prosecution in the United Kingdom to publish a policy clarifying the exercise of its discretion in assisted suicide. Importantly, the experience in the United Kingdom serves as a timely reminder that Australia too should formulate its own guideline that detail how prosecutorial discretion will be exercised in cases of assisted suicide. This is especially given the fact that many Australian citizens are travelling to jurisdictions where assistance in dying is legal. Any policy should not, however, distract from addressing law reform on voluntary euthanasia. Australian legislators should be consulting with the public in order to represent the opinion of the majority. Nevertheless, any future policy and law reform implemented should provide adequate safeguards and be guided by the principle of individual autonomy.
The paper is here.
Thursday, February 18, 2016
Genetic editing is like playing God – and what’s wrong with that?
Johnjoe McFadden
The Guardian
Originally published February 2, 2016
The announcement that scientists are to be allowed to edit the DNA of human embryos will no doubt provoke an avalanche of warnings from opponents of genetic modification (GM) technology, who will warn that we are “playing God” with our genes.
The opponents are right. We are indeed playing God with our genes. But it is a good thing because God, nature or whatever we want to call the agencies that have made us, often get it wrong and it’s up to us to correct those mistakes.
Sadly, of the half a million or so babies that will be born in the UK this year, about 4% will carry a genetic or major birth defect that could result in an early death, or a debilitating disease that will cause misery for the child and their family. This research will eventually lead to technologies that could edit DNA in the same way that we can edit text – to correct the mistakes before the child’s development goes to its final draft. Its successful implementation could reduce, and eventually eliminate, the birth of babies with severe genetic diseases.
The article is here.
The Guardian
Originally published February 2, 2016
The announcement that scientists are to be allowed to edit the DNA of human embryos will no doubt provoke an avalanche of warnings from opponents of genetic modification (GM) technology, who will warn that we are “playing God” with our genes.
The opponents are right. We are indeed playing God with our genes. But it is a good thing because God, nature or whatever we want to call the agencies that have made us, often get it wrong and it’s up to us to correct those mistakes.
Sadly, of the half a million or so babies that will be born in the UK this year, about 4% will carry a genetic or major birth defect that could result in an early death, or a debilitating disease that will cause misery for the child and their family. This research will eventually lead to technologies that could edit DNA in the same way that we can edit text – to correct the mistakes before the child’s development goes to its final draft. Its successful implementation could reduce, and eventually eliminate, the birth of babies with severe genetic diseases.
The article is here.
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