By Anders Sandberg
Practical Ethics
Originally posted on Jul 31, 2014
A while ago Facebook got into the news for experimenting on its subscribers, leading to a fair bit of grumbling. Now the dating site OKCupid has proudly outed itself: We Experiment On Human Beings! Unethical or not?
(cut)
The harm angle is more interesting. While Facebook affected the emotions slightly on people who might not have expected emotional manipulation, OKCupid is all about emotions and emotion-laden social interaction. People date because of the site. People have sex because of the site. People marry because of the site. Potentially manipulations could have far more far reaching consequences on OKCupid than on Facebook.
The entire blog post is here.
Monday, August 18, 2014
Sunday, August 17, 2014
Tainted Altruism
When Doing Some Good Is Evaluated as Worse Than Doing No Good at All
George E. Newman and Daylian M. Cain
Published online before print January 8, 2014
doi: 10.1177/0956797613504785
Psychological Science March 2014 vol. 25 no. 3 648-655
Abstract
In four experiments, we found that the presence of self-interest in the charitable domain was seen as tainting: People evaluated efforts that realized both charitable and personal benefits as worse than analogous behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. This tainted-altruism effect was observed in a variety of contexts and extended to both moral evaluations of other agents and participants’ own behavioral intentions (e.g., reported willingness to hire someone or purchase a company’s products). This effect did not seem to be driven by expectations that profits would be realized at the direct cost of charitable benefits, or the explicit use of charity as a means to an end. Rather, we found that it was related to the accessibility of different counterfactuals: When someone was charitable for self-interested reasons, people considered his or her behavior in the absence of self-interest, ultimately concluding that the person did not behave as altruistically as he or she could have. However, when someone was only selfish, people did not spontaneously consider whether the person could have been more altruistic.
The article is here.
George E. Newman and Daylian M. Cain
Published online before print January 8, 2014
doi: 10.1177/0956797613504785
Psychological Science March 2014 vol. 25 no. 3 648-655
Abstract
In four experiments, we found that the presence of self-interest in the charitable domain was seen as tainting: People evaluated efforts that realized both charitable and personal benefits as worse than analogous behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. This tainted-altruism effect was observed in a variety of contexts and extended to both moral evaluations of other agents and participants’ own behavioral intentions (e.g., reported willingness to hire someone or purchase a company’s products). This effect did not seem to be driven by expectations that profits would be realized at the direct cost of charitable benefits, or the explicit use of charity as a means to an end. Rather, we found that it was related to the accessibility of different counterfactuals: When someone was charitable for self-interested reasons, people considered his or her behavior in the absence of self-interest, ultimately concluding that the person did not behave as altruistically as he or she could have. However, when someone was only selfish, people did not spontaneously consider whether the person could have been more altruistic.
The article is here.
Saturday, August 16, 2014
Are Human Rights Redundant in the Ethical Codes of Psychologists?
Alfred Allan
Ethics & Behavior
Volume 23, Issue 4, 2013
DOI:10.1080/10508422.2013.776480
The codes of ethics and conduct of a number of psychology bodies explicitly refer to human rights, and the American Psychological Association recently expanded the use of the construct when it amended standard 1.02 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. What is unclear is how these references to human rights should be interpreted. In this article I examine the historical development of human rights and associated constructs and the contemporary meaning of human rights. As human rights are generally associated with law, morality, or religion, I consider to which of forms of these references most likely refer. I conclude that these references in ethical codes are redundant and that it would be preferable not to refer to human rights in codes. Instead, the profession should acknowledge human rights as a separate and complimentary norm system that governs the behavior of psychologists and should ensure that they have adequate knowledge of human rights and encourage them to promote human rights.
The entire article is here.
Ethics & Behavior
Volume 23, Issue 4, 2013
DOI:10.1080/10508422.2013.776480
The codes of ethics and conduct of a number of psychology bodies explicitly refer to human rights, and the American Psychological Association recently expanded the use of the construct when it amended standard 1.02 of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. What is unclear is how these references to human rights should be interpreted. In this article I examine the historical development of human rights and associated constructs and the contemporary meaning of human rights. As human rights are generally associated with law, morality, or religion, I consider to which of forms of these references most likely refer. I conclude that these references in ethical codes are redundant and that it would be preferable not to refer to human rights in codes. Instead, the profession should acknowledge human rights as a separate and complimentary norm system that governs the behavior of psychologists and should ensure that they have adequate knowledge of human rights and encourage them to promote human rights.
The entire article is here.
Friday, August 15, 2014
Our brains judge a face's trustworthiness, even when we can’t see it
Science Daily
Originally posted August 5, 2014
Our brains are able to judge the trustworthiness of a face even when we cannot consciously see it, a team of scientists has found. Their findings, which appear in the Journal of Neuroscience, shed new light on how we form snap judgments of others.
"Our findings suggest that the brain automatically responds to a face's trustworthiness before it is even consciously perceived," explains Jonathan Freeman, an assistant professor in New York University's Department of Psychology and the study's senior author.
The entire article is here.
Originally posted August 5, 2014
Our brains are able to judge the trustworthiness of a face even when we cannot consciously see it, a team of scientists has found. Their findings, which appear in the Journal of Neuroscience, shed new light on how we form snap judgments of others.
"Our findings suggest that the brain automatically responds to a face's trustworthiness before it is even consciously perceived," explains Jonathan Freeman, an assistant professor in New York University's Department of Psychology and the study's senior author.
The entire article is here.
Moral judgement in adolescents: Age differences in applying and justifying three principles of harm
Paul C. Stey, Daniel Lapsley & Mary O. McKeever
European Journal of Developmental Psychology
Volume 10, Issue 2, 2013
DOI:10.1080/17405629.2013.765798
Abstract
This study investigated the application and justification of three principles of harm in a cross-sectional sample of adolescents in order to test recent theories concerning the source of intuitive moral judgements. Participants were 46 early (M age = 14.8 years) and 40 late adolescents (M age = 17.8 years). Participants rated the permissibility of various ethical dilemmas, and provided justifications for their judgements. Results indicated participants aligned their judgements with the three principles of harm, but had difficulty explaining their reasoning. Furthermore, although age groups were consistent in the application of the principles of harm, age differences emerged in their justifications. These differences were partly explained by differences in language ability. Additionally, participants who used emotional language in their justifications demonstrated a characteristically deontological pattern of moral judgement on certain dilemmas. We conclude adolescents in this age range apply the principles of harm but that the ability to explain their judgements is still developing.
The entire article is here.
European Journal of Developmental Psychology
Volume 10, Issue 2, 2013
DOI:10.1080/17405629.2013.765798
Abstract
This study investigated the application and justification of three principles of harm in a cross-sectional sample of adolescents in order to test recent theories concerning the source of intuitive moral judgements. Participants were 46 early (M age = 14.8 years) and 40 late adolescents (M age = 17.8 years). Participants rated the permissibility of various ethical dilemmas, and provided justifications for their judgements. Results indicated participants aligned their judgements with the three principles of harm, but had difficulty explaining their reasoning. Furthermore, although age groups were consistent in the application of the principles of harm, age differences emerged in their justifications. These differences were partly explained by differences in language ability. Additionally, participants who used emotional language in their justifications demonstrated a characteristically deontological pattern of moral judgement on certain dilemmas. We conclude adolescents in this age range apply the principles of harm but that the ability to explain their judgements is still developing.
The entire article is here.
Thursday, August 14, 2014
Bostrom on Superintelligence
By John Danaher
Philosophical Disquisitions
Originally published July 27, 2014
Nick Bostrom’s magnum opus on the topic of AI risk — Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers and Strategies — was recently published by Oxford University Press. The book is a comprehensive overview and analysis of the risks arising from an intelligence explosion. As you may know, some people are concerned that the creation of superintelligent machines will precipitate an existential catastrophe for the human race. For better or worse, the debate about this issue has largely taken place online, via various internet fora. Now, while I’m certainly not one to disparage such fora — this blog, after all, would count as one — I have to admit that Bostrom’s book is something of a relief. At last, we have a detailed, reasonably sober, academic analysis of the issue, one that is clearly the product of many years of research, reflection and discussion.
The rest of the review and content analysis is here.
Philosophical Disquisitions
Originally published July 27, 2014
Nick Bostrom’s magnum opus on the topic of AI risk — Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers and Strategies — was recently published by Oxford University Press. The book is a comprehensive overview and analysis of the risks arising from an intelligence explosion. As you may know, some people are concerned that the creation of superintelligent machines will precipitate an existential catastrophe for the human race. For better or worse, the debate about this issue has largely taken place online, via various internet fora. Now, while I’m certainly not one to disparage such fora — this blog, after all, would count as one — I have to admit that Bostrom’s book is something of a relief. At last, we have a detailed, reasonably sober, academic analysis of the issue, one that is clearly the product of many years of research, reflection and discussion.
The rest of the review and content analysis is here.
Why Can’t the Banking Industry Solve Its Ethics Problems?
By Neil Irwin
The New York Times
Originally published July 29, 2014
The financial crisis that nearly brought down the global economy was triggered in no small part by the aggressive culture and spotty ethics within the world’s biggest banks. But after six years and countless efforts to reform finance, the banking scandals never seem to end.
The important question that doesn’t yet have a satisfying answer is why.
Why are the ethical breaches at megabanks so routine that it is hard to keep them straight? Why do banks seem to have so many scandals — and ensuing multimillion dollar legal settlements — compared with other large companies like retailers, airlines or manufacturers?
The entire story is here.
The New York Times
Originally published July 29, 2014
The financial crisis that nearly brought down the global economy was triggered in no small part by the aggressive culture and spotty ethics within the world’s biggest banks. But after six years and countless efforts to reform finance, the banking scandals never seem to end.
The important question that doesn’t yet have a satisfying answer is why.
Why are the ethical breaches at megabanks so routine that it is hard to keep them straight? Why do banks seem to have so many scandals — and ensuing multimillion dollar legal settlements — compared with other large companies like retailers, airlines or manufacturers?
The entire story is here.
Wednesday, August 13, 2014
Doing their duty: An empirical analysis of the unintended effect of Tarasoff
By Griffin Sims Edwards
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 57, 2014
Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-61
Abstract
The seminal ruling of Tarasoff v. Regents enacted a duty that required mental health providers to warn potential victims of any real threat to life made by a patient. Many have theorized that this required breach of confidentiality may have adverse effects on effective psychological treatment - but the question remains unanswered empirically. Due to the presence of duty to warn laws, patients might forego mental health treatment that leads them to violence. Using a fixed effects model and exploiting the variation in the timing and style of duty to warn laws across states, I find that mandatory duty to warn laws cause an increase in homicides of 5%. These results are robust to model specifications, falsification tests, and help to clarify the true effect of state duty to warn laws.
The entire article is here.
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 57, 2014
Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-61
Abstract
The seminal ruling of Tarasoff v. Regents enacted a duty that required mental health providers to warn potential victims of any real threat to life made by a patient. Many have theorized that this required breach of confidentiality may have adverse effects on effective psychological treatment - but the question remains unanswered empirically. Due to the presence of duty to warn laws, patients might forego mental health treatment that leads them to violence. Using a fixed effects model and exploiting the variation in the timing and style of duty to warn laws across states, I find that mandatory duty to warn laws cause an increase in homicides of 5%. These results are robust to model specifications, falsification tests, and help to clarify the true effect of state duty to warn laws.
The entire article is here.
The Role of and Challenges for Psychologists in Physician Assisted Suicide
Shara M. Johnson, Robert J. Cramer, Mary Alice Conroy, and Brett O. Gardner
Death Studies, 38: 582–588, 2014
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0748-1187 print/1091-7683 online
DOI: 10.1080/07481187.2013.820228
Abstract
Physician assisted suicide (PAS) poses complex legal and ethical dilemmas for practicing psychologists. Since the passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act in 1997, Montana and Washington have passed similar legislation. Despite the law requiring competence evaluations by medical and psychological professionals, existing psycholegal literature inadequately addresses the role of psychologists in the PAS process. This article reviews legal statutes and analyzes ethical dilemmas psychologists may face if involved. We consider competence both generally and in the context of PAS. Suggestions are made for psychologists completing competence assessments and future directions to improve competence assessments for PAS are provided.
The entire article is here.
Death Studies, 38: 582–588, 2014
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0748-1187 print/1091-7683 online
DOI: 10.1080/07481187.2013.820228
Abstract
Physician assisted suicide (PAS) poses complex legal and ethical dilemmas for practicing psychologists. Since the passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act in 1997, Montana and Washington have passed similar legislation. Despite the law requiring competence evaluations by medical and psychological professionals, existing psycholegal literature inadequately addresses the role of psychologists in the PAS process. This article reviews legal statutes and analyzes ethical dilemmas psychologists may face if involved. We consider competence both generally and in the context of PAS. Suggestions are made for psychologists completing competence assessments and future directions to improve competence assessments for PAS are provided.
The entire article is here.
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