Transformative experience and the right to revelatory autonomy

Farbod Akhlaghi

Analysis

Originally Published: 31 December 2022

Abstract

Sometimes it is not us but those to whom we stand in special relations that face transformative choices: our friends, family or beloved. A focus upon first-personal rational choice and agency has left crucial ethical questions regarding what we owe to those who face transformative choices largely unexplored. In this paper I ask: under what conditions, if any, is it morally permissible to interfere to try to prevent another from making a transformative choice? Some seemingly plausible answers to this question fail precisely because they concern transformative experiences. I argue that we have a distinctive moral right to revelatory autonomy grounded in the value of autonomous self-making. If this right is outweighed then, I argue, interfering to prevent another making a transformative choice is permissible. This conditional answer lays the groundwork for a promising ethics of transformative experience.

Conclusion

Ethical questions regarding transformative experiences are morally urgent. A complete answer to our question requires ascertaining precisely how strong the right to revelatory autonomy is and what competing considerations can outweigh it. These are questions for another time, where the moral significance of revelation and self-making, the competing weight of moral and non-moral considerations, and the sense in which some transformative choices are more significant to one’s identity and self-making than others must be further explored.

But to identify the right to revelatory autonomy and duty of revelatory non-interference is significant progress. For it provides a framework to address the ethics of transformative experience that avoids complications arising from the epistemic peculiarities of transformative experiences. It also allows us to explain cases where we are permitted to interfere in another’s transformative choice and why interference in some choices is harder to justify than others, whilst recognizing plausible grounds for the right to revelatory autonomy itself in the moral value of autonomous self-making. This framework, moreover, opens novel avenues of engagement with wider ethical issues regarding transformative experience, for example concerning social justice or surrogate transformative choice-making. It is, at the very least, a view worthy of further consideration.

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This reasoning applies to psychologists in psychotherapy.  Unless significant danger is present, psychologists need to avoid intrusive advocacy, meaning pulling autonomy away from the patient.  Soft paternalism can occur in psychotherapy, when trying to avoid significant harm.

Nonvoluntary Psychiatric Treatment Is Distinct From Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment

Dominic A. Sisti
JAMA. Published online August 24, 2017

Some of the most ethically challenging cases in mental health care involve providing treatment to individuals who refuse that treatment. Sometimes when persons with mental illness become unsafe to themselves or others, they must be taken, despite their outward and often vigorous refusal, to an emergency department or psychiatric hospital to receive treatment, such as stabilizing psychotropic medication. On occasion, to provide medical care over objection, a patient must be physically restrained.

The modifier “involuntary” is generally used to describe these cases. For example, it is said that a patient has been involuntarily hospitalized or is receiving involuntary medication ostensibly because the patient did not consent and was forced or strongly coerced into treatment. Importantly, a person may be involuntarily hospitalized but retain the right to refuse treatment. “Involuntary” is also used to describe instances when an individual is committed to outpatient treatment by a court. The fact that a person is being treated involuntarily raises numerous challenges; it raises concerns about protecting individual liberty, respect for patient autonomy, and the specter of past abuses of patients in psychiatric institutions.

Although it has become both a clinical colloquialism and legal touchstone, the concept of involuntary treatment is used imprecisely to describe all instances in which a patient has refused the treatment he or she subsequently receives. In some cases, a patient outwardly refuses treatment but may have previously expressed a desire to be treated in crisis or, according to a reasonable evaluator, he or she would have agreed to accept stabilizing treatment, such as antipsychotic medication. A similar scenario occurs in the treatment of individuals who experience a first episode of psychosis and who outwardly refuse treatment. With no prior experience of what it is like to have psychosis, these patients are unable to develop informed preferences about treatment in advance of their first crisis. In these cases, some believe it is reasonable to provide treatment despite the opposition of the patient, although this could be debated.

The article is here.