How Other- and Self-Compassion Reduce Burnout through Resource Replenishment

Kira Schabram and Yu Tse Heng

Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 65, No. 2

Abstract

The average employee feels burnt out, a multidimensional state of depletion likely to persist without intervention. In this paper, we consider compassion as an agentic action by which employees may replenish their own depleted resources and thereby recover. We draw on conservation of resources theory to examine the resource-generating power of two distinct expressions of compassion (self- and other-directed) on three dimensions of burnout (exhaustion, cynicism, inefficacy). Utilizing two complementary designs—a longitudinal field survey of 130 social service providers and an experiential sampling methodology with 100 business students across 10 days—we find a complex pattern of results indicating that both compassion expressions have the potential to generate salutogenic resources (self-control, belonging, self-esteem) that replenish different dimensions of burnout. Specifically, self-compassion remedies exhaustion and other-compassion remedies cynicism—directly or indirectly through resources—while the effects of self- and other-compassion on inefficacy vary. Our key takeaway is that compassion can indeed contribute to human sustainability in organizations, but only when the type of compassion provided generates resources that fit the idiosyncratic experience of burnout.

From the Discussion Section

Our work suggests a more immediate benefit, namely that giving compassion can serve an important resource generative function for the self. Indeed, in neither of our studies did we find either compassion expression to ever have a deleterious effect. While this is in line with the broader literature on self-compassion (Neff, 2011), it is somewhat surprising when it comes to other-compassion. Hobfoll (1989) speculated that when people find themselves depleted, giving support to others should sap them further and such personal costs have been identified in previously cited research on prosocial gestures (Bolino & Grant, 2016; Lanaj et al., 2016; Uy et al., 2017). Why then did other-compassion serve a singularly restorative function? As we noted in our literature review, compassion is distinguished among the family of prosocial behaviors by its principal attendance to human needs (Tsui, 2013) rather than organizational effectiveness, and this may offer an explanation. Perhaps, there is something fundamentally more beneficial for actors about engaging in acts of kindness and care (e.g. taking someone who is having a hard time out for coffee) than in providing instrumental support (e.g. exerting oneself to provide a friendly review). We further note that our study also did not find any evidence of ‘compassion fatigue’ (Figley, 2013), identified frequently by practitioners among the social service employees that comprised our first sample. In line with the ‘desperation corollary’ of COR (Hobfoll et al., 2018), which suggests that individuals can reach a state of extreme depletion characterized by maladaptive coping, it may be that there exists a tipping point after which compassion ceases to offer benefits. If there is, however, it must be quite high to not have registered in either the longitudinal or diary designs. 

The research is here, behind a paywall.

Observers penalize decision makers whose risk preferences are unaffected by loss–gain framing

Dorison, C. A., & Heller, B. H. (2022). 

Journal of Experimental Psychology: 

General. Advance online publication.

Abstract

A large interdisciplinary body of research on human judgment and decision making documents systematic deviations between prescriptive decision models (i.e., how individuals should behave) and descriptive decision models (i.e., how individuals actually behave). One canonical example is the loss–gain framing effect on risk preferences: the robust tendency for risk preferences to shift depending on whether outcomes are described as losses or gains. Traditionally, researchers argue that decision makers should always be immune to loss–gain framing effects. We present three preregistered experiments (N = 1,954) that qualify this prescription. We predict and find that while third-party observers penalize decision makers who make risk-averse (vs. risk-seeking) choices when choice outcomes are framed as losses, this result reverses when outcomes are framed as gains. This reversal holds across five social perceptions, three decision contexts, two sample populations of United States adults, and with financial stakes. This pattern is driven by the fact that observers themselves fall victim to framing effects and socially derogate (and financially punish) decision makers who disagree. Given that individuals often care deeply about their reputation, our results challenge the long-standing prescription that they should always be immune to framing effects. The results extend understanding not only for decision making under risk, but also for a range of behavioral tendencies long considered irrational biases. Such understanding may ultimately reveal not only why such biases are so persistent but also novel interventions: our results suggest a necessary focus on social and organizational norms.

From the General Discussion

But what makes an optimal belief or choice? Here, we argue that an expanded focus on the goals decision makers themselves hold (i.e., reputation management) questions whether such deviations from rational-agent models should always be considered suboptimal. We test this broader theorizing in the context of loss-gain framing effects on risk preferences not because we think the psychological dynamics at play are

unique to this context, but rather because such framing effects have been uniquely influential for both academic discourse and applied interventions in policy and organizations. In fact, the results hold preliminary implications not only for decision making under risk, but also for extending understanding of a range of other behavioral tendencies long considered irrational biases in the research literature on judgment and decision making (e.g., sunk cost bias; see Dorison, Umphres, & Lerner, 2021).

An important clarification of our claims merits note. We are not claiming that it is always rational to be biased just because others are. For example, it would be quite odd to claim that someone is rational for believing that eating sand provides enough nutrients to survive, simply because others may like them for holding this belief or because others in their immediate social circle hold this belief. In this admittedly bizarre case, it would still be clearly irrational to attempt to subsist on sand, even if there are reputational advantages to doing so—that is, the costs substantially outweigh the reputational benefits. In fact, the vast majority of framing effect studies in the lab do not have an explicit reputational/strategic component at all. 

A pdf is here.

Changing impressions in competence-oriented domains: The primacy of morality endures

A. Luttrella, S. Sacchib, & M. Brambillab

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Volume 98, January 2022, 104246

Abstract

The Moral Primacy Model proposes that throughout the multiple stages of developing impressions of others, information about the target's morality is more influential than information about their competence or sociability. Would morality continue to exert outsized influence on impressions in the context of a decision for which people view competence as the most important attribute? In three experiments, we used an impression updating paradigm to test how much information about a target's morality versus competence changed perceivers' impressions of a job candidate. Despite several pilot studies in which people said they would prioritize competence over morality when deciding to hire a potential employee, results of the main studies reveal that impressions changed more when people received new information about a target's immorality than about his incompetence. This moral primacy effect held both for global impressions and willingness to hire the target, but direct effects on evaluations of the target as an employee did not consistently emerge. When the new information about the target was positive, we did not reliably observe a moral primacy effect. These findings provide important insight on the generalizability of moral primacy in impression updating.

Highlights

• People reported that hiring decisions should favor competence over morality.

• Impressions of a job candidate changed more based on his morality (vs. competence).

• Moral primacy in this context emerged only when the new information was negative.

• Moral primacy occurred for general impressions more than hiring-specific judgments.

Conclusion

In sum, we tested the boundaries of moral primacy and found that even in a context where other dimensions could dominate, information about a job candidate's immorality continued to have disproportionate influence on general impressions of him and evaluations of his suitability as an employee. However, our findings further show that the relative effect of negative moral versus competence information on domain-specific judgments tended to be smaller than effects on general impressions. In addition, unlike prior research on impression updating (Brambilla et al., 2019), we observed no evidence for moral primacy in this context when the new information was positive (although this pattern may be indicative of a more general valence asymmetry in the effects of morally relevant information). Together, these findings provide an important extension of the Moral Primacy Model but also provide useful insight on the generalizability of the effect.

The research is here.

Opt-out choice framing attenuates gender differences in the decision to compete in the laboratory and in the field

J. C. He, S. K. Kang, N. Lacetera

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 

Oct 2021, 118 (42) e2108337118

Abstract

Research shows that women are less likely to enter competitions than men. This disparity may translate into a gender imbalance in holding leadership positions or ascending in organizations. We provide both laboratory and field experimental evidence that this difference can be attenuated with a default nudge—changing the choice to enter a competitive task from a default in which applicants must actively choose to compete to a default in which applicants are automatically enrolled in competition but can choose to opt out. Changing the default affects the perception of prevailing social norms about gender and competition as well as perceptions of the performance or ability threshold at which to apply. We do not find associated negative effects for performance or wellbeing. These results suggest that organizations could make use of opt-out promotion schemes to reduce the gender gap in competition and support the ascension of women to leadership positions.

Significance

How can we close the gender gap in high-level positions in organizations? Interventions such as unconscious bias training or the “lean in” approach have been largely ineffective. This article suggests, and experimentally tests, a “nudge” intervention, altering the choice architecture around the decision to apply for top positions from an “opt in” to an “opt out” default. Evidence from the laboratory and the field shows that a choice architecture in which applicants must opt out from competition reduces gender differences in competition. Opt-out framing thus seems to remove some of the bias inherent in current promotion systems, which favor those who are overconfident or like to compete. Importantly, we show that such an intervention is feasible and effective in the field.

From the Discussion

A practical implication of our studies is that organizations could attenuate the gender gap in competitions by moving from a default, in which applicants must opt in to apply, to a default whereby those who pass a performance and qualification threshold are automatically considered but can choose to opt out. Examples include promotions in organizations, participation into start-up pitch competitions, and innovation or creativity contests. Future work could examine similar interventions that circumvent the self-nomination aspect of opt-in schemes for competitive selection processes. For instance, rather than self-nomination, peer-nomination could attenuate the gender gap. The results of Study 2 also suggest that manipulating or nudging social norms could result in a similar effect.

The research is here.