Philip Goff
Scientific American
Originally published 3 July 24
Here is an excerpt:
The hard problem comes after we’ve explained all of these functions of the brain, where we are still left with a puzzle: Why is the carrying out of these functions accompanied by experience? Why doesn’t all this mechanistic functioning go on “in the dark”? In my own work, I have argued that the hard problem is rooted in the way that the “father of modern science,” Galileo, designed physical science to exclude consciousness.
Chalmers made the quandary vivid by promoting the idea of a “philosophical zombie,” a complicated mechanism set up to behave exactly like a human being and with the same information processing in its brain, but with no consciousness. You stick a knife in such a zombie, and it screams and runs away. But it doesn’t actually feel pain. When a philosophical zombie crosses the street, it carefully checks that there is no traffic, but it doesn’t actually have any visual or auditory experience of the street.
Nobody thinks zombies are real, but they offer a vivid way of working out where you stand on the hard problem. Those on Team Chalmers believe that if all there was to a human being were the mechanistic processes of physical science, we’d all be zombies. Given that we’re not zombies, there must be something more going on in us to explain our consciousness. Solving the hard problem is then a matter of working out the extra ingredient, with one increasingly popular option being to posit very rudimentary forms of consciousness at the level of fundamental particles or fields.
For the opposing team, such as the late, great philosopher Daniel Dennett, this division between feeling and behavior makes no sense. The only task for a science of consciousness is explaining behavior, not just the external behavior of the organism but also that of its inner parts. This debate has rattled on for decades.
Here are some thoughts:
The author discusses the "hard problem of consciousness," a concept introduced by philosopher David Chalmers in the 1990s. The hard problem refers to the difficulty of explaining why the brain's functions are accompanied by subjective experience, rather than occurring without any experience at all.
The author uses the idea of "philosophical zombies" (beings that behave like humans but lack consciousness) and "pain-pleasure inverts" (beings that feel pleasure when we feel pain, and vice versa) to illustrate the complexity of this problem.
This is important for psychologists because it highlights the deep mystery surrounding consciousness and suggests that explaining behavior is not enough; we also need to understand subjective experience. It also challenges some basic assumptions about why we behave the way we do and points to the perplexing "mystery of psychophysical harmony" - why our behavior and consciousness align in a coherent way.
