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Monday, March 4, 2024

How to Deal with Counter-Examples to Common Morality Theory: A Surprising Result

Herissone-Kelly P.
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.
2022;31(2):185-191.
doi:10.1017/S096318012100058X

Abstract

Tom Beauchamp and James Childress are confident that their four principles—respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice—are globally applicable to the sorts of issues that arise in biomedical ethics, in part because those principles form part of the common morality (a set of general norms to which all morally committed persons subscribe). Inevitably, however, the question arises of how the principlist ought to respond when presented with apparent counter-examples to this thesis. I examine a number of strategies the principlist might adopt in order to retain common morality theory in the face of supposed counter-examples. I conclude that only a strategy that takes a non-realist view of the common morality’s principles is viable. Unfortunately, such a view is likely not to appeal to the principlist.


Herissone-Kelly examines various strategies principlism could employ to address counter-examples:

Refine the principles: This involves clarifying or reinterpreting the principles to better handle specific cases.
  • Prioritize principles: Establish a hierarchy among the principles to resolve conflicts.
  • Supplement the principles: Introduce additional considerations or context-specific factors.
  • Limit the scope: Acknowledge that the principles may not apply universally to all cultures or situations.
Herissone-Kelly argues that none of these strategies are fully satisfactory. Refining or prioritizing principles risks distorting their original meaning or introducing arbitrariness. Supplementing them can lead to an unwieldy and complex framework. Limiting their scope undermines the theory's claim to universality.

He concludes that the most viable approach is to adopt a non-realist view of the common morality's principles. This means understanding them not as objective moral facts but as flexible tools for ethical reflection and deliberation, open to interpretation and adaptation in different contexts. While this may seem to weaken the theory's authority, Herissone-Kelly argues that it allows for a more nuanced and practical application of ethical principles in a diverse world.