B. Flanagan, G.F.C.F. de Almeida, et al.
researchgate.net
Abstract
Socialization demands the capacity to observe a plethora of private, legal, and institutional rules. To accomplish this, individuals must grasp rules’ meaning and infer the class of conduct each proscribes. Yet this basic account neglects important nuance in the way we reason about complex cases in which a rule’s literal or textualist interpretation conflicts with deeper values. In six studies (total N = 2541), we examined legal determinations through the lens of these cases. We found that moral appraisals—of the rule’s value (Study 1) and the agent’s character (Studies 2-3)—shaped people’s application of rules, driving counter-literal legal determinations. These effects were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect (Study 4). Our final studies explored the role of theory of mind: Textualist judgments arose when agents were described as cognizant of the rule’s text yet ignorant of its deeper purpose (Study 5). Meanwhile, the intuitive tendency toward counter-literal determinations was strongest when the rule’s purpose could be inferred from its text—pointing toward an influence of spontaneous mental state ascriptions (Studies 6a-6b). Together, our results elucidate the cognitive basis of legal reasoning: Intuitive legal determinations build on core competencies in moral cognition, including mental state and character inferences. In turn, cognitive control dampens these effects, promoting a broadly textualist response pattern.
General Discussion
Our present studies suggest that moral appraisals shape people’s determinations of whether various rules have been violated. Counter-literal judgments emerge when agents violate a rule’s morally laudable purpose, but not when they violate a rule’s evil purpose (Study 1). An impact of moral appraisals is observed even when manipulating the transgressor’s broader moral character—such that blameworthy agents are deemed to violate rules to a greater extent than praiseworthy agents, even when both behaviors fall within the literal scope of the rule (Study 2). These effects persist when applying two further robustness checks: (i) when encouraging participants to concurrently and independently evaluate the morality as well as the legality of the target behaviors, and (ii) when explicitly denying any constitutional constraints on the moral propriety of legal or private rules (Study 3). Turning our attention to the underlying cognitive mechanisms, we found that applying time pressure promoted counter-literal judgments (Study 4), suggesting that such decisions are driven by automatic cognitive processes. We then examined how representations of the agent’s knowledge impacted rule application: Stipulating the agent’s ignorance of the rule’s underlying purpose helped to explain the default tendency toward textualist determinations (Study 5). Finally, we uncovered an effect of spontaneous mental state inferences on judgments of whether rules had been violated: Participants appeared to automatically represent the likelihood of inferring the rule’s true purpose from its text, and the inferability of a rule’s purpose yielded greater counter-literal tendencies (Studies 6a-6b)—regardless of the agent’s actual knowledge status.
In essence, an individual's moral judgments affect their interpretation of laws, and biases the decision-making process.
