Human Vision Reconstructs Time to Satisfy Causal Constraints

Bechlivanidis, C., Buehner, M. J., et al.

(2022).

Psychological Science, 33(2), 224–235.

Abstract

The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, because the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here, we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: In three experiments (N = 607), the experienced event timings were determined by causality in real time. Adult participants viewed a simple three-item sequence, ACB, which is typically remembered as ABC in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, participants’ points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite participants’ full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by postperceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades.

Statement of Relevance

There are two sources of information on the temporal order of events: the order in which we experience them and their causal relationships, because causes precede their effects. Intuitively, direct experience of order is far more dependable than causal inference. Here, we showed participants events that looked like collisions, but the collided-on object started moving before the collision occurred. Surprisingly, participants indicated in real time that they saw events happening significantly earlier or later than they actually did, at timings compatible with causal interpretations (as if there were indeed a collision). This is evidence that perceived order is not the passive registration of the sequence of signals arriving at the observer but an active interpretation informed by rich assumptions.

General Discussion

Collectively, our findings constitute the first demonstration of a unisensory perceptual illusion of temporal order induced by causal impressions, indicating that the visual system generates the experienced order through a process of interpretation (Grush, 2016; Holcombe, 2015).  Participants were given precise instructions and sufficient time to repeatedly view the sequences, they attended to the critical events using the same modality, and they synchronized object motion with a nonlocalized flash.  We can thus confidently rule out alternative explanations based on inattentional blindness, multimodal integration, flash lag, and motion aftereffects. Because stimulus presentation was free and unconstrained relative to the time of saccades, our results cannot be accounted for by transient perisaccadic mislocalization, either (Kresevic et al., 2016; Morrone et al., 2005). Although in this case we examined the effect only with an adult population recruited from a crowdsourcing platform, previous research suggests that children as young as 4 years old are also susceptible to causal reordering, at least when asked to make post hoc reports (Tecwyn et al., 2020).  More research needs to be carried out to study the degree of perceptual shift and, more broadly, the generalizability of the current results.

A pdf is here.

Brain Scans Confirm There's a Part of You That Remains 'You' Throughout Your Life

Mike McRae

Science Alert

Originally published 27 Nov 20

At the very core of your identity a kernel of self awareness combines memories of the past with the fleeting sensations of the present, and adds a touch of anticipation for the future.

The question of whether this ongoing sense of 'you' is as robust as it feels has intrigued philosophers and psychologists throughout the ages. A new, small psychobiological study weighs in, looking at brain scans to conclude that at least some part of you is indeed consistent as you grow and age.

"In our study, we tried to answer the question of whether we are the same person throughout our lives," says Miguel Rubianes, a neuroscientist from the Complutense University of Madrid.

"In conjunction with the previous literature, our results indicate that there is a component that remains stable while another part is more susceptible to change over time."

Self-continuity forms the very basis of identity. Every time you use the word 'I', you're referring to a thread that stitches a series of experiences into a tapestry of a lifetime, representing a relationship between the self of your youth with one yet to emerge.

Yet identity is more than the sum of its parts. Consider the allegory of Theseus's ship, or the grandfather's axe paradox – a tool that's had its shaft replaced, as well as its head, but is still somehow the same axe that belonged to grandfather.

If our experiences change us, swapping out components of our identity with every heart break and every promotion, every illness and every windfall, can we truly still say we see ourself as the same person today as we were when we were four years old?

You can be forgiven for thinking this sounds more like philosophical navel-gazing than something science can address. But there are perspectives which psychology – and even the wiring of our neurological programming – can flesh out.

The info is here.

The Tyranny of Time: How Long Does Effective Therapy Really Take?

Jonathan Shedler & Enrico Gnaulati
Psychotherapy Networker
Originally posted March/April 20

Here is an excerpt:

Like the Consumer Reports study, this study also found a dose–response relation between therapy sessions and improvement. In this case, the longer therapy continued, the more clients achieved clinically significant change. So just how much therapy did it take? It took 21 sessions, or about six months of weekly therapy, for 50 percent of clients to see clinically significant change. It took more than 40 sessions, almost a year of weekly therapy, for 75 percent to see clinically significant change.

Information from the surveys of clients and therapists turned out to be pretty spot on. Three independent data sources converge on similar time frames. Every client is different, and no one can predict how much therapy is enough for a specific person, but on average, clinically meaningful change begins around the six-month mark and grows from there. And while some people will get what they need with less therapy, others will need a good deal more.

This is consistent with what clinical theorists have been telling us for the better part of a century. It should come as no surprise. Nothing of deep and lasting value is cheap or easy, and changing oneself and the course of one’s life may be most valuable of all.

Consider what it takes to master any new and complex skill, say learning a language, playing a musical instrument, learning to ski, or becoming adept at carpentry. With six months of practice, you might attain beginner- or novice-level proficiency, maybe. If someone promised to make you an expert in six months, you’d suspect they were selling snake oil. Meaningful personal development takes time and effort. Why would psychotherapy be any different?

The info is here.

The Role of Passing Time in Decision-Making

N. Evans, G. Hawkins, & S. Brown
PsyArXiv
Last edited 1 April 19

Abstract

Theories of perceptual decision-making have been dominated by the idea that evidence accumulates in favor of different alternatives until some fixed threshold amount is reached, which triggers a decision. Recent theories have suggested that these thresholds may not be fixed during each decision, but change as time passes. These collapsing thresholds can improve performance in particular decision environments, but reviews of data from typical decision-making paradigms have failed to support collapsing thresholds. We designed three experiments to test collapsing threshold assumptions in decision environments specifically tailored to make them optimal. An emphasis on decision speed encouraged the adoption of collapsing thresholds – most strongly through the use of response deadlines, but also through instruction to a lesser extent – but setting an explicit goal of reward rate optimality through both instructions and task design did not. Our results provide a new explanation for previous findings regarding decision-making differences between humans and non-human primates.

The research is here.

Slow response times undermine trust in algorithmic (but not human) predictions

E Efendic, P van de Calseyde, & A Evans
PsyArXiv PrePrints
Lasted Edited 22 Jan 20

Abstract

Algorithms consistently perform well on various prediction tasks, but people often mistrust their advice. Here, we demonstrate one component that affects people’s trust in algorithmic predictions: response time. In seven studies (total N = 1928 with 14,184 observations), we find that people judge slowly generated predictions from algorithms as less accurate and they are less willing to rely on them. This effect reverses for human predictions, where slowly generated predictions are judged to be more accurate. In explaining this asymmetry, we find that slower response times signal the exertion of effort for both humans and algorithms. However, the relationship between perceived effort and prediction quality differs for humans and algorithms. For humans, prediction tasks are seen as difficult and effort is therefore positively correlated with the perceived quality of predictions. For algorithms, however, prediction tasks are seen as easy and effort is therefore uncorrelated to the quality of algorithmic predictions. These results underscore the complex processes and dynamics underlying people’s trust in algorithmic (and human) predictions and the cues that people use to evaluate their quality.

General discussion 

When are people reluctant to trust algorithm-generated advice? Here, we demonstrate that it depends on the algorithm’s response time. People judged slowly (vs. quickly) generated predictions by algorithms as being of lower quality. Further, people were less willing to use slowly generated algorithmic predictions. For human predictions, we found the opposite: people judged slow human-generated predictions as being of higher quality. Similarly, they were more likely to use slowly generated human predictions. 

We find that the asymmetric effects of response time can be explained by different expectations of task difficulty for humans vs. algorithms. For humans, slower responses were congruent with expectations; the prediction task was presumably difficult so slower responses, and more effort, led people to conclude that the predictions were high quality. For algorithms, slower responses were incongruent with expectations; the prediction task was presumably easy so slower speeds, and more effort, were unrelated to prediction quality. 

The research is here.

The Morality of Larks and Owls: Unethical Behavior Depends on Chronotype

Brian Gunia, Christopher Barnes, and Sunita Sah
The Morality of Larks and Owls: Unethical Behavior Depends on Chronotype as Well as Time-of-Day Psychological Science, Forthcoming
Georgetown McDonough School of Business Research Paper.

Abstract:    

The recently-documented “morning morality effect” indicates that people act most ethically in the morning because their energy wanes with the day. An estimated 40% of the population, however, experience increased energy levels later in the day. These “evening people,” we propose, should not show the morning morality effect. Instead, they should show the same or an increasing propensity toward ethicality in the evening. Two experiments supported this hypothesis, showing that people with a morning chronotype tend to behave more ethically in the morning than the evening, while people with an evening chronotype tend to behave more ethically in the evening than the morning. Thus, understanding when people will behave unethically may require an appreciation of both the person (chronotype) and the situation (time-of-day): a chronotype morality effect.

The entire article is here.

Time, Money, and Morality

By Gino, F., and C. Mogilner. "Time, Money, and Morality." Psychological Science (forthcoming).

Abstract

Money, a resource that absorbs much daily attention, seems to be present in much unethical behavior thereby suggesting that money itself may corrupt. This research examines a way to offset such potentially deleterious effects—by focusing on time, a resource that tends to receive less attention than money but is equally ubiquitous in our daily lives. Across four experiments, we examine whether shifting focus onto time can salvage individuals' ethicality. We found that implicitly activating the construct of time, rather than money, leads individuals to behave more ethically by cheating less. We further found that priming time reduces cheating by making people reflect on who they are. Implications for the use of time versus money primes in discouraging or promoting dishonesty are discussed.

The entire article is here.