Problems with the interjurisdictional regulation of psychological practice

Taube, D. O., Shapiro, D. L., et al. (2023).

Professional Psychology: Research and Practice,

54(6), 389–402.

https://doi.org/10.1037/pro0000536

Abstract

The U.S. Constitutional structure creates ethical conflicts for the cross-jurisdictional practice of professional psychology. The profession has chosen to seek interstate agreements to overcome such barriers, and such agreements now include almost 80% of American jurisdictions. Although an improvement over a patchwork of state laws regarding practice, the structure of this agreement and the exclusion of the remaining states continue to pose barriers to the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. It creates a system that is extraordinarily difficult to change and places an unrealistic burden on professionals to know, address, and act under complex legal mandates. As psychological services have moved increasingly to remote platforms, cross-jurisdictional business models, and a nationwide mental health crisis emerged alongside the pandemic, it is time to consider a national professional licensing system more seriously, both to further reduce barriers to care and complexity and permit the best interests of patients to prevail.

Impact Statement

Access to and the ability to continue receiving mental health care across jurisdictions and nations has become increasingly urgent in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic This Ethics in Motion section highlights legal barriers to providing ethical care across jurisdictions, how those challenges developed, and strengths and limitations of current approaches and potential solutions.

The info is here.

My summary: 

The current system of interjurisdictional regulation of psychological practice in the United States is problematic because it creates ethical conflicts for psychologists and places an unrealistic burden on them to comply with complex legal mandates. The system is also extraordinarily difficult to change, and it excludes psychologists in states that have not joined the interstate agreement. As a result, the current system does not adequately protect the interests of patients.

A national professional licensing system would be a more effective way to regulate the practice of psychology across state lines. Such a system would eliminate the need for psychologists to comply with multiple state laws, and it would make it easier for them to provide care to patients who live in different states. A national system would also be more equitable, as it would ensure that all psychologists are held to the same standards.

The ethics of doing human enhancement ethics

Rueda, J. (2023). 

Futures, 153, 103236.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103236

Abstract

Human enhancement is one of the leading research topics in contemporary applied ethics. Interestingly, the widespread attention to the ethical aspects of future enhancement applications has generated misgivings. Are researchers who spend their time investigating the ethics of futuristic human enhancement scenarios acting in an ethically suboptimal manner? Are the methods they use to analyze future technological developments appropriate? Are institutions wasting resources by funding such research? In this article, I address the ethics of doing human enhancement ethics focusing on two main concerns. The Methodological Problem refers to the question of how we should methodologically address the moral aspects of future enhancement applications. The Normative Problem refers to what is the normative justification for investigating and funding the research on the ethical aspects of future human enhancement. This article aims to give a satisfactory response to both meta-questions in order to ethically justify the inquiry into the ethical aspects of emerging enhancement technologies.

Highlights

• Formulates second-order problems neglected in the literature on the ethics of future enhancement technologies.

• Discusses speculative ethics and anticipatory ethics methodologies for analyzing emerging enhancement innovations.

• Evaluates the main objections to engaging in research into the ethical aspects of future scenarios of human enhancement.

• Shows that methodological and normative meta-questions are key to advance the ethical debate on human enhancement.

A Hybrid Account of Harm

Unruh, C. F. (2022).

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1–14.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2048401

Abstract

When does a state of affairs constitute a harm to someone? Comparative accounts say that being worse off constitutes harm. The temporal version of the comparative account is seldom taken seriously, due to apparently fatal counterexamples. I defend the temporal version against these counterexamples, and show that it is in fact more plausible than the prominent counterfactual version of the account. Non-comparative accounts say that being badly off constitutes harm. However, neither the temporal comparative account nor the non-comparative account can correctly classify all harms. I argue that we should combine them into a hybrid account of harm. The hybrid account is extensionally adequate and presents a unified view on the nature of harm.

The info is here.

Here's my take:

Charlotte Unruh proposes a new way of thinking about harm. Unruh argues that neither the traditional comparative account nor the non-comparative account of harm can adequately explain all cases of harm. The comparative account says that harm consists in being worse off than one would have been had some event not occurred. The non-comparative account says that harm consists in being in a bad state, regardless of how one would have fared otherwise.

Unruh proposes a hybrid account of harm that combines elements of both the comparative and non-comparative accounts. She says that an agent suffers harm if and only if either (i) the agent suffers ill-being or (ii) the agent's well-being is lower than it was before. This hybrid account is able to explain cases of harm that cannot be explained by either the comparative or non-comparative account alone. For example, the hybrid account explains why it is harmful to prevent someone from achieving a good that they would have otherwise achieved, even if the person is still in a good state overall.

Unruh's hybrid account of harm has a number of advantages over other accounts of harm. It is extensionally adequate, meaning that it correctly classifies all cases of harm as harmful and all cases of non-harm as non-harmful. It is also normatively plausible, meaning that it accords with our intuitions about what counts as harm. Additionally, the hybrid account is able to explain a number of different phenomena related to harm, such as the severity of harm, the distribution of harm, and the compensation for harm.

The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in Shaping the Moral Circle

Jaeger, B., & Wilks, M. (2021). 

Cognitive Science. 

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/46kws

Abstract

People's treatment of others (humans, nonhuman animals, or other entities) often depends on whether they think the entity is worthy of moral concern. Recent work has begun to investigate which entities are included in a person's moral circle, examining how certain target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) shape moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of target and judge characteristics in predicting moral inclusion remains unclear. When predicting whether a person will deem an entity worthy of moral consideration, how important is it to know who is making the judgment (i.e., characteristics of the judge), who is being judged (i.e., characteristics of the target), and potential interactions between the two factors? Here, we address this foundational question by conducting a variance component analysis of the moral circle. In two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (N = 836), we test how much variance in judgments of moral concern is explained by between-target differences, between-judge differences, and by the interaction between the two factors. We consistently find that all three components explain substantial amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. Our findings provide two important insights. First, an increased focus on interactions between target and judge characteristics is needed, as these interactions explain as much variance as target and judge characteristics separately. Second, any theoretical account that aims to provide an accurate description of moral inclusion needs to consider target characteristics, judge characteristics, and their interaction.

Here is my take:

The authors begin by reviewing the literature on the moral circle, which is the group of beings that people believe are worthy of moral consideration. They note that both target characteristics (e.g., species category, perceived intelligence) and judge characteristics (e.g., empathy, political orientation) have been shown to influence moral inclusion. However, the relative importance of these two types of characteristics remains unclear.

To address this question, the authors conducted two studies with participants from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In each study, participants were asked to rate how much moral concern they felt for a variety of targets, including humans, animals, and robots. Participants were also asked to complete a questionnaire about their own moral values and beliefs.

The authors' analysis revealed that both target and judge characteristics explained significant amounts of variance in judgments of moral concern. However, they also found that the interaction between target and judge characteristics was just as important as target and judge characteristics separately. This means that the moral circle is not simply a function of either target or judge characteristics, but rather of the complex interaction between the two.

The authors' findings have important implications for our understanding of the moral circle. They show that moral inclusion is not simply a matter of whether or not a target possesses certain characteristics (e.g., sentience, intelligence). Rather, it also depends on the characteristics of the judge, as well as the interaction between the two.

The authors' findings also have important implications for applied ethics. For example, they suggest that ethicists should be careful to avoid making generalizations about the moral status of entire groups of beings. Instead, they should consider the individual characteristics of both the target and the judge when making moral judgments.

This algorithm could predict your health, income, and chance of premature death

Holly Barker

Science.org

Originally published 18 DEC 23

Here is an excerpt:

The researchers trained the model, called “life2vec,” on every individual’s life story between 2008 to 2016, and the model sought patterns in these stories. Next, they used the algorithm to predict whether someone on the Danish national registers had died by 2020.

The model’s predictions were accurate 78% of the time. It identified several factors that favored a greater risk of premature death, including having a low income, having a mental health diagnosis, and being male. The model’s misses were typically caused by accidents or heart attacks, which are difficult to predict.

Although the results are intriguing—if a bit grim—some scientists caution that the patterns might not hold true for non-Danish populations. “It would be fascinating to see the model adapted using cohort data from other countries, potentially unveiling universal patterns, or highlighting unique cultural nuances,” says Youyou Wu, a psychologist at University College London.

Biases in the data could also confound its predictions, she adds. (The overdiagnosis of schizophrenia among Black people could cause algorithms to mistakenly label them at a higher risk of premature death, for example.) That could have ramifications for things such as insurance premiums or hiring decisions, Wu adds.

The info is here.

Here is my summary:

A new algorithm, trained on a mountain of Danish life stories, can peer into your future with unsettling precision. It can predict your health, income, and even your odds of an early demise. This, achieved by analyzing the sequence of life events, like getting a job or falling ill, raises both possibilities and ethical concerns.

On one hand, imagine the potential for good: nudges towards healthier habits or financial foresight, tailored to your personal narrative. On the other, anxieties around bias and discrimination loom. We must ensure this powerful tool is used wisely, for the benefit of all, lest it exacerbate existing inequalities or create new ones. The algorithm’s gaze into the future, while remarkable, is just that – a glimpse, not a script. 

Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US, and Brazil

Paulo Sérgio Boggio, et al. (2023) 

Philosophical Psychology

DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637

Abstract

Morality has traditionally been described in terms of an impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral psychological research has largely followed in this vein, focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness, manipulating whether the person doing the action was a friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e., conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are judged differently according to who committed them and according to the political ideology of the judges. We discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and the black sheep effect.

The study is here.

Here is my summary:

The study explores how moral judgments vary depending on both the agent committing the act and the nationality of the person making the judgment. The study's findings challenge the notion that moral judgments are universal and instead suggest that they are influenced by cultural and national factors.

The researchers investigated how participants from the UK, US, and Brazil judged moral violations committed by different agents: friends, strangers, refugees, and unspecified individuals. They found that participants from all three countries generally judged violations committed by friends more harshly than violations committed by other agents. However, there were also significant cultural differences in the severity of judgments. Brazilians tended to judge violations of purity as less wrong than Americans, but judged violations of care, liberty, and fairness as more wrong than Americans.

The study's findings suggest that moral judgments are not simply based on the severity of the act itself, but also on factors such as the relationship between the agent and the victim, and the cultural background of the person making the judgment. These findings have implications for understanding cross-cultural moral conflicts and for developing more effective moral education programs.

Pope Francis approves Catholic blessings for same-sex couples, but not for marriage

Becky Sullivan

npr.org

Originally posted 18 Dec 23

Pope Francis has granted his formal approval allowing Catholic priests to bless same-sex couples so long as they do not appear to endorse their marriage, marking the church's most permissive decree yet on the issue of same-sex couples.

The declaration, published Monday in a new document titled "Fiducia Supplicans: On the Pastoral Meaning of Blessings," marks a major departure for the Vatican, which only two years ago had said God "cannot bless sin" in a controversial 2021 decision about same-sex couples. Monday's document was approved by Pope Francis.

Still, the Vatican stressed that marriage remains exclusively between a man and a woman, and any priests granting a blessing to a same-sex couple must "avoid any form of confusion or scandal" that could suggest otherwise.

Francis, 87, has made liberalization toward LGBTQ Catholics a hallmark of his papacy. Since he became pope in 2013, he has urged the decriminalization of homosexuality. When asked in 2013 about gay priests, he famously replied: "If someone is gay and he searches for the Lord and has good will, who am I to judge?"

Monday's declaration is a "major step forward" for the church in regards to LGBTQ people, said the Rev. James Martin, an American Jesuit priest who has advocated for the LGBTQ Catholic community.

The declaration "recognizes the deep desire in many Catholic same-sex couples for God's presence in their loving relationships," Martin wrote on the social media site X, formerly known as Twitter. "In short, yesterday, as a priest, I was forbidden to bless same-sex couples at all. Today, with some limitations, I can."

What the declaration says about blessings for same-sex couples

In the document, the Vatican draws a distinction between what it described as "ritual and liturgical" blessings and those that are more informal and spontaneous.

"This Declaration remains firm on the traditional doctrine of the Church about marriage, not allowing any type of liturgical rite or blessing similar to a liturgical rite that can create confusion," wrote prefect Cardinal Victor Manuel Fernández in an introduction to the document.

The info is here.

The moral arc of the universe is long and complicated, and we hope it bends toward justice.

-paraphrasing Theodore Parker and Martin Luther King Jr.

Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation

Knobe, J., Prasada, S., & Newman, G. E. (2013).

Cognition, 127(2), 242–257. 

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.01.005

Abstract

Five experiments provide evidence for a class of ‘dual character concepts.’ Dual character concepts characterize their members in terms of both (a) a set of concrete features and (b) the abstract values that these features serve to realize. As such, these concepts provide two bases for evaluating category members and two different criteria for category membership. Experiment 1 provides support for the notion that dual character concepts have two bases for evaluation. Experiments 2–4 explore the claim that dual character concepts have two different criteria for category membership. The results show that when an object possesses the appropriate concrete features, but does not fulfill the appropriate abstract value, it is judged to be a category member in one sense but not in another. Finally, Experiment 5 uses the theory developed here to construct artificial dual character concepts and examines whether participants react to these artificial concepts in the same way as naturally occurring dual character concepts. The present studies serve to define the nature of dual character concepts and distinguish them from other types of concepts (e.g., natural kind concepts), which share some, but not all of the properties of dual character concepts. More broadly, these phenomena suggest a normative dimension in everyday conceptual representation.

Here is my summary of the research, which has its current critics:

This research challenged traditional understandings of categorization and evaluation. Dual character concepts, exemplified by terms like "artist," "scientist," and "teacher," possess two distinct dimensions:

Concrete Features: These are the observable, physical attributes or characteristics that members of the category share.

Abstract Values: These are the underlying goals, ideals, or purposes that the concrete features serve to realize.

Unlike other types of concepts, dual character concepts allow for two distinct bases for evaluation:

Good/Bad Evaluation: This assessment is based on how well the concrete features of an entity align with the expected characteristics of a category member.

True/False Evaluation: This judgment is based on whether the abstract values embedded in the concept are fulfilled by the concrete features of an entity.

This dual-pronged evaluation process leads to intriguing consequences for categorization and judgment. An object may be deemed a "good" category member based on its concrete features, yet not a "true" member if it fails to uphold the abstract values associated with the concept.

The researchers provide compelling evidence for the existence of dual character concepts through a series of experiments. These studies demonstrate that people have two distinct ways of characterizing category members and that dual character concepts influence judgments of category membership.

The concept of dual character concepts highlights the normative dimension of conceptual representation, suggesting that our concepts not only reflect the world but also embody our values and beliefs. This normative dimension shapes how we categorize objects, evaluate entities, and make decisions in our daily lives.

Folk Psychological Attributions of Consciousness to Large Language Models

Colombatto, C., & Fleming, S. M.

(2023, November 22). PsyArXiv

https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/5cnrv

Abstract

Technological advances raise new puzzles and challenges for cognitive science and the study of how humans think about and interact with artificial intelligence (AI). For example, the advent of Large Language Models and their human-like linguistic abilities has raised substantial debate regarding whether or not AI could be conscious. Here we consider the question of whether AI could have subjective experiences such as feelings and sensations (“phenomenological consciousness”). While experts from many fieldshave weighed in on this issue in academic and public discourse, it remains unknown how the general population attributes phenomenology to AI. We surveyed a sample of US residents (N=300) and found that a majority of participants were willing to attribute phenomenological consciousness to LLMs. These attributions were robust, as they predicted attributions of mental states typically associated with phenomenology –but also flexible, as they were sensitive to individual differences such as usage frequency. Overall, these results show how folk intuitions about AI consciousness can diverge from expert intuitions –with important implications for the legal and ethical status of AI.

The preprint is here.

My summary:

The results of the study show that people are generally more likely to attribute consciousness to LLMs than to other non-human entities, such as animals, plants, and robots. However, the level of consciousness attributed to LLMs is still relatively low, with most participants rating them as less conscious than humans. The authors argue that these findings reflect the influence of folk psychology, which is the tendency to explain the behavior of others in terms of mental states.

The authors also found that people's attributions of consciousness to LLMs were influenced by their beliefs about the nature of consciousness and their familiarity with LLMs. Participants who were more familiar with LLMs were more likely to attribute consciousness to them, and participants who believed that consciousness is a product of complex computation were also more likely to attribute consciousness to LLMs.

Overall, the study suggests that people are generally open to the possibility that LLMs may be conscious, but they also recognize that LLMs are not as conscious as humans. These findings have implications for the development and use of LLMs, as they suggest that people may be more willing to trust and interact with LLMs that they believe are conscious.