Individualist moral principles and the expansion of the moral circle

Singh, M., & Hoffman, M. (2022, August 20).

https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/pqem7

Abstract

The last three centuries have witnessed a moral and political transformation. Groups previously denied equivalent moral standing—including propertyless men, women, ethnic and religious minorities, homosexuals, and slaves—became moral equals deserving of similar legal treatment. Here we argue that this process was driven by the reputational benefits of demonstrating commitment to individualist moral principles. These principles flourished in “fluid” social ecologies with high relational mobility and weak kinship institutions, both as individuals aimed to signal impersonal prosociality and as they strove to be governed under institutions that protected substitutable individuals unbound by formal obligations. As long as parties benefited from appearing committed to these principles, and denying rights to certain groups appeared inconsistent with these principles, then those parties were incentivized to grant those rights. Given the universalist nature of these principles, people signaling commitment were also incentivized to sanction rights-based violations in other countries, helping expand rights beyond their original context. We use this account to explain both expansions and contractions of the moral circle and reconcile the roles of ideas, markets, reasoning, reputation, the Catholic Church, argumentation, moral intuition, social organization, individual strategizing, and large-scale cultural evolution.

From the General Discussion

The first, which we’ll call sincere ideology, acknowledges that expansions occurred because of internalized principles yet rejects or downplays the role of trust. By this account, people have pushed for better treatment because of principles adopted for many potential reasons, such as argumentation or other socialization processes, yet desires to attract trust have been minimally involved.  For the sake of convenience, we refer this account as sincere ideology, although a better name might be sincere ideology without trust, given that our account permits that individuals will internalize and genuinely feel committed to principles to the extent that doing so helps cultivate trust.

The second alternative we call bargaining-for-rights. By this account, the moral circle has expanded because minority groups were better able to bargain for better treatment. An example of this account is Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000) proposal that Western elites expanded the franchise as concessions to deter social unrest.

Both alternatives are consistent with some of the observations we and other researchers have reported. For instance, the sincere ideology account similarly predicts that revolutionaries who claim certain moral principles will create corresponding institutions after gaining power (sect. 4.2).  Bargaining-for-rights, meanwhile, is consistent with rights expanding with increasingly fluid social ecologies.  Yet on their own, each has difficulty explaining key patterns.

The research is here.

Permitting immoral behaviour: A generalized compensation belief hypothesis

Wang, X., Chen, Z., et al. (2022). 

British Journal of Psychology.

https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12593

Abstract

When are we more likely to permit immoral behaviours? The current research examined a generalized compensation belief hypothesis that individuals, as observers, would morally tolerate and accept someone paying forward unfair treatment to an innocent person as a means to compensate for the perpetrator's previously experienced mistreatment. Across five experiments (N = 1107) based on economic games (Studies 1–4) and diverse real-life scenarios (Study 5), we showed that participants, as observing third parties, were more likely to morally permit and engage in the same negative act once they knew about previous maltreatment of the perpetrator. This belief occurred even when the content of received and paid-forward maltreatment was non-identical (Study 2), when the negative treatment was received from a non-human target (Study 3) and when the maltreatment was intangible (e.g. material loss) or relational (e.g. social exclusion; Study 5). Perceived required compensation mediated the effect of previous maltreatment on moral permission (Studies 4 and 5). The results consistently suggest that people's moral permission of immoral behaviours is influenced by perpetrator's previous mistreatment, contributing to a better understanding of the nature and nuances of our sense of fairness and contextualized moral judgement.

From the General Discussion

The existence of a generalized compensation belief is in line with the theories of person-specific equity and equity with the world, which state that individuals attempt to maintain net equity (i.e. a balance between loss and gain) both within and across relationships (Austin & Walster, 1974; Homans, 1961).  Whereas traditional person-specific equity and equity with the world theories are mainly concerned about how I (i.e. the first-person perspective) actually form balanced relations with others (out of potential motives, e.g. self-interest and negative affect), generalized compensation belief examines individuals' perception of how general social interactions involving mistreatments should be, and it shows that individuals have a fundamental moral belief in balancing social interactions and permit paying-forward moral mistreatment, even when their self-interest remains relatively irrelevant.

At first sight, the generalized compensation belief may be inconsistent with the predictions of some theories. For example, the theory of morality-as-cooperation argues that solutions to problems of cooperation constitute human morality (Curry et al., 2019a, 2019b), thus whether an act is considered morally acceptable or not should depend on whether it promotes cooperation. Generalized compensation belief permits paying forward a harmful act and does not promote immediate interpersonal cooperation (if not promote the opposite). However, it is worth pointing out that the theory of morality-as-cooperation makes no specific predictions about how we make a moral judgement in particular proximate contexts.  The generalized compensation belief could still be compatible with the ultimate function of ensuring generalized reciprocity and promoting cooperation in the end, a possibility worth examining using evolutionary psychology approaches.

The research is here.

COVID-19 and Politically Motivated Reasoning

Maguire, A., Persson, E., Västfjäll, D., & 

Tinghög, G. (2022). Medical Decision Making.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X221118078

Abstract

Background

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the world witnessed a partisan segregation of beliefs toward the global health crisis and its management. Politically motivated reasoning, the tendency to interpret information in accordance with individual motives to protect valued beliefs rather than objectively considering the facts, could represent a key process involved in the polarization of attitudes. The objective of this study was to explore politically motivated reasoning when participants assess information regarding COVID-19.

Design

We carried out a preregistered online experiment using a diverse sample (N = 1500) from the United States. Both Republicans and Democrats assessed the same COVID-19–related information about the health effects of lockdowns, social distancing, vaccination, hydroxychloroquine, and wearing face masks.

Results

At odds with our prestated hypothesis, we found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19. Moreover, we found no evidence supporting the idea that numeric ability or cognitive sophistication bolster politically motivated reasoning in the case of COVID-19. Instead, our findings suggest that participants base their assessment on prior beliefs of the matter.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more likely to be driven by lack of reasoning than politically motivated reasoning—a finding that opens potential avenues for combating political polarization about important health care topics.

Highlights

• Participants assessed numerical information regarding the effect of different COVID-19 policies.

• We found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19.

• Participants tend to base their assessment of COVID-19–related facts on prior beliefs of the matter.

• Politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more a result of lack of thinking than partisanship.

The research is here.

The Nature of Moral Progress: Definitions, Types and Measures

John Danaher

Philosophical Disquisitions

Originally posted 24 AUG 22

Moral progress is something to be celebrated. But what is it, exactly? In answer to that question, many people point to paradigmatic cases of moral progress: the abolition of slavery, the extension of legal rights to women and racial minorities, the decriminalisation of homosexuality, and so on. But what is it that unites these cases? What makes them all instances of moral progress? Can we identify progress as it happens or does it only become obvious in retrospect?  These are important questions. They are important from a social perspective since past episodes of moral progress have improved the state of the world for many people. We might like to accelerate such progress in the future. They are also important from an individual perspective since we want to be on the right side of history. We don’t want to be reactionary, conservative, relics of the past. At least, most of us don’t.

But it is not always easy to say what moral progress is or to understand how it comes about. Philosophers and social scientists have been studying this topic for some time and there is considerable disagreement about what it is and whether it exists. Indeed, as some academic commentators have noted “for much of the 20th century, it was taken as a sign of moral progress that we had stopped believing in it” (Sauer et al 2021).

Still, we can say some things about the nature of moral progress. In particular, following a recent review by Hanno Sauer, Charlie Blunden, Cecilie Eriksen and Paul Rehren, we can say something about: (i) the definition of moral progress; (ii) the different forms of moral progress; and (iii) the epistemic challenge of identifying episodes of moral progress. In what follows, I will consider each of these in more detail. In doing so, I am inspired, but not constrained, by what Sauer and his colleagues have to say. Much of what I write will summarise their insights; but some of what I write will expand upon or criticise what they have to say. It should be obvious when the latter is happening.

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From Measuring Moral Progress section

And therein lies the rub. The measurement problem arises from the fact that there may be too many measuring sticks and they might not all reach the same verdict about a particular instance of moral change. What’s more, these measuring sticks might be contested, with some groups preferring one over another. The demoralisation of homosexuality might be progressive when measured against the values of autonomy and individual well-being but, according to conservative critics, would be regressive (or transgressive) when measured against the values of purity, naturalness, and social cohesion.

And the problem may go even deeper than this. If moral measuring sticks are themselves subject to progressive moral change, then it might be even more difficult to classify instances of change as progressive. You have to have some fixed set of values against which to measure change as progressive. If nothing is fixed, then all progress seems illusory (or at least highly contingent and relativistic).

These are not new problems. They have been part and parcel of moral philosophy for a long time, but they do affect the study of moral progress. I tend to think there is no entirely satisfactory resolution to them. The best we can do is to be clear about the measuring sticks we are using.

The blog post is here.

A psychologically rich life: Beyond happiness and meaning

Oishi, S., & Westgate, E. C. (2022).

Psychological Review, 129(4), 790–811.

https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000317

Abstract

Psychological science has typically conceptualized a good life in terms of either hedonic or eudaimonic well-being. We propose that psychological richness is another, neglected aspect of what people consider a good life. Unlike happy or meaningful lives, psychologically rich lives are best characterized by a variety of interesting and perspective-changing experiences. We present empirical evidence that happiness, meaning, and psychological richness are related but distinct and desirable aspects of a good life, with unique causes and correlates. In doing so, we show that a nontrivial number of people around the world report they would choose a psychologically rich life at the expense of a happy or meaningful life, and that approximately a third say that undoing their life’s biggest regret would have made their lives psychologically richer. Furthermore, we propose that the predictors of a psychologically rich life are different from those of a happy life or a meaningful life, and report evidence suggesting that people leading psychologically rich lives tend to be more curious, think more holistically, and lean more politically liberal. Together, this work moves us beyond the dichotomy of hedonic versus eudaimonic well-being, and lays the foundation for the study of psychological richness as another dimension of a good life.

Summary of Empirical Evidence

A psychologically rich life, filled with a wide variety of interesting and perspective-changing experiences, is distinct from a happy life and a meaningful life. Psychometrically, a 3-factor model, in which happiness, meaning, and psychological richness each constitute discrete constructs, fits the data significantly better than 1- or 2-factor models which conflate richness with happiness or meaning.  Likewise, people with psychologically rich lives differ in personality from people leading happy or meaningful lives. Openness to experience, in particular, as well as extraversion strongly predicts psychological richness. Finally, leading a psychologically rich life predicts important outcomes above and beyond a happy and/or meaningful life, including system justification, political orientation, attributional complexity, and challenge-seeking.

In sum, the building blocks of a psychologically rich life are different. Particular life experiences and situational factors uniquely contribute to psychological richness, without increasing happiness or meaning. For instance, students’ lives were psychologically richer after a semester studying abroad, but not happier or more meaningful. In experimental work, we likewise find that perspective change uniquely predicts psychological richness. Figure-ground illusions consistently evoke more psychological richness than comparable drawings (but do not increase positive moods). Shifts in perspective increase how psychologically rich (but not how personally meaningful) people find cognitive activities, and perspective-changing information (e.g., learning that a pianist is blind) enriches a musical performance. Finally, perceived difficulty is uniquely associated with psychological richness and (independent of outcomes) predicts how rich, but not how happy or meaningful, people find escape rooms. This is clearly illustrated in the obituary studies: Dramatic (and mostly unpleasant) life events such as unemployment and bereavement are positively associated with richness but negatively associated with happiness.

A pdf of the research is here.

Attributions of emotion and reduced attitude openness prevent people from engaging others with opposing views

Teeny, J. D., & Petty, R. E. (2022).

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 

102, 104373.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104373

Abstract

People exhibit a general unwillingness to engage others on social issues for which they disagree (e.g., political elections, police funding, vaccine mandates, etc.), a phenomenon that contributes to the political polarization vexing societies today. Previous research has largely attributed this unwillingness to the perception that such counterattitudinal targets are extreme, certain, and/or difficult to change on these topics. However, the present research offers an additional theoretical explanation. First, we introduce a less studied perception of targets, their affective-cognitive attitude basis (i.e., the degree to which an attitude is seemingly based on emotions versus reasons) that is critical in determining engagement willingness. Specifically, perceivers are less willing to engage with targets who are perceived to hold an affective (vs. cognitive) attitude basis on a topic, because these targets are inferred to have low attitudinal openness on it (i.e., expected to be unlikely to genuinely “hear out” the perceiver). Second, we use a series of multimethod studies with varied U.S. samples to show why this person perception process is central to understanding counterattitudinal engagement. Compared to proattitudinal targets, perceivers on both sides of an issue ascribe more affective (vs. cognitive) attitude bases to rival (counterattitudinal) targets, which cues inferences of reduced attitudinal openness, thereby diminishing people's willingness to engage with these individuals.

From the General Discussion

One of the foremost paths to combatting political polarization is to have people of opposing views engage with counterattitudinal others (e.g., Broockman & Kalla, 2016). Unfortunately, people tend to be unwilling to do this, which previous research has largely attributed to perceptions about the target’s attitudinal extremity, certainty, and the perceived difficulty required to change the target’s mind. However, in the current research, effects on these measures were not only inconsistent (see Footnotes 2 and 4 as well as the web appendix), but they also had reduced explanatory power relative to the focal perceptions outlined here. That is, regardless of how certain, extreme, or difficult to change a counterattitudinal target was perceived to be, it was the affect (relative to cognition) ascribed to their attitude that predicted inferences of reduced attitudinal openness, which in turn determined bipartisan engagement.

These findings emerged across multiple topics, varied study designs, and in light of targets presenting actual rationale for their opinions.  Moreover, post-hoc analyses reveal that these effects were neither moderated by which side of the issue the participants took, nor the participant’s ideological stance (i.e., both liberals and conservatives demonstrated these effects), nor the participants’ own perceived attitude basis.

A pdf is here.

Beyond individualism: Is there a place for relational autonomy in clinical practice and research?

Dove, E. S., Kelly, S. E., et al. (2017).

Clinical Ethics, 12(3), 150–165.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1477750917704156

Abstract

The dominant, individualistic understanding of autonomy that features in clinical practice and research is underpinned by the idea that people are, in their ideal form, independent, self-interested and rational gain-maximising decision-makers. In recent decades, this paradigm has been challenged from various disciplinary and intellectual directions. Proponents of ‘relational autonomy’ in particular have argued that people’s identities, needs, interests – and indeed autonomy – are always also shaped by their relations to others. Yet, despite the pronounced and nuanced critique directed at an individualistic understanding of autonomy, this critique has had very little effect on ethical and legal instruments in clinical practice and research so far. In this article, we use four case studies to explore to what extent, if at all, relational autonomy can provide solutions to ethical and practical problems in clinical practice and research. We conclude that certain forms of relational autonomy can have a tangible and positive impact on clinical practice and research. These solutions leave the ultimate decision to the person most affected, but encourage and facilitate the consideration of this person’s care and responsibility for connected others.

From the Discussion section

Together, these cases show that in our quest to enhance the practical value of the concept of relational autonomy in healthcare and research, we must be careful not to remove the patient or participant from the centre of decision-making. At the same time, we should acknowledge that the patient’s decision to consent (or refuse) to treatment or research can be augmented by facilitating and encouraging that her relations to, and responsibility for, others are considered in decision-making processes. Our case studies do not suggest that we should expand consent requirements to others per se, such as family members or community elders – that is, to add the requirement of seeking consent from further individuals who may also be seen as having a stake in the decision. Such a position would undermine the idea that the person who is centrally affected by a decision should typically have the final say in what happens with and to her, or her body, or even her data. As long as this general principle respects all legal exceptions (see below), we believe that it is a critical underpinning of fundamental respect for persons that should not done away with. Moreover, expanding consent or requiring consent to include others (however so defined) undermines the main objective of relational autonomy, which is to foreground the relational aspect of human identities and interests, and not merely to expand the range of individuals who need to give consent to a procedure. An approach that merely extends consent requirements to other people does not foreground relations but rather presumptions about who the relevant others of a person are.

The article is here.

Why do narcissists find conspiracy theories so appealing?

A. Cichocka, M. Marchlewska, & M. Biddlestone

Current Opinion in Psychology

Volume 47, October 2022, 101386

Abstract

Narcissism—a conviction about one's superiority and entitlement to special treatment—is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. Recent developments in the study of narcissism suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. We argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. Specifically, we discuss the role of paranoia, gullibility, and the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. We also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one's social groups. We consider the wider implications this research might have, especially for political leadership. We conclude by discussing outstanding questions about sharing conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation.

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Gullibility

Although narcissists are typically overconfident in their abilities, judgments, and intelligence, they tend to be naive and less likely to engage in cognitive reflection. For example, Hart and colleagues found that those scoring high in narcissistic rivalry/antagonism (but not admiration/agentic extraversion) were more gullible, that is insensitive to cues of untrustworthiness and vulnerable to being manipulated. Furthermore, studies consistently show that both grandiose (especially its antagonistic, but less consistently agentic extroversive, component) and vulnerable (its antagonistic and neurotic components) narcissism are associated with a predisposition towards odd and unusual beliefs. Conspiracy theories can be one example of such beliefs. There is also evidence that gullibility strengthens the association between narcissism and conspiracy beliefs. In a study by Ahadzadeh and colleagues, the link between narcissism and endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories was especially pronounced among those who were not skeptical towards social media posts in the first place. Taken together, this research suggests that narcissistic antagonism and neuroticism might predict higher gullibility, further related to conspiracy beliefs.

Parallel effects of collective narcissism

Multiple studies indicate that conspiracy theories might not only be appealing to those high in individual narcissism, but also in collective narcissism—a belief that one's group is exceptional and deserves special treatment. Collective narcissism predicts beliefs in conspiracy theories about outgroups, for instance accusing them of involvement in high-profile events (such as the 2019 Smolensk air disaster). Collective narcissism has also been linked to beliefs in anti-science conspiracy theories (e.g., about vaccines, COVID-19, or climate change). These associations are typically explained by the exaggerated intergroup threat sensitivity of collective narcissists, analogous to the paranoia and threat sensitivity of individual narcissists. A conviction that one's group is unique and entitled to special treatment might also increase the need to deny or deflect from national failings by pointing a finger towards malevolent forces undermining the ingroup. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that a motivation to restore personal control strengthens the association between collective narcissism and outgroup conspiracy beliefs, echoing the role of control and dominance motives in individual narcissism. Finally, given studies linking collective narcissism to bullshit receptivity and low cognitive reflection, it is at least plausible that gullibility also plays a role. Thus, collective and individual narcissism could be linked to conspiracy beliefs via similar psychological processes. At the same time, while the effects of individual narcissism might be relatively stable across contexts, any effects of collective narcissism might depend on whether certain identities are important or salient to participants. More work is needed to examine these possibilities.

The info is here.

Some important information for mental health clinicians.

Understanding "longtermism": Why this suddenly influential philosophy is so toxic

Émile P. Torres

Salon.com

Originally posted 20 AUG 22

Here is an excerpt:

But what is longtermism? I have tried to answer that in other articles, and will continue to do so in future ones. A brief description here will have to suffice: Longtermism is a quasi-religious worldview, influenced by transhumanism and utilitarian ethics, which asserts that there could be so many digital people living in vast computer simulations millions or billions of years in the future that one of our most important moral obligations today is to take actions that ensure as many of these digital people come into existence as possible.

In practical terms, that means we must do whatever it takes to survive long enough to colonize space, convert planets into giant computer simulations and create unfathomable numbers of simulated beings. How many simulated beings could there be? According to Nick Bostrom —the Father of longtermism and director of the Future of Humanity Institute — there could be at least 1058 digital people in the future, or a 1 followed by 58 zeros. Others have put forward similar estimates, although as Bostrom wrote in 2003, "what matters … is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge."

In this article, however, I don't want to focus on how bizarre and dangerous this ideology is and could be. Instead, I think it would be useful to take a look at the community out of which longtermism emerged, focusing on the ideas of several individuals who helped shape the worldview that MacAskill and others are now vigorously promoting. The most obvious place to start is with Bostrom, whose publications in the early 2000s — such as his paper "Astronomical Waste," which was recently retweeted by Musk — planted the seeds that have grown into the kudzu vine crawling over the tech sector, world governments and major media outlets like the New York Times and TIME.

Nick Bostrom is, first of all, one of the most prominent transhumanists of the 21st century so far. Transhumanism is an ideology that sees humanity as a work in progress, as something that we can and should actively reengineer, using advanced technologies like brain implants, which could connect our brains to the Internet, and genetic engineering, which could enable us to create super-smart designer babies. We might also gain immortality through life-extension technologies, and indeed many transhumanists have signed up with Alcor to have their bodies (or just their heads and necks, which is cheaper) frozen after they die so that they can be revived later on, in a hypothetical future where that's possible. Bostrom himself wears a metal buckle around his ankle with instructions for Alcor to "take custody of his body and maintain it in a giant steel bottle flooded with liquid nitrogen" after he dies.

The article is here.