It’s hard to be a moral person. Technology is making it harder.

Sigal Samuel

vox.com

Originally posted 3 Aug 21

Here is an excerpt:

People who point out the dangers of digital tech are often met with a couple of common critiques. The first one goes like this: It’s not the tech companies’ fault. It’s users’ responsibility to manage their own intake. We need to stop being so paternalistic!

This would be a fair critique if there were symmetrical power between users and tech companies. But as the documentary The Social Dilemma illustrates, the companies understand us better than we understand them — or ourselves. They’ve got supercomputers testing precisely which colors, sounds, and other design elements are best at exploiting our psychological weaknesses (many of which we’re not even conscious of) in the name of holding our attention. Compared to their artificial intelligence, we’re all children, Harris says in the documentary. And children need protection.

Another critique suggests: Technology may have caused some problems — but it can also fix them. Why don’t we build tech that enhances moral attention?

“Thus far, much of the intervention in the digital sphere to enhance that has not worked out so well,” says Tenzin Priyadarshi, the director of the Dalai Lama Center for Ethics and Transformative Values at MIT.

It’s not for lack of trying. Priyadarshi and designers affiliated with the center have tried creating an app, 20 Day Stranger, that gives continuous updates on what another person is doing and feeling. You get to know where they are, but never find out who they are. The idea is that this anonymous yet intimate connection might make you more curious or empathetic toward the strangers you pass every day.

They also designed an app called Mitra. Inspired by Buddhist notions of a “virtuous friend” (kalyāṇa-mitra), it prompts you to identify your core values and track how much you acted in line with them each day. The goal is to heighten your self-awareness, transforming your mind into “a better friend and ally.”

I tried out this app, choosing family, kindness, and creativity as the three values I wanted to track. For a few days, it worked great. Being primed with a reminder that I value family gave me the extra nudge I needed to call my grandmother more often. But despite my initial excitement, I soon forgot all about the app.

The info is here.

Social Workers’ Perceptions of Their Peers’ Unprofessional Behavior

Gricus, M., & Wysiekierski, L. (2021).

Journal of Social Work. 

https://doi.org/10.1177/14680173211012576

Abstract

Summary

This article explores social workers’ perceptions of their colleagues’ professional mistakes, and the influences of those opinions. Vignettes in a factorial survey helped to determine whether certain variables related to the social worker or the situation influenced the perception of others’ professional errors and ethical violations. The changed variables included personal characteristics of the offending social worker such as perceived race, gender, and sexual orientation of the social worker, and characteristics of the situation, such as the length of time involved in unprofessional behavior.

Findings

Licensed social workers in six U.S. states (n = 5596) read vignettes based on real cases brought before licensing boards (n = 22,127) and assigned levels of seriousness and importance to discipline. The vignettes rated most highly involved perceived harm to a client or other vulnerable individual. Those on the lower end of seriousness and importance to discipline were those violations against the profession of social work. Analysis of changed variables indicated respondents’ ratings were influenced by several situational factors, but not by personal characteristics of the social worker involved in the vignette.

Applications

Our findings provide some insight into the decision-making factors important to social workers. The results may be helpful to licensing boards considering the contextual factors of unprofessional behavior and whether to discipline certain actions.

From the article:

The availability heuristic proposes that people make judgments based only on the information available at the time (Croskerry, 2002; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). The representativeness heuristic allows people to judge whether an example belongs to a given category (Bowes et al., 2020). In clinical settings, this heuristic can play out in diagnosing similar, but not identical, clinical presentations with the same diagnosis. The representativeness heuristic can also cause people to make judgments based on race and gender stereotypes (Bowes et al., 2020). Bisking et al. (2003) (as cited in Salvador, 2019) found that when individuals are involved in enacting sanctions on someone perceived to have engaged in misconduct, their decisions are influenced by characteristics of the offender such as gender. The anchoring and adjustment heuristic, also known as focalism or priming, reveals that people form judgments largely based on the first piece of information they receive and weigh it against all other information (Bowes et al., 2020). Focalism can help to explain why misinformation can be difficult to disprove.

The research is here.

As a doctor in a COVID unit, I’m running out of compassion for the unvaccinated. Get the shot

Anita Sircar

The Los Angeles Times

Originally published 17 Aug 21

Here is an excerpt:

The burden of this pandemic now rests on the shoulders of the unvaccinated. On those who are eligible to get vaccinated but choose not to, a decision they defend by declaring, “Vaccination is a deeply personal choice.” But perhaps never in history has anyone’s personal choice affected the world as a whole as it does right now. When hundreds and thousands of people continue to die — when the most vulnerable members of society, our children, cannot be vaccinated — the luxury of choice ceases to exist.

If you believe the pandemic is almost over and I can ride it out, without getting vaccinated, you could not be more wrong. This virus will find you.

(cut)

If you believe if I get infected I’ll just go to the hospital and get treated, there is no guarantee we can save your life, nor even a promise we’ll have a bed for you.

If you believe I’m pregnant and I don’t want the vaccine to affect me, my baby or my future fertility, it matters little if you’re not alive to see your newborn.

If you believe I won’t get my children vaccinated because I don’t know what the long-term effects will be, it matters little if they don’t live long enough for you to find out.

If you believe I’ll just let everyone else get vaccinated around me so I don’t have to, there are 93 million eligible, unvaccinated people in the “herd” who think the same way you do and are getting in the way of ending this pandemic.

If you believe vaccinated people are getting infected anyway, so what’s the point?, the vaccine was built to prevent hospitalizations and deaths from severe illness. Instead of fatal pneumonia, those with breakthrough infections have a short, bad cold, so the vaccine has already proved itself. The vaccinated are not dying of COVID-19.

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, has mutated countless times during this pandemic, adapting to survive. Stacked up against a human race that has resisted change every step of the way — including wearing masks, social distancing, quarantining and now refusing lifesaving vaccines — it is easy to see who will win this war if human behavior fails to change quickly.

The info is here.

Reducing the uncanny valley by dehumanizing humanoid robots

Yam, K.C., Bigman, Y., & Gray, K.

Computers in Human Behavior

Volume 125, December 2021, 106945

Abstract

Humanoid robots are often experienced as unnerving, a psychological phenomenon called the “uncanny valley.” Past work reveals that humanlike robots are unnerving in part because they are ascribed humanlike feelings. We leverage this past work to provide a potential solution to the uncanny valley. Three studies reveal that “dehumanizing” humanoid robots—stripping robots of their apparent capacity for feelings—can significantly reduce the uncanny valley. Participants high on trait dehumanization (Study 1) or experimentally instructed to dehumanize (Study 2) reported lower feelings of uncanniness when viewing a humanoid robot, an effect mediated by reduced perceptions of feelings. We replicate these effects in an experimental field study where hotel guests interacted with real humanoid robots in Japan, and reveal that dehumanization reduces the uncanny valley without decreasing customers’ satisfaction (Study 3).

Highlights

• The uncanny valley can be mitigated by a dehumanization manipulation.

• This effect is mediated by reduced experience perceptions.

• This simple manipulation can improve user experience of humanoid robots.

The research is here.

Deconstructing Moral Character Judgments

Hartman, R., Blakey, W., & Gray, K.

Current Opinions in Psychology

Abstract

People often make judgments of others' moral character-an inferred moral essence that presumably predicts moral behavior. We first define moral character and explore why people make character judgments before outlining three key elements that drive character judgments: behavior (good vs. bad, norm violations, and deliberation), mind (intentions, explanations, capacities), and identity (appearance, social groups, and warmth). We also provide a taxonomy of moral character that goes beyond simply good vs. evil. Drawing from the Theory of Dyadic Morality, we outline a two-dimensional triangular space of character judgments (valence and strength/agency), with three key corners-heroes, villains, and victims. Varieties of perceived moral character include saints and demons, strivers/sinners and opportunists, the non-moral, virtuous and culpable victims, and pure victims.

Conclusion 

It seems obvious that people make summary judgments of others’ moral character, but less obvious is how exactly that make those judgments. We suggest that people rely upon behavior, identity, and perceived mind when inferring the moral essence of others. We acknowledge that this list is certainly incomplete and will be expanded with future research. One key area of expansion explored here is the importance of perceived strength/agency in character judgments, which helps provide a taxonomy of character types. Whatever the exact varieties and drivers of moral character judgments, these judgments are clearly an important foundation of social life.

A pdf is here.

America’s long history of anti-science has dangerously undermined the COVID vaccine

Peter Hotez

The Dallas Morning News

Originally published 15 Aug 21

Here is an excerpt:

America’s full-throated enthusiasm for vaccines lasted until the early 2000s. The 1998 Lancet publication of a paper from Andrew Wakefield and his colleagues, which wrongly asserted that the measles virus in the MMR vaccine replicated in the colons of children to cause pervasive developmental disorder (autism), ushered in a new era of distrust for vaccine.

It also resulted in distrust for the U.S. Health and Human Services agencies promoting vaccinations. The early response from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was to dismiss growing American discontent for vaccines as a fringe element, until eventually in the 2010s anti-vaccine sentiment spread across the internet.

The anti-vaccine movement eventually adopted medical freedom and used it to gain strength and accelerate in size, internet presence and external funding. Rising out of the American West, anti-vaccine proponents insisted that only parents could make vaccine choices and they were prepared to resist government requirements for school entry or attendance.

In California, the notion of vaccine choice gained strength in the 2010s, leading to widespread philosophical exemptions to childhood MMR vaccines and other immunizations. Vaccine exemptions reached critical mass, ultimately culminating in a 2014–2015 measles epidemic in Orange County.

The outbreak prompted state government intervention through the introduction of California Senate Bill 277 that eliminated these exemptions and prevented further epidemics, but it also triggered aggressive opposition. Anti-vaccine health freedom groups harassed members of the Legislature and labeled prominent scientists as pharma shills. They touted pseudoscience, claiming that vaccines were toxic, or that natural immunity acquired from the illness was superior and more durable than vaccine-induced immunity.

Health freedom then expanded through newly established anti-vaccine political action committees in Texas and Oklahoma in the Southwest, Oregon in the Pacific Northwest, and Michigan and Ohio in the Midwest, while additional anti-vaccine organizations formed in almost every state.

These groups lobbied state legislatures to promote or protect vaccine exemptions, while working to cloak or obscure classroom or schoolwide disclosures of vaccine exemptions. They also introduced menacing consent forms to portray vaccines as harmful or toxic.

The Texans for Vaccine Choice PAC formed in 2015, helping to accelerate personal belief immunization exemptions to a point where today approximately 72,000 Texas schoolchildren miss vaccines required for school entry and attendance.

The info is here.

The relational logic of moral inference

Crockett, M., Everett, J. A. C., Gill, M., & Siegel, J. 

(2021, July 9). https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/82c6y

Abstract

How do we make inferences about the moral character of others? Here we review recent work on the cognitive mechanisms of moral inference and impression updating. We show that moral inference follows basic principles of Bayesian inference, but also departs from the standard Bayesian model in ways that may facilitate the maintenance of social relationships. Moral inference is not only sensitive to whether people make moral decisions, but also to features of decisions that reveal their suitability as a relational partner. Together these findings suggest that moral inference follows a relational logic: people form and update moral impressions in ways that are responsive to the demands of ongoing social relationships and particular social roles. We discuss implications of these findings for theories of moral cognition and identify new directions for research on human morality and person perception.

Summary

There is growing evidence that people infer moral character from behaviors that are not explicitly moral. The data so far suggest that people who are patient, hard-working, tolerant of ambiguity, risk-averse, and actively open-minded are seen as more moral and trustworthy. While at first blush this collection of preferences may seem arbitrary, considering moral inference from a relational perspective reveals a coherent logic. All of these preferences are correlated with cooperative behavior, and comprise traits that are desirable for long-term relationship partners. Reaping the benefits of long-term relationships requires patience and a tolerance for ambiguity: sometime people make mistakes despite good intentions. Erring on the side of caution and actively seeking evidence to inform decision-making in social situations not only helps prevent harmful outcomes (Kappes et al., 2019), but also signals respect: social life is fraught with uncertainty (FeldmanHall & Shenhav, 2019; Kappes et al., 2019), and assuming we know what’s best for another person can have bad consequences, even when our intentions are good.  If evidence continues to suggest that certain types of non-moral preferences are preferred in social partners, partner choice mechanisms may explain the prevalence of those preferences in the broader population.

The research is here.

Would I Give Aducanumab to My Mother?

Dena S. Davis

The Hastings Center

Originally published 11 June 21

Here is an excerpt:

First, it is not at all clear that the drug works, in terms of affecting cognition and slowing decline. As Jason Karlawish explains in an incisive piece in STAT, crucial scientific steps were missed, and the current data are inconclusive and contradictory. 

Side effects include possible brain swelling and bleeds (which appear to be severe in about 6% of patients), headache, falls, diarrhea, and what Biogen describes as “confusion/delirium/altered mental status/disorientation.”  Wait a minute!  I thought the reason to take this drug was that one already had altered mental status and confusion.

Before someone is even considered eligible for aducanumab, they must take a PET scan to ascertain that they have elevated levels of amyloid and then an MRI to make sure they don’t already have brain swelling. MRIs have to be repeated regularly while people are on the drug. I know perfectly competent adults who are freaked out by MRI’s.  How do you explain this to someone with dementia?  Or do you sedate them, thus adding to the risk? Furthermore, the drug itself is not a pill, but a monthly infusion. 

Put that all together, and it just doesn’t add up. How would my mother’s life change for the better? There is little evidence of the drug’s efficacy. Meanwhile, her peaceful life in her rural home with her dedicated caregiver would now be punctuated by trips to the hospital for MRI’s, and monthly struggles to start infusions in her 90-year-old body, with its tiny veins and paper-thin skin. Aducanumab is apparently best suited to people in the early stages of Alzheimer’s, but even in the earliest stage my mother refused to accept that she had a problem. I cannot imagine successfully explaining that we were taking these measures in the faint hope of combatting a problem she insisted she didn’t have. And in the absence of an explanation she could understand, surely the frequent hospital trips would feel to her like unpleasant, even scary, invasions.

The entire info is here.

A simple definition of ‘intentionally’

Quillien, T., & German, T. C.

Cognition

Volume 214, September 2021, 104806

Abstract

Cognitive scientists have been debating how the folk concept of intentional action works. We suggest a simple account: people consider that an agent did X intentionally to the extent that X was causally dependent on how much the agent wanted X to happen (or not to happen). Combined with recent models of human causal cognition, this definition provides a good account of the way people use the concept of intentional action, and offers natural explanations for puzzling phenomena such as the side-effect effect. We provide empirical support for our theory, in studies where we show that people's causation and intentionality judgments track each other closely, in everyday situations as well as in scenarios with unusual causal structures. Study 5 additionally shows that the effect of norm violations on intentionality judgments depends on the causal structure of the situation, in a way uniquely predicted by our theory. Taken together, these results suggest that the folk concept of intentional action has been difficult to define because it is made of cognitive building blocks, such as our intuitive concept of causation, whose logic cognitive scientists are just starting to understand.

From the end

People can use the word “intentionally” in very strange ways. Our intuitions about whether something is intentional are swayed by moral considerations, are pulled one way or another depending on the amount

of control an agent exerts, and are influenced by how circuitous the causal chain between the agent and the outcome is. Intentionality requires a relevant belief, but the latter can be present in very small doses.

Norm-violating actions are judged as more intentional than norm-conforming actions – except when they are judged as less intentional.

These seemingly erratic intuitions can be anxiety-inducing. One might conclude that our commonsense psychology is fundamentally moralistic; that linguistic meaning is hopelessly entangled in its context;

or that motivational and pragmatic factors constantly warp our intuitions about the proper extension of words.

We think such anxiety might be misplaced. Instead, we view the strangeness of “intentionally” as emerging naturally from the core structure of the concept. The way people use the concept of intentional

action offers a fascinating window on some of the building blocks that make up human thought: it lets us glimpse into our implicit causal model of the mind, and the algorithms with which we assign causes to events.

A pdf is here.