The Knobe Effect From the Perspective of Normative Orders

Waleszczyński,A.,Obidziński,M. & Rejewska, J.

(2018). Studia Humana,7(4) 9-15. 

https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2018-0019

Abstract

The characteristic asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality in causing side effects, known as the Knobe effect, is considered to be a stable model of human cognition. This article looks at whether the way of thinking and analysing one scenario may affect the other and whether the mutual relationship between the ways in which both scenarios are analysed may affect the stability of the Knobe effect. The theoretical analyses and empirical studies performed are based on a distinction between moral and non-moral normativity possibly affecting the judgments passed in both scenarios. Therefore, an essential role in judgments about the intentionality of causing a side effect could be played by normative competences responsible for distinguishing between normative orders. 

From the Summary

As to the question asked at the onset of this article, namely, whether the way of thinking about the intentionality of causing a side effect in morally negative situations affects the way of thinking about the intentionality of causing a side effect in morally positive situations, or vice versa, the answer could be as follows. It is very likely that the way of thinking and analysing each of the scenarios depends on the normative order from the perspective of which each particular scenario or sequence of scenarios is considered. At the same time, the results suggest that it is moral normativity that decides the stability of the Knobe effect. Nevertheless, more in-depth empirical and theoretical studies are required in order to analyse the problems discussed in this article more thoroughly. 

A pdf of the research is here.

My brief explanation:

The Knobe Effect is a phenomenon in experimental philosophy where people are more likely to ascribe intentionality to an action if it has a harmful side effect that the agent could have foreseen, even if the agent did not intend the side effect. This effect is important to psychologists because it sheds light on how people understand intentionality, which is a central concept in psychology.

The Knobe Effect is also important to psychologists because it has implications for our understanding of moral judgment. For example, if people are more likely to blame an agent for a harmful side effect that the agent could have foreseen, even if the agent did not intend the side effect, then this suggests that people may be using moral considerations to inform their judgments of intentionality.

These asymmetrical attributions may be most helpful when working with high conflict couples who interpret harmful messages as intentional, and may minimize helpful and supportive messages (because these are expected).

A simple definition of ‘intentionally’

Quillien, T., & German, T. C.

Cognition

Volume 214, September 2021, 104806

Abstract

Cognitive scientists have been debating how the folk concept of intentional action works. We suggest a simple account: people consider that an agent did X intentionally to the extent that X was causally dependent on how much the agent wanted X to happen (or not to happen). Combined with recent models of human causal cognition, this definition provides a good account of the way people use the concept of intentional action, and offers natural explanations for puzzling phenomena such as the side-effect effect. We provide empirical support for our theory, in studies where we show that people's causation and intentionality judgments track each other closely, in everyday situations as well as in scenarios with unusual causal structures. Study 5 additionally shows that the effect of norm violations on intentionality judgments depends on the causal structure of the situation, in a way uniquely predicted by our theory. Taken together, these results suggest that the folk concept of intentional action has been difficult to define because it is made of cognitive building blocks, such as our intuitive concept of causation, whose logic cognitive scientists are just starting to understand.

From the end

People can use the word “intentionally” in very strange ways. Our intuitions about whether something is intentional are swayed by moral considerations, are pulled one way or another depending on the amount

of control an agent exerts, and are influenced by how circuitous the causal chain between the agent and the outcome is. Intentionality requires a relevant belief, but the latter can be present in very small doses.

Norm-violating actions are judged as more intentional than norm-conforming actions – except when they are judged as less intentional.

These seemingly erratic intuitions can be anxiety-inducing. One might conclude that our commonsense psychology is fundamentally moralistic; that linguistic meaning is hopelessly entangled in its context;

or that motivational and pragmatic factors constantly warp our intuitions about the proper extension of words.

We think such anxiety might be misplaced. Instead, we view the strangeness of “intentionally” as emerging naturally from the core structure of the concept. The way people use the concept of intentional

action offers a fascinating window on some of the building blocks that make up human thought: it lets us glimpse into our implicit causal model of the mind, and the algorithms with which we assign causes to events.

A pdf is here.